Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. I’m Robin Niblett, Director of the Institute. Welcome to all of our members, guests and to those joining us as well through the livestream that we’re doing today of this event. And I’m really thrilled to welcome back to Chatham House the Rt. Hon. Alistair Burt MP, now has a double role and doubly relevant for Chatham House, as well as obviously, for the subject we’re discussing today, as a Minister of State at the FCO for Middle East and North Africa and Minister of State at the Department for International Development. And this puts him really, right at the core of the topic that we’re discussing today, and with the paper that’s being released on Deal Making and Peace building: A New Approach to Reducing Conflict. And I will just, as you are, many of you, most of you here, members of Chatham House, just note that this is a critical area and one that my colleagues, in particular in the Middle East and North Africa Programme, also our Asia Programme, have been focused on for some time. In fact, I remember when the Yemen conflict first broke out, prior to the current conflict when the Civil War broke out, we were doing these huge mapping exercises of all the different tribal groups and that whole concept of the bargaining that goes on behind trying to manage long-term conflict, which is reflected in a number of reports we’ve released, over the last six months, on Libya, on Iraq, on Syria and on Yemen, really, I think, just point to the complexity of trying to resolve, prevent and overcome the types of intractable conflicts that are, sadly, becoming a defining feature of our time and which really should not remain defining features of our time.
So, I’m going to turn it over, in a minute, to Alistair Burt. We’ll hear his remarks. We’ll take some questions and have a good discussion, I hope. As I mentioned, Alistair now has this dual role, a position he’s held for almost exactly one year. I think yesterday might have been your anniversary, for the position. But he has – first joined Parliament, actually, back in 1983, but has held his position as Conservative MP for North East Bedfordshire, since 2001 and over his Parliamentary career, has held a number of Parliamentary Under Secretary positions and Ministerial positions, most recently as a Minister of State in the Department of Health and, prior to that, a period where we got to work really quite closely together, when he was Parliamentary Under Secretary of State at the FCO, again, working very importantly in a critical period on the Middle East from 2010 to 13. So, Alistair, welcome back to Chatham House. Very much looking forward to your remarks and, even more so, I think, as well, to the conversation we’ll have afterwards. Over to you.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Thank you very much. Thank you, Robin, very much. It’s a great pleasure to be back here. Normally, the introduction is that Alistair Burt has had a long and varied career in Parliament, and it shows. So, I’ll try and keep up the energy levels. It was, in fact, 35 years ago, this last Thursday, that I was first elected to Parliament as a Conservative Member of Parliament in 1983. So, what I don’t know about conflict is anybody’s guess, though we haven’t quite resolved everything. I am looking forward to applying some of the principles that the unit has produced to current political issues within the Conservative Party, and others, and seeing how it works out. Please don’t tell anyone, “Oh dear, it’s being livestreamed.” Right, okay.
Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to do this. This is a really interesting paper, which I’ll introduce. I found it challenging, indeed, in the summary, the second point, these findings challenge some of the key approaches deployed by HMG, which is a coded way of adding to the normal foreign policy rule of thumb, it’s all our fault anyway. But having been around for a while, I did find it, and I do find it, important that we’re given academic research that looks very intently at some of the things the Politicians do, because we don’t get it all right and if we don’t learn lessons, we’re in difficulties, and I got that sense that that was the work that had been commissioned. It’s a tool. This is not policy that I’m coming out with, it’s a tool that’s adaptable to situations. But, as you’ll find from both what I say, the conversation and your reading of the document, you will see it’s important, but I’m very pleased to get the chance to talk about it. But let me go into the prepared remarks, if I may.
Robin, it’s an honour to be here with you at Chatham House. This institution has a prestigious history, created in the wake of the Great War, when those coming out of that terrible conflict, sought ways to better understand international affairs and prevent such wars happening again. It is, therefore, the ideal place to present the Government’s latest thinking on conflict, stabilisation and long-term stability. When my team set about working on this report I asked them to frame it as an answer to some key questions. First, how can we get better at ending violence and building peace? Secondly, how do we deal with the fact that in order to end violence and build peace, we may have to talk to the bad guys and what terms do we deal with them? And, thirdly, once the warring parties have been persuaded to put down their arms, how do we stop them from picking them up again?
Before tackling those questions, let me set out some of the evolving challenges that led us to ask them. As we look out about – across parts of the Middle East, and North Africa in particular, one thing seems clear, conflicts have become more complex and more intractable. Half the world’s current conflicts have lasted for more than 20 years and getting on for all – for two thirds of all armed conflicts that ended in the early 2000s had relapsed within five years. We’ve seen the rise of militant nationalism, sectarianism and extremism. The fragmentation of insurgent forces and the resurgence of autocrats, weak states, extremist insurgents and the growth of transnational organised crime have driven cycles of violence.
Grievance builds up, political violence mutates into criminal violence, powerful war economies emerge and tensions and flashpoints become harder to contain and manage. I’ve seen evidence of all these things in my work in Libya, in Yemen, in Syria, in Iraq. I’ve also seen the enormous cost, human cost, of conflict and instability, lives lost, property destroyed, whole communities displaced and suffering appalling trauma. All of this fuels grievances and drives further cycles of violence. We felt the impact, here in the United Kingdom, as these cycles of conflict and violence, thousands of miles away, provide the seedbed for terrorism and illegal migration on European soil.
Too often, the horrors of today’s conflicts are compounded and prolonged by states who work to stall and stymie the rules-based international system and by non-state actors who choose to ignore it. We see that in Syria where Assad and the militants of the, so-called, Islamic states are both acting in open defiance of the rules designed to protect us all. And UN led efforts to find a political solution to the conflict have been repeatedly blocked at, in all places, the UN Security Council. We have to acknowledge that despite the best efforts of the vast majority of UN member states, European Union and others, the rules-based international system is being tested and, in many cases, constrained. The answer is not to give up and walk away, but to stand firm, join hands with likeminded partners and actually strengthen the international rules that have kept us safe for over 70 years and remind people of just why they came into place, in the first instance.
I strongly believe that the UK, working with our partners and guided by these rules and norms, can help turn many of today’s conflicts around. I reject the notion that we can or should simply step away because the conflicts are too entrenched, too complicated or nothing to do with us. The cost of non-intervention are too great. The scale of suffering in Syria and Iraq is testament to the fact that such conflict should not be left to continue unabated and, as I’ve seen first hand just a few weeks ago, the destruction and loss of life in places like Mosul has been appalling. Well meaning members of the international community will always have a crucial role to play in bringing about peace through our diplomacy, our development support and, in some cases, the judicious use of military force. The UK’s commitment, the UK Government’s commitment to nurturing peace and stability is well known. It runs through our National Security Strategy and our Foreign Office priorities and it guides our aid strategy. DFID is committed to spending half of its annual budget in fragile states in a way that genuinely tackles the underlying drivers of instability.
As we constantly strive to improve and refine our approach, we’ve not shied away from honest self- reflection. We’ve sought to acknowledge and understand where our approach has not always worked and where it’s faced major challenges, whether in Yemen, Syria or Libya, or further back in Afghanistan. The Iraq enquiry highlighted the need to better understand the consequences of our interventions before we embarked on them. It stressed that we needed to work more effectively across Government, as a single team, and to be realistic about our timescales and ambitions. Looking ahead, as we reflect on those difficult lessons, I think there is a need to be more proactive, if we’re to make a real difference. As part of that process, I tasked officials that undertake the major research project that I’m launching here today. This work augments the findings of DFID’s building stability framework, which I also want to highlight. Our stabilisation unit, to which I’m indebted for this work, analysed how interventions, by the UK and other international actors, have and have not helped to reduce violence and set the conditions for more sustainable transitions out of conflict.
Their work sought to answer two of the questions I began with: how do we end violence and prevent violence from recurring? And how do we deal with the often unsavoury forces and individuals that sustain them? It has identified lessons from 21 conflicts, past and present, spanning the globe from Middle East to Latin America and from Africa to Southeast Asia. Our central finding may appear too obvious for fanfare, but I disagree. It’s all the more worthy of note because it’s been repeatedly underestimated in the past. In short, our central finding is this, that understanding conflict and ending violence requires a total focus on the politics and the powerholders at play.
All too often, in the past we’ve, shied away from engaging with individuals or groups, that our moral or political judgement’s deemed unpalatable or, alternatively, we’ve sought to apply overly formal and technical solutions to what are, essentially, political problems. We need to be honest with ourselves. Our disdain, however well founded, will not persuade them to put down their guns or put away their bombs and our proposed solutions will fail if they do not account for the realities of who holds the power and resources on the ground.
For example, in Sudan in 2005, the so-called Comprehensive Peace Agreement excluded many South Sudanese soldiers and civilians, leading to its collapse. In Iraq, Libya or Afghanistan, when we’ve embarked on ambitious state and institution building before the power struggle has been resolved, we’ve seen progress reversed and gains undone. Only by better understanding the motivations and power bases of those calling the shots, and dealing with those realities as our priority, can we hope to move towards violence reduction. We need to fully factor in the political dynamics at a local, national, regional and international level and understand how they play into each other.
Of course, building peace in this way means we will face many more uncomfortable questions and choices. There will be times we have to hold our nose and support dialogue with those who oppose our values or who may have committed war crimes. Let me be clear, supporting dialogue must not imply recognition or support of those who are party to views and values we abhor. We may have to be more ready to recognise that the very existence of armed groups reflects genuine grievances felt by certain communities and is an expression of their sense of political and social exclusion, whether real or imagined. This will require a change in mindset for many of us: Politicians, activists, academics and the media. As Hillary Clinton once said, “You don’t make peace with your friends.”
I don’t want to overstate a shift in our approach, rather, I want to make the case that the international community should apply the lessons of our previous successes more consistently. There are plenty of examples of international interventions that have successfully balanced the political and military realities on the ground. Close to home, in Northern Ireland, we showed that it was possible to accommodate the interests of diametrically opposed armed groups in a political process that has brought two decades of peace. And further afield, in Afghanistan, we’ve supported initiatives to engage with the Taliban. We welcome President Ghani’s declaration of a ceasefire last week, a bold move I very much welcome. I was pleased to see the Taliban had agreed to the cessation in hostilities, over the latter part of Eid, and I hope this provides an opportunity for real confidence building measures and dialogue.
In the Philippines, through the unique model of the International Contact Group, we supported negotiations between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Government and in Liberia, we saw how Deft international engagement put pressure on former leader, Charles Taylor, and helped bring peace to Sierra Leone. Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, where our stabilisation work has had mixed results, our diplomacy has, from time-to-time, been able, positively, to shape local level elite politics and reduce violence.
These experiences show that it’s possible to add momentum to highly political deal-making between warring parties. We have the diplomatic assets, expertise and influence to build trust. We have political and economic levers to help bring parties to the table and make deals stick. We have military and peacekeeping assets at our disposal to provide security guarantees, so parties can come to the negotiating table when they wouldn’t otherwise. What we sometimes lack is the political will to attempt the most uncomfortable, but pragmatic, solutions. But getting the sequencing right is also vital.
Part of doing that successfully is about acknowledging when the time has not yet come for a political breakthrough. Standing back and allowing for deals to emerge slowly is sometimes more predictive than intervening, however frustrating it might be for Politicians involved. Such an approach brings real challenges and trade-offs. How should we respond to the legitimate aspirations of those who seek peaceful change and reform? Aspirations that are based on values with which we have overwhelming sympathy, but which are met with violence and repression, as happened in Syria in 2011. How do we best prevent violence or shorten conflict in these circumstances? We have to get better at recognising that all good things do not come together at the same time. If we force state building and institutional reform before political agreement has been forged, then there’s a high risk we’ll be setting ourselves up for failure.
In Libya, in 2012, when I was the Minister responsible for the Middle East and North Africa at the time, working with David Cameron and William Hague. We rushed to build capacity to enable the new Government to govern, but it was all done in the absence of a political settlement, which reflected both the interests of the warring elite and aspirations of the Libyan population. We should have prioritised the politics over technocratic state building. We also have to acknowledge that there will be times when our interests will not be aligned, for example, the tension between our counterterrorism priorities and supporting an inclusive political process with the Taliban and Afghanistan has made progress on the latter really challenging. So, we need to ruthlessly prioritise our efforts, recognise the trade-offs and have an appropriate sequenced strategy of engagement.
Finally, let me turn to my final question, how do we prevent conflicts from reigniting? We’ve seen, in Bosnia and Libya, how much investment is required to bring about a sustainable peace and, in both countries, despite all our engagement, there is still much work to do. With that in mind, my fellow Ministers tasked DFID teams to develop the Building Stability Framework to identify what determines long-term stability. This allows us to ensure that we design and implement our development programmes appropriately.
We’ve identified five key factors for stability: fair power structures, inclusive economic development, mechanisms for ongoing conflict resolution, effective and legitimate institutions and supportive regional environments. The Stability Framework recognises that development results are not, alone, enough to reduce instability and violence. The framework sets out how we need to help countries and communities to manage change peacefully. Building stability is a political process. Every decision we make has to be grounded in an understanding of how power is distributed and used. Development, alone, cannot afford to be framed in apolitical, technical terms, otherwise it will be done in silos and we’ll miss the wider picture. We’re putting this framework into action in countries across the world and ensuring that political realities are not merely skimmed over. We believe it’s having a positive impact from Sudan to Somalia, from Lebanon to Kenya and from Jordan to Nepal.
And, finally, we must not overlook the importance of increasingly involving women in peace building, ‘cause they’re rarely involved in causing the conflict in the first place. The evidence is clear that when women are able to participate in a peace process, there’s a greater chance of reaching agreement and, crucially, of that agreement being sustained. In Colombia, women’s groups spearheaded a campaign demanding a vote to approve the peace deals. In Northern Ireland, as many of us remember, women, from across the political spectrum, worked together to gain seats around the main negotiating table. We recognise that removing barriers to women’s participation in peace processes is as important as promoting their opportunities to engage. We’re working towards both these goals through our National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.
Let me conclude. I come back to the stark challenges we face, as we look across the seemingly intractable conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Libya and beyond. I believe we have a moral obligation to do what we can to reduce their terrible consequences. But we have a more hard-headed interest in doing so too, as we seek to minimise the dangers that poverty, exclusion and radicalisation pose to global stability and our own national security. There’s nothing new in that, but we do need to keep reviewing our approach, in light of experience, and that is what this report seeks to do. It’s an expression of the UK’s continuing commitment to work in the interests of our citizens, our neighbours, and the rest of the world to bring peace, stability and prosperity for all. So, I commend the report to you. I’m happy to discuss questions. I have some of the report’s authors with me for the questions that are too difficult for a Minister to answer, and I’m happy to go wider than the issues of the paper, if you want to talk about conflict in the region and other solutions more widely. Thank you very much for listening [applause].
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much indeed, Alistair, for laying out a very thoughtful set of remarks and for providing the context as well, which, as you noted, is one that is not particularly positive and one in which a report of this sort ends up being needed. And I would notice this, as you, yourself, said, this report’s been produced by the Stabilisation Unit that, as you said, we’ve got a number of folks here we may turn to, if you need to, for some of the questions, but we’ve got the Director, Mark Bryson-Richardson, with us as well, who’s, I think, been, as I was looking earlier through his list of countries, where he’s had to be posted, Libya, Kabul, Mogadishu, it matches, I think, some of the travels that you’ve had to do as well, Alistair, in your travels through your Ministerial career. But I think you’ve got a great set of experiences, sadly, from which to be able to draw the conceptual structure that this paper pulls together and, you know, if madness is repeating the same things over and over again, obviously, we want to be able to do things differently. And in that context if I can ask a first question and take the prerogative of the Chair, you made a very interesting remark, well, a well known remark, as you said Hillary Clinton and others have said it before, you’ve got to work with the bad people often, or people who are committing elements that democratic societies find particularly difficult to work with, but you also said sometimes, you have to let things play out and take their time. And, I suppose a, sort of, conceptual question I would ask you first is that sometimes do you need to let conflicts play out, despite the violence that is taking place, so that it gets to a position where, when a country like the United Kingdom, with or without its allies, wants to be able to apply pressure, you have pressure that can be applied to a result rather than simply playing on the margins? And I’ll just put one conflict on your docket on this one, and it’s something you would have some experience on, Yemen.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Where, right now, it is at that point where there’s at least a push to try to change the balance of power, such that when that negotiation happens, if it does, it’s done from a different position to the one that we had even two or three months ago. So, how does a country like the UK look at that? The increased conflict, create a humanitarian crisis, DFID perspective bad. You know, on the other hand, to your point here in the thesis, that maybe you need a better balance of forces to negotiate, from FCO perspective, may be necessary. Just talk us through how, from your paper’s perspective maybe, you see this moment.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Okay, firstly, thank you, Robin, for the question and, again, thank you all, your Excellencies and others, for such a large attendance, it’s really appreciated. I will go as wide as I can in answer to some of these questions. I’m conscious it’s on the record but, even so, I hope I can be, you know, slightly open with some of the responses. Clearly, conflict has many different stages. I think the United Kingdom will always have a commitment that before a conflict begins, we’re doing the, sort of, things that will help reduce the risk of conflict starting in the first place, and I think to have any other position would be wrong and immoral. Clearly, our determination is to seek, in all circumstances, to save lives and, in doing so, to promote the, sort of, conditions in which we believe lives are most likely to be saved in areas of potential conflict. And it comes down to some of the things not necessarily mentioned through the paper, but are available in other places, you know, basic tolerance, good governance, the ability to, in some way, connect with a population.
As we know very well, it won’t always be through a Westminster model. I think we’re pretty clear there isn’t just one model of governance that gives a sense of consent and acceptance by those who are governed and those who govern. But unless those basics are there, in some way, you’ve got a risk of conflict, and I think the United Kingdom will always be involved, at whatever stage, in urging parties to a potential conflict or in situations of tension that arise, to look for solutions that are likely to prevent violence and therefore, stop conflict in the first place.
Then conflicts will begin and what do the responsibilities become? Again, we go back to something mentioned in the paper and I mentioned, this is the worries and the queries now about international norms and international organisations that promote peace and structures that are designed to prevent, i.e., when the UN Security Council agrees a resolution on a ceasefire it ought to be respected and, if it isn’t, then you wonder what the point is. And if you look at the UN resolutions in relation to Syria recently and when the conflict in Douma was at its height and UN resolution was passed, calling for humanitarian access, a ceasefire, etc., it simply wasn’t adhered to. And one of the points we all have to make and be very conscious of is, if these international norms are simply disregarded, then what protection do we have? If we go back to simply might is right, then something is wrong and we’ve not learned the lessons that were built on the painful conflicts of the 20th Century. But then, time will roll on and assuming the reality is that conflict still goes on, what do we do?
Now, the Yemen example is actually a very good and highly pertinent one. It’s clearly one on which I’m being challenged and the Government is being challenged as we speak. What do you do in these circumstances? It would appear that the coalition acting in Yemen, on behalf of a Government challenged by insurgency, has taken a view that the recapture of Hodeida and the ousting of the Houthi, in these circumstances, is likely to bring a more rapid conclusion of the conflict than not doing. They take the view, I think, that the Houthi, in control of the port, gives them a revenue stream, gives them the potential for weapons to come in and, all of which, concentrates their control over areas of Yemen, which have suffered greatly under that control from lack of humanitarian access, the inability to get in fuel, water and food, denying vaccinations, whatever it may be. And the coalition has come to a conclusion that it would be better to risk the conflicts into Hodeida with the risks of displacement and deaths and wounded than leaving things be.
The United Kingdom has spent its time, in the last few months and few weeks, seeking to discourage an attack on Hodeida, I’m very clear. We looked at the possibilities. We are not a party to the conflict. We’re not a party to the thinking of the coalition or anything like that, but it appeared, to us, our role ought to be to say the attack on Hodeida has many difficult consequences and if it goes wrong, these are the things that will happen. Accordingly, keep working with the UN Special Envoy, keep working on the possibility of negotiations, keep all those channels open. And I think that was the right thing for the United Kingdom to do, that in a situation where there is a dispute mechanism available, even though it’s been difficult, where the UN is engaged, supported. But now we have, today, and action has started, what do you do? I don’t think the United Kingdom is in a position to say to the coalition, “You must immediately stop this.” I think the view we take is we understand the reasons behind this. We’ve said our piece. Now we concentrate on the humanitarian aspects. We are in touch with the coalition in relation to that and what could be done to safeguard the population, and we think that’s the right thing to do.
But in any available conflict, what you do, when push comes to shove and these decisions are taken, I think the moral position for the United Kingdom must be, as often as possible, to work for a peaceful negotiated solution, but there will be moments at which that will not be practicable. And I remember, in Jonathan Powell’s book, he talks about two weapons that states have: fighting and talking, and I also mentioned, sort of, judicious use of force in my remarks. So, there are some occasions in which there is a calculation at which a conflict might bring a wider conflict to an end more quickly. These will always be a matter of judgements and then there are always enquiries afterwards to find out whether you were right or wrong.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So your future. Right, let me take some questions. I’ve seen a few hands go up already, so I’m going to take them as I go. The gentleman had his hand up almost before I’d finished, at the back, and I’m going to come down to the front, then, to the lady here. I’ll get to your …
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Oh no.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Oh well, I don’t know. You see, I don’t know this person, you do already?
Chris Doyle
Thank you. Thank you very much. Chris…
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
We know each other very well.
Chris Doyle
Chris Doyle from the Council for Arab-British Understanding. Thank you very much, Alistair, and it’s great that a report like this is being done because I think that, with all the crisis going on, it really is necessary to think, you know, deeply about the long-term implications. Two very quick questions, one, you talked about having to talk with one’s enemies and even the people one abhors. Some people might argue, Jonathan Powell, even, as well, that that perhaps should include Hamas. Is that a regret there that, perhaps, at certain points, that more negotiations couldn’t have happened with Hamas? And, secondly, what role do you see war economies playing in the way in which conflicts are sustained? We’ve seen this in Syria and Yemen, and the way in which perhaps sometimes sanctions and other economic actions that the international community have taken may have actually even exacerbated the war economies.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Yeah, two great questions, but I wouldn’t expect anything less, you know the region well and care about it hugely. The question about Hamas is really very interesting. The United Kingdom’s position is clear, the Government position is clear, my position is clear, and don’t let me have any doubt about it, we do not have any contact with Hamas. But, he said, there’s no doubt that channels exist to Hamas for many others: European Governments, United States, Israel. Often, of course, as we all know, these are back channels. These are through security intelligence agencies, type two, Track Two conversations.
Now, I think that these are all valuable mechanisms that can be deployed without direct engagement. I think Jonathan Powell’s point is that there’s maybe a time for more direct engagement more early and that’s what he discussed, particularly in the context of the IRA. I also remember a quote from David Petraeus in Iraq saying, “I think we took too long to talk to those who had American blood on their hands.” Now, that’s a really powerful statement from someone who has an engagement with conflict in a very different sense to mine, and if someone like David Petraeus can say it, it should make you think.
I was in Israel and the region just last week, as you’re aware, Chris, and I picked up a copy of Haaretz, because I like Haaretz, and the front page lead was a senior IDF spokesman saying, “It’s time to talk to Hamas.” And I think what it tells us is, the truth of what various – so many parties have said, at some stage there is a conversation to be had, it’s a question of timing. And I think what Jonathan Powell’s work does, and what the work of Gabrielle Rifkind, in her book, with the other author she shared it with, The Fog of Peace, if you’re going to get into the minds of the individual on the other side and understand them, and the older I get and the longer I get in politics, the more I think that’s really important because we’re too binary. We need to find the middle space and we need to find the compromises, then I think you start to look earlier at some of the discussions you otherwise put off. So, that’s the first one.
Your second, war economies. This is another real dilemma. If your determination, as a state or as a group of allies or the United Nations, is to do anything but conflict, if you, therefore, put on the economic sanctions and find that an economy develops, which can cope with this, the war keeps going. When I’m talking to groups in my constituency and around the country and we talk, say, about Yemen or Syria and I tell them, “You do understand that some people are profiting through war, don’t you? You do understand there are people out there who are keeping the war going because it makes money for them and they are salting this money away, either in international bank accounts, if they’re in Government or other places, and that’s one of the reasons we can’t get peace.” And most British people look at you absolutely horrified, because it’s not there instinct, they can barely believe that people are willing to go on killing others because, somehow, it makes them some money. And the difficulty then is, what do you do in those circumstances? Do you say, frankly, the best answer is to get this sorted quickly? And you then turn to the judicious use of force, in order to get something done quickly, and you would then face all the hostility and opprobrium for such a decision. I think what you’re pointing out is a dilemma to which there is no simple answer and, accordingly, all the work you do to try and prevent the circumstances coming along in the first place are pertinent.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I think we’re seeing the, at least the synopsis of the paper that I saw, at least understanding the war economy can give you a much better sense of where the power balances are amongst the groups involved that you would have to negotiate with, you’re then able to potentially, apply leverage in the right places and develop the right strategy, so…
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
The exploitation of the situation in Yemen by the Houthis, of course, is a major cause of the conflict continuing and has put the coalition in a position where this could go on for ages, so they have decided that they need to do something different.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Right, first the lady, first, here, first. I’ll bring everyone in, hopefully. But the lady with the red top who had her hand up first, and I’ve seen other’s hands go up as well, yeah.
Cinzia De Santis
Cinzia De Santis from a Charity, Healing Venezuela. I know the focus is Middle East, but you’ve mentioned and showed the picture of Columbia, have you ever been involved or are you planning to be involved with the unpleasant people round in Venezuela? Because we definitely need a lot of help there.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Personally, Madam, no, I’m not, in any way, a South American expert. I don’t know if any of my colleagues, who’ve been involved, want to venture a comment about that. But I have specialised in the Middle East for the past decade, so I don’t want to go down the wrong track, Mark?
Mark Bryson-Richardson
I’m afraid to say – Mark Bryson-Richardson.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Microphone, we need to use a microphone otherwise, the live feed won’t get it out.
Mark Bryson-Richardson
So, I’m afraid I also, as Robin alluded to, am actually more of a Middle East/Africa expert, but I think the – I draw it back to the key tenets of the, sort of, the process that we’re trying to describe here, about understanding the context and we hope it’s a framework that applies to other actors, as well as ourselves, we look to learn from it, but we’re hoping others will look at this. So, rather than making it about individuals, because I don’t know the context well enough, I do say I think the framework suggests we need to understand the dynamics, the actors involved, and if we want to reach to a long-term solution, we’ve got to work out how to bring all of those into the process. How we get there and the speed we get there, I think, is the key point, the Minister just spoke about sequencing, so that doesn’t mean, as we were just talking now, about diving in straightaway, but it does mean trying to identify a path to get there in the long run that brings all of those actors together.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Let me just add something else, while we’re on this because, again, I don’t want this to be misunderstood. There are real dilemmas here that are very difficult to resolve. But going back to Chris Doyle’s question on Hamas, one of the things that I think we need to juggle with is how do you make sure you don’t provide incentives to violence or anything? Now, in the Middle East, there is a group that renounced violence against Israel, accepted the existence of the State of Israel, works with Israel on security matters to keep the peace, it’s the Palestinian Authority, it’s the PLO. How to make sure, in a future peace settlement, that the PLO is not disadvantaged by the actions of a body that has not accepted any of these things. And, clearly, in what’s being discussed, we’ve got to make very sure that this doesn’t lead into, and it’s not intended to lead into, any, sort of, reward for the violent and it’s not designed to do that, so we must be very clear. But it focuses on the underlying causes of grievance that, if tackled early enough, can prevent the creation of some of the bodies that turn to violence by making sure and, certainly after conflict has finished, in the rebuilding, as should have happened in Iraq to prevent the rise of Daesh, you’d make sure there was inclusivity of all communities and avoided the dangers of some of the bad guys getting a grip.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And go to the back to my colleague, Renad Mansour, he does a lot of work on Iraq. I’ve got lots of hands up now.
Renad Mansour
Hello, Renad Mansour, with the North – Middle East and North Africa Programme. Minister, my question is about the, sort of, differentiation between institutions and personalities to support. So, you make the point that rather than focusing on technocracy and building institutions, we need to focus on the political process. What we’ve seen in Iraq, particularly, is a very public support for an individual to the point where, you know, the incumbent Prime Minister, in his electoral campaign, was a very important part of what would be post conflict stabilisation from the UK, but not just the UK, the EU and the US very publicly. And so my question is, in the terms of when there’s a very clear individual that the UK supports in a post-conflict setting, how does that problematize, sort of, the political process negotiations and building the state and its institutions? Thank you.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
And as always, it’s got to be a combination of both. There is little point in trying to give a boost or deal with institutions that are either unformed or chronically unfit. We’re used to institution building and, in the long run, in the long run, the stability and the building of institutions is absolutely fundamental because if that isn’t there, you are simply left with the individuals and the individuals will dominate and human nature, being what it is, we get some of the crises that we see. So, in the long term, I think institution building is the best protection and best security for those in states. But, in the first instance, very often, at the end of a conflict or in an area where there are no institutions, and Libya is probably, you know, one of the most clear examples where there wasn’t even really a semblance of institutions, ‘cause it was so personally built, wherein other places there are workable institutions that had simply fallen into disuse and disrepair. Trying to rebuild institutions from scratch, this is an impossible thing, so you’ve got to work with the individuals.
That, interestingly, of course, that is where Gabrielle Rifkind’s work, I mean, she starts with talking about how important individuals are, as well as institutions, because getting into the mind of the individual, understanding the individual, understanding where they are coming from and those with them, is a fundamental in building the processes of peace, and I’m much taken with that argument. So it’s a combination of both. But you have to accept the reality, in a number of different areas, where the individual is so important that that individual can form the backdrop to the building of institutions, if the handling of the bargain and the work with the elite bargains that the paper is about is carefully applied, recognising the different pressures and dynamics on elite bargaining and taking that forward, and in those circumstances individuals are, of course, paramount. But building the future institutions of a state must be a commitment to which we all share.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Come to the front, please, the lady here’s been waiting. There’s a microphone coming.
Member
Thank you, you said…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Could you introduce yourself?
Marion Affra
My name is Marion Affra. You said, in your speech, you always try to contact every group, during the sorting out the conflict in order to reduce the violence or to build up peace, although even if you don’t want to meet with some group, in order to reach your goal, you need to contact with every group and negotiate with them. But, also, when you were answering some questions, you said, “UK is not contacting with Hamas.” But it seems to me, contradicting when you say that, in my view, ‘cause you said, “You have to contact with every group in order to find peace,” and you said, we don’t – “UK doesn’t contact with Hamas.” As you know, Hamas was elected in last year, how do you say? Election, do you think if you don’t contact with Hamas that you are ignoring the people’s, how do you say? Will, and you can reach, how do you say, peace in this way?
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
If I may say, madam, it won’t be the first time a contradictory statement has been picked up from any country’s Foreign Minister, and I was told almost the first day I walked in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 2010, the only thing consistent about foreign policy is its inconsistency, and that is because it deals with human dilemmas and it’s not always linear and it’s not always straightforward.
The honest answer to your question is, yes, indeed, there is a contradiction, but if I could put what I said, after my statement, in some, sort of, parenthesis? What I said is there are ways in which people are contacted. I’m not revealing anything about the United Kingdom’s position in this, because the position I pointed out was very straight. I’m aware of Hamas’ electoral position in Gaza. I’m aware then, of what it did next in expelling the PA. I’m aware of what it stands for and its commitment to destroying Israel, which puts it in the unacceptable category for direct contact, and I make no excuse or apology for that. Nonetheless, recognising what happens in real life, the whole point of what we talk about is to say it poses an uncomfortable challenge.
The events in Gaza, recently, are currently being interpreted. I believe it’s fanciful, for either extreme, to be correct. Gaza is neither completely full of terrorists nor were the marches entirely peaceful. They were a mixture of the two. The frustration that led to the protests, the right to Return March, are based on long-term failures to secure a solution for the people of Gaza and their long-term misery. That that could be exploited by some seems, to us, to be entirely realistic and happened and, accordingly, we believe Hamas had a responsibility there.
In order to prevent this in the future what must we do? Hence, I offered the comments I did, from a number of people, who think there are different ways to do this. I then also, came up with the dilemma of how you balance the reward of those who have accepted non-violence against those who don’t. So, in a way, madam, I hope we’re both right. I entirely knowledge the contradictory position. It’s one of the difficulties faced in the speech, how do we overcome these? I think probably, what I’m trying to do is, give more of a boost for the backdoor channels that people speak about that maybe Governments have to be more honest about these. But, as I say, I’m conscious of trying to ensure that those who would seek to exploit those do not gain credit for doing so.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Just there are so many good questions, I’ve nodded to a lot of people, which is getting me a little worried.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
I’ll try and be shorter.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
They’re good answers and the good thing about it, so let me – I’ll do pairs, if I may, and I’ll keep track, and there’s paper, if you need it, but I will keep track, as I go along. This gentleman’s been waiting very patiently here and the lady in the corner, right in the corner, with her hand up there, let’s just do it one at a time, yeah.
Peter Price
Peter Price, former Member of the European Parliament. The approaches that you’ve outlined require patience and sophistication, yet, what you face in Parliament and from the media constantly is a demand for something immediate and relatively simple. How do you cope with that, kind of, situation? Is it through contradictory statements, the phrase you used? Or is there some other way that you can deal with it? And when you look around for partners, do you say, “Britain really has a role to play in many of these situations, rather like Norway did at a certain point in the Middle East, acting alone?” Or who do you look to for your partners who really have a common understanding?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I suspect these are two. If I get two questions from everyone, we’re going to be a real trouble, and that was a nice one, yeah?
Abigail Watson
Abigail Watson, the Oxford Research Group. I just wonder what the UK plans to do to bring allies alongside this vision? I worry that if, as much of the UK might understand that the counterterrorism objectives and long-term objectives for stability in a country, might not align if it continues to sometimes support allies that embolden groups on the ground, who are the most able to tackle the terrorist threat, what the implications of that can be for this vision?
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Thank you, and again, two very good questions. Peter, as I would expect from a Member of the European Parliament, thank you. The modern context of dealing with this has been – is being heavily influenced, a 24 hour news cycle, increasing stridency, the availability of instant contact, the availability to see images immediately and demand something straightaway does make it more difficult. When I stand up in Parliament, if I’m dealing with, say, the recent events in Gaza and what may happen in Yemen, it will be – I can be very sure that I will face colleagues who are – who may be deeply upset with circumstances and demand answers, which I will not consider to be appropriate, perhaps, a bit simplistic in the circumstances, though I will know that they will be deeply well meant.
It’s hard, but I think it’s really, really important to stick out for things you believe are correct and to resist what is becoming rapidly, a very binary way of looking at every issue, in that I think, when we first started, it was possible to find middle ground. So, if I don’t agree with you, it doesn’t mean I’m against you, it means I’m looking for something different from what you’re putting forward, whereas, at the moment, everybody’s put into a box, you’re either for us or against us, and alliances are developing around the world in relation to different issues where you can’t take middle ground.
Let me be honest about Iran. Iran is one of those, it’s – and I remember speaking about this, many years, ago when I first left the FCO and I said to audiences, “It’s very easy to put Iran in a box marked ‘villain’, because we know a variety of things that the Iranians do,” I said, “but what happens when the Iranians want to come out of that box? Or what happens when other things are happening and that box becomes more difficult?” It’s much more convenient to forget that, keep them in the box. But I think it’s more subtle than that. I mean, North Korea, until three weeks last Tuesday, North Korea was in a very big box marked ‘villain’ and, at a stroke, suddenly, it’s not. Well, I think what my argument is for is it demonstrates that a rush to judgement may often be wrong and, accordingly, being patient and working through things may be right and looking for space, where you can disagree with people and not be assumed to be hostile to them is really important. That’s the way to do it.
Your second point, we’re not a Norway and we’re not an Ireland because of our history, but we have something quite special because of that. I’m deeply impressed, whenever I’m in the Middle East, how we’re seen. People know their history. They know that there were good things about UK involvement and less good things. But there’s a, sort of, trust, particularly, about our Diplomats, our Ambassadors, abroad, and, often, I’ve noticed our Government is gone to in the first place when there’s difficulty or questions. We’re not the biggest, we’re not the most powerful, we’re not the richest, but we’ve got a, sort of, understanding of the region and a trustworthiness that many people go to. I think that gives us an opportunity and when, say, the Middle East peace process gets going again, I hope we use that in a way which, perhaps, we haven’t been able to do before now.
The second question, allies for this. As I said earlier, people don’t always see it the same way and you’re right, I think people, these days, are very keen to mark in boxes and there will be difficult contradictions where dealing with a terror threat has to be dealt with in one way. But actually, the way to diffuse terror is, sometimes, by doing the talking that you’re doing on the other hand. And, again, Jonathan Powell’s work is instructive in this, because the best way to deal with a terror threat is to make sure it’s not there and if there is a political issue to be solved and that solves the terror threat, then you can – then that’s the way to move forward. That won’t always be possible, and Powell talks about it, as I said earlier, you’ve got two tools. You’ve got fighting and you’ve got talking and sometimes you have to use both, and it’s just looking for those opportunities and the way forward. There won’t always be just one way to deal with the problem.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay, the two gentlemen waiting here at the front very patiently for a long time, then I’m coming there and here. Sorry, you were first, I’m afraid.
Jonathan Paris
Jonathan Paris, Middle East Analyst. Mow are you, Mr Minister?
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Nice to see you, Jon.
Jonathan Paris
My question is about stabilisation in southern Syria. Six months ago, when I spoke at a meeting with your former Ambassador to Iran, I asked about Qasem Soleimani’s plans. He’s the General Head of the al-Quds Division of the IRGC. To build this corridor all the way to Golan to the borders of Israel and nobody in the room seemed to be aware that that might be an epiphenomenon, a byproduct of their victory over the rebels in Syria. But it’s happened, until six weeks ago and, curiously, it was the use of force that changed the dynamic, the use of force by Israel in attacking Iranian positions in Syria that have now changed a lot of people’s minds, starting with Moscow, possibly now, even Damascus, that Iran is more of a problem than a benefit for the long-term stabilisation of Southern Syria. Any comment?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Microphone just there next to you, just hold that thought.
Robin McNeill Love
Minister, thank you very much indeed for your speech. Robin McNeill Love, I’m the Vice President of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission and, as you know, we are the only permanent and treaty-based international body for IHL fact-finding and good offices. We work on the basis of impartiality, independence and confidentiality, and we limit our recommendations, when we undertake investigations to the parties concerned. Can I just wave our flag to your department? We would be delighted to come and speak to your staff and, hopefully, emphasise the importance of our commission in areas of your very important paper and thoughts for the way ahead. Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So, I’m going to park that as that was a…
Robin McNeill Love
That was a unsolicited testimonial.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Exactly, which is good, which allows me to squeeze one more question in, quickly.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Well taken. Thank you for the opportunity, and I’m sure we’ll talk to you afterwards.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So there’s waiting two questions. I’m going to try and – gentlemen, sorry, I’ve got to take the gentleman who was waiting, sorry, there. There, that was, yeah, you, sir, yeah. I will come, yeah. If you just take the microphone there, microphone there, microphone there, yeah. If you decide to treat, this is the second question.
Peter Marsden
Thank you very much. I’m Peter Marsden from Concordis International and Chatham House Member. I really welcome this report’s recommendation to be engaging with non-state actors, potentially armed groups, as well, of course, as not excluding those who’ve chosen not to take up arms. Are there any plans, though, to change the rules on engagement with prescribed groups, in the light of these recommendations, both in terms of the rules of Her Majesty’s Government, but also of, perhaps, some of Her Majesty’s Government’s allies who offer very restrictive rules on engagement with prescribed groups including, perhaps, offering support being training in peace building, training in negotiation, and training in mediation? Thanks.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Let me take the second question first, if I may? Let me emphasise, again, you’re not reading a policy paper. This is a tool. This is an analytical tool for the UK Government to use in considering what policies we should follow in the future. It’s not – accordingly, please see it that way. It’s a piece of analysis looking back on what’s happened and thinking, could we do things differently in the future? What might we do? But don’t take it as a policy programme, and some dramatic shift of the United Kingdom. But it just raises some new possibilities for us, which may or may not be brought into practice in the future. But the point of doing it, I hope, was to raise the sorts of issues, which you do.
If I may, we could spend a long time on one of our favourite subjects. South Syria, it would appear clear to us that the regime is going to be successful in recovering territory, but there’s no doubt that having had the allies of both Russia and Iran, in order to accomplish this, the moment you reach the point that there are now, then new issues arise. And the long-term nature of Syria and its alliances are now very different, in terms of consideration than they were six months and, certainly, two years ago. Israel has been able, successfully, to flag up, as it has done consistently, over a lengthy period, that the engagement of Iran and Syria has much to do with applying pressure to Israel and the potential offensive capability, rather than anything to do with their professed reasons for being in Syria and supporting the regime of President Assad, and it’s enabled people to look at it differently.
I don’t know how the conversations will go. Certainly there are those who say the long-term interests of Russia and Iran are quite different and the interests of Syria may be different. If Iranian presence in Southern Syria is simply seen as an invitation to attack it, it wouldn’t seem a useful guest to have on your premises. And there is no doubt that people are pretty clued up now that Iran’s engagement may have been rather more than simply seeking the stability of an ally and that there might have been other motives involved. All that, I mean, and that, therefore, we will wait and see what happens next. The United States’ engagement, of course, in Syria, is currently the big unknown in that we’re not quite sure what the commitment is going to be and how long it’s going to stay there. I think the United Kingdom’s view is that presence is really, really important and that grand bargains being done that don’t include the United States in the Middle East will be uncomfortable and we want it to remain.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I think I’ve given myself or received permission to just extend five minutes over, if that’s alright?
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
I’ll be very quick. If you do two or three.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I’m going to do a last three questions, and I apologise for those whose hands I didn’t get to, but you will have taken an enormous amount of questions when we’re done at the end. So, first here and then I’m taking the lady here, lady there, yeah.
John Wilson
John Wilson, I’m a Journalist and a Member of this institute and various other ones. I would like to widen the question, Minister, whilst your aspirations are wonderful, I put it to you that because mankind is fundamentally selfish, greedy, lazy and hypocritical…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Except for members of Chatham House, I hope.
John Wilson
…that only the dead have only seen the end of war and that what you seek is impossible to achieve, do you agree?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
That sounds like an existen – that should have been the last question. No, right, to the front row here. Microphone, yeah.
Member
Hello, I’m referring to…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Microphone up, please.
Member
…recent President Trump’s intervention about Jerusalem against all international law, UN, everything, and I just want to know what is Britain’s position? And if you’re leaving the peace process, what’s happening to the, you know, all the Palestinians living in these terrible conditions? Where is the human rights? Who is looking after people who are all over the world? But they seem be being neglected, for the past 70 years, so…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
That’s one conflict you’d avoided, up until now.
Member
So anything to relieve the plight of the Palestinians?
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Very happy to respond, madam.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, and the question here. Please, the lady there.
Olivia Lazard
Thank you very much. My name is Olivia Lazard. I work for the European Institute of Peace, based in Brussels. We work with Martin Griffiths in Yemen. We work in South Sudan. We work in Afghanistan and Columbia and in all the places where we work, one of the major issues that we have, when we deal with mediation and processes, dialogues, is that we encounter predation systems, power systems, which lie at the heart of conflict systems. So, first of all, thank you for asking for this type of study because, for the first time, we see a recognition that relational issues, regarding power, lie at the heart of conflict systems.
One of the other things that we observe, when we work in these zones, is that all of the investments made by states are, most of the time, on technical issues, because we believe that this is the safe road towards making peace happen. And usually, we completely ignore this relational part, the power systems, the power relations. I understand that this is not a policy paper that you asked for, however, I would like to ask you, what policy changes you envisage in the future, what options you would like to consider in order to change the way that we approach peace operations, mediation, dialogue processes, in order to make sure that we actually transform conflict systems, rather than contain violence? Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
You’ve got the big questions at the end, which is appropriate, I think, and I’ll let you decide how you want to handle them, Alistair. You can claim time. There’s limited amount of time.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
Let me handle them in reverse order, if I may? I’ll come to the nature of humankind last, perhaps, if I may? Again, 35 years experience in the Conservative Party, oh, I can tell you all about – and you’re not far off, no, no. But let me come to that in the end.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
It’s a party political statement the wrong way around, I think, Alistair.
The Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP
No, I’m only teasing. Madam, let me start there. Thank you for the welcome of this. I said earlier that I’m very lucky. I’ve been, you know, the best part of eight, nine years now, involved, through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with international affairs and then, some years before, as Chris knows, again, I’ve spent a long interest in Middle East peace process matters and others. The older I’ve got the more tempted I am by the, sort of, things I read from Jonathan Powell, from Gabrielle Rifkind, from those who look at the nature of conflict more deeply and see that unless you tackle the fundamentals and unless you look at individuals, you’re missing something, and I think it’s not impossible to weave that into foreign policy. There isn’t a naiveté about it, I think that was the – Mr Wilson’s question, and I’m very conscious of that, because I’m not looking for unicorns, and Ministers who start doing that should be rapidly removed because we would be no use to anybody.
But in looking at the causes of conflict and being prepared to look more deeply, particularly when, you know, you’ve got evidence, both of successful tackling of some and failures of others. If you didn’t look at your failures and think what could you do differently? What was really behind this? We wouldn’t be doing our job. And I do look at the nature of some longstanding conflicts, because we’ve missed things and I think – I’m really interested, and I will be when I leave the Foreign Office, in due course, as all Ministers do in DFID, how the combination of development work and politics can go together. And, as I say, I’m particularly interested, how do you make sure conflicts don’t restart? ‘Cause one of the tragedies, across the region, is you go through this blood, this loss of life, this horror, it comes to an end for a period of time and because the peace is not built effectively, you kickstart it again, and we got to avoid that and I think there are real lessons in this that can be applied. So, I’m really interested in following that through.
I couldn’t say now what elements of policy are going to change but, as I say, without being naive, without recognising there are times, unless, as a properly equipped nation, working with allies, with power and force, available to use that, unless you are prepared to do that, then I’m not sure you can actually carry through your duties, so I’m very conscious of that. But there may be different ways to apply your skills and that’s what we’re looking for.
Madam, in relation to your questions. Very straightforwardly on Jerusalem, we thought the decision of the United States was wrong and it was wrong to bring forward the Embassy into West Jerusalem and we opposed it. It is a sovereign decision for them, but it went against all international agreements. We thought it was insensitive to others, other friends of the United States, who were then put in a difficult position, and we would have preferred the United States not to do so. We do not regard Jerusalem as having been taken off the table. We regard Jerusalem as a key to the ultimate resolution of a just settlement, which provides justice for Palestinians and a secure Israel, and we are still going to continue to work on that.
Like you, I share a sense that for so many different reasons, and there are faults on so many different sides, that a lot of the Palestinians, who are still in camps and still in great difficulties, is something that badly needs addressed and should have been addressed much earlier. I was in a UNRWA camp in Jordan a few days ago, I was in Gaza just two weeks ago, and I visit regularly. I was at [inaudible – 68:00] just a few days ago to bring in another issue. I’m very conscious of the issues in the region, it’s why the United Kingdom says, so publicly, so often, this is not an issue that can be managed, it must be tackled. We look forward to what the US envoys have to say and we will work with all partners there to try and find a resolution. Madam, we cannot go on as we are and we have to deal with some of these issues and the United Kingdom is very determined to seek to do so.
Last question. Well, your judgement on human nature depends where you come from. As a Democratic Politician, I can’t accept it as a base of going forward, simply because I see, in my own country, the things that have changed over centuries and over decades. I see a country where there is greater tolerance than there was when I was born. I see a country where medical advances have, you know, given people the chance to live much longer, where we have found, in many places, a recipe for harmony and living in diversity, which is always challenged. But it’s challenged because people assume that a situation in which neighbours get on with each other, where people protect each other, where people believe that their vote counts, that they can see change by their actions, that they can work in civil society to make things better, I don’t think these are exclusively British values. I see people all over the world who seek to do the same. Sometimes they work in completely hopeless positions. There are always people who will fit your description, absolutely, and they will seek to bring harm to others. But working with partners, I think our long history, our relationships, suggests that the cause far from hopeless and that we keep going; we persevere. And just to finish with one last quote, it was Hans Blix who said, “If you want peace, prepare for peace.” Do the work necessary to bring out the values that counter what you fear in human nature and, actually, I suspect that’s what Chatham House stands for and that’s what we should be doing. Thank you for giving me a chance to address it [applause].
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Alistair, thank you for – well, thank you for the last comment. I want to say a big thank you to you and your colleagues at the Stabilisation Unit, for really offering a, as you said, a roadmap, a think peace, a toolbox and that toolbox is designed, hopefully, for a role the United Kingdom will play, as well in the future, in offering ideas, maybe in the UN Security Council, maybe on international law. The structure is going to be as important, as you said, as the policies as well. You won’t get the right policies without the right structure. So, we thank you very much for taking the time to share and release this paper. You’ve had a great – and it’s a big turnout and people have stayed for the extra time and thank you to our members watching online as well, thank you and your colleagues, a very strong hand and we will meet again later [applause].
