Negotiating with the Taliban

Dr Renata Dwan

Good afternoon, good morning for our colleagues, good evening if you’re joining us from further East of the UK, and welcome to Chatham House. My name is Renata Dwan, and I am Deputy Director here in Chatham House. We’re delighted to have you join us today with a very distinguished panel, to discuss a topic very much in the news today, Negotiating with the Taliban.

Now, obviously, the Taliban takeover on the 15^th of August caught everyone in and around the world by surprise in its scale and its speed and its totality. And I think it’s fair to say that it also appeared to take the Taliban itself by surprise. In that time, we’ve – since, the world has grappled to respond to the situation on the ground, the scale of the humanitarian crisis. We saw in 2021 a second severe drought in three years, fighting that had a huge scale of disruption and harm on civilians. So, even before the takeover, we had a population very much in need, facing acute levels of food insecurity, currently estimated to be over 47% of the population in insecure food situations. And of course, we also saw a population and a country heavily dependent on overseas development authorit – assistance. It’s estimated that 75% of the country’s budget was reliant, and the government budget, reliant on overseas developmental systems.

That aid has stopped, that has frozen since the assumption of the Taliban’s resumption to power and so too had international cash transfers as a function of, as a consequence of US and UN sanctions. In the case of the US, on the Taliban as a movement itself, in the case of the UN, on individuals now in the Taliban leadership regime. With that has meant the collapse of remittances to the country and the ability to keep the country in cash circulating. So, we have, essentially, economy in free flow.

To help us discuss what that means and to help us explore what are the options for international aid actors, for Afghans on the ground, for development donors to engage, we have a great panel today. So, let me briefly introduce them to you and then I will run through the modalities for co-operating for – with them, for engaging with them, before we hand over to the panel.

First, we’re joined by Dr Orzala Nemat. Dr Orzala is an internationally known Afghan scholar and activist, currently with the School of Oriental and Asian Studies in London, and she has been involved in setting up, in leading and in running multiple Afghan civil society organisations, looking at Afghan issues, looking at Afghanistan and looking, in particular, at Afghan women. Dr Orzala, welcome to join us today. I’m delighted also to welcome, from the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, we’re joined by Patricia Escolano Guiote, Deputy Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific. And Patricia has also served in Kabul, in Afghanistan with the ICRC delegation there. Last, but by certainly no means least, join me in welcoming Indrika Ratwatte, who is Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific at the UN High Commission for Refugees. He also has had a long and distinguished career in the region, including as UNHCR’s representative in Pakistan. So, it’s a great panel and I’m delighted to have them here with us today.

Let me just note that this conversation is on the record and is being recorded, and so, please do add any questions that you’d like to put to the panel. Please feel free to put in the Q&A function that you’ll see on your screen. I will try to take as many of them as I can, so do start putting them in early, even before the – we open up for questions. And if you would like me to read it out, please indicate. We may bring in some people, if we can, pending time. So, very much look forward to this discussion today.

I’m going to start with you, appropriate, I think, Orzala, as the Afghan among us, to maybe just describe for us the situation on the ground right now and what is the context of this political, the security and above all, the humanitarian and development situation, Orzala?

Dr Orzala Nemat

Thank you very much, Dr Dwan. It’s a great pleasure and honour to be part of this distinguished panel. Afghanistan, at the present, is probably in its most challenging time in, at least in its contemporary history. This challenge has different dimensions, from humanitarian catastrophe, that is on the process of being unpacked, at the brink of a harsh winters. Afghanistan is a mountainous area, with a lot of, you know, different diverse weather conditions. There is crisis in the economic and finances – financial term and there is also crisis, in terms of governance and what’s happening.

So, we all know that since August 15, the de facto administration is a kind of a regime that is probably unique in many aspects. It’s not recognised by any of the international countries, nor has it – is it following any of the sort of, norms and standards in many aspects of, sort of, governance itself.

Within this context, another aspect of the crisis that has missed being spoken about, while we – our, sort of, coverage generally, the coverage of Afghanistan’s news and situation, is mostly about the humanitarian crisis and how in, for example, every two Afghans, of the 38 million, one is unsure about their next lunch or dinner. Within this crisis, another dimension that is not spoken is the escape of the capacities, the human resources crisis that we are facing. A lot of government institutions are either starting to become dysfunctional or are dys – at the risk of becoming dysfunctional, because every single person feels that they are unsafe, and they have to leave the country.

So, within this context, it’s also important to mention about the situation of different organisations responding to the crisis situation. Then we are talking about, in the last 20 years, the Afghan civil society has been one of the most vibrant and active civil societies in the region, if not globally. That, sort of, whole sector, if I may say, is – are also facing tremendous challenges, in terms of the points that you’ve mentioned at the beginning, in terms of the funding stopped. Afghanistan has been an extremely donor dependent country in the last 20 years and so, the lack of financial resources arriving there is also making it very difficult for those who are very genuinely willing to respond to the crisis to be able to do so.

Another challenge, obviously, is the banking crisis and, also, to be very specific, in terms of the humanitarian aid organisations, particularly the national organisations, the biggest hurdle that they face is receiving funding from abroad, whether it’s for private individual channels, which becomes very complicated through the hawala system, the traditional system of money transfer, or through the NGOs because of the financial policies, auditing concerns and everything. So, while the situation is unpacking, in terms of its humanitarian dimensions and governance dimensions and overall, we are also faced with several key questions to be answered by different parties within the country and at the government or ruling party level and, also, at an international level, in terms of how to manage these responses.

I will just end by saying that what we observe, generally watching, is more statements of the problem, rather than practical and rapid actions to the solution, and the clock is really, really ticking and November is just ending, so the snowfall has already reached some parts of Afghanistan, and it’s a huge humanitarian and I would say, moral responsibility to the world, to different parties, to really take more active and rapid action to find solutions to these issues. So, I’ll just stop here, thank you.

Dr Renata Dwan

No, thank you so much, Orzala, and thanks for bringing out for us just the scale of the change of Afghan society over the past two decades, not just its growth, not just its urbanisation, but the organisation of Afghan society, the range of actors, the range of organisations that really developed, including with Western support, in that two decades.

Right now, in terms of civil society organisations on the ground, can you just share with us this ability of these organisations to work? Are people able to move around? Is there a sense of being able to have meetings? You explained the practical cash problems, but describe for us a little bit, in terms of the day-to-day engagements.

Dr Orzala Nemat

Thank you. In terms of day-to-day engagements, I was highlighting the challenge of government institutions mostly becoming, sort of, dysfunctional. But at least one good news is that within the governments, certain ministries where a lot of investment has been made, in terms of building systems. The good news is that those systems are functional. For example, the tax system, I’m laughing because, of course, everyone likes to get money, so the taxation system functions very nicely and there is no problem. There is an automatic way of working on that, and Customs and Revenue is the same. Ministry of Economy, where most of the NGOs are registered, are also following the same registration procedure, the same software process where you can put your annual reports and updates.

So, generally, people were doing it every six months, so we will see by end of December what will be the expectation. But generally, the NGOs and humanitarian organisations, different organisations working at the grassroots level, those, with volunteer nature, have been quite active and significantly active. Those depending on external funding are facing problems. For example, I sit in one charity humanitarian organisation and although they have very specific earmarked allocation of funding for humanitarian response, but to get funding to Afghanistan and to get funding from Kabul to provinces, is a huge hurdle. I personally, was transferring private donation to, for example, Bamyan province and my friend in Bamyan had to travel all the way from Bamyan to Kabul to be able to get the money.

So, a flow of cash is really a challenge. At the same time, in terms of mobility, I have to say there is – not entirely, we see that incidents unfortunately continue to happen, violence is still there, but there is a relative level of security and stability when it comes to access foreign remote areas, when it comes to access areas that for a long, long time, many people could not travel. So, travelling within the country, and we see some international donor is even taking the roads to travel, is relatively better than before. But only safety and security, in terms of moving from point A and B is not really what everyone is looking for. Organisations led by women, for example, are asked – mostly massive – large organisation – medium and smaller size are working in some level. But generally, large women headed organisations are asked to stay put and stay for the response of the organis – for the response of the government, in terms of their functioning.

So, the Taliban are not openly stating that no women can work in the NGOs. They say NGOs can continue their work as before, but there is also, at the same time, a concern that if a massive number of women go to one specific place, they are avoided to go in the government offices and the universities and – public universities, I mean. Private universities found some ways and some of them are active and then – and where courses of educational activities are happening. These are really the sense of how things are, generally, in this context.

Dr Renata Dwan

No, thank you very much, Orzala, and I hope we will come back to the question of the banking freeze, let’s say, or paralysis, and what can practically be done, including by actors from outside the country, in the West, in the coming weeks. But let me move onto you, Patricia, from the ICRC. The ICRC has a long history in Afghanistan and remains on the ground today. Maybe just give us some sense of a perspective of how aid organisations are operating right now in the country, what restrictions, what abilities you have to move and what are your priorities on the ground?

Patricia Escolano Guiote

Thank you very much, Renata, and good afternoon, good evening, good evening, to all participating. Well, if I have to summarise a bit the main situations that we are seen in the field in Afghanistan, I would – or the main challenges, I would mention two, starting by the scale, and just to explain a bit the situation, I will focus in two areas. The one, first one, is health, where, as you mentioned, we have a long history of presence and support to the Afghan health system and the hospitals and primary care – healthcare centres. And what we have seen, for example, is, and I give you a specific example, I mean, significant increase on children consultation linked to malnutrition, linked to the degradation, linked to pneumonia, etc. And just to give an example for a – in a Midwives hospital in Kandahar that we’ve been supporting for many years, we have doubled the number – we’ve seen double the number of children that have raised the hospital between 15th of August and September, only, and this is foreseen to be increased.

The situation in general, as well, in terms of access of – to health services by the popula – large population because of incapacity to travel, because of the system – health system collapsing, salaries not being paid for medical staff, running costs not being covered and this means no fuel for generators, no fuel for ambulances to run and a whole system that cannot respond to the dire situation. We have experienced, as well, since the 15th of August, an increase of injuries related to landmines, of population that was going back to their places after the clashes, that took over in the previous months. So, we have seen an increase of needs, that the current systems are very – that were already weakened before, but now they are at the verge of collapsing in order to response to them.

The second situation that I would like for us to focus is, and as mentioned also by Dr Orzala, is the situation related to the economical impasse, banking system, availability of cash, capaci – the rise on prices of food, the rise on prices of fuel, the capacity of a population to face drought, the compounding efforts – effects of drought, plus a missing harvest season that has been missed now in October, and obviously, the difficulty to be able to buy food, essential – basic needs for the household. And this is affecting a large part of the population. I mean, before this situation, now, we were talking about half of the Afghan population already in very dire situation. Now, these figures are rapidly increasing and the winter – we’re in the middle of the winter and we expect this to go even beyond, and this – we, the ICRC, we’re trying to respond to all these situations. We have a scale-up, but the scale – the needs and the situation that is currently happening and expected, will – is – will not be possible for any humanitarian organisation to face it.

And I come to the second challenging – challenge that we are seeing and experiencing in the field and it’s this impasse of the international community. Is all these political considerations towards the current situation in Afghanistan, that at the end of the day, are directly impacting Afghan population and measures and policies that are there to tackle the authorities, the current authorities, it is now being suffered by the Afghan population. And here is the call for all international organisation – institutions to all the international communities, sorry, to react and not to be trapped – to be compliance with international humanitarian law, in terms of humanitarian action not be jeopardised and hijacked by political considerations or sanctions that, at the end of the day, do acknowledge the need for humanitarian action, so to reach the population. So, we would need a reactor – a reaction and a quick answer from the international community if we don’t want this manmade disaster to go beyond the current, already very dire situation, that we are seeing in the field. Back to you, Renata.

Dr Renata Dwan

Thanks, Patricia. It’s a sobering picture that you paint, and I wanted to ask you a little bit about just the receipt of humanitarian assistance. Because you mentioned the need for an international response and in September, we saw the UN Secretary-General launch an appeal for humanitarian assistance that overperformed, in terms of expectations and ambitions. I think $1.2 billion was committed. Is that aid coming through, or is that aid getting tied up in politics and engagements? I saw a recent report, or a recent comment, from UN agencies on the ground saying that that aid wasn’t showing up in any form of speed or scale, as committed. So, is it a problem of meeting existing commitments, or does it remain a problem related to perhaps domestic populations uncertain as to whether they want to give to a country where they see themselves, now, led by, administered by, ruled by a Taliban regime that has been the source of many human rights abuses for decades?

Patricia Escolano Guiote

I will – thank you, Renata. I will let Indrika respond on the UN appeal and the amounts, because we are, as you know, not part of the UN system, and he is better placed on this sense. But on our side, what I can say is that we have scale-up significantly our operations in Afghanistan, that we are responding to the dire situation. I mean, there is no – or that we are left in an impossible situation where we can just try to bridge this gap until the international community reacts, but that in any case, a humanitarian organisation will be able to substitute a health system, a running structure in a country for basic services. So, the dire situation is that as much as we scale-up responses and try to go beyond capacities to respond to the situation in the field, we will need a solution to the impasse that we are seeing today on the international community that has been supporting Afghanistan for many years in the past and that right now, we – they – we find the whole structures and articulated serv – by basic services for the population, been at the verge of collapsing because there’s no support.

Dr Renata Dwan

And I think, Patricia, maybe just, too, for our audience to help bring out, the question is not just humanitarian assistance alone, although that is at a massive scale. I think the situation is also that you’re referring to going beyond immediate humanitarian assistance, to education, to development, to infrastructure, to salaries for Civil Servants, to functioning transport mechanisms, the banking system that Orzala keeps mentioning, and that those needs are not going to be met by humanitarian action alone. And the challenge is…

Patricia Escolano Guiote

Exactly.

Dr Renata Dwan

…how does – how do we think about development responses in a country context where the international community, and the entire international community, at the moment, does not recognise the authorities, de facto authorities? Indrika, if I may, I’m going to come to you, not to help us answer that question, although we would welcome your thoughts, but maybe to help bring a little bit of the regional perspective. Because one of the issues around Afghanistan is the geopolitical dimension. You have a withdrawal of the US-led coalition and a sense, many argued, that this will create a space for China and for other actors to fill a vacuum at the scene. But so far, we’ve seen relatively cautious action on the part of Afghanistan’s regional partners. We haven’t seen huge commitments aid wise. We haven’t seen formal recognition. We’ve seen a degree of caution. So, could you perhaps describe what the situation is regionally, both for Afghan refugee flows and how the region is responding, in terms of border closures, border openings, support and engagement?

Indrika Ratwatte

[Pause] Thank you, Renata, and greetings to all the colleagues and others online. From a regional perspective, I think there are three, kind of, pivots, if one wants to – or filters, if one wants to look at it. One is, I think, the neighbouring countries in the region who are the larger refugee hosting countries, namely Pakistan and Iran, who now, for the fourth decade, have been hosting millions of Afghan refugees. Both registered refugees, in the context of Pakistan, for example, you have about 1.4 million registered refugees, and about another two million Afghans of undocumented and other status. In Iran, similarly, you have about 800,000 registered refugees and again, around two million plus Afghans of various status, undocumented, documented, passport holders with visas.

So, from the perspective of these two, if I would say, principal refugee hosting countries, who basically, have been hosting the Afghan refugees for the last 40 years, and about almost 85% of the world’s Afghan refugee population is hosted by these two countries, there is a sense of, if I could say, asylum fatigue. They have seen, with competing humanitarian crises globally, the support coming to refugees dwindling in the – in these countries and the host communities, who have lived together with refugee communities harmoniously for decades, also feeling the pressure, comp0unded by what’s happened with the tragic impact, the economic impact of COVID. And this has devastated coping mechanisms for Afghan refugees and Afghans in these host countries and, also, of the local host communities.

Despite this, I must say, when you look at the response of these host communities and governments, Afghan refugees have had access to national health systems, albeit challenging. Afghan refugees, in the case of Iran, for example, all registered Afghan refugees and other children, can go to government schools for free. So, they’ve tried, very much, to create an enabling environment, despite the challenges on the ground for Afghan refugees. And there’s a deep sense of fatigue, the economic impact on the countries, the impact of sanctions in Iran really negatively impacting the whole country’s economic system. So, it’s extremely challenging for the average Pakistani and the Iranian and obviously, for the refugees, as well, whose coping mechanisms have been stretched. And we have seen very many negative coping mechanisms are being adopted just to survive.

Another impact of this is Afghans, when they’re unable to really have any subsistence of managing the host countries, move further afield, and we’ve seen in 2015 where many, many Afghans, along with Syrian refugees, moved through Turkey, into Europe, and we had a crisis there. And there’s a false perception that people are necess – just looking for greener pastures. This is individuals trying to survive, trying to find coping mechanisms. So, this is really important, and the burden sharing we talk about in international nomenclature can only be meaningful if host countries and host communities feel that there’s some commensurate predictable burden sharing with that, and that’s, sadly, in the case – context of the Afghan refugee situation, a protracted four-decade old refugee crisis, has been diminishing. And to that extent, the protection/asylum space has been challenged in the principal host countries.

Now, with the developments – recent developments, I think, still, Renata, the importance of the regional actors’ ability to dialogue with the Taliban administration, and number one, reiterate, as they are doing, that the Taliban administration live up to the commitments they have put forward about inclusive governance, about the right of women to go and work in the workplace, about girl children’s ability to access education, about the inclusion and respect of minorities, these are commitments the Taliban has made as well, that these are translated into action which are tangible. Not because the international community or the neighbours want it. It – because 38 million Afghans in Afghanistan want to see that. They have these expectations, and as Dr Orzala rightly mentioned, there’s a whole demographic, there is a vibrant civil society, there are a entire demographic in Afghanistan who grew up in the last 20 years, who have expectations, who want to be part of Afghanistan, a vibrant Afghanistan, an inclusive Afghanistan. These are very, very legitimate expectations.

So, I think the neighbouring countries have a vested interest, obviously, they are the neighbours. So, if there is any situation that negatively impacts Afghans within Afghanistan and Afghans move, it’s going to go first into the neighbouring countries. So, there’s a vested interest there from a management of population movement. From a security perspective we have serious issues, as we have tragically seen the ISK activities inside Afghanistan impacting minorities. Civilians being targeted, tragic loss of life, again. These, I think, impact the region, and we see China and Russia engage in a dialogue. We have other formats within the neighbours really trying to engage with the Taliban to say, “Here are the concerns. We would like to see how we can help you deliver on the commitments that you have made,” and I think this is a very important role.

And finally, I think in terms of population movements, an important element here is that the internal displacement inside Afghanistan has been exponential in the last years. 3.5 million Afghans have been internally displaced due to conflict, not to mention those impacted by drought, impacted by COVID, impacted by food insecurity. Just conflict alone has displaced 3.5 million Afghans. Of that number, over 670,000 are displaced this year alone, and when I was there in Kabul, and I’ve been Afghanistan three times in the last year, and September was the last, when we had discussions with the interim Taliban authorities, we saw people which we know, our teams on the ground, families, children, living under trees with plastic sheeting.

As Dr Orzala said, winter is upon us, snow is there, the people can’t survive. And this is not to dramatize, this is the reality, and I think unless a concerted humanitarian action is supported and scaled up to address those immediate humanitarian needs, people will move again. And this time, if you’ve been displaced multiple times, you have no coping mechanisms, you are going to move across border. You are going to move into host countries. And the host countries also have the fear of large numbers of refugees and others coming onto their territory and they have legitimate questions about the burden sharing, “If there is massive population movements, are we going to be supported, because we have our own challenges in the country?”

So, I think here is where, also, the international community has to support the host countries in a robust manner, that they feel that the burden is shared. And I think at the end of the day, as also colleagues are mentioning, humanitarian action, imperative as it is, is the Band-Aid. It’s not the long-term solution. You need to have critical functions of a government working, health workers being paid and delivering health services, Teachers being able to teach, and here is where I think the development resources also have to come in and engage.

And I think I’ll end by reiterating what my colleagues have said on the panel. This is not a time to be debating. 38 million Afghans are in Afghanistan, in need, resilient people whose dignity is at stake here. And I think this is a time to step up and address the issues in a concrete manner and not politicise the debate, because we are not talking about the regime, we’re talking about the people, and 38 million of them, right now, need that help.

Dr Renata Dwan

Indrika, thanks for that. You pointed out dialogue and you talked about the dialogue that’s going on between countries of the region and Taliban authorities in Kabul. You also talked about the dialogue that you, as humanitarian organisations, are having with the Taliban. And you set out four – you set out three conditions, but you’ve hinted at a fourth, for possible arrangements of support with the Taliban. One was inclusive governance and some form of inclusive governance process that, as you said, the region is demanding, not just Western actors. You talked about rights of girls to education and women to work. That’s a key Western demand. You talked about respect for minorities and, of course, the first Taliban regime that we saw in August had very little representative minorities from within the country. It was primarily Pashtun. And the fourth was also efforts in relation to ISK and the prevention of terrorism and exported terrorism on violent terrorism from the country.

So, those are four conditions. I – what I would like to ask all of you, as panellists, is do you think there can be unity around those four conditions on the part of all international actors, regional and Western actors, vis-à-vis the Taliban? And two, is the priority that you all – at least Patricia and Indrika, you seem to be suggesting health, can we unify around a set of priority activities that health is the first sector that needs to go forward? So, I will start with you, Indrika, but then Orzala and Patricia, feel free to come in.

Indrika Ratwatte

I think, Renata, there is an effort to prioritise, very much, I think, and as Patricia also said, on health. Right now, the UN system is looking at the modality and how best, as you alluded to before, use some of the frozen development resources to impact these immediate needs. For example, the health systems, the health mandate scheme, which provides critical health support, now, through a pass-through mechanism from the special trust fund for Afghanistan that has – under the aegis of UNDP, is trying to pay the salaries of health workers, for example, as an immediate measure. And similarly, I think, looking at Teachers will be incredibly important. Now, again, while this is important as a stopgap measure, it also is unsustainable as a ad hoc stopgap measure in the long-term. So, again, it goes back to the point of saying, having consensus, how these resources can be unlocked at scale in a predictable manner to deliver these services to the people.

Secondly, I think, while the Taliban, you know, interim administration, has clearly made commitments on security and when we were having a dialogue with them, we impressed upon them the need for security for ourselves, for our partners, as one, our premises and then, also, I believe access communities do needs assessments, unimpeded, and most importantly, deliver humanitarian assistance in an unimpeded manner to all Afghans. And there, we did get the commitments and at this point of time, we have no problem in delivering aids on the ground. But the other commitments need to really – it’s a mixed picture right now. It’s not consistent, as Dr Orzala also said, and that’s where I think there is a need to really clearly articu – well, by the Taliban, to articulate its terms of governance on these measures.

And on that point, I think, also, the neighbours really have a particular role. Why do I say that is when the Taliban says it’s within a frame, which is contextual to the Afghanistan and under the Sharia guidelines, I think the neighbouring countries, particularly the Islamic republics, also can look at and show best case. And even further afield, Ichkeria and others, say, “Look, there are – entire population, 50% of the population are women and girls. Look at our countries, look at how they’re engaged in our civil society, in academia, in media, in professional work life for female colleagues, and here are examples.” And really encouraging and nurturing and putting some of those real concrete proposals as how some of these principles can be implemented. I think that’s an important dialogue that is not seeing a Western imposition, or the West talking about a rights-based approach, but saying, “This is how it should be and here are examples on how it can work and should work.”

I think again, an important roleplaying there, but I’ll maybe ending by saying I do feel that the international community and the member states that have committed resources in September last year, to the ARTF, to the Citizens’ Charter, to all the frameworks that were impacting the development outcomes of Afghanistan, need to find a way to really channel those resources and enable the gains of the last 20 years on the development fronts, on the rights-based gains, to be sustained and maintained. If not, if you get caught in the polemic of a debate and that money doesn’t go to the people, we’re actually losing the gains and we’re not advancing.

Dr Renata Dwan

Orzala, what vehicles are there for delivery of aid outside of the Taliban? What are the vehicles that one can consider, Afghan NGOs, international NGOs? What are your thoughts about some of those vehicles for, Indrika said, that money that is there?

Dr Orzala Nemat

Thank you. Like I mentioned before, Afghanistan, in the last 30 or 40 years, I would say, NGOs have played, like, a very critical role in different phases of history. In times where we had a dysfunctional government, the NGOs filled that space. The differences this time is that even the NGOs’ hands are tied because of the limitations that we’ve mentioned. We – if you look at it in terms of the local capacities, and these days I’m in conversation with a couple of organisations who are very, very eager to reach to the hard to reach provinces and areas, like Zabul, Nuristan, you know, Baghlan, remote areas, Nangarhār, remote areas, places that nobody really goes. They are very genuinely intending to reach out to those. Again, we are facing with this hurdle of how to flow funding, because without money in your hand, we can’t do things. Sorry that I keep coming back to that.

But I felt also, to make another point regarding the engagements, because I see in the Q&A, also, there are questions raised that, okay, like everyone talks about engage – what it means. You also mention about outside Taliban kind of agreements. Okay, the de facto reality on the ground is Taliban ruling the country, we like it, or we don’t. They are a reality existing there.

So, constructive, in principle, engagement, in my view, is very, very critical in this process. By principle engagement I mean every single either national or international must make it very clear that we don’t agree with certain policies that you have. But here, if we keep and stick all those con – preconditions that were earlier mentioned by respectful panellists, in terms of inclusive to governments, rights to girls’ education, rights to women’s access to work, for example, the rights of minorities and so forth, if we stick the humanitarian crisis with those preconditions, let’s be very realistic, it will not reach anywhere. Because for Taliban, average Taliban mindset, and I have to say this based on what you see, in terms of reflection of Taliban’s views and perspectives within the regime, there are people who are supporting girls’ education, they are desperate to see some changes by the policymakers at the Taliban side.

There are those who just are hitting a dead end, and those who are the young – so, just probably some of the younger Taliban generation were translating, I gave this example earlier, in another session, as well, they posted a video and translated immediately in Arabic, because they have Arabic audience. I’m sure this guy maybe have chat with some, you know, fellows in a conversation that “You guys, what kind of government you are ruling? This is not Islamic system that you are ruling.” It was, like, “Look, it’s rumours, it’s all propaganda that we are against girls’ education. Look, girls are going to school.” So, the person who posted the video corrected himself and says, “Yes, these are girls, but they are primary school girls. Secondary and high schools are closed. Universities for girls are closed.”

So, this contradictory approach by the Taliban needs to immediately end, but if we expect and we compromise education with food and assistance to reach emergenc – urgently to people in need, I think we are missing something here. So, I cannot emphasise enough, in terms of a rapid action, internal human capacity, internal organisational capacity is available in Afghanistan at the village level, at the community level. We’ve had systems created over the past 30 years. Look, I mean, Afghanistan has been the largest development intervention of the whole world, probably in the history. It’s comparable with the Second – end of the Second World War time and even probably higher, in some cases, in terms of the length it took for intervention, for reconstruction and all of that.

And suddenly, of course, the financial resources are cut, but the human resources are on the ground, are there. There needs to be a mechanism. And some reports, even with the funding flow of emergency responses, are coming back with concerns that, okay, there is not enough community engagement in terms of monitoring, that the neediest ones should reach – should be reached out. So, that requires more action. I think it’s the really critical time for the United Nations, for different humanitarian larger organisation and also medium and smaller organisations, to really look into more, sort of, active ways of engaging and, also, bringing the responsible and in charge authorities of the administration, as well, into the conversation. Not bringing them into the conversation and just leaving them aside and in the margins. It’s not taking us anywhere, because I believe in terms of humanitarian – I mean, I’m joined by two distinguished, you know, humanitarian institutions here, we have to, sort of, like, prioritise saving lives before going to our principles. And I say this as a very principled Afghan myself. So, I think what I’m missing, really, in this larger picture, is this situation that I, unfortunately, don’t see enough action being taken.

Dr Renata Dwan

Right, thank you for that. I’m struck by the unity of all three of your positions, where you come from, and I’m struck by the sense, from the audience too, the sense – the questions that we’re getting and that were coming in, I’m going to turn to them, is really, well, how do we go forward? And so, one thing I’d like you to think about as we wrap up, when we come around, is to what extent are we missing leadership, leadership from international actors, whether groups of states, whether individuals, whether Security Council, whether bank, whether IMF, whatever those actors are, to take some of those first steps?

But let me open to the questions now, and I’m going to bring in the first question from Trisha de Borchgrave. Trisha, would you like to take the screen to ask your question?

Trisha de Borchgrave

Hello, can you hear me?

Dr Renata Dwan

We can hear you well, thanks.

Trisha de Borchgrave

I mean, I think that all of you have, sort of, tried to answer what is, basically, on all of our minds, which is how do you reconcile this fact that, you know, humanitarian aid is one thing, but we don’t – you know, that the international community right now is in that very vengeful mood and does not want to see help or support, or see the Taliban succeed in its’ endeavours. But I think you’ve, sort of, answered in some ways, I think these incremental things that perhaps we can do to separate humanitarian aid from, sort of, the Taliban’s own political empowerment. I think what Mr Ratwatte said about, you know, perhaps we should engage a lot more strongly and support neighbouring host countries, that’s one way of, if you like, circumventing what people are trying to avoid there.

My worry is when you say, “Well, let’s lead through health.” I couldn’t agree more, but the problem is that when that’s been done in the past in countries of need, and I’m thinking of Sudan right now, that just gets – those funds get really absorbed into government vested interests and healthcare really doesn’t come out on top. And people who really need it are very disenfranchised in that way. So, I’m worried about, you know, bringing everybody together through health, but what are those oversight mechanisms, that way of making sure that perha – at least $5 out of every $10 does go to those communities who desperately need them?

So, yeah, you’ve been responding, and I just – you know, today you’re supposed to say, you know, to the international community, what will prompt everyone to really cough up, you know, and “What are those vehicles?” as Renata said. I’m not too sure. Maybe it’s these small incremental things. Thank you so much.

Dr Renata Dwan

Well…

Trisha de Borchgrave

Sorry, I’m…

Dr Renata Dwan

Thanks, Trisha.

Trisha de Borchgrave

…ranting.

Dr Renata Dwan

Thanks, Trisha. I’m going to, perhaps, ask Patricia to give it a first go, but what I want us to think about is we have not been – this is not a completely novel situation. The international community has found itself in these situations before. We have found ourselves in these situations in Yemen. We’ve found ourselves in situations where Syria – in Libya, in Venezuela, where questions of provision of emergency humanitarian lifesaving assistance and some critical other service support deliveries have to be navigated. So, there are some models and Patricia, I don’t know whether you want to offer even any suggestions from looking at local health systems to off budget NGO support to engagement?

Patricia Escolano Guiote

Thank you, Renata, and thank you all for the different questions, very interesting. I will try to come back to some of those very quickly. But you’re mentioning other context and I want to reflect, as well, on Somalia and the situation in Somalia in 2010, where we were in a similar – and I’m not comparing the two countries, but the response of the international community among those, on there and the caveats that were brought into the 1988 sanctions system. And this is something that we are in dire need right now for Afghanistan.

When we talk, and we were discussing, “So, what can be the solutions?” First, the humanitarian aid cannot be conditioned. I know, and we all know, that there are issues of inclusion, there are issues of minorities, there are many issues, but what if these women, these children, these minorities, will not make it until spring? So, we are in this situation, so we are not in the moment of conditioning, the life and the impact on the life of 38 million Afghans on this conditioning. So, there must be some dialogue happening. There were dialogue with Taliban before by the international community, so why it’s not happening now? And we are around the issue of recognition of the government. Engaging in dialogue doesn’t mean recognition of the government. So, there is also avenues that need to be separated there and then walk through, in order to find solutions.

I would like to put an example. We’ve been engaging – a practical example of what can be concretely done in Afghanistan. We begin engaging with Taliban. Now, we’ve been operating in Taliban controlled areas before the 15th of August and we were having in place due diligence mechanism, mitigating measures, making sure that we have compliance mechanisms that we monitor, that we – so, there are mechanisms that are there that we can put in place and the international community can, as well, put in place to ensure that this aid is reaching the needed communities.

As you mentioned, as well, or there were some of the questions, engaging at local level, engaging at district/provincial level, having a monitor – a robust monitoring system, robust procedures. We have 11 structures across Afghanistan. We – there’s possibility to have third party monitorings. We have a Risk Monitoring Unit working there. We have a – there’ve been plenty of mechanisms that can be put in place and this is what need to be discussed, and it goes beyond the issue of conditioning and aid or recognition of a government. It’s the situation of the Afghan population that is a catastrophe that is induced and that we, the international community, has also responsibility over. Back to you…

Dr Renata Dwan

Thank you.

Patricia Escolano Guiote

…Renata.

Dr Renata Dwan

Thanks, Patricia. I’m conscious that time is ticking and so, I’m going to group some of the questions, if I can, because I think there’s three sets of questions that are coming out. There’s one question about “what alternatives?” and the question of “local level, local municipalities, district level, Mayors, is it traditional tribal leaders?” Orzala, I’m going to ask you that question. And then, I’m going to the question that you’ve touched on, Patricia, “Is it possible to monitor, is it possible to oversee, is it possible to trust delivery of assistance in difficult, politically volatile and security volatile situations?” Patricia has offered us some examples of how that is possible. Third party monitoring is very well established in Afghanistan since at least one decade, because of many of the regions being under Taliban control for a long time, but we can come to that.

And the third set question, which I’ll ask you, Indrika, to speak, but I’ll invite all the panel to speak to, is, “Who’s talking to the Taliban in Kabul?” It seems to me, by the way, that, Owen, to your – Owen Paulson’s question, everybody is talking to the Taliban right now. It seems a very busy time. Every delegation’s coming in, talks in Doha, embassies in Doha, and engagement. But to the question, I suppose another way of Owen – I think framing Owen’s question, is should there be a co-ordinated conversation with the Taliban at the international level, and if so, who should lead that conversation in this time? So, I’m going to start with you, Orzala, on the local structures, the options and engagements, and then, Indrika, on who should be talking. But please, Patricia, all of you, do feel free to come in on all of the questions. Orzala?

Dr Orzala Nemat

Thank you for the question. In terms of local engagements, you know, maybe the political or the physical geography of Afghanistan, as a mountainous country, is such that if you don’t have local actors involved, it would be very unrealistic to be able to reach those areas. And all NGOs, whether UN agencies and humanitarian organisations, development organisations, are very familiar with this system for the last 30 years, or 40 years I would say, even, since we have been in war and since the NGOs have been an actor on the ground. So, mechanisms to provide and to offer support definitely are in place.

And we have to remember one thing, the Taliban takeover is not really a complete replacement of every and each government’s Officer by a Taliban Officer. No, only the top political leadership is shifted. Ministers, Deputy Ministers, not even in some cases Directors, they are the same Directors of the – their former system. So, the existing state institutions are up and running, in most cases, and our hope is that if this crisis is handled and managed properly, there will be less mobility of people. We were talking about, you know, migration and every other person just wants to get a passport and run away from Afghanistan. So, if that is addressed, people stay, then we have the institutions that will be functioning.

The Mayors, the municipality systems, are not operating yet in the same way as it does, for example, in many other countries, but there are structures, district level. There has been District Development Assemblies. Now there are, like, Citizens’ Charter clusters, and they are having Community Development Councils, people are there. They are desperate for need. They are desperate to co-operate in delivering of assistance.

And the monitoring, a lot of monitoring, there has been examples, and as a Researcher, I can, sort of, be reminded of some excellent example of the community-based monitoring systems that were very successful and those are very handy in this very difficult and challenging time, to make the communities themselves in charge of ensuring that – if the donors are doing the right work, in terms of donors – sorry, the implementing agencies delivering the aid funding. So, local solutions are there.

In terms of who is talking to the Taliban, very briefly, I would say I think my major concern is that this whole culture of talking to Taliban, even Taliban are falling into this trap, it’s becoming all, unfortunately, a PR kind of activity. So, you can only find about it in photographs and the Twitter and on Facebook, on all these social media. And I haven’t really, as a Researcher, as somebody who’s involved, watching over the developments situation, I so far, in the last three months, have not come across any single action-oriented discussion or conversation that is meaningful. Sorry if I sound very black, but really, like, just chats and conversation and photoshooting sessions, a lot of them, but not really an actual conversation. And that is – you were talking about the leadership, and I’m saying unfortunately, we are missing that leadership and that, sort of, creative engagement and leadership from internationals, from nationals, unfortunately from everyone, I would say. Thank you.

Dr Renata Dwan

Thanks, Orzala, for being so honest in your assessment. Indrika?

Indrika Ratwatte

[Pause] Thank you. I think Dr Orzala hit the nail on the head. There is not much left to be said in that regard. On the question, Renata, on who’s talking and who should lead? I think it’s multifaceted, and as you said, there are many talks going on, some in the public domain, some overtly in the public domain, which may be not too much impact than the power of a tweet, as Dr Orzala said. But there are other discussions goings, there are various bilateral discussions going. But if you take a step back and look at other crises, as well, I mean, let me be frank here. It’s, first and foremost, it’s about ability and willingness. I think the ability is there. What we need is willingness. Willingness at leadership, willingness to dialogue, willingness to transcend beyond our political domestic pressures, which we understand. Every domai – member state has domestic concerns. If a major donor country says, “We don’t want to see our resources going channelled in X manner,” the political leadership of that country can’t dismiss that, obviously. But I think here, the regional configuration, as I said before, has a key important role to play and they are engaging, and reiterating some of the very – four points we were talking about, which is congruent with what the international community at large is doing.

So, I think the principles, or the expectations of the Taliban, vis-à-vis with their own commitments is laid out, but what is needed now is for various entities which are having this dialogue, the region, regional institutions, the OIC, the others, the EU, we’re having discussions, is to come together and be now much more concerted and demonstrate the willingness to have consensus around the very fundamentals that we have just discussed right now, and that’s needed. And it might seem self-serving, but I would propose one particular catalyst for that convening could be the United Nations, and at the end of the day, the United Nations is as united as its membership, who are member states.

And there, I think, from the Security Council down, we need to see that consensus being built around some of these issues and convening and supporting and putting a frame forward for inclusive governance. Putting that proposal – well, it’s been done before. Having a law Loya Jirga is nothing new in Afghanistan. That is consensus building bottom-up, so how do you enable that? How do you look at the interpretations of what inclusion is from the region and beyond? I think this is what is needed right now, and time is – you can’t wait. I think this time is of essence here and there have been some proposals for the United Nations to convene certain fora. I think it’s time to really sit down with the Taliban and really have a robust engagement of civil society? This should – this is – shouldn’t be member states run. Member states have a key role to play, but with civil society, and not forgetting that in that forum of – and that convening towards a roadmap, with distinct, mutually agreed milestones, should be a robust component of civil society. And this is not outsiders telling Afghanistan how Afghanistan should be. It is Afghanistan saying how it should be and the international community supporting them.

Dr Renata Dwan

Indrika, I’d love us to continue for the next few hours, but unfortunately, we have to draw it to a close. Let me just flag to Patricia, Indrika and Orzala, with great appreciation, the unity of your analysis, both on the scale and the urgency. Second, I was really struck by the confidence with which you felt there are instruments, there is ability to deliver both humanitarian aid and development assistance in Afghanistan. There are structures, there are tools, there’s experience, there’s people. So, you really all made that key point.

But what really came out, I think, Orzala, was your point about the banking system, that we have to look at waivers to international banks to allow processing of cash transfers. That is about wavering. It doesn’t have to involve the complete lifting of sanctions. You all talked about the urgent need for dialogue. There seemed to even be coherence across the – what would be the key points of dialogue. Indrika, you pointed to the fact that there is dialogue already and one might argue that there’s even some responsiveness in the Taliban, or among different Taliban. Slow though as it may be, there has been some changes to the Taliban regime to bring in a little bit more ethnic minorities. It’s far from representative, but there has been, already, some changes there. There has been polio vaccination. So, is there signs that dialogue is worth it, in addition to Patricia’s point of being urgent and the humanitarian need?

And then, I think I also very much have heard that we do face a leadership gap and we do need to look at a question about how the international unit – community comes around a sense of a sustained and monitored dialogue. The final point that I think Orzala meant, Indrika and Patricia, you’ve hinted at it, either that the Taliban is not a monolithic group, but it is not a monolithic actor. That the situation needs to be seen region-by-region, which echoes the point of needing a multiple approach, with many different actors, with different regional partners, with different NGOs, because each province has its own distinct dimensions, features, challenges. So, a very complex picture, but a picture in which, as Indrika says, there is a potential roadmap if, to use Trisha de Borchgrave’s word, we can move from a ‘vengeful’ to a more practical oriented moment.

So, let me thank our panellists, Indrika, Orzala, Patricia, for your frankness, for your details, for your information. Thank all of you for joining us today and to say that some of these elements will be on the record, will be accessible to our members, and we look forward to continuing the conversation and to exploring ways forward on Afghanistan. Thank you very much, everyone, and have a nice afternoon.

Patricia Escolano Guiote

Pleasure, thank you very much.

Indrika Ratwatte

Thank you.

Patricia Escolano Guiote

Thank you, all.