Iran: Protests, politics and power

Dr Sanam Vakil

Good evening, everyone. Thank you for joining us for this Chatham House webinar on Iran: Protests, Politics and Power. My name is Sanam Vakil. I’m the Deputy Head of Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, and it’s my great pleasure to welcome three distinguished guests and experts here tonight, who will be walking us through these very complex issues for an on the record conversation.

Iran’s protests have been ongoing now for over two months. These protests were sparked by the tragic death of a young woman named Mahsa Amini, who was killed at the hands of Iran’s Morality Police, and since the protests erupted in late September, Iran has seen protests almost every day, bringing women, students, labourers, ethnic groups, the middleclass and young children also out onto the streets to express their anger over the variety of issues that plague the Islamic Republic. From women’s challenges, bailing, but also, economic grievances alongside, you see, the political challenges.

It’s my great pleasure tonight to welcome three experts who, each in their own right, have been following this issue alongside so many others. First let me introduce Robin Wright. Robin is well-known to almost everyone, she’s been a long-time follower of all things Iran. She’s a Columnist at The New Yorker, a Fellow at the US Institute of Peace and the Woodrow Wilson Center. She has published extensively on Iran and has written one of my favourite books, “The Last Great Revolution.” So, welcome, Robin, thank you for being here.

We’re also joined by Rob Macaire, who was the UK Ambassador from 2018 to 2021 to Iran, and was there at a very pivotal moment, and has been involved in the JCPOA negotiations for many years, and now he is Chief Advisor at Rio Tinto.

And last, and certainly not least, welcome to Hussein Ibish, who is a Senior Resident Scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington DC. Thank you all for being here. There is so much to discuss and I really want to turn the floor over to you, and I think I would just get started, Robin, and ask you quite quickly and directly, how are you seeing the protests today in Iran? They have been ongoing, as I mentioned, for nine weeks now. Government repression continues, and yet these protests are also continuing unabated.

It’s estimated that about 15,000 people have been detained in Iran, about 350 people have been killed, 50 of them young minors, and the Iranian Government is also, beyond these arrests, sentencing now a number of the protestors, five thus far, to death for their involvement in these protests. So, how do you assess what’s happening in Iran? You’ve been watching Iran for so long and you’ve seen rounds of past protests. Over to you, Robin, what do you see happening?

Robin Wright

Thank you so much, Sanam. I’m honoured to be on this panel with Rob and Hussein. This is such expertise on this panel. I’d say a number of things. First of all, these demonstrations are very different, because you have Gen Z involved, and this is the group of people between – born between the – 1997 and 2012, and they’re very distinct from their parents in that they did not witness the trauma of the Revolution or the post-Revolutionar – kind of, reconstruction period. They didn’t witness the Iran-Iraq War. They haven’t gone through those hardships. They haven’t been willing to compromise with the regime in order for their, you know, kind of, financial subsistence there. And so, they’re taking a very imaginative and bold stand, led for the first time in human history by young women. This is the first time we’ve seen women both inspiring a counter-revolution and being the leaders of it, and that’s going to make this historic, whatever happens.

The second thing I’d point out is that the Iranian Revolution took 14 months, and we’re seeing incredible longevity with these protests, longer than in 2017, longer than in 2019. But so far, the main [audio cuts out – 06:17], and by my count there are [audio cuts out – 06:19] in 43 campuses [audio cuts out – 06:25] 28 alone, 28 campuses in Tehran. And what’s striking is that this is, you know, covering whether it is conservative Mashhad, southern Bandar Abbas, Baluchistan in the South East, the Kurdish and Azeri issues in the North, that this really covers the country.

That does not necessarily mean, however, that this Gen Z has a common vision of the future, and I think one of the things that’s lacking so far is that sense of who’s the leader or who’s organising this, and what is their agenda for the future, what is their alternative vision? Is this another Arab Spring? And these are questions that none of us have the answer to, that inspire, you know, people across a region, that lead to the ouster of our regimes, but does not necessarily open the way for democracy, so, there are a lot of unanswered questions.

But clearly, there is new momentum, particularly there’s a strike, a three-day strike by the Bazaaris that began today, and so, we’re seeing different sectors of society join in. Not yet the way that the prominent legs of the Revolu – of the Shah’s era, the Bazaaris, the oil workers, the military turning on the regime. That hasn’t happened yet, but, you know, they haven’t been able to stop it, and that’s really telling.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Robin, I hear what you’re saying. We’re – we could be at the beginning of something, perhaps all of these threads and all of these cleavages could be weaved together, but really, I guess, we need time, momentum, organisation and leadership to develop. So, thanks for laying that out, and I want to come back to you, actually, and ask for your reflections on Gen Z, but also women in Iran and this moment of empowerment, because you have been in Iran and you’ve been, sort of, following some of these social changes.

But before we do that, I want to turn to Rob. Rob, you were in Iran for some pivotal years, including during the November protests, the Aban protests that were particularly violent, that – this is the anniversary period taking place today, and that’s why Iranian shopkeepers and bazaar merchants are striking in solidarity.

How are you seeing what’s happening in Iran today, is this a particular inflection point, and because of your interactions with the political establishment in Iran, I’m keen to know, do you think – what do you think that the Islamic Republic is thinking? How are they responding, is their response different than what we’ve seen in the past? I mean, Aban protests were particularly violent. It’s reported that 1,500 people were killed during those protests, so, keen to hear your views.

Robert Macaire

Yeah, thanks very much, Sanam, and I completely agree with everything that Robin has said, and I do think it’s important to try to understand this by trying to look at it through the eyes of the regime because, you know, we all see this through the eyes of the protestors, thanks to some incredibly brave citizen journalism and social media getting that footage out of what’s happening and, you know, that’s how it’s articulated to us in the West.

But, you know, if you just try to, sort of, think yourself into the position of the people in authority, that’s, to me, that’s the secret to trying to make sense of what might happen. So, you know, the security state in Iran, of course, is incredibly strong and not just through the IRGC, but, you know, particularly through having the Basij as well, the ability to del – to deploy, you know, almost unlimited amount of power to counter protests, in a way, having a range of tools that, you know, the Shah didn’t have 40 years ago.

But, you know, and, you know, they say the willingness to use that, as you say, the brutality of the response has been very serious. But at the same time, you know, there must be rifts and debates going on inside the regime, and they’re not going to be visible to us. You know, we see the echoes of it through what some public figures have said, and you can see some people positioning themselves a bit, and of course, we know that, for example, you know, the Sepāh, the IRGC is not a monolithic institution and there are different factions within it, although those are probably factions that are more to do with patronage networks than they are competing visions for the future of the Islamic Republic.

But nevertheless, behind closed doors, this debate must be going on, because the playbook of just cracking down is all very well and people well, you know, inside the regime, they’ll be thinking about 2009 and thinking, “Well, this was a success, you know, and the last time there was a really mass movement out there. We were able to suppress it by the use of violence and arrests and some, you know, suppression of various sorts.”

But at the same time, there – I’m absolutely sure there will be discussions going on about the fact that they have really run out of anything to offer the Iranian people. So, they’re not offering political reform of any form, they’re not offering any sort of social liberalisation, which at least was held out as a prospect under the Rouhani Government. They’re not offering any economic opportunity, because the economy is so badly damaged, and that’s partly because of corruption and inequality. But obviously largely because of sanctions and they’re not from – linked to that, they’re not offering a foreign policy that offers any pathway to greater rapprochement with any outside powers really, and let alone a lifting of those economic measures.

So, that must – you know, for – I – you know, there will be people inside the regime who are absolutely hard-line and just want to use the maximum amount of force. But all of that debate will be about regime survival, and that’s not about keeping alive the revolutionary flame, that’s about power and money and about people being able to hang on to it. And the question of whether it’s sustainable to carry on in this way when the regime is so bankrupt of anything, any sort of legitimacy, democratic or sort of through an unwritten contract with the people, it must be quite lively. And it may be that the answer is at the moment there is no other alternative future under the current Supreme Leader, but at the very least, I should imagine it’s conditioning private discussions about what happens at that moment of succession, whenever that comes.

So, you know, I’d say, now, I’m speculating because we don’t know, none of us see behind those closed doors, but that is an interesting thing to think about. And obviously, there – you know, in a rational world, you would say that the regime would want to relieve economic pressure on the people who are protesting by doing a deal on the JCPOA, accepting constraints on their nuclear programme and seeing sanctions being lifted. But the truth is of course that it’s probably the opposite applies, which is any prospect of doing a deal now would just be seen as weakness inside the regime, and there is of course – ooh, I think we maybe, sometimes we underestimate the amount of backstabbing and internal conflict and strife inside the regime. And I’m sure they’ll be looking around for scapegoats for what’s happening now, but certainly, no-one’s going to want to put their head above the parapet and say, “Now is the time to make concessions to the Americans and the West.” So, yeah, that’s one way of looking at it.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Rob, you really actually gave us a very broad tour-de-force, sort of, touching on so many of the issues that I think we need to delve into a bit deeper. So, I’m going to come back to you on them, but I mean, I think your point right that debates within the system, if you can imagine them playing out, you know, the optics of killing young children is really a difficult one, even for the Islamic Republic that has, in the past, not been afraid to gun down its citizens in very brutal ways. So, I think that that is something to consider.

But you also are quite right that competition is fierce and deep inside the Islamic Republic as well, and that oftentimes gets downplayed, between the power of the Supreme Leader and the lack of power of the Iranian President. But there is fierce competition, and that fierce competition we should get back to, and maybe reflect on succession, as well as, I’m keen to hear your views also on what this means for President Raisi. This has been a very tough year with not a lot of delivery for President Raisi, so, I’ll let you think about that, and let me turn to Hussein.

But before I turn to Hussein, I did neglect to tell our guests that I am going to open the floor to questions in about ten/15 minutes. Please put your questions in the chat, but I want to invite you to ask your questions live, so we can hear your voices and be as interactive as possible. And we’re keen to answer as many questions as you might have, so, please, put them into the Q&A box, thank you.

Hussein, you follow everything in the region in-depth, and Robin mentioned the Arab Spring and, you know, I can’t help but wonder how the myriad of regional states, and I don’t want to ask you to have to respond from every Arab state around Iran’s perspective, but, you know, what is the region thinking about these protests? Iran, of course, has a history of protests, and Iran had, you know, the 2009 protests before the Arab Spring but, you know, what are Gulf states thinking, what are, you know, Iraqis thinking? Kurdistan has been attacked a few times already, you know, and regional states have also been quite…

Hussein Ibish

Yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

…quiet because…

Hussein Ibish

Right.

Dr Sanam Vakil

…these protests are quite scary, you know.

Hussein Ibish

Yes.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Could this lead to the disintegration of the Islamic Republic, the downfall of the Islamic Republic, or a fierce regional response from the Islamic Republic? What do you see?

Hussein Ibish

So, I agree with that. I think it is really striking that the main adversaries of Iran in the region, and Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, where I am now, have been very quiet about the protests and very – and therefore you can read into that a certain ambivalence, right? They don’t know whether this is an opportunity, and it’s very clear they have not been trying to meddle. They haven’t been funnelling money into – despite claims by the Iranian regime, they have not really been funnelling cash into insurgent groups, or trying to, you know, gin up the protests through media or in any other way.

On the other hand, there is a temptation here clearly to think that maybe this weakens the Iranian regime, and therefore strengthens their hands in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Now, I think that it’s obvious that the easiest way out for the regime is some sort of a resurrection of the JCPOA and reduction in sanctions, but I think everybody’s right that there are different factions.

I’d just like to say, I see signs of the emergence very quietly of a faction that wants to do a deal on the JCPOA. And things like the recent article by Seyed Hossein Mousavian, who doesn’t only speak for himself, but has friends and is, kind of, a bellwether, who suggested that some sort of reforms combined with economic relief through doing a deal on the JCPOA would be the right course for the regime.

I don’t think that emerges in a vacuum. I think there are people deeper inside the regime, even among hard-liners, who think that’s the easiest way out. Because I think, I can’t imagine the military of Iran, as the Egyptian military would not, opening fire on ordinary people, on their mothers and sisters and brothers, and what have you.

So, having said that, there are also Iran’s clients in the region, right? So, there’s the Syrian regime, Hezbollah, the PMFs and the Houthis. I think all of them are a bit unnerved by the protests, but they have been much more immediately involved in the Arab Spring. So, they’re a bit unnerved in a way, but also, kind of, sanguine. So, I think you have a kind of hubristic confidence on the part of Iran’s clients in the region. They think it’s all okay. They don’t see any big threat to the regime, and they’re not worried yet.

On the side of Iran’s adversaries, I think you do see, as I said, this kind of ambivalence that I described, and that’s really the biggest thing. The big question mark is, how does this affect the regime’s response in the potential resurrection of the JCPOA or something like it with the United States and the P5+1? Plus, there are these dialogues that are ongoing between Saudi Arabia and Iran in Iraq, and between the UAE and Iran, that purport to be about maritime issues and the islands that are disputed, but actually are about everything else as well.

I think one of the real questions is – here is whether this makes Iran more conducive to deals on all of those fronts, or whether it makes Iran more intransigent, and we don’t really know yet what the answer is. We did see the most interesting development, you know, along those lines, in recent days, was the – that Saudi Arabia alerted the United States to a purported Iranian military threat. Some sort of sabotage or attack or missile or drone attack along the lines of the September 2019 hyper-precision missile and drone attack on Abqaiq and Khurais, the Saudi Aramco facilities, that was very devastating. And the American response was to scramble jets and really deter, a show of force, of military force that hasn’t been seen in a long time in this region. That seemed to be an effort not only to pushback against any effort by IRGC or Iranian hard-liners’ attempts to stage an attack against Saudi Arabia as a distraction or change of subject for the Iranian people, the Kurdish threat, I think, having been rather played-out, right? So, the US wasn’t going to allow that.

But also, I think, it has an important role in the US-Saudi dialogue where the Saudi question has been, “Where are you on our security?” And the American answer is, “Right here. Now, where are you on our energy prices? We’d better see something on December 5th, when OPEC+ meets again, and when the seaborne oil imports from Russia become boycotted formally by Europe.” That happens on the same day, and seems to me a very interesting and important convergence of influence. So, Iran plays a major role in all of this by being both a threat and an opportunity, and I think everyone’s still waiting to see how this instability influences Iran’s approach to all of that.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Hussein, you gave us a lot to think about, and thank you for also connecting this to dynamics in Washington, tensions between Riyadh and the Biden administration over OPEC+, over the war in Russia, and it’s a perfect segue, actually, to turn back to Robin. You know, the scrambling of jets and this show of force, and the definition of perhaps maybe a new US policy towards Iran could be emerging. What do you think?

President Biden, on the campaign trail in advance of the elections, I think, said, “We’re going to free Iran pretty soon,” and I practically fell off my chair when I heard that, ‘cause I thought regime change was formally off the table. What do you make of all of this? Is the Biden administration in a new, sort of, predicament with the protests, and does this, sort of, tie their hands on the JCPOA, or are they defining a new policy towards Iran that has yet to be made public?

Robin Wright

A great question. I think the administration is in a bit of a predicament, but policy has not changed. I put that question to the National Security Council on the record the next day and said, you know, “Has something changed?” And the answer is no. I think this is one of the President’s, kind of – he does this occasionally, a slip, and he’s done the same thing on Taiwan, and they – and the administration quickly comes back and says, “No, no, no, our policy hasn’t changed.” So, this is – the administration has shown open support for the protestors. It has again today imposed yet another round of sanctions, as it has several times on the Morality Police, the Iranian broadcasting system and others who’ve engaged in the various aspects of the crackdown.

The administration does not have a policy of regime change, and I think one of the lessons that President Biden learned during the Arab Spring is “let the people decide their own future.” That’s been, you know, a constant argument in Washington: “How much do you try to shape what happens, and how much do you let history, kind of, evolve rather than try to change it?” The lessons of 1953.

But I think there is a sense in Washington that we’re reaching a really interesting turning point for Iran one way or the other. First of all, the regime is entrenched. The two symbols of the Islamic Republic are domestically the hijab, in other words, a way of saying this – “Islamic law and Islamic traditions are most important,” and the antipathy toward the United States. And this Raisi administration has not been willing to show compromise on either, and in fact is heading toward and growing confrontation, both on domestic policy and foreign policy. And this comes as the – as Rob mentioned, the, you know, the possibility of a transition in the near future. And you have to wonder if there was some kind of challenge to – further challenge to the Supreme Leader’s health at the – at a time that the protests are ongoing. And then in the context of all this you have Ayatollah Sistani, who’s 92, the Leader of the Shi’ite world. I mean, there are a lot of transitions that could, kind of, intersect and playout in very dynamic ways.

I just want to make one more point, and that is that when we – we keep talking about the future of the regime, in terms of what’s playing out on the ground right now. And I think the basic question that has defined tensions inside Iran from day one has been the question of, “Is the Islamic Republic of Iran first and foremost Islamic, which God’s law is supreme, or is it first and foremost a Republic, in which man’s law ultimately decides policy and actions?” And we’ve seen that playout in the Presidential elections, who takes power, and that plays out today more than ever, especially with this transition looming. So, the stakes are much broader than the future of these protests, it really is whether or not the regime survives, what it does. Does it entrench itself further, or does it adapt? And there are no indications that it’s willing to adapt.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Robin. I mean, you’ve really laid out what is ahead for the Islamic Republic. It is clearly at an inflection point, and so much of its future is hanging on succession, key decisions over the JCPOA, but also legitimacy and a really frayed, you know, deeply broken social contract. And none of the pathways ahead really indicate that the system is willing to make decisions, and this really leaves such a bleak and heart breaking outcome, I think, for Iranians.

Rob, you know, Hussein was positive, or he sees positive signs on the JCPOA, potentially positive signs on the JCPOA, and you, sort of, indicated that, you know, if the state was rational, or from our version of rationality, the deal would be a useful deal. What is your thinking on how the leadership in Iran might react right now in this moment, might they embrace the deal or make steps towards a deal?

And at the same time, are there actions – I mean, or what is your thinking about the Western policy response? There’s been support for the protests, sanctions have been coming down from all sorts of European capitals. Is this – are these protests going to close off an avenue, or make it much more difficult for the international community to sign a JCPOA if Iran suddenly says, “Let’s go, let’s do it?”

Robert Macaire

Yeah, thanks for that, Sanam. I mean, there’s two questions there, I suppose. On the question of the Western response to the protests, I mean, I very much echo what Robin said. I mean, there’s a shadow hanging over, you know, from, sort of, 2009, where, you know, President Obama was criticised for not doing enough to support the Green Movement, and I think himself said afterwards he wished he’d done more.

But the bigger shadow, as Robin said, is 1953, you know, because I think a lot of Iranians still think that the US or the UK or other Western powers have the ability and/or the intent to intervene in some way in Iran, which of course isn’t remotely realistic these days, and hasn’t been since 1953, but that’s how it’s seen. And, you know, it is really important to stand up for the rights of the protestors, stand up for the rights of people to make their wishes known, but also, the demands that they have and the, you know, the demand just to be able to live a normal life. And the sanctions on individual and institutional human rights abusers are important, even if they’re largely symbolic.

But I think it is also really important to – you know, one of the most important things is to allow free and unbiased journalism to continue from outside the country, given the certain restrictions inside the country. So – but that’s about it, because this is really a question for the Iranian people.

I mean, coming onto the question about the JCPOA and what this does for that, I agree with Hussein. I’m sure there’s a faction inside the regime who are supportive of it, but in a sense, you know, there always has been. I think the trouble is that even before these protests brought – broke out, the regime had not been able to reach significant consensus around doing a deal. And the deal on the table, I mean, I – and of course, I was involved in its talks in Vienna, you know, over the, sort of, Christmas period, you know, for quite a while, and, you know, it’s a pretty clear deal. You know, it is lifting substantially all the nuclear-related sanctions in return for a return to the restrictions on the nuclear programme. And Iran has not been able to get to a position of doing that.

I just think it feels quite unrealistic they would come to that decision in the current context, and I think it would be very difficult for the West if – in the situation where there are actually people out on the streets, to be seen to be doing something. It would be – in the West, there’d be allegations that this was giving a concession to Iran, which of course it wouldn’t be because, you know, the nuclear programme is a massive concern, and if you had real constraints on it, that would be worth getting.

I, sort of, feel that the original JCPOA, you know, may not be attainable any more, you know, because the sunsets are now so short, if you went back to it. You’d need to have a deal that reset the clock in some way, and that’s going to be very hard to negotiate and none of that could happen very soon. But I do really strongly believe that the fundamental logic for both sides of having a deal that lifts those nuclear-related sanctions in return for the serious constraints on the programme, you know, has to make sense, and it will – that will therefore come back at some point. It just doesn’t feel realistic politics that it’s going to happen any time soon, and I hope I’m wrong but, you know, that’s how it feels.

And finally I would say that, you know, lifting those sanctions, you know, shouldn’t be seen as, you know, a concession. You know, a deal like that has advantages and actually, you know, there’s a logic behind the lifting of those sanctions. Other sanctions would remain for other reasons, but it is not necessarily against the interests of protestors, for example.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Rob. Let me ask Hussein one more question, and then I’m going to open…

Hussein Ibish

Okay.

Dr Sanam Vakil

…up the floor. Hussein, you rightly mentioned Saudi-Iranian talks. There were five rounds, but those talks haven’t really developed further at this time, and of course revelations that Iran is exporting UAVs, drones to Russia that are being used in the Ukraine war further complicate an already complex regional picture and regional landscape.

Is this a gamechanger in Iran’s regional and international role? Is this concerning Gulf states, for example, this…

Hussein Ibish

In the process.

Dr Sanam Vakil

…further export of lethal aid abroad, or is this helping their cause and drawing attention to what Gulf states have, you know, constantly been, sort of, pointing to, that Iran is a regional menace, and hence the regional issues that require further attention?

Hussein Ibish

You’re talking about the sale, the drone sale to Russia, right?

Dr Sanam Vakil

Yes, yes.

Hussein Ibish

And I think it’s the second. I think the – one of the reasons why the Gulf countries are less concerned than they were in the past about the JCPOA is not just that it became clear to them that it – this is not, cannot and will not be the prelude to the United States, sort of, switching partners in the Gulf region from the Arab states to Iran, that’s obviously out of the question under the – you know, the current regime is simply an anti-status-quo power, and that is not going to happen. And that was a nightmare, you know, back during the early part of the second Obama term. I mean, it really was a suspicion in the Gulf that, “Oh, my goodness, they’re going to make this deal with the Iranians, and then they’re going to, you know, sort of, switch partners.” And so, that’s not going to happen.

But I think the threat that’s emerged, other than the nuclear threat and other than the long-established threat of Iran’s network of regional armed gangs: Hezbollah, the PMFs, the various Brigades in Syria, the Houthis even, etc., beyond that is Iran’s arsenal of conventional missiles and drones and rockets with precision, and indeed hyper-precision guidance, has been a gamechanger, right, for them. So, the main way they project power in the region is through these armed gangs, and the main way they exert a, sort of, a threat and a deterrent regionally is through these missiles and rockets that we’ve seen used to great effect, especially in September 2019.

Now, the – for the Gulf countries, when they see Iran exporting drones and rockets and guidance to a country like Russia, it only underscores the fact that this really is a – that’s the gamechanger, that was the gamechanger. That was what really, sort of, I think, was the last major development that restructured thinking in the Gulf about Iran, was the realisation of how far advanced Iran was with conventional missiles and rockets and drones, and guidance, and precision and hyper-precision guidance, and what it could do. And that became very clear, you know, towards the end of the Trump term, and so, yeah, it just underscores that.

I would like to add one quick thing, which is, yeah, the JCPOA, as such, may not be salvageable. You could try to resume dialogue on less contentious issues. There are a bunch of outstanding issues between Iran and the United States and, you know, various disputes about property, about prisoners, things like that. Potentially – you know, I wouldn’t completely dismiss the idea that both sides at this point could find a value in resuming a dialogue, you know, based on something a lot less dramatic than rejiggering the JCPOA. And of course, the Ambassador is right about not just the sunsets, but Iran’s R&D and the centrifuge expertise that it’s gained. Even if you were to extend the sunset, it would still be a threshold state, because when you achieve that level of mastery, you can’t undo that. You can’t shoot everybody who knows how to do that and, you know, so, it, sort of, renders the 2015 agreement, you know, kaduk, as they say, but there you go.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thanks, Hussein. I think you’ve brought up a really important point that perhaps is a little bit beyond the purview of this conversation, but the takeaway from 2019 and Iran’s, sort of, precision, highly-developed programme is the, sort of, development of indigenous programmes around the region. And I think that is concerning and doesn’t get enough attention, but we’ll park that for now. And I, you know, I can’t help but add that I do deeply worry that Iran’s, sort of, takeaway from watching the war in Ukraine and Russia’s positioning as a weakened state, perhaps similar to Iran, is that its nuclear card, its nuclear programme is its best asset. So, perhaps it shouldn’t barter that away in this moment of perceived weakness, but maybe that’s my own pessimism or cynicism seeping into this conversation.

Okay, lots of great questions have come in. I would first call on Benjamin Gray, and if you could please direct your questions to either Robin or Rob or Hussein, that would be really helpful.

Benjamin Gray

[Pause] It’s a question for the whole panel, but what role do you envisage the Iranian diaspora playing in this moment?

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay. Does Robin – should I turn to you first on that one?

Robin Wright

I cover Iran and I don’t cover the diaspora, so, others will be better on that subject than I.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Hussein or Rob, any thoughts on the diaspora?

Hussein Ibish

Maybe it’s a question for you. Maybe it’s a question for you, Sanam. I think it is. I really can’t answer.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Okay.

Hussein Ibish

I have no idea, so, yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

I’ll wade in on this, but it’s, you know, dangerous territory, and it’s dangerous territory because obviously the diaspora is, very rightly, mobilised and very emotional. There are five million Iranians living abroad, and five million Iranians have been traumatised by exile, and diaspora life and, you know, clearly have a sense of solidarity, deep solidarity and emotionality with what’s going on in Iran.

As a member of the Iranian diaspora, I humbly do not think, and this is going to get me in a lot of trouble, that the diaspora has a huge role to play, beyond providing symbolic support for the protests. I myself struggle watching young people and fellow Iranians going out and putting themselves in harm’s way while I’m sitting very comfortably in London. And so, I approach this with a lot of humility and I admire the bravery, but I can’t, in good conscience, send people into a dangerous situation.

I think the diaspora has a problem though, that it’s very divided, highly competitive and doesn’t demonstrate signs of a unified and supportive society willing to help nurture political evolution in Iran. I would like to see my fellow activists and members of the diaspora come together, be more unified, supportive of divergent views, and ultimately think about what people inside Iran need more than anything. And I think that is really where we should be investing our time and energy and it’s, sort of, bleak to say that, but this is a fight that has to be taken by Iranians inside Iran. I don’t think that this is a fight that we can playout in London or Paris or Los Angeles or Melbourne, for that matter. So, my two cent on that very controversial question, and no doubt, I will be attacked on Twitter and every social media platform for that statement. So, welcome to the diaspora.

Elizabeth Balsam, please come in, and it would be great if you could direct your question to a specific member of the panel.

Elizabeth Balsam

Well, I think, in a way, Hussein partly answered my question, or started to touch it. I was wondering to what extent Iran’s relationship with Russia and supplying the drones, which seems to be very important in the war with Rus – in Ukraine, is strengthening the regime?

And I did have another question, which, I apologise, is so ignorant, but I do struggle to get my head around why a piece of cloth, which a woman covers her hair with, is so vital for – to a regime? It just seems totally crazy to me, but…

Dr Sanam Vakil

Hussein, why don’t you take the Russian one, and then…

Hussein Ibish

Well, you know…

Dr Sanam Vakil

…I wanted Robin to speak about women as well, so…

Hussein Ibish

Yeah, I’ll pass. I’d like to hear Robin on both, but just – I just want to say one quick thing about this. I mean, look, it – the biggest thing that has strengthened Iran, in regard to the Ukraine war, is not the sale of drones or its emergence as a purveyor of cheap weapons. It is the fact that Russia has had to remove assets and soldiers and military personnel and equipment from Syria, alright.

Iran and Russia have had a frenemy-like competition in Syria, where they joined together, along with Hezbollah, in the fall of 2015 to save al-Assad’s dictatorship from collapsing, which they successfully did. But since then there’s been a, kind of, jockeying, a subtle jockeying for influence in Syria, which then extends into Lebanon, extends into Iraq, etc., and Russia’s, you know, commitment in Ukraine has made [inaudible – 44:43] greatly strengthening Iran’s position in Syria, and therefore also in Lebanon, etc., and that’s the bigger thing. So, with that, I throw it right to Robin.

Robin Wright

So, thanks. Look, the United States now views Iran as a full combatant, meaning fully engaged in Russia’s war in Ukraine. It not only is providing at least two types, and possibly a third type of drone, but it has dozens of Iranian forces in Crimea, training the Russians. This is no longer subterfuge. This is now a very public alliance, and the United States charges that, in turn, the Russians are helping Iran deal with the protests.

So, this is a two-way street, and this is deepening a strange alliance. They are odd bedfellows, considering Russia’s occupation of Iran during World War Two, which was the first crisis of the then United Nations, and led – eventually that was the seed of the Cold War. But this is one of those traditional “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” and they are aligned, both countries under – facing severe US sanctions, pressure from the West. And this is a very interesting moment because there is a strong suspicion that Iran is going to provide missiles to Russia, surface-to-surface missiles, that it may be a conduit for weaponry from other countries, including North Korea. So, you cannot understate the importance of Iran’s role in Ukraine now.

The United States charges that it is responsible for – these drones are responsible for civilian deaths, and that could open the way for, if there are eventual war crimes, for the Iranians to be brought into that process as well.

On the question of the hijab, look, I think the thing to me that’s striking, and I’ve been covering Iran since 1973, since, you know, the Shah’s era, is that the hijab, for 30-plus years, has been challenged by women. I have seen the hijab slip further and further and further back on their heads, and I always wonder how they manage to keep it on. So, this is not something that is original, this is something that has been growing in momentum, whether it’s the shortening of the, kind of, dress, loose dress that women are supposed to wear, the tightening of jeans.

You know, I remember the days when I had to wear Band-Aids over my fingers because I had nail polish on, and today the girls wear black and purple nail polish. You know, this – you know, societies evolve, and Iran’s society is a very dynamic, energetic, sophisticated and modern society. And they, with the access to technology, want to be part of the outside world, and – but, as I said earlier, the hijab is the symbol of repression.

I think what’s striking is that the girls in schools are taking off their scarves and pulling down the pictures of the Supreme Leader, and stomping on them and shouting “death to the dictator.” This – again, the “death to the dictator” is not new, it’s been echoed throughout the last 13 years of protests. But I want to remind everyone that the Gen Z in Iran only constitutes 20% of the population, and that is – you know, these are the kids of the baby-boom generation produced after the Revolution, when Iran wanted women to breed an Islamic generation, and they did, and these are now those kids, and they’re – Iran introduced a very effective birth control programme, and so, the population went from six children per family down to less than replacement, under two. And so, you have a very, you know – the distribution of the population, the demographics of the protests and the political situation are really very important.

One final thing, just to weigh in on what you’ve talked about earlier, and that is the debate within. I think one of the striking things is that the former high-profile figures of the Reformist era, whether it’s Qatami or Rohani or Zarif, have increasingly been silenced. One of the most dangerous position to hold in Iran is former President. They’re often silenced, unable to be quoted, to travel, to attend public meetings, and so, when you talk about debate, you have to realise that the debate is in a smaller and smaller and smaller group, and that’s the dangerous part, that there is not the, kind of, organic path of political, you know, of the political process.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Robin, and thank you also for bringing up the demographics, ‘cause I think that’s very important. Iran is an ageing society in the Middle East, and it’s – the largest portion of its population is middle-aged, between the ages of 35 and 45. Ashkan Hasheimipour, please come in, and I think it would be great to get Rob’s view on your question, and perhaps I might add onto it. So, Ashkan, please go ahead.

Ashkan Hasheimipour

Yeah, thank you so much, Sanam, and thank you to all the panellists. So, Robin, you responded to this a bit at the end of your – at the end of the last question, but I was wondering, given that in 2009 during the protests, even though there were some protestors in that movement calling for the fall of the regime, we did see reformists and moderates like Rafsanjani and Mousavi [inaudible– 50:17], etc., coming out and supporting protests. Is it possible that anyone politically can defect and support the protestors, or have the protestors’ demands just gotten too maximalist and, like, a universal calling for the end of the regime, to that even be a possibility for anybody?

And then additionally, in terms of the armed forces, obviously we probably won’t see on, like, [inaudible – 50:43] Tehran, anyone defect from there, but given that there are a lot of different armed groups in Iran like Artesh, is it possible that anybody on that side, the military side, could defect? And if that will have any effect? So, yeah, thank you.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Rob, if I could just add one more layer, how do you see the protest impacting succession politics, if at all? I mean, we are very much in the fog of all of this, but is there an outcome where this matters for succession, considering the moderate and reformist elements that Ashkan also referenced?

Robert Macaire

Yeah, well, I think we, you know, obviously need quite a lot of humility in trying to make predictions about what goes on inside Iran. Having said that, I think it’s quite hard to see how any political figure could come out and try and put themselves as a figurehead for these protests, which are seen to be regime-threatening, you know, because of that, sort of – you know, someone who puts their head above the parapet. There’s no-one strong enough to do that and not to be brought down by the regime, because the regime’s survival instinct is incredibly strong and it is, as I said earlier, it is – there was a huge amount of self-interest in this.

I mean, this regime was back-to-the-wall. I mean, you know, even 40 years ago, the Shah and the people around him were able to flee and start new lives. You know, it’s not that easy if you’re a senior Ayatollah or a senior IRGC General, there’s not so many options. So, you know, these are people who have control of the power and the wealth of the state, and they don’t want to give it up, and they will do anything to hang onto it. So, you know, it is difficult to see someone emerging to do that in that way.

I think what is interesting, and it perhaps refers back to some of the – the earlier question about the hijab, is that, you know, that’s a very symbolic thing. It doesn’t seem logical from outside, but a lot of senior Clerics have said, “This is,” you know, “if we give way on this, the whole regi – the whole Islamic Republic falls. This is symbolic of the entire thing that we’ve built.” And so, you know, if they were forced by protests to maybe, you know, stop enforcing it without admitting – you know, without changing the law, you know, would that open the door to other change? And I think those are the, sort of, dynamics that it’s really important to watch.

And then finally on the question of succession, well, look, you know, President Raisi must have known when he took the job in a way that was, you know, the most stage-managed of the Iranian elections, that the trade-off that was being made was that the regime was more coherent, more unified, stronger and tighter, but also much smaller in the circle of power, and with much less public credibility and legitimacy. And, you know, without the regime, the hard-line being able to blame a Reformist President, you know, they’re responsible for everything that happens so, there – he must have known that there was a risk that his ambition to be Supreme Leader, you know, would be threatened by what happened, and him being tainted by whatever was to happen on his watch.

But clearly this must be having that impact. It’s very difficult to see him not being tainted by this, although I’m not sure that it makes the prospect of Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, more attractive either. So, that’s why I said earlier, I think the debate around succession, which again is not visible, certainly to me, I don’t know if anyone else feels it is visible to them, but, you know, it’s probably affected by what’s happening on the streets.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Absolutely, thank you, Rob. James Gaunt, you have a good question that I think we should draw attention to [pause]. If we – okay [pause]. James, are you there [pause]? Hello? I can read your question, if you have a hard time connecting. Okay, in the interests of time, because we’re running out I’m going to do that.

“The recent missile strikes against Kurdish opposition groups, do you think that these are designed to divert attention away from the instability within Iran, or does the Iranian state really view these groups as a threat to its border security in the Iran/Iraq/Kurdish area? Are we going to see ongoing strikes, missile and drones, so long as the protests continue?” Hussein?

Hussein Ibish

Sorry. My sense is that it is – was at least 95% driven by a desire to create a ginned-up national threat on the border area, an external threat, a non-Persian threat, a threat that appears to have also “foreign hand” connections and all that good stuff, that everybody who wants to oppose a popular uprising generally tends to reach for.

It had all of those features, and I don’t think the Iranian regime was terribly afraid of these Kurdish groups, or of the situation on the border with Iraq, at least in that regard. Would we see more of it? Sure, we might, but I think the turn towards Saudi Arabia, which was thwarted, either because it wasn’t going to happen in the end, or because the United States made it clear that the price would be very high and that the US was not going to turn a blind eye this time, which was a very good thing, that either way, what it suggests is that the external Kurdish threat and “foreign-hand” routine is maybe played out, and perhaps they need something else now. So, you might see some more, but it strikes me that that card has been played and really didn’t get them anywhere.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Hussein. In the interests of time, I’m just going to read out two more questions and ask you all to reflect and respond as you wish. Mohammed al-Shamsi is asking – and since we’re sticking to the role of the external powers here, “Do you see Israel as involved covertly in Iran during the protests?” And, you know, as uncertainty is, sort of, clouding our judgement here, we don’t know what’s going to happen with the JCPOA. Netanyahu is back in office, you know, how is Israel going – how do we imagine Israel playing its hand, you know, remains the big, sort of, variable here as well.

And last, but certainly not least, Kieran Allen is also asking about “China’s expertise and involvement in managing internal repression inside Iran.” So, Robin, let me turn to you first to answer what you wish and share any final thoughts. Thank you.

Robin Wright

Sure. I think one of the interesting things about China and Iran today is that China has been the main economic outlet for Iranian oil and helped it, its so-called “Resistance Economy” actually survive. There were expectations that Trump’s “Maximum Pressure” campaign might cripple or at least deeply hurt, and Iran, you know, its currency’s in serious trouble, but – and prices still go up, but the economic card has not yet intersected with the protests on the ground.

So, China is an important player, but I suspect China is looking at the war in Ukraine and Russia and so forth and think, “Let them all worry about, you know, what’s – Iran’s protests, they’ve all got their own internal problems,” and China has its agenda, and it’s just blowing ahead without, you know, the world using its resources to focus on China.

I just want to say, on the – I think the JCPOA is virtually dead, if not formally dead, and I think one of the things to watch is what talks happen between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Iran, because there are issues that date back to 2003 that are now on the table again. And Iran faces, you know, censure and referral to the United Nations, and that’s a slow-moving dynamic, but could intersect, in terms of what the world does in response.

The sanctions by Europe, the sanctions by the United States over the protests; now you’ve got this secondary issue, technically unrelated to the JCPOA, but it reflects that element of tensions with the outside world. So, there are a lot of growing pressures, and I think the – whether it’s the attack on the Kurds or the planned attack on Saudi Arabia, it shows that Iran is trying to divert attention.

And just one final note: Esmail Qaani, the Head of the Revolutionary Guards, is in Baghdad today, and I suspect it’s because the Iraqis want clarification on the attacks on its soil.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you, Robin. Rob.

Robert Macaire

Yeah, well, obviously, the Iranian system attributes an awful lot of things to outside hands, and in particular Israel, so, if you believed that everything that they said was, you know, was true, then Israel would be doing everything, controlling everything that happens inside the country, and clearly that’s not the case. It’s clearly exaggerated, and obviously, it doesn’t mean to say there’s nothing at all that Israel is doing, but I just don’t believe that any foreign power has a say over young women coming out on the streets to protest.

You know, it’s so clearly genuine and spontaneous that to believe that it’s promoted by a foreign power is just fanciful, and I don’t think it has any traction really, except amongst the most, sort of, extreme regime, sort of, loyalist factions, who will always be loyal. I think for anyone in the middle ground, they would look at the allegations and regard them as removing credibility of the regime rather than increasing it.

Hussein Ibish

Yeah, I think it’s the kind of thing people say rather than believe, much like election denial in the United States, it’s something people say.

Robert Macaire

Yeah.

Dr Sanam Vakil

Thank you. Thank you to all, really, this was a rich discussion, reflective of all of your knowledge and insight and experience in following Iran domestically and regionally and internationally. But also you brought actually a macro perspective to the Iran conundrum that continues to really be an international policy problem, and we’ll be watching this space for the next weeks and months, if not years to come.

So, thank you for joining us, Robin, Rob and Hussein. It was a real pleasure, and thank you to all of our guests who sent in questions and listened intently. It was a pleasure to be with you all tonight, and have a good evening, have a good afternoon, and look forward to seeing you all again before too long. Goodnight.

Robert Macaire

Thanks very much.