Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Ladies and gentlemen, I’m Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House. Welcome to the Institute. Sorry we’re starting a little late, but we had lots of people to get in for this meeting. I can see people are not starting their Christmas holidays early, although a chance to take a look inside the Brexit negotiation after the summit meeting last weekend – just before last weekend, I can appreciate the interest. But thank you very much for coming and joining us today. This meeting is also been livestreamed and so, welcome to members of Chatham House who are joining us virtually as well.
And a special thanks to Stefaan De Rynck for making the time to come and join us today, a member of the EU Brexit Negotiating Team, and Advisor to Michel Barnier. And we were just discussing, he’s had two opportunities advising Michel Barnier before, most recently on the financial services side, where you supported him in that capacity in his Commissioner role there. And then also, earlier on, I think you were involved on some of the EU institutional discussions with him at that point as well, when he did institutional reform between 2001 and 2004.
So, Stefaan brings a good knowledge, probably a deep knowledge. We will, I’m sure, find it tested a little bit today, as you will get, I think, some interesting questions from our members, but on the broad range of activities of the EU that are going to be especially pertinent to this next phase of the negotiations: what do we mean by the internal market? What are the options in the financial services space? How do we think about regulatory standard setting in the future? These are the dry subjects that have now become the absolute stuff of high politics here in the UK and across the EU.
So, what I would say, regarding this meeting, is on the record. We will hear some remarks first, from Stefaan here up at the podium. I’ll pose two or three questions to him afterwards. We will open it up, and as I’ve said, we will run probably ten minutes over, ‘cause I do want to give this a full hour, so we’ll run this to ten past one, if that’s okay for everyone?
Stefaan, welcome to Chatham House. Delighted you’ve come and been a part of the, kind of, outreach after the summit. There’ll be great interest in your remarks. We look forward to hearing from you [applause].
Stefaan De Rynck
Thank you, Robin. Good afternoon everyone. It’s a great pleasure and honour to be here. As Robin said, I am somehow as guilty as charged, because indeed, we worked with Michel Barnier on the convention, which then became the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon, with the now famous Article 50 part of that and so, that was part of the issues that we worked on together, when I worked with him the first time. So, it’s important for us, in the team of Michel Barnier, the Chief Negotiator’s Team, to contribute to the UK public debate, and I’m very grateful to be able to, today, in this distinguished setting at Chatham House.
Now, it’s this time of the year where people look back at what has been, but I would rather look forward to what is to come in 2018, in terms of the Brexit negotiations, because we’re clearly entering now, a new chapter of the Brexit negotiations, whereby the focal point of discussions will gradually enlarge and encompass a wider range of subjects, from drafting the withdrawal treaty, to then negotiating the terms of a transition deal„ and then to scoping the parameters for the future relationship and finally, making choices on what that UK/EU partnership will look like in the future. So, our canvass will go beyond the traditional tryptic of citizens’ rights, Ireland’s financial settlement, into a broader range of issues.
For the withdrawal treaty itself, there’s still a number of separation or disentanglement issues that need to be negotiated. Euratom is one of the more important ones, I would say. The governance of the withdrawal agreement, but also more ‘technical issues’, but with very important, often political, ramifications, and also, issues that are of political importance, what happens with intellectual property rights and geographical indications for products after Brexit?
Naturally, also, then, in scoping the terms of the future relationship, the subjects will enlarge and will not just encompass trades, but also look at questions related to the stability of the European continent, defence, security, foreign policy and issues of justice home affairs, Police co-operation, counter-terrorism and those kind of issues.
And in writing this new chapter, so to say, of the Brexit negotiations, it will be important, on our side, the EU side, to continue with the negotiation method that has given us a good first result in closing phase one and reaching sufficient progress on those three priority topics I mentioned earlier. And that means, on the EU side, transparency of our negotiation positions, which publication of the negotiation mandate for the transition deal. In two days from now the European Commission may adopt its recommendation for the negotiation mandate for the transition deal, which will be rendered public.
We will continue to publish the EU position papers in diversions, as discussed with the 27-member states and as transmitted to the UK authorities. We will be transparent in drafting the withdrawal treaty and publish EU text proposals. It’s important, in terms of negotiation matter, that we also maintain the unity of the 27. And Prime Minister May has rightly stated that that is also very much in the interest of the UK to organise an orderly withdrawal and discussed and the future relationship. So, we’ll no doubt have rounds of negotiations, agendas published, progress achieved, consolidated publicly, so that we can then move on and build on that to reach the end of phase two, so to say.
So, let me touch briefly of each of these three topics that I mentioned by way of introduction: the withdrawal treaty, the transition deal and the future relationship, in my introductory remarks. Indeed, the first task for the New Year will be for us the drafting of the withdrawal treaty, based on the joint report that we published and that the negotiators agreed to. So, all the points of agreement, the commitments that are in the joint report in nearly 100 paragraph of precise and detailed language, will have to be reflected fully in the withdrawal treaty.
This means also, that in the next phase on citizens’ rights we will continue to discuss a number of issues. We have reached sufficient progress, but that is not full progress on all of the issues. But surely, in the withdrawal agreement, there will be the personal scope and all the material rights that we have agreed to and also, the important request from the UK, to which we have agreed, to have a system for EU citizens to apply for special status and be able to stay in this country and enjoy their rights under EU Law in the future.
It’s a point that has been the focus of criticism by some citizens’ organisations. Also, those of you who have read the European Parliament resolution of last week feel the reluctance towards this system on the EU side. But the joint report contains safeguards for those who could be rejected by the system and the conditions for obtaining that status do not give any discretion to UK authorities to deviate from free movement rights under EU Law. In the same context, we will have to put in the withdrawal treaty the enforcement mechanism that we have now agreed to, the agreement that the UK will not undercut agreed rights in the future, except for the option of expressly repealing the ratification of the withdrawal treaty.
The application of Court of Justice case law for the lifetime of the citizens concerned, with UK Judges having to pay due regard to the new jurisprudence after Brexit and then, thirdly, that system whereby UK Judges have the possibility for eight years to ask preliminary rulings to the Court of Justice, in case they are unclear of what EU Law means, in the case that is put in front of them. We’ll also have a dialogue between UK/EU Judges and a new independent authority that the UK will create, which we hope will also be an important vehicle for citizens to make sure their rights are applied effectively.
I’ll come back to Ireland later on. Just a word on the financial settlement: basically, we have now a watertight methodology that defines the UK’s obligations, the share of the UK in those obligations. And as we’ve always said, beyond money, this has always been a question of trust from us from the EU side. We have a treaty, the UK has commitments under that treaty, and we needed to know how the UK saw those commitments before being able to move to a discussion on the future.
So, let me look at that future, transition. A general point, first. Making progress on transition in the future depends on progress with drafting the withdrawal agreement and negotiating the text of the withdrawal agreement. And in the Florence speech on transition, Prime Minister May put the question of an implementation period on the table as a new element and as a UK request. Now, as I said, my talk today comes two days before the Commission’s recommendation.
For the EU the principles for those transition are clear and they are contained, also, in the European Council’s guidelines. Integrity of Single Market and Customs Union during the whole of transition: this means, for instance, application of the common external tariff of trade policy, during the whole period of transition. New EU rules that come online will need to be applied in the UK. No cherry picking, or what one could call a buffet style transition, where one picks and chooses the bits one likes. And the autonomy of the EU decision-making, at a time, of course, when the UK will no longer be a member and no longer be part of the EU institutions. Transitions should be short and time limited and the Florence speech mentions around two years, until the end of 2020, seems indeed, like a natural endpoint for that implementation period or transition.
Now, there is some reluctance on these conditions, but I should stress that these conditions are in the interest of the UK and EU economy alike, ‘cause part of the reason to have a transition is that business wants to adapt only once to a new regime. And not just business, UK Customs authorities and some UK Cust – EU Customs’ points will also need to adapt to a new regime, once the future relationship starts, and so, a transition with uncertainty on the rules seems to me as in no-one’s interests.
Now, we understand on timing of transition, that many stakeholders would like clarity as soon as possible. But legally, the transition arrangements will have to be a part of the Article 50 withdrawal treaty. There is no other way to organise that in the period that we have ahead of us and that withdrawal treaty will have to be ratified here in Westminster and of course, approved by the Council and with the consent of the European Parliament in Strasburg.
The final point of transition arrangements: they must be situated also, in a more global picture and in the sense of perspective of where we are going with the future relationship. So, there is a need for that sense of perspective to bring clarity. And that, then, leads me to my final point in my introductory remarks: the future relationship, which the European Council said last week, should be clarified in a political declaration in October 2018. And that political declaration would then have to be duly referred to in the withdrawal treaty, in the legal text of the withdrawal treaty, obviously.
So, on the future relationship, a few more minutes before I wrap up, we will start exploring this with the UK before already March 2018, but the European Council has said that it would adopt additional guidelines on that future relationship in March 2018 and it has said, “We would like to know first, what it is that the UK wants from the future relationship.”
Now, some may argue, the UK has been clear, we’re leaving the Single Market, we’re leaving the Customs Union, we will build our own trade policy, we will stop free movement, we want to get out of the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice, and we have always said that’s the UK’s choice, we respect that. That’s not the only choice the UK has, but if that is the choice of the UK, it is something that we respect. Based on these positions, there are important consequences for the free trade relationship that we will then need to negotiate.
The consequence, of course, from these positions, is that the UK will have less obligations towards the EU in the future. That’s the essence of taking back control. The other obvious conclusion is that the UK will have less benefits economically, compared to being an EU member, and we will need to see what further clarity the UK can bring to this particular issue. And at the heart of this discussion will no doubt be the benefits that are lost because of the obligations that are renounced. And there is some tension between the ideas that emerge in this capital, also this morning reading the press and think tanks, and also having read Robin’s piece last week on regulatory issues and alignments. And if you look at the April guidelines of the European Council, which have been reconfirmed, you can feel some tension. Let me just give you three examples before I wrap up.
In pharmaceuticals, for instance, mentioned as a sector of importance to the UK in its white paper. Regulatory decisions, key compliance activities must be taken according to EU Law. That is the part of the EU not giving up control, so to say, and the April guidelines stressed the full regulatory autonomy of the EU. So, outside of the EU legal framework, you cannot simply reinstate a Single Market mutual recognition of standards, because you’re outside of the common enforcement and institutional structures of the EU.
In financial services, we had problems in the past of regulatory arbitrage within the Single Market and that was based on the mutual recognition of each other’s systems inside the Single Market, up until the financial crisis. That regulatory arbitrage is not the only reason, but it’s one of the reasons that led to the financial crisis, on which the price was incredibly heavy, in terms of economic and social terms. The EU’s response was to have a single rulebook, with harmonised standards. So, you can see that already inside the Single Market, often mutual recognition is simply not enough to make a Single Market work. And it is hard to see how one could design our system, given the regulatory autonomy of the EU, of joint UK/EU rule setting, with mutual recognition of each other’s standards, simply based on trust in agreed outcomes. Recognising the country of origin, saying that a UK Supervisor can issue an EU financial passport is only possible within the framework of the EU.
Now, in the sector of goods, final example, there are a wide range of goods whereby, inevitably, the rules of the importing party will apply, of the EU if it’s – or of the UK if it’s EU business importing – exporting to the UK. Though, there are certifying conformity with such rules is sometimes, in free trade agreements, delegated to the body of the other party, by the UK to the EU, by the EU to the UK, in this particular case.
Let me just wrap up and leave my comments on Ireland and defence perhaps for the Q&A by saying that there was a lot of talk on Canada and its pluses, or other models and their minuses. And personally, I don’t see that discussion as incredibly fruitful and as a pitfall for lots of semantic confusion, perhaps, over the next five/six months. Each free trade agreement is tailormade to the party with whom the EU negotiates. The Canada one is only a replica of the South Korea one. The Japan free trade agreement, which will hopefully enter into force early 2019, has a chapter on corporate governance, corporate transparency, which you do not find in other FTAs; has a very ambitious chapter on free movement of professionals, so-called mode four in trade talks, and family rights to move with the professional. So, it’s just an example of what is there in Japan that is not always there in other trade agreements. And also, with the UK, if indeed, based on the UK’s choice as we go to a free trade agreement, that free trade agreement will be typical in view of the respective economies and the negotiated outcome.
But to come back to the mathematics of pluses and minuses, what you cannot do is square an FTA circle into a Single Market and that is one of the key issues that we will have to live with, I think, and clarify quickly. There can be no sector-by-sector participation in the Single Market and trying to square the FTA in a way that would lead to a sector based participation in the Single Market would, for the EU, be the beginning of the end of the correct functioning and the integrity of the Single Market and that’s, therefore, something that the EU will want to avoid.
Thank you very much [applause].
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much, Stefaan. You’ve opened a whole bunch of new chapters, one might say, especially, I think, with your quite detailed comments, your three examples at the end there about the potential tensions in some of the desires or ambitions of the UK Government and some of the realities of the Single Market.
Let me just ask a couple of quick questions, if I may, and we’ve got a good time here, we’ve got a good 40 minutes or so to be able to run. But let me just dive right in where you left off, looking ahead at the future agreement. A colleague of mine here pointed out to me, as I was preparing for this meeting, look at what the EU was offering the United States for a TTIP, for Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. All sorts of areas of mutual recognition and we wanted to get financial services in there. And there’s some interesting language there about a supposition that, you know, the regulations are so finely attuned, there’s so much benefit to be achieved, we could work out dispute settlement mechanisms. There was no talk about destroying the integrity of the Single Market of the EU, as a result of trying to strike a TTIP in whatever sectors it could be achieved in, even if those sectors were broadly writ. Is it possible that the EU would’ve offered more to the United States than it’s going to be willing to offer to the UK?
Stefaan De Rynck
Well, we all know [coughs] – apologies. On account of a bit of an illness, I need to drink a bit of water.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
This is what Brexit does to everyone, right?
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes, well, that’s what the end of phase one may do to some of us.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
You have a good Christmas holiday, okay, ‘cause I don’t want to see what…
Stefaan De Rynck
But…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…phase two does to you.
Stefaan De Rynck
Well, on TTIP, I think it’s important to understand a couple of things. I mean, you say there was no talk of destroying of the Single Market. I remember, quite clearly, some distinct public mobilisation against TTIP at some point in European society, and in many different countries, against the idea that such a deal would lead to a watering down of the European capacity to set standards in the public interest. And so, that’s an important lesson to draw from TTIP and also, for the future relationship going forward and that’s then, where you come back to the EU wants to keep its autonomy of decision-making. And the whole debate in international trade on the right to regulate and the regulatory autonomy has certainly received a new dimension, I would say, over the last ten years, in view of experiences that we all have had.
And there’s a more fundamental point of – to be made. You mentioned mutual recognition. At some point there was, indeed, some ideas on mutual recognition of standard, but that idea has been dropped rather quickly. So, when you talk about standards and mutual recognition, usually what you talk about is a system for businesses, EU business exporting to UK, or UK to the EU in the future, to be able to declare conformity of product rules with the UK body, in terms of conformity with EU rules. You don’t talk about the standards. You talk about the conformity assessment bodies and you screen that.
And the final thing I would like to say is that, again, going forwards, in terms of the third country relationship that you will need to build with the EU, is if you look at EU legislation within Financial Services or on Data Protection, or on veterinary checks in the agricultural field for safety and veterinary purposes, you always have a system whereby the EU needs to screen the third country system to declare adequacy or equivalence, or it may be called differently in different fields, where it’s always an autonomous decision of the EU to take that decision base again and say yes, the Data Protection standards have Country X, in terms of privacy protection, are indeed, adequate and therefore, we can indeed, make a system that is more fluid compared to countries that we do not declare adequate. And you can – and we have done that in the context of free trade deals as well. With Japan, there is some provisions on that to make that easier. But that’s as far as it goes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And it works both ways. I presume Japan will have to certify that the EU’s mechanisms are sufficient to meet its standards, yes? It’s a, kind of…
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…a mutual track, in that sense. I mean, to what extent do you think the – there is capacity for the EU to be open to what the Prime Minister hinted at in her Florence speech? She talked about, kind of, three levels of regulation, those that really do not apply to trade. There’s a sense, in Britain, that there were many issues that were not applicable, necessarily, to trade between the EU and the UK, that nonetheless, got pulled into EU regulations. So, it might be aspects of working a type – work – you know, safety of some working standards, it might be quality of air, of water, I mean, issues that are important for citizens’ rights, may be important for British citizens, but which, in a way, the British Parliament should be able to decide, that are not connected, necessarily, with the trading relationship.
Then she talked about a second layer, where look, you know, we want to achieve the same things, but maybe through different goals, and we could trust each other’s regulatory systems to go there. And then she seemed to be implying in the third level, she’d pretty much be willing to follow the EU lead in areas: cars, pharmaceuticals, a lot of the areas that you mentioned. Without going into too much detail on each of them, necessarily, at this point here, but do you think the EU’s going to be wanting – it’s all or nothing, is what it seems to feel like. Even in areas that are not necessarily central to UK/EU trade, the EU’s looking for a form of more conformity, if you’re going to get the full benefits of access to the EU market.
Stefaan De Rynck
I think that from our side a good way to approach this is to start again with our key principles. And I think it’s also important, for the debate here, to understand that it – that the EU says, well, there can’t be a sector based participation of the Single Market and there can’t be anything that damages the autonomy for the EU for decision-making. So, those are two very important parameters to keep in mind when discussing those methods.
You mentioned a couple of things: air quality, working time, you almost said, I believe?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yes, I did, yeah. Trying to work out how to phrase it, yeah.
Stefaan De Rynck
And it makes you think about, you know, if you – in terms of the fair-trading relationship, which we need to construct and the level playing field that we need to construct. So, there are a couple of questions that come out of this. There’s the more general question of the fair competition standards, the level playing field, which is important on the EU side, will be important for public opinion, no doubt, but also interestingly, for business that – in countries that trade a lot with the UK and that are worried about unfair competition, stay dates, tax competition and those kind of things. So, that’s the first general point.
If you start talking about air quality, then it seems to suggest that standards could be lowered. Is that the case? I don’t believe that is the commitment on this side, but it’s a theoretical possibility and one shouldn’t forget we are negotiating something that will govern the interaction for decades to come. So, you need to look at all the foreseeable future options on that. You get into discussions of, again, undercutting competitive standards, perhaps. If you talk about aligning very closely and in parts of the UK economy, which presumably is the part that exports a lot to the EU, that indeed, if that is the direction of travel here, you could indeed – imagine you end up in a free trade agreement where that kind of commitment leads to a productive outcome. But that is way too early today to start thinking about that through in detail, but that’s, kind of, the general, kind of, principle you could have there. But what worries people, on the EU side, is the idea that the UK would leave the Single Market and we would need to trust, somehow, that the outcome will be the same anyway on the UK side, in terms of standard setting. And that is not enough, that is not enough glue to keep the system together, in a way, that trust, so you…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, but if the Government committed at a particular time, and Theresa May has said she doesn’t want to reduce standards, ‘cause what I hear a lot of what you’re saying is that the worry in the EU, which we always think of as legal in many cases, is political. When I mentioned the TTIP, you said, “Well, people have been talking about watering down commitments,” so that the fear is, as much as anything, what might happen in the future, I presume, rather than, you know, you’re listening to the language in the United Kingdom, as much as you’re looking at the words in any particular negotiating position. Is that correct?
Stefaan De Rynck
The Single Market is a dynamic system of rulemaking that we make together and that the UK has made with us for 44 years, proactively and very dynamically, I should say. And so, once you leave that, then there is obviously, a question on well, if you don’t want to abide by the rules anymore, what is it you want to do? And I gave the example, in my introductory remarks, of the financial crisis, which led to mutual recognition here, which is regulatory competition between member states, basically, doesn’t always work, so we’ll harmonise. And in the future, how would that work?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah. One last question, then, I want to open it up and bring people in. There has been some calls by, I’ve seen some political figures in the EU, but some others as well, about the UK, and I think you’ve said it’s also, actually, in the language – the one-page paper that talks about the next phase, that the Commission put out for the negotiations, which talks about translating things into legal terms as soon as possible. But at the same time, in the opening April negotiating mandate, back from, I think it was May of this year, the Commission’s position was “Nothing’s agreed ‘til everything is agreed.” How does one square the circle of maybe member states wanting to see the British Parliament putting things into a, sort of, legal framework, with the fact that nothing’s going to be agreed ‘til everything’s agreed at the end?
Stefaan De Rynck
But we will start drafting the withdrawal treaty, but it will all come together in the end, so the package, let’s say, in October 2018, if – which is our goal, would be, indeed, a fully written withdrawal treaty ready for ratification on both sides. In that withdrawal treaty there could be a transitional arrangement, a transition period or implementation period that the Prime Minister refers to. That is not a given today. Now, let’s be very clear about that. We, in the Commission, are going to propose a mandate and then the Council needs to adopt its mandate. So, we’ll get to February/March for the big discussion on the transitional arrangements and then a political declaration on the future relationship, which would then, at some point after the UK has left, so 29th of March 2019, be translated into a negotiation mandate to negotiate the future relationship and those negotiations will, no doubt, have to continue during the transitional period. And so, the package that comes out and is this withdrawal treaty with the transition, possibly, and the clarity on what the future relationship will bring. And we talk a lot about trade, but it should also provide clarity on defence, security, foreign policy, justice home affairs and a number of, perhaps, thematic co-operation issues.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah. Well, I think this is going to be one of those difficult things for the British Government, is the extent to which whatever framework for the future UK/EU relationship you are able to establish in this political declaration, how committed is the EU 27 to that framework? Because if it is all simply up for negotiation aft – once the transition begins, the transition is just another period of uncertainty for the United Kingdom. Would it be inside the withdrawal treaty itself, the political declaration, or would it be a separate thing, do you think?
Stefaan De Rynck
Exactly. The legal form, I don’t know, but it would have to be, certainly, referred to in the withdrawal treaty, in the withdrawal agreement, yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, the withdrawal treaty?
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Which is therefore, legally binding.
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, okay, right. There we go, lots of hands going up. So, if you don’t mind, I’m going to take, sort of, two or three. I’ll keep track, but I have a feeling we’re going to have to get through a lot here. And there’s quite a few quite experty EU people amongst Chatham House members, who will have some quite detailed questions, I’m sure. So, we’ll do our best, both of us. So, let me just – I saw hands go up and I don’t want to look like I’m completely favouring people. The gentleman here, and I’m going to go there and here, please, to start with and then, don’t worry, we’ve got lots and lots of time. So, yeah, microphone there, start there, as the microphone’s next to you.
Anthony Robinson
My name’s Anthony Robinson. I’m a member of Chatham House and a Former FT Correspondent. Thank you very much, but I’m afraid I did have the sensation, listening to you, that I was listening to the surrender terms imposed – about to be imposed on a defeated United Kingdom by a victorious European Leviathan. There are some amongst of us who see not a Leviathan, but rather a Tinman and the European Union as more like a collection of 27 quacking ducks. What I would like to know is, at what point do the quacking ducks have any influence on the outcome of the negotiations and the positions taken by the European Union as a Leviathan? Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So, the quacking ducks, you mean the member states, in other words, yes? Anthony, you mean the member states, yes? When are the member states are going to get involved, is what you’re saying, yes, the member states? Okay, I think that’s what he meant. Quentin?
Quentin Peel
Quentin Peel, Associate Fellow here at Chatham House. I’d like to come straight back to that question of the transition period and the end result. It – there seems to be a growing consensus that that transition period would be about two years. There’s quite a lot of concern around that that would be a far too short period, not least the Irish Foreign Ministers talked about five years and businesses looking at maybe a longer period. It also looks as if negotiation on the end result would be incredibly difficult to finish within that two-year period and that would look much more like a five to, even, I’ve heard, ten-year period. So, what happens at the end of a two-year transition, if you haven’t agreed on the final result?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Right and let me take one more at the front here? I’ll do a – yeah, and then I’ll do a second round. I’ve got…
John Wilson
John Wilson a Journalist and a businessman. Mao Zedong, the Chinese leader, when asked whether the French Revolution had been a success, is alleged to have said, “Too soon to say.” When do you think we will know whether the Brexit has been a success a) for the EU and b) for the UK?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
There we go. Let’s do those three first and I’ve got lots more questions, yeah.
Stefaan De Rynck
On the gentleman there, the first point, with the Animal Kingdom metaphors, that I will not repeat…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Very good.
Stefaan De Rynck
…the 27-member states are involved every week with our work and on an individual basis, we interact every day with at least one of those member states. But collectively, we brief member states before we have a negotiation round, we debrief after there’s a negotiation round. And the fundamental principles, and that comes back to the first metaphor you used, which was from a different category, is that the member states themselves started this process with the guidelines from April in the European Council. And what the member states said in that was basically, “We respect that you are leaving, but do not expect us to reform the Single Market or to give up the autonomy of our decision-making, because the UK is leaving.” So, let’s respect that choice and then let’s see what kind of new future relationship we can create. And for me, in terms of the first words you used, I think that is a very important issue to keep in mind.
On what happens at the end of a transition, well, we don’t have a mandate yet to start discussing a transition and negotiating, so you will forgive me for not going into all – too many details and questions on transition and future relationship. And always falling back on general principles, but I think what our goal would have to be is to make sure that a future relationship is indeed, in place in January 2021, if the transition were indeed, to end at the end of 2020. And if at some point in the process one feels one is pressed for time, there are perhaps a number of issues that could get more priority than others, but that’s way, way too early to start thinking exactly how that would work.
On the French Revolution and Brexit, for us, I don’t think we will ever label Brexit a success in the EU. I think it’s a [applause] – I think – I didn’t include in my introductory remarks, like on defence and foreign policy, but if you think about that, it’s a mutual weakening, I think, of the two parties. You know, last Friday or Thursday, the sanctions against Russia were extended by the European Council at 28. Post-Brexit that will be 27 plus one, somehow. So, it can work, but it’s – won’t be as easy as it happens today in the common framework. Economically for us, Brexit is a lose/lose situation. So, our negotiation here is not like we had with Japan, how do we create value together, but how do we minimise losses economically, on both sides? Because no matter how you turn Brexit and what it means, it means that there will be barriers where they do – don’t exist today, in terms of UK/EU relationship, no matter how ambitious the free trade agreement could be.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Right, the front, right in the middle there, yeah, and then over there, gentleman, you were the first one. I’ll come to you, yeah.
Nicolas Maclean
Nicolas Maclean, Tories Against Brexit, and from your very wide experience of free trade agreements, can you give us examples of where financial services have satisfactorily been negotiated by external partners of the EU and also, agricultural products? I know these are two particularly sensitive areas, which are largely excluded from the Canada model and they’re two absolutely crucial areas for the UK economy.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, yeah, second question in the middle?
John Peet
Yes, John Peet from the Economist. In the Commission report on the withdrawal agreement you suggested you couldn’t see how to reconcile Britain leaving the Single Market and Customs Union, with the promise not to have no hard border with physical infrastructure in Ireland, a point that was also echoed by Leo Varadkar on Friday, when he said he couldn’t see how to square that circle. Is that right that if Britain leaves the Single Market and Customs Union, there is no way of avoiding a hard border in Ireland?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And the gentleman there, the blue suit? Yeah, keep going up, yeah, yeah, yeah, thank you.
Brunello Rosa
Yes, Brunello Rosa from Rosa & Rubini. Yeah, effectively a follow-up from the previous question. So, it seems like, yes, you can negotiate a bespoke agreement with the UK, but in reality, some models have been suggested: Norway, Canada and then, perhaps the worst of all, say no deal. Now, for what has been said about the Irish border, effectively it seems like if there’s no deal then the whole of the UK will have to maintain full alignment with the Customs Unions and the Single Market, which, to me, it seems like no Brexit, so from no deal to no Brexit, or if I misunderstood.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Do you want to take those three, then, we have financial services? This is – I mean, this is what’s very interesting. I mean, the Canada agreement, the first plus that most Brits imply to is that it would involve services, broad agriculture as well, which of course, is critically important. I mean, how – is there any reason why the British side should not look forward to a potential negotiating an agreement with the EU that would include financial services, in a free trade framework?
Stefaan De Rynck
I was actually working in the Department of Financial Services when we were discussing and negotiating CETA and the key for us was to have what we call a prudential carve-out, which is basically, a carve-out of what you put into the treaty for financial stability purposes and so, keep your rights to intervene regulatory, basically, and take the measures that are needed. And so, that was already – gives you an important sense of what is possible in free trade agreements and financial services.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
But that was not agreed, then?
Stefaan De Rynck
That was agreed, yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
But that was agreed?
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes, there is a prudential carve-out – there is a financial service chapter in CETA.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay and I think a lot of people feel there isn’t.
Stefaan De Rynck
And…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Could you just explain that, quickly?
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes, and this – yeah, I can. Canada, is – it is, of course not – it is much more modest than Single Market membership, in terms of what you have. There is basically, a provision on non-discrimination of the Canadian legal entities when they operate in the Single Market, so they can establish themselves in the Single Market, just like I would expect in the future, UK financial operators can establish themselves in the Single Market.
In terms of market access, it is actually very limited and what the EU does, in terms of market access, so to say, for third country operators, is unilateral equivalence decisions, and those are not part of free trade agreements. So, we have, in our financial service legislation, equivalence provisions for investment firms, for trading venues, for clearing houses, for derivatives and with the United States, for instance, we have an equivalence for what they call swabs, clearing of swabs, what we call the clearing of derivatives, with the financial regulator there, so to make that market more fluid for the operators, basically. But that is a unilateral decision that the EU takes.
Now, some people say some of it’s uncomfortable. Of course, it’s a legal decision, so there’s a due process involved in that. But you – but it doesn’t extend across the board for all financial services and it, indeed, puts you in the hand of a unilateral decision from the other party, which is the other party protecting itself in case the third country then deviates from what was agreed, in terms of the supervisory quality and the regulatory quality on top.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
But providing there was the protection there, which is what I think you’re saying you would insist there was, there’s no reason why the UK, which is already engaged in all dimensions of financial services with EU, why this agreement might not go in the direction of allowing continued UK based firms’ participation in EU financial services, but under those terms where you retain the regulatory independence, as the…
Stefaan De Rynck
Which…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…British authorities would have for European companies wanting to operate in the UK, correct?
Stefaan De Rynck
Which – and which only exist for a subset of the wider set of financial services, yes. On Ireland?
Nicolas Maclean
Agriculture.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Oh sorry, agriculture, yeah, it’s a good point. Anything you could say on the agriculture side? I mean, would you – again, we’re already fully in that market. Is there – are there ways that – you know, could you imagine the UK retaining, in essence, but under the same terms of the EU regulatory determination? I mean, there’s going to be a huge amount of trade-offs here…
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…from the fisheries to phew.
Stefaan De Rynck
Well, I think I’m – have to be careful not getting carried away with the conversation here, given that we don’t have a mandate yet and you know, so…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
From your – based on your experience of the past. This is all analogies.
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes, but I think I went as far as I could with analogies on financial service and again, and it is an important caveat. So, I mean, we are – what we will do, in the team now is, with the 27, to come back to the gentleman’s question, to have these seminars at 27 to discuss all these issues and see where the member states collectively want to take this. So, I would hesitate a bit to enter into too many sector logics in this discussion today, ‘cause I also would expect that we would refrain from entering into sector logics too quickly in this new phase.
So, on Ireland, squaring another circle, apparently, is what now needs to be done. I think the paragraph 49 of the joint report is the crucial one. It says, “The UK will try to solve this issue in the context of the future relationship.” Now, it also says, in the joint report, “The UK is leaving the Single Market and the Customs Union,” and we have said, “If that is the case, then friction with trade is not possible.” But, okay, let’s have that conversation. If that doesn’t work, there is a commitment from the UK to come up with a specific solution for what is called the unique circumstances of Ireland and again, we would need to discuss that and see what that specific solution would be. And if that would not convincingly solve the issue of having the commitment of no hard border, no physical infrastructure, no border checks, which is commitments from the joint report, we have the solution of full alignment, of current and future rules for the Single Market and the Customs Union, for the North-South Co-operation, the All Ireland Economy and the Good Friday Agreement. So, that is basically, the design of the Irish discussion for the future. It is important for us that we will take this forward in a distinct strand of the negotiations. So, Ireland remains – the question of Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland, remains a distinct issue in the second phase of negotiations.
There was a question on no deal and…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, no, actually, it was tied a little bit into the Irish, I mean, it was two versions…
Stefaan De Rynck
Right.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…of the Irish question: what happened if there was no deal?
Stefaan De Rynck
Yeah.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Let me keep going, ‘cause I think we’ve got many other questions want to come up. The lady at the front, gentleman here, and I’m just going to do a little cluster here, then I’m going to go that way, yeah?
Anita Punwani
Anita Punwani, Risk Advisor. To what extent would you describe the negotiations as been rational, logical decision-making and what’s your view, in respect of David Davis in being held accountable to Parliament, admitting that there haven’t been impact, sectoral impact, assessments carried out?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
I don’t know how much commentary you’ll get on British politics from this gentleman. Please microphone right behind, please.
Sir Simon Fraser
Hi, it’s Simon Fraser. I’m the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Chatham House. Can I just ask you, from a commercial and business perspective, on the transition period, which, by the way, as I understand it, is not really a transition period, it’s a negotiation period, and presumably, there would have to be a transition period when that negotiation was done. But from businesses’ perspective, what – the really important thing for them is the understanding, as I see it, that there will be continuity of the status quo, in terms of their operations in Europe. But you said something very interesting in your introductory remarks. You said that could not be ratif – would have to be part of the ratification process of the Article 50 withdrawal treatment. So, at what point will business actually have certainty that there will be that continuity for their operations in Europe?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, exactly. Just pass the microphone back two rows and I’m going to take one question right at the back as well.
Thomas Cole
Thomas Cole, Head of Policy at Open Britain. By when would you like to have the transition period negotiated, is that by the March Council?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So, two on the – negotiated, by that you mean finished?
Thomas Cole
Yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay. Alright, and that was two transition questions. Let me take the question right at the back, and gentleman, yeah, yeah, on camera, I think it is, question, yeah? The person on camera, is that…?
Carl Dinnen
Thank you, yes.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you, yeah.
Carl Dinnen
Carl Dinnen from ITV News.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Could you hold the microphone up?
Carl Dinnen
Carl Dinnen from ITV News. What difference would people notice here between our relationship with the EU now and our relationship during the transition? Will it be any different from simply not having a seat at the table?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Right. Okay, let’s just do that cluster and I’ve got more. We’re doing very well on time. Don’t worry, we’ll get more questions in. Yeah.
Stefaan De Rynck
Okay.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Thank you very much.
Stefaan De Rynck
Good, thanks for the questions. On the first one, on our side, we approach these negotiations in a calm manner, in a business-like manner. It’s impor – we have a due process. We want to get it through. I think it is very important to make the negotiations a success and successfully conclude that we put these things in the right order. I think we can be pleased where we sit today that we have wrapped up this phase one and the fact that we have wrapped up phase one is a tribute to both parties, because it’s a joint report. So, we will continue with our transparency policy, as I said, and with our constant consultations with the European Parliament and the member states to – in taking it forward. So, indeed, I will not start commenting on the British Negotiation Team. As I said, the phase one deal is a tribute to both parties.
On businesses and when the certainty comes, it only comes when – indeed, when the transition, which is part of the Article 50 deal, will be ratified, and businesses need to – I know it is very uncomfortable and we meet stakeholders, who say, “But we have contingency planning. What do we do?” And we, of course – it’s a cost. It’s up to the business to see. We are, in the Commission at least, continuing with our no deal planning and our agencies are putting out notices to the industry to explain what might happen and how they might want to prepare. But then, the responsibility is for the private sector to do that.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So, therefore, to the third question, the one that followed, ‘cause I think these are two completely interlinked questions, you cannot have the transition deal negotiated and agreed by end of March/early April 2018. You could have, in principle, like we had on the Irish border, we, sort of, had it in principle, and then maybe we don’t. So, you could have it in principle, but ultimately, it is – nothing’s done ‘til everything’s done applies to the transition agreement as well, correct?
Stefaan De Rynck
But you could have it in – and more like the citizens’ rights or the financial settlement as well. But indeed…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
But those aren’t confirmed ‘til…
Stefaan De Rynck
But nothing is agreed.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…they’re confirmed, are they?
Stefaan De Rynck
No, and exactly, those need to be translated into a legally precise text. Those are not confirmed until they’re politically endorsed, obviously, and European Parliaments on our side will have the last word on that, so…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
The European Parliament has a potential veto? If the European Parliament were not to be happy with whatever deal is organised, what would happen?
Stefaan De Rynck
Then there is – then the deal is not ratified.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And it goes back and is reviewed, or is that a negotiation between the EU 27…
Stefaan De Rynck
But…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…and Parliament, or would it then…
Stefaan De Rynck
But…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
…have to go back to the EU 27 UK?
Stefaan De Rynck
I think – and again, we shouldn’t get…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yes, legally, just…
Stefaan De Rynck
Yeah, legally, but still, what I say has also a political dimension and I think what is important to say is that Michele Barnier is involving the European Parliament extremely closely and indeed, President Juncker as well. You may have seen that he met with the MEPs that steered this for the European Parliament just before he met with the Prime Minister, on that Monday the 4th of December. So, we are briefing so-called Brexit Steering Group of the European Parliament before and after to make sure that we know what their concerns are and to avoid the kind of situation you exactly referred to.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay and there was one last question here: our relationship now and inside the transition, is the key question I think that came there from the gentleman at the back.
Stefaan De Rynck
Yeah, for us, the key for transition is the Single Market rules, the Customs Union rules, need to apply and that’s both rights and obligations. So, the UK maintains rights and obligations and that is the idea that we could work on for the transition period and as the European Council said, the UK will be outside of the institutions and outside of the EU agencies. Now, we’ll need to see what the UK wants to propose, if it wants to propose something further on that, or we start negotiating, based on our mandate. Again, we will need to see the precise terms of our mandate, which we hopefully will get by the end of January 2018, to then engage with the member states to thrash out the precise details of our position on the transition and then, take it forward in the negotiations.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay. Let’s get a few more questions in. There’s a lady – yes, please, madam, waiting there, yeah, her hand up in the white jacket. And you’ve been waiting very patiently, sir, as well, and as well there, yeah, at the back. Sorry, yeah, if you deal with the first one, lady, yeah, have you got the microphone?
Ana Cristina Coward
Yes, yeah, my name is Ana Cristina Coward, I’m a member of the Chatham House. My question relates to when you said, sorry, that the EU is not going to change for the UK because the UK wants to leave. My question regards – is regarding reform of the EU, because even though you’ve said that, I think it’s much easier if Brexit doesn’t happen, because the EU, in my view, was working very well. Unfortunately, what we’re coming across at this time is populist and far right movements all around Europe. So, I think it would be much easier if the EU started to see this as a reason to reform, regarding mass migration. I’m not talking about the free movement of people within the EU, it’s not that. I’m talking about the mass migration that was enforced in many European countries, which the E – sorry, what I’m saying is, shouldn’t the EU reform its policy of mass migration in face of the threat of terrorism? I’m not talking about EU nationals, I’m talking about outside nationals, to avoid the rise of the far right in other European countries, which could potentially also, affect the integrity of the EU as it is?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay and that might…
Ana Cristina Coward
And also, perhaps get a deal with the E – UK to stay in the EU.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Exactly, link those two things, uh-huh. Some people have been proposing those things. Gentlemen here, the microphone right at the back, yeah, gentleman here?
Chris Morris
Thank you, it’s Chris Morris, BBC. Stefaan, during the transition, the EU says the UK will stay in the Single Market, in the Customs Union. The Government says it will not be in the Single Market and the Customs Union. Is this just a linguistic dispute, given that you’re saying that all the rules and regulations will remain the same, or does it suggest that something more serious may be a January surprise emerging, as you start to look into the details of what the transition means?
Secondly, if I may, the political declaration you hope to reach on the future partnership by October next year, can you give some indication? I know you don’t have a mandate yet, which is a good excuse to hide behind, but can you give some indication of what kind of detail might be in that document and how long you think it might be? Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Okay, right – next one, you’re right, there we go and then, gentleman in the blue jacket over there, up against the wall, yeah. Please, Mary?
Mary Dejevsky
Mary Dejevsky, The Independent Former Foreign Correspondent. I’d like to ask you to clarify something that I think you said in the course of your presentation. You said that, and I think this refers to during the transition, “There would be no discretion for the UK to deviate from free movement rights,” and then you said, “Unless it expressly repeals the withdrawal treaty.” I wonder what you meant by that?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, okay, last question there, up against the wall?
Hasan Turunç
Yeah, Hasan Turunç from Turkish Business Association. Stefaan, so far the issues between EU and UK has been contentious issues, like Irish border, EU citizens. How about the next issues that seems more existential, like the ECG and the Customs Union, etc.? So, these are issues not contentious, these are existential. That’s what – like EU is EU or – and also, at the same time, this is the reason why we have a referendum in the UK, taking back control sovereignty. Do you think that will be the cut-off relations after that, so are you prepared for a no deal scenario? Thank you.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Prepared no deal. I think you said you were looking at negotiating on that. As we’re coming up, I think, close to the end of the time here, are you alright a little bit on time, are you? I think you’ve got this lot here. We’ll probably do it, I think. There was, oh yeah, one question here, which was right from the beginning, I’ve not taken. And there’s so many hands. And yes, yeah, I see one at the back as well, yeah. Sorry, I’ve got to go there. Yeah, first here and then right at the back of the room, next to the camera, please.
Robert Gardner
Robert Gardner, Chatham House. Before the referendum there was a debate here and Chris Grayling made a remark that said, “They’re not interested in proposing to leave the EU as it is today, but what they think it will become.” Two questions ever closer union, can you please define exactly what that means; And second of all, if ever closer union is a pillar of your organisation, are you going to ask the people of the 27 countries whether they think that’s a good idea or not? Thank you very much.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And Martin Schulz has some strong ideas on that. Yeah, gentleman there with the pink shirt, got a pink shirt right at the back next to the camera? [Pause] Nick?
Robert Hamilton
Robert Hamilton, Channel 4 News. We’re hearing that the Cabinet may be thinking of a plan of gradual divergence, so perhaps Britain leaves aligned in perhaps most, or even all sectors, and then only over time separate on some sectors and therefore, lose access as a result in those sectors. Is that something that you can see the EU 27 signing up to at any stage?
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Interesting, gradual divergence; might not be able to unify sectorally, but you could maybe gradually. Yeah, please?
Stefaan De Rynck
I think the first question is a broader political strategic question on popular discontent, basically, which is being expressed in many different member states. Not in all member states. You don’t get populist parties being so popular in all member states, but a number of them. So, it’s a challenge that clearly cuts across and affects many countries in Europe. Now, the EU will reform itself at 27. It is doing that all the time and that’s part of the ever-closer Union. Since 1956, if you look at where it has come, it’s much closer aligned now and closely integrated, I shouldn’t say aligned here, closely integrated.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
No, maybe you should.
Stefaan De Rynck
And no, no, no, absolutely not, closely integrated. But that is then, a question that the political class in different member states and in the EU institutions, will have to tackle more forcefully, and my personal view is, how do you deal with that popular discontent? How do you deal with people who say, “The economy doesn’t work for me anymore?” I think that goes then, beyond the whole Brexit negotiations, where it’s perhaps part of the background of the story.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
But there’s been quite a bit of discussion in the United Kingdom that if the EU were to be tightening movement of people, whether it’s for migration reasons, whether it’s for counter-terrorism, that that tightening up, in a period of uncertainty of an extended transition, might open up a possibility for the UK to have a different type of relationship, like other countries might do. And I’m just raising this, ‘cause it’s often discussed here that if the EU were to evolve in a way in the next couple of years, during an uncertain transition, then it might offer an opportunity for a, sort of, renegotiation in a different way. You think that – is it worth thinking in that way at all?
Stefaan De Rynck
But the Heads of State and Government have said it before, freedoms are indivisible, and they are attached to them and so, that’s the answer, I think. On the linguistic issue, I mean, the important thing for transition is that the rules remain clear from the start ‘til the end and that all the rights and obligations, as exist today for economic operators, for citizens as well, continue during the whole period of transition. So, there are lots of different words for that, but I think that is, in substance, what it is.
On the detail of political declaration, I will not venture into that field today on how many page. I think it’s way too early. It’s not just hiding behind due process. It is genuinely too early to come to that and the European Council was very firm in saying, “We would like the UK to clarify first, what it – exactly it is asking,” and that will be one of the important elements to get to that political declaration.
Yeah, the question on the express repeal of the withdrawal treaty, indeed, thanks for that question, ‘cause it leads to a lot of confusion amongst citizens’ rights groups sometimes and what does that mean? Indeed, for the registration system, EU Law applies, also post-Brexit. So, for the 3.2 million, the people that are protected on this side of the channel by the withdrawal treaty, the EU Law Principles details apply, and they have direct effect and that then, comes to the paragraph that seems to confuse some people. What does that mean?
It means that future UK rules will not overrule the rights of the withdrawal treaty. So, future Parliaments will not say, just a hypothetical, we’re no longer allowing the exportability of disability benefits and so on. The only way to do that is to have a repeal of the whole legislation, basically. So, you can’t have inconsistent rules building up over time, which means that the rights as they are on Brexit day in the withdrawal treaty, remain for the lifetime for these people. For newcomers it’s, of course, a different story. But for the people you protect, that is basically…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
And this is…
Stefaan De Rynck
…that what means, and it’s…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
The eight year limit is nothing to do with this?
Stefaan De Rynck
No, no, the eight year limit is only – it’s always UK Judges that will be in charge of judging, if there’s litigation, from a citizen against the state, let’s say, against the Home Office. And it’s only for eight years that the Judge has the possibility to ask the European Court of Justice, which then rules in a binding manner, obviously.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Does the plan of – I mean, I think the ever-closer union, I don’t think you’re going to describe what that means right now, but the plan of gradual divergence?
Stefaan De Rynck
Yes, although the ever-closer union was ratified by all 27 – 28 countries, I should say, and so, all Parliaments have ratified their treaties, yeah. So, it’s not something that Brussels invented. It’s something that all capitals have ratified. So, that’s – the question of gradual divergence, well, that seems, to me, stating the obvious, that as of when Brexit will happen, the UK will start diverging where it wants to, and it will need to tell us exactly where it wants to. And if it wants to align fully and not diverge at all in certain sectors, we would need to know that, in view of the negotiations for the future relationship, because that affects the level of commitments one could expect from both sides. So, it’s, kind of, stating the obvious, in my view, that there will be gradual divergence. But if the underlying idea is we’ll stay in Sector X/Y/Z until we are ready to no longer stay in Sector X/Y/Z, then obviously, we’re in the buffet style metaphor that I used in the beginning, which is not something that we would want to accept.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Do you think – as a closing question, do you think there is any space for the United Kingdom to consider being part of the European Economic Area in a minus way? And let me just – I know you said the models are all terrible, but they are, but just a Norway minus, rather than Canada plus, plus, plus? I mean, the idea that the United Kingdom – ‘cause, obviously, the EEA does provide some protection on the surges of migration. There is an expectation at the moment of being in Schengen, but maybe there doesn’t need to be. It allows you to be outside the Customs Union, as Norway is. This might be fine for the EU with Norway, ‘cause of the size of the Norwegian economy, but could you see some sort of model of the European Economic Area, either within an extended transition, or as part of the future debate, just from your experience of knowing the EU?
Stefaan De Rynck
No, but the EU has been clear that the Norway model, so to say, is on the table. I’m not sure what the minus then refers to.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Well, movement of people, I would think, in particular.
Stefaan De Rynck
So, less obligations, basically. I mean, we would like the Norway model, please, but with less obligations on us.
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
Yeah, well, why not?
Stefaan De Rynck
Well…
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
There’s a mutual interest, potentially, here. I think it goes to the first question. We don’t want to have a lose/lose that’s too lose/lose.
Stefaan De Rynck
I would say let’s see for the moment. We are negotiating with the UK Government who says, “No, we’re leaving the Single Market, we’re leaving the Customs Union.” We have always said, “That’s your choice. There are other choices. But that’s the choice and let’s then, negotiate on that basis.”
Dr Robin Niblett CMG
So, you want to hear a bit more from the UK. I think we all do, actually. So, we’d – but I think everyone here is going to be that much better informed about some of the detail, the minutiae, some of the implicit red lines. But also, if I may say, Stefaan, you brought also – I know you tried to keep this quite specific and technical, but I think you did bring in here some of the communication of the political dimensions of this. You clearly are listening, as are other members of the EU 27, the Commission, very carefully to what the dialogue is here, as you try to interpret what you may or may not accept, and I think that’s something that isn’t always fully understood on the UK’s side. And I think some of the detail that you brought here was very enlightening, I think, for those who are following this closely. And you saw you had a full room that stayed ‘til quarter past one. Probably no one’s had lunch here and they’ll be starving, including you. Can I have – very strongly, Stefaan De Rynck, hope we can have you back, thank you [applause].
Stefaan De Rynck
Thank you. Thank you [applause].
