Towards a vision for transatlantic digital cooperation

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Okay, ladies and gentlemen, I’m Robin Niblett, the Director of Chatham House. Thank you very much for hanging in there while we made sure we got our platform working. I don’t want to say anything about this not being a Microsoft platform, but any case, we may have been joking about that a few seconds ago amongst us on the panel. But welcome and thank you very much for joining us for this members’ meeting where we’re going to be discussing the big topic of Towards a Vision for Transatlantic Digital Co-operation.

Just to remind you all that this meeting is on the record and it’s meant to run to 6:15. As we’ve, kind of, lost ten minutes of it, I may stretch us over by five or so minutes at the end, so that we can have a chance to really draw on the insights of this great panel that we have with us on this very important topic. So, again, welcome and thank you very much for joining us.

Just to let you all know a little bit about the context, we are holding this meeting today because we have just released a report here at Chatham House, last week, on Digital Trade and Technology Standards, subtitle being Opportunities for Strengthening US, EU and UK Co-operation on Digital Technology Governance. Long title, but I think it says what it is on the tin. Though, as you can probably get by the three actors referenced there, US, UK and EU, it tries to capture a little bit of this interesting, awkward dynamic we’re in at the moment, of the United Kingdom, kind of, swimming around in-between the big behemoths in the technology space of the US and EU. I’m particularly glad, therefore, that we will also have a UK Government perspective on this conversation, ‘cause it really is a very interesting time to look at the interaction between these three key players in the digital space. So, as I said, we released this report, which I think you can find. It’ll be in the chat or the link will be shortly, and this report drew on a series of roundtables we held over the course of the year and I’d like to thank, while I’m about it, Microsoft for their support, also, of this project that we were able to undertake over this last year.

Before I, sort of, get into all of the logistics, I did just want to say that we’re very pleased, I said, to have this panel with us. We have Susan Aaronson, who is Professor at – of International Affairs, based in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University in Washington, Director of the Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub there, and a frequent Writer and Commentator on all issues to do with data, national security and mapping forms of data governance.

And we’ve got, in alphabetical order, then, Rhys Bowen, who was appointed International Director at the Department for Digital Culture, Media and Sports in the UK. For those of you who are not British, you’ll know that’s a bit of a mouthful as a name for a department, but it actually sits right in the middle of all of the UK’s work on digital governance and digital policy. So, it really is at the heart of this debate in the United Kingdom and, Rhys, we’re very glad you could join us today, somebody who’s been working – really focusing on economic and international economic security policy in his time in government, but very importantly, also involved in some of the Brexit negotiations, which touched on these topics, as well.

Anu Bradford, Professor of Law and International Organizations at Columbia Law School. Anu, welcome back to Chatham House, great to have you with us, also Director of Columbia’s European Legal Studies Center. Somebody who specialises, I think you all know, on international trade law, but specifically focusing these days on the role of the EU and its play on international regulation, having written the book, “The Brussels Effect: How European Union Rules the World,” which came out in 2020. A wonderful, provocative title, which we’ll have a chance to dig into, yet again, on this conversation.

And last, and very much not least, Casper Klynge, Vice President for European Government Affairs at Microsoft, but somebody who I got to know in his last role, before taking up this one, which was as Denmark’s first Tech Ambassador, based in Silicon Valley, interactive between Denmark and a lot of the companies and other players, civil society organisations, working there on the West Coast, on technology policy. And Denmark was one of the first countries to, kind of, spot the technology needed and capacity to develop its own diplomatic strategy and set of policies. He’d also been Ambassador, prior to that, to Indonesia and had worked all of his career, in fact, in the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but now, right in the heart of Brussels and at the heart of this big topic that we’re going to be dealing with today.

So, what I’m going to do is ask a few questions, engage in conversation. Let me ask all of you who are participating in this event, we do want your ideas, your questions, your thoughts, through the course of it. Please put your questions into the Q&A function. We won’t be able to see them in the chat and we won’t have a raised hand function here. We’re going to use the Q&A. So, please write your question into the Q&A and we will get to you and get to it once we’ve had initial roundtable chat amongst the five of us. And I’ll – Casper, I’m going to start with you, if I may, with a couple of questions to, kind of, set the scene.

One of the propositions in the report that we have written is that there really is an opportunity, right now, for closer US-European co-operation on the issue of technology governance. It has been, for quite a while, as you know, as I think a lot of our participants at this meeting are aware as well, one of the really knotty, thorny, difficult areas of transatlantic relations. Digital tax obviously being an area that’s been at the forefront, this idea of being ruled, perhaps, Europeans by big American technology companies operating under a US technology outlook, which cuts against the grain of some of the values, an issue that Susan, I know, works on a lot. So, the values and structures that Europeans feel comfortable with. And yet, our sense, over this last year of roundtables, discussions with experts, preparing the report, and one of the thesis of the report, is that the world has changed, that the rise of the China threat, in particular, has created a greater sense of transatlantic common purpose and that the US itself, at a legislative, political level, maybe at a popular level, is less enamoured of the big tech companies that have been leading the way. And that, therefore, there might be a more – willingness to entertain a more European approach, if I may say, towards how we engage with tech companies. So, just a very big opening question for you, who came from the West Coast, as a European Diplomat, into Brussels, now working for an American company. I mean, you really have been on both sides of this debate. How does it feel to you? What do you think is the context? Over to you.

Casper Klynge

Well, thanks, Robin, although I am very disappointed with you, because you took away the thunder of what I thought would be a very good joke about Zoom versus Teams, initially here, but now, it’s too late for me to go in that direction. But thanks for the question and it’s great to be on the panel, also with people I have enormous respect for, and I’m sure that Susan and Anu will correct everything that I’m saying, in the next couple of minutes, and get us in the right path.

But what I would say is I think we should make a distinction between what is currently happening and then, I think what many of us think needs to happen. And I think on, sort of, the transatlantic regulatory collaboration, if you like, around digital issues, around technology, I think you’re right in saying that, you know, if I just compare with a couple of years ago, when I was still in the US, and do I miss the weather sitting here in Brussels? I absolutely do that. But I think it was a very different climate and a lot more antagonism, a lot of more disagreement around the necessity of regulating big technology companies or technology, per se. I think that feels different today, but I think we also need to be a little bit honest and, of course, you stand where you sit. So, I’m sitting in Brussels, and I think there is no reason to hide the fact that there is a, still a little bit of caution in, sort of, feeling out the degree of appetite coming out of Washington D.C. in collaborating with Brussels around, you know, the technology and digital agendas.

So, I think those are big questions and then, I think with Rhys, and perhaps also with you, Robin, I think the big question in this equation is also how do we make sure we bring in the UK? Because I think that moves a little bit into the aspiration side of it, do we need a bigger and closer collaboration over the Atlantic, including the UK on some of these issues? I think the answer’s absolutely yes. Will there be differences, for example, on competition issues, on privacy issues, on national security issues? I’m sure there will be, but if you look at the bigger picture, I think there is much more in common between Europe, the UK and the US, that there are, in fact, you know, areas that takes us apart.

Now, what does that mean for a private technology company, including for Microsoft? Well, I think, you know, before we kicked off the discussion, as Susan was, sort of, referring to a word that I’m going to use as well now, that is ‘trust’. I think for us, being a technology company and a technology provider, our technology runs on trust. If there is no trust in what we do, then it’s very difficult for us to be successful as a company. And I think providing a regulatory framework that gives citizens confidence or trust in the technology that we’re rolling out, whether it’s on, you know, avoiding biases in artificial intelligence, or whether it’s making sure that there is competition in the market, I think that is going to be incredibly important, also for a company like Microsoft, which is why we’re hoping for, sort of, you know, predictable level playing field rules that are broadly applicable, regardless of whether you find yourself in the US or whether you find yourself in the UK or in mainland Europe. So, that’s a bit the aspirational side of it, where we think we need a lot more collaboration than what we’ve seen already.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And if I were to just take you over something very practical, straightaway. Following President Biden’s visit to Europe last June, there was, you know, a decision to move forward with something that had been proposed even earlier, I think by the EU, of a US-EU Trade and Technology Council to try to create a kind of, structure for a more regular conversation about digital governance, digital rules, approach to markets, approach to the services that are provided. Can you give us – give our participants here any insights as to whether you feel this is just window dressing, sorry to be blunt about it, or do you think there’s some there, there? Are there some topics that you, from a private sector standpoint, feel are now being addressed and that we’re not, sort of, sitting behind ramparts on either side of the Atlantic, looking each deeply suspiciously? I mean, you know, how real is it, in your opinion?

Casper Klynge

And I think it’s a good question and if you allow me just one comment, before moving that, because I think it’s related. I think if you look at where especially Europe is right now, there is a lot of focus on, you know, the discussion around strategic autonomy or digital sovereignty, and I think, you know, part of that, frankly speaking, and being very blunt in this small group, is related, also, to what we’ve seen during the global pandemic. And you know, has that been creating opportunities for technology companies like Zoom, or for Microsoft? Absolutely, and of course, we wouldn’t have been able to cope with the stresses of COVID, have we not had access to, sort of, 21st Century technology.

But I think it has also raised, you know, sincere and I think, also, valid concerns in Europe about the dominance of non-European Union technology companies in this sphere, and I think if we, sort of, look into the crystal ball of what’s coming in the digital economy, it goes without saying that in terms of economic growth, job creation, you know, those are areas where the technology companies are going to play a role. So, I think, for us, as a technology company, the question we need to ask ourselves is how can we give, you know, the sovereignty to, in our case, European stakeholders, in a way that they feel comfortable with what we’re providing? And I think that has a lot to do with control, it has a lot to do with transparency, had a lot – has a lot to do with supporting, sort of, the broader ecosystem, in our case, in Europe.

And that leads me to your question about the Trade and Technology Council, and I have to be very careful in how I’m going to formulate this, it goes without saying. But is this going to be revolutionary, in terms of transatlantic collaboration? Well, perhaps not necessarily short-term. Is it the only show in town right now? Absolutely, and I think we need to invest in the TTC. I think it came up from a good start. After some initial, I think, discussions, and I’d be very interested to hearing from Susan and from Anu, because I think what we understood is, also, in Washington D.C., in the administration, there were some considerations on, you know, how much to invest and how much to lean in on the TTC. I think that was removed in the first meeting in Pittsburgh and we now have a number of different working groups involved in everything from, sort of, indirectly, the regulatory framework, to cybersecurity, to broader competition issues. And I think the enthusiasm we’re feeling, also, here in Brussels, in the European Commission, among those that are very transatlantically oriented, is giving ground for optimism on whether TTC is going to a head. And I think that’s such an important vehicle for keeping the US and Europe together.

I think the problem with the TTC is, of course, it doesn’t include the UK, and I’ll be very cautious in saying anything on Brexit, but I do think, you know, regardless or Brexit, or perhaps even because of Brexit, we do need to find an approach with the sort of, three different components: the US, the UK and Europe. I think we need that, also, from a global perspective.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

We’ll have a chance to get to that with Rhys in a minute. But let me just, for the moment, thanks – say thanks to Casper and just go over to Anu, if I might, ‘cause I think there was a word you used there about sovereignty. And Anu, coming to you, obviously, this has been one of the leitmotifs of EU discussion, not just in the pure security sphere, but in the economic sphere and especially in the last few years, in the digital sphere. And I suppose the question I’d like to put over to you is one, really, about whether you think the EU is acquiring the right kind of sovereignty in the digital space? Because I think the thesis that you laid out in your book, which is incontestable, is that you as being one of the most active regulators, certainly in the transatlantic space, of technology and obviously, GDPR, General Data Protection Regulations, have become synonymous with that capacity.

But I suppose I want to ask you, ‘cause you get a lot of questions about it, after your book on this topic, whether you feel it has become a, sort of, blunt interest – instrument. I’m trying to think of how many people these days, when they get that little question, you know, “Do you want to accept these rules or not?” most of my friends just, “Just get the damn thing off my screen,” and they just click, “Yes,” whatever. And then, if you open it up and you’ve got all the questions underneath it, it’s just interminable and blah, blah, blah. So, now, I suppose my point is, do you think that, in its quest for sovereignty in this area, which is a lot of the difficulty we, therefore, have at a transatlantic level, do you think it’s ended up with too blunt an approach? Is it actually helping the EU becoming more technologically engaged? Is there greater trust, back to Casper’s point, amongst citizens, or is it just a kind of, box ticking exercise, to put it bluntly? Where do you think we are on this, Anu?

Anu Bradford

Very good. Thank you, Robin, I’m delighted to share this conversation with this wonderful group and your listeners. So, I hear two different, but related questions, and let me take them in order. So, one is this idea you talk about whether the EU regulation is the blunt instrument and a box ticking exercise. I think there are legitimate concerns that the EU has been successful in generating a lot of regulation. But whether that regulation actually has been effective in changing the marketplace, do we actually have much more competitive marketplace after imposing ten billion of fines against [inaudible – 17:56]? Even if we have the GDPR basically taking over the world, are we really enforcing the GDPR in the way that we see much enhanced privacy? We know that internet is still flooded with this in – disinformation and hate speech.

So, I think one of the big questions for the EU is that it’s not that some are worried that there’s too much regulation. I think we could say there’s probably too little regulation, that the EU needs to double down and follow through, and it actually needs to make sure that that enforcement is really backed up by effective enforcement.

So, that’s one comment and I think we really see this is a pivotal year to look at the rollout of the Digital Services Act, Digital Markets Act, which are really examples of trying to take it up a notch and try different tools, gain new powers to regulate in more pervasive ways. So, I think that’s really a test case for the EU. And in particular I would say this is an important test case, because we see China cracking down on tech giants and one big question is whether these tech companies actually are any more governable, and we have a question, ultimately, do the tech companies win or the government wins? And I think the safe bet might be that, in China, the government will win, but the test is whether there’s a democratic governance model that actually can rein in the tech companies.

So, that’s one, but let me now take directly the question of sovereignty. And it’s one of those it’s a very contested concept and to the extent it is used to urge the EU to build more capabilities, really invest in innovation, I am all for that. I don’t think the strategic dependencies are healthy and especially in today’s world, safe, because trust is very low and uncertainty is high. So, I understand the origins of that desire to be more independent. At the same time, it worries me tremendously that we are seeing this move towards techno-protectionism and techno-nationalism around the world. So, I think there is a legitimate case that now countries around the world, that governments have woken up to the need to rein in tech companies, but I’m probably a bigger proponent of the governments reining in than propping up. So, these subsidy races, for instance, for the EU to enter into an AI race between the US and China, the EU will run out of money before China will, and ultimately, I am not sure whether it serves the world better that we are trying to resolve this through subsidies. And if we take, for instance, the Brussels effect seriously and the idea that the EU’s regulations do get transplanted around the world, protectionist regulations can also be exported through the Brussels effect. So, ultimately, I don’t think it would create the world that is better for European companies. I don’t think there are, generally, winners in tech wars and protectionism, and it certainly wouldn’t serve the internet users around the world.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Look, very clear answers. I mean, can I ask you just one immediate follow-up, which is do you think the Digital Markets Act, just focus on that one, the DMA itself, is pointing in the right direction for what you see currently? In other words, is it going to end up, potentially, reining in market dominance of US companies, or will it also, by creating a more competitive marketplace, potentially open up opportunities for European companies to start to take in that space? ‘Cause if it’s only the former, yeah, then it isn’t necessarily, in the end, helpful to Europe as a whole. So, when you look at the DMA, how much is it focused, do you think, on helping incentivise a more helpful ecosystem for European companies to take root, to be able to compete with their big American counterparts, on particular, or how much is it just about trying to regulate the American companies?

Anu Bradford

So, ideally, there’s a connection between the two that by regulating the biggest players, that happen to be American companies, sometimes really hard to know whether the EU is going after them because of their size or because of their nationality, but there are many smaller US companies, for instance, that are egging the EU on and asking explicitly the EU to be very stringent and try to sure up the regulatory landscape vis-à-vis the US companies, because they are the biggest market players. But at the same time, I don’t think that simply by reining in the largest tech giants will be enough for the EU companies to compete.

There are many other issues that European Union needs to do, in order to – for there, one day, to be a Google of Europe and Microsoft of Europe and Facebook of Europe. But I don’t see – many people are saying that it’s the regulation that keeps these European companies down and we now need to just level the playing field. I think we need to complete the Digital Single Market, we need to complete the Capital Markets Union, so that these companies can actually raise funds and grow in Europe, as opposed to being acquired by one of the tech giants. We need to have different bankruptcy laws, that actually incentivise and allow for risk taking and a different culture of entrepreneurship, and we need to shift our policy when it comes to immigration, because a lot of the success stories behind these US tech giants is the US’s ability to attract the best tech entrepreneurs from around the world.

So, I would like to, sort of, debunk this myth that regulation is hampering the EU and there would be this, kind of, desperate, envy driven attempt now to level the playing field by targeting, specifically, the American companies. I am hopeful that the DMA will provide tools that actually will challenge these companies to rethink and develop a different kind of business model, where the downsides of the current business models to the competitive marketplace have become and obstacles to better competition. But again, a lot comes down to how will this be enforced and what kind of market will they – will it generate in Europe, in the end?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Okay. I was thinking of bringing in Rhys now, but actually, I think given all the comments you’ve just made now, it’d be better for me, if Rhys doesn’t mind, just to actually fold over to Susan. Because I think these big questions about what it is that the EU’s trying to achieve, its con – its ideas of sovereignty and so on, are going to be quite relevant to try and understand what is driving current thinking in the US and in particular, the Biden administration, which came in with seemingly, a very different approach, a kind of, desire to try to respond both to popular and, in some case, congressional demand, to impose some greater controls, I suppose might be the right word to use, on the US tech industry. Susan, can I come to you, and can you give us a flavour of where do you think the debate is right now in the United States, and in particular, in Washington, of this administration, about making its own adjustments to what has been an incredibly free market approach to allowing the rise of these companies?

Susan Ariel Aaronson

It’s not – okay, there we go. Brand new thinking, which is being led by the National Economic Council and not really by Congress, and I – the Biden administration wants, very much, to create a new template for digital trade and that template, allegedly, will be focused on the labour and user issues. The problem is that that template can’t go anywhere until Congress gives fast track authority and directions as to what the legislative priorities for negotiating digital trade should be.

Moreover, unfortunately, Congress is sending very confusing signals, right, because there is yet no personal data protection law, despite multiple frameworks. There’s no unified bipartisan approach to regulating the tech giants, and I think there’s a real misunderstanding about what data is. And if I may segue to that point, when you were asking Anu about the conception of sovereignty, I just want to say that I think almost every model of how we think about these issues is totally out of date. Who is sovereign over data, right, which is at the root of all these sectors? Who is sovereign over personal data and who is sovereign over non-personal data?

And then, in order to answer that question, you have to assess what is data? So, what is it? Is it a quasi-public good, is it a proprietary good? You know, we need to think about these things very coherently in order to decide what is protectionist and what isn’t. And because I think about that, I think the current models of thinking about how you regulate, whether it is digital trade or whether it’s competition policy, is totally out of date.

If I make one final point, it is that these models also ignore the needs of the users, which are – users are feeling less and less trust online, according to polling data, which I understand can be very unreliable and biased. But I urge you all to think about the role of trust online and how important that is, and we are not addressing user concerns, which are not about consumer welfare or malware or spam, today. They’re about online harassment, they’re about internet shutdowns. I could go on and on.

It’s also shocking to me how much we ignore technological change. The metaverse is upon us. I shouldn’t have said the metaverse. I should’ve said increasing use of immersive technologies. Who is sovereign over that and what kind of rules should take place? That’s what I think we should be talking about, both for digital trade agreements and for regulation.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Well, again, let me just do one follow-up to you, in that case, Susan, ‘cause actually, I also find this question of sovereignty fascinating, because maybe as a European, I sense a sort of, in-built desire amongst individuals to have a greater sovereignty over their own data.

Susan Ariel Aaronson

Right, exactly.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And that’ll expose the – no, this is only one…

Susan Ariel Aaronson

But that…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Either the companies have sovereignty, or for that matter, or the countries or the governments, is how can we move to a position where there’s greater individual sovereignty? So, you know, might that be a place where there is a bit of a bridge between US and Europe? You said that the loss of trust in the United States about online harassment being, sort of, ejected from certain online platforms, how your data is being used, especially if we get into the more immersive worlds. Do you sense a – there’s been a sense, in a way, that companies could do whatever they wanted, if I can put it that way, because there wasn’t the demand at the private level. But do you think there is a greater demand emerging in the US, which will filter up, then, into the political system, for people to have greater control over their own data and is there any moves to be able to respond to that desire in the US? ‘Cause if there is, then I think we’ve got a bridge over to Europe, but just tell me what you think on that.

Susan Ariel Aaronson

Well, a couple of things. I think there is a widening consensus between democracies, whether it’s Brazil, whether it’s – and maybe the common leadership is a problem, but I think citizens who live in democratic societies understand that the openness of their society is leading to all sorts of problems, in terms of their own personal data, and that a business model built on surveillance of – and prediction is inherently dangerous to democracy and to human autonomy. And that – but does that motivate people? People say they care about personal data protection, but they don’t act it, and I just cite as example Facebook, which I think is the most dangerous, sometimes, of misuse of this model, is moving – is increasing its user base, especially older users, in Europe and whereas it’s declining in the United States, and that’s why Facebook realises its future can’t be as a social network, it needs to be a something else.

But I don’t think – like, you’re asking me about a current approach to how we regulate, and I would say what we need to do is widen the tech in Technology Council, although I understand that’s very difficult to do. But I work for a Canadian think tank, and I can tell you the anger that I hear about not being a part of those discussions is quite infuriating. Mexico the same, I would imagine the UK feels the same way, I think you hinted at that. That’s number one. That’s the discussions are so old line that they’re talking about this, “Is this a problem between business and government?” It’s not a problem between business and government. It’s a problem between who has control over data. So, I’m just coming full circle with your point, sovereign over data. The public kind of gets this, but are they moved to act politically? I don’t see the evidence. What do you all think?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Perfect chance for me to move over, Rhys, to you. I mean, we’ve had several – you know, we’ve been basing this whole conversation around some of the differences in approach and capability between the US and Europe. Let me turn to you and ask you, maybe, the obvious question, whether you think that the UK has a, kind of, seam that it can go down here of a differentiated approach, or one that is equally aligned between some of the instincts of US regulation and some of the instincts of EU regulation. Where is the UK situating itself in this debate and what steps is it taking to situate itself differentially? Over to you, Rhys.

Rhys Bowen

Robin, thank you very much, and very nice to see everybody. Thank you for joining this. Robin, I’m going to start off, actually, by taking almost the inverse of your question and just picking up on Casper’s point. And he used the phrase, “There’s more in common than separates the kind of, major players here,” and I think that is very much true. I chaired the G7 Tech Working Group last year, under the UK Presidency, and we covered many of the themes we’ve talked on today: digital trade, digital competition, online harm, standards.” We can get into a number of those, as we go forward, and I did sense quite a strong consensus about the fundamental policy objectives in most of those areas. I think that there have been some shifts in position, I think, on some of those, kind of, key economies over the recent time and I think the G7 discussions last year really reinforced that sense to me, that whilst – as Casper absolutely rightly, kind of, highlighted, there are differences in emphasis and there are differences in approach. In terms of fundamental objectives and I think, actually, the kind of, fundamental, kind of, view about where the role of the state is on this, I think there is a bit of consensus building out there.

That’s not to say that, you know, that there is one model emerging and I think that’ll take some time, but in any case, I think that isn’t necessarily strictly required in all these areas. And the UK certainly does see the opportunity of Brexit as being in the regulatory space and of the ability for us to regulate in a way which we believe allows us to, kind of, support what UK preference is a bit more directly and, in some cases, to move a bit more agilely, and I think the digital policy space is one of those areas where that is true.

We’re looking at our data regime, as many people are aware, and consulting on that right now, and for us, we absolutely want to, sort of, lock in the, kind of, focus on the consumer privacy that is, kind of – I guess we’ve inherited from our recent past as part of the EU, but we do think there are greater economic opportunities to be gained from a data regime that is more slanted towards free flow of data. And again, building on previous themes, we believe that the pandemic has actually shown a fantastic case study and the benefits of data transfer, in terms of all the work that was done internationally on COVID and the data that was shared about new variants and the development of vaccines and antivirals, for example, and really demonstrated the kind of, public benefit of that sort of data exchange when it’s done right. We see those benefits, very much, kind of, coming out in the future around areas of like AI as well, where the ability to share large scale data, we think could be crucial to really secure the benefits of AI.

In other areas, as well, I mean, we have a competition regime that we’ll be legislating for soon and we already have a shadow operation working in the – in our Consumer Markets Authority here in the UK. And I think whilst, again, I think the objective to what we’re trying to do on digital competition are quite similar to those coming through the DMA, for example, and those that are also being put forward, at least in draft form, in terms of some of the bills considered in Washington right now, we believe, you know, there are some choices to be made about exactly how to develop a regime that is proportionate, as well as, kind of, effective, in terms of what we’re trying to do on the competition front and so, we do think there are opportunities there.

The final part I will just say, I think, is around some of the future technologies and obviously, this plays against some of Anu’s comments about how future regulation gets set. We think there are opportunities and there is, you know, there is a close association, actually, with delivering an effective, but agile, regulatory environment and making the UK an attractive place to do business and again, AI is an example of where we are trying to do that. In our National AI Strategy, which we launched back in September of last year, we, sort of, shifted the emphasis from previous iterations, away from the pure research side of AI, more of the application side and that’s very much where we want to try to support UK research and UK industry. But we think getting the kind of, right standards around artificial intelligence, how it is important, firstly, to kind of, maintain that consumer trust, which others have mentioned has been so important, but also make the UK, you know, the right place, we hope, for Researchers to do their primary research or build businesses here.

And so, we’ve been quite active. We launched an AI Standards Hub, based out of the Turing Institute, just a few weeks ago now, which for us, is about how we can push forward on the debate about regulation in that space. So, we do believe that there are opportunities there, even if, fundamentally, some of the policy objectives, I think, are shared between the main transatlantic partners.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

And thanks very much for, you know, for laying out that kind of approach and that thinking there. You did mention the role that you’d played and, obviously, the government had played with its Presidency of the G7. How much are you pushing, and I think this has touched on something Casper said earlier, to, kind of, enlarge the circle of governments that are going to be engaged, who try to arrive at a more shared approach to digital governance, whether in the market space or the services space? Do you see Japan, I don’t know, South Korea, Australia, some of these others, Canada, to Susan’s point, you know, being – do we need to have them in now? In other words, we heard from Casper earlier on, we need to get the UK into the US-EU discussion. Is that the right question, or is it that we ned to have the US and the EU in a conversation that also includes Canada, UK, Australia, take your pick, South Korea, some others, I don’t know, Brazil? You – what’s the objective of the UK, is it trying to insert itself in that transatlantic dialogue, or are you trying to keep it larger?

Rhys Bowen

I think we’re trying to look for a larger, more global, approach, Robin, and some of you will be aware that as part of our G20 – sorry, G7 Presidency last year, we had three invited guests, that was Australia, South Korea and India, who took part in the discussions we had, and sorry, South Africa joined the later part of the G7 Presidency, as well. So, we have that broader focus and I think, actually, having particularly those additional voices from South-East Asia, who are, kind of, active in the digital policy space, I think was very much enriching for our discussions.

We built on that, as, again, some of you are aware, with our Future Tech Forum event, which we had at the end of the Presidency, which was a multi-stakeholder event. It included a large number of industry and civil society perspectives and partners, but also, a much broader range of countries joined that event. And what we were trying to discuss there was how we can go ahead to ensure that the next generation of technology evolution evolves in a way that is consistent, I guess, with the kind of, core democratic values that we share as a group of nations and the way technology is developed and deployed is consistent with that. And I think that was the, kind of, start of the discussion, but we think it is important that that is the global discussion, because as well as things like the G7 and G20 groups, which are really important here, we’re conscious, for example, that this is going to be a very busy year for the ITU, the International Telecommunications Union, the UN body, with a number of major conferences and then their Plenipotentiary Conference in September, where the new Secretary-General and the council, and others, will be voted upon. And we think, again, making sure there is the kind of, broadest group of countries around that is important.

We think others share that perspective and an example for that, for me, is the Alliance for the Internet Initiative that is being launched out of Washington at the moment and Tim Wu, and others, have spoken about publicly, where again, I think there is a desire to see a kind of, broad group of countries work together in that sort of space.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks very much, very helpful. Look, I’m just going to remind everyone that if you want to ask questions, please drop them into the chat. That’d be wonderful, and I’ll come to – I’ve got one up there already, but I’m going to come to it in a minute. Just see if I can just follow-up on a couple of other quick points, first of all, with people.

One of the topics that we focused on in the Chatham House paper, the two areas where we were looking at capacity for closer US-European co-operation, obviously, one is in the trade space, the trade in digital services, in digital products, in digital data, I suppose, in that sense, as well, and the capacity, therefore, for companies to be able to share data across the Atlantic, in order to enable that trade. Anu, just turning to you, could you just share where you think we are in this environment where we’re hoping there’s a little bit more convergence across the Atlantic, and we’ve heard it, I think, from all of the comments today. Where we are on the issue of data and data privacy and data protection, which still remains, as I understand, a real sticking point across the Atlantic, with the so-called Schrems II regulation, which you can explain to our participants here, for those who don’t know it. I mean, that is still a real sticking point, is it not? I mean, could – you know, could – do you see any chance of – because if we’re still stuck on how you protect individual data, then a lot of the issues we’re discussing here, including in the AI space, are going to be moot. So, how optimistic are you that we can have some breakthrough in that area?

Anu Bradford

So, Robin, I think you’re absolutely right that it remains a major sticking point, that it’s one of those more intractable conflicts, and I would draw a distinction. There are two different types of issues that the Europeans worry about when it comes to transferring data to the US. So, one is the data in the hands of the US companies, so the kind of, surveillance capitalism. But the second one is data in the hands of the US Government. So, this is the post-Snowden revelation concerns that what happens if the US national security apparatus gets its hands on the European data? And this is for those who are not familiar with the Schrems I and Schrems II. These are decisions by the highest court of the European Union, that, basically, halted, invalidated the agreement that was the basis of data transfers between the US and the EU. And the reason was the concern that there is no adequate equivalent level of protection for European data that the Europeans are enjoying when that data stays in Europe.

So, really, it was the – and it was in the post-Snowden era, when the extent of the US surveillance and its connection to European data was revealed. And this is one of those issues where both the US and the EU Governments want to make progress. We want – there are compelling reasons to transfer data across the Atlantic. It has economic significance I think Rhys was pointing on, in terms of, well, dealing with public health crisis. We do need to find a way to do this in a sustainable way.

But at the same time, even if there was some kind of a political consensus that we would get to a point where we agree and negotiate yet another agreement, after two have already been invalidated by the court, the question is can we actually reach the kind of agreement that will withstand the strict scrutiny by the European courts? European courts are not negotiating. That’s a part of a diplomatic, sort of, process that they are part of. They are evaluating the impact on the fundamental rights of European citizens. That’s not the same thing as striking a political compromise.

So, I think there’s a deep scepticism that currently – that today’s political climate would, for instance, make the US comfortable reining in its surveillance state and, sort of, rebalancing surveillance and privacy in the way that would satisfy the bar set by the European courts. So, we continue to operate under some degree of uncertainty on these standard contractual clauses, for instance, of the kind of, the – well, it’s not a temporary arrangement, but the companies need to, basically, come up with the set of protections that they guarantee when they engage in data transfers. But those are still more vulnerable. It doesn’t provide a same level of security that the earlier Safe Harbour Agreement or the Privacy Shield Agreement did. So, I am not optimistic that there is any quick, easy solution that would have already emerged.

And at the same time, I think Europeans are struggling with these questions of how do we, so, combine some pressures for national security needs, some terrorist attacks that we’ve had on European soil? How do we think about encryption of data? How do we think about data retention? So, it’s one of those issues where I see the continue interest lan – transatlantic friction to continue.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

That’s super, thanks. Look, I’m just going to do one more. Casper, I wanted to come over to you quickly with one more question, which, I suppose, is connected to what Anu was just discussing there. And I think we’ve all seen in the news this, you know, dispute going on right now between the European Data Protection Supervisor and Europol about, you know, precisely this issue about security and how long personal data can be kept for national security reasons by European security agencies, never mind the US. So, I think Anu was saying there are very different views, even inside Europe, on these topics or between different camps, if you can call it that.

Could you just say a word or two about data localisation, Casper? Because this is a phenomenon that when it was first discussed, everyone said, “Oh, my God, it’s something the Chinese are going to demand or the Turkish Government or others.” It was considered so out there, you know, that you – companies will be forced to keep all the data just inside the boundaries of where the citizens lived, if you see what I mean. Is data localisation becoming something that you sense gaining more traction, for example, in Europe, and neighbouring likeminded governments? Because of the lack of trust that Susan Aaronson mentioned, because of the debates that Anu just mentioned now about concerns about access to security or other reasons for people’s individual data, where is data localisation and where does a company like Microsoft see that? Are you – does it make any difference to you, we can live with it if that’s where we’re going, or is it going to be a real blockage to the more integrated and collaborative approach we’re talking about here, at least between the US and Europe?

Casper Klynge

Yeah, there’s – I think that’s a great question, because it actually goes into the more practical dimension of the digital sovereignty debate and, also, frankly speaking, what we’re experiencing, also, with our customers, both on the public and the private side. There’s not – I think what Anu described is something that I would complete it here, so I think we’re hoping for a quick solution that would enable, again, without any questions, you know, data transfers between Europe and the US. Is that very likely? I don’t know. I’m certainly hoping that it will be, because I think there is a fundamental misunderstanding around the data transfer debate, not in all quarters, but in some quarters, that this is primarily a problem for US technology companies, so it’s a US phenomena.

And I think it’s so important, and it goes a little bit back to what Susan said before about the role of data in the 21st Century and, not least, in the years we’re in right now. I mean, this issue about data transfer is as much a problem for European companies as it is for US technology companies. So, if you are a German car manufacturer, I can assure you that data transfer is absolutely essential when you look at, you know, predictable maintenance, when you look at, you know, different components’ development, when you look at autonomous driving. You are so dependent on the transfer of data, and I do think we need to find a way forward.

Now, GDPR was very much focusing on our personal data. We now have two pieces of regulation coming forward in Brussels, the Data Governance Act and the Data Act, which is, basically, it’s, sort of, handling non-personal data, and if you allow me to be a little bit positive and optimistic, and Robin, you know me well, it doesn’t come natural for a Dane and for somebody who was used to be a Diplomat, but I think what gives me a little bit of a ground for optimism is that both those pieces of regulation is actually focusing on the opportunity of data. It is acknowledging that we have to become better at facilitating data transfer, of course in a safe way, in a way that respects privacy, but fundamentally, enabling Europe comp – European companies to do better in the digital economy by utilising the transfer of data.

Now, and this is, I think, where the discussion becomes a little bit schizophrenic, because then you – it then inserts the digital sovereignty discussion, and it – you’re spot on in saying data localisation is a thing that we are being confronted with on a daily basis. So, the desire for customers to have better control, or better perceived control of data, by having, you know, us commit to storing data in its specific areas, and we actually did something, you know, last year, where we established what we call the EU Data Boundary, that gives our customers the opportunity to not only store data in Europe, but also to process data in Europe. Now, does that mean that we were not already living up to all commitments? No, we were completely living up to all commitments and all regulation, but I think this is where the psychology comes in.

Now, what I would say, and it’s, sort of, a slightly broader discussion and if you allow me to bring in cybersecurity, because I think it’s an important part of it, as well. You know, is there a contradiction between Europe focusing on protection and Europe focusing on connection? And I would say absolutely not and I think that’s part of the discussion where we’re hoping we can interject a little bit of, sort of, insights, also, for the – from the technology side, because what we’re seeing, for example, around cybersecurity, including what is happening a little bit towards the East these days, is, you know, there is something fundamentally logical about if you want to protect yourself, you pull things closer together. And if you look at data, you put things into your basement, into an on premise service. The problem with the digital world and the virtual world we’re living in today is that that actually gives less protection against these sophisticated attacks that we’re seeing unfolding.

So, the best way to enable, also, a company like us and many other technology companies, to offer state of the art, you know, mitigation technology is, in fact, moving towards the Cloud. And if you want me to be a little bit, sort of, provocative, although I’m not going to be very provocative, but I think the concerns I would have, both as a European, but also representing the company that I do, is that the digital sovereignty discussion across Europe can turn into a bit of an obstacle, for example, of applying Cloud technology at the moment where Europe is actually trading behind globally, trading behind North America, trading behind Asia, in terms of adapting the Cloud. And I think that would be problematic for small and medium-sized enterprises that could have access to cheap state of the art technology, but in fact, it’s also problematic, in terms of defending your societies, your critical infrastructure, from the cybersecurity attacks that we’re seeing going through the roof these months.

So, I think this is where the operational side of the digital sovereignty discussion raises a few concerns and where I think we need to have, sort of, a better discussion between the private sector and the public sector.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Very interesting. Look, I’m just going to bring Susan in, who wanted to come, very quickly, on that point. I’m going to call on three people who’ve asked questions to see if I can get them – just warning you to unmute, if you’re comfortable, in a minute. My colleagues will be in touch with you. And then, also, I want to come to Rhys at the right moment to talk a bit about the standards issue, which is so important right now and was the other main focus, actually, of our report. So, somewhat in that order; we’ve got about 15/20 minutes to go, so I think we’re doing well. But Susan, over to you quickly on data localisation, first.

Susan Ariel Aaronson

Thanks so much. So, in terms of data localisation, I think it is, increasingly, a function of the demand for data sovereignty. And I do think that it – you know, as the Internet of Things and smart manufacturing becomes ever more important, what we’re really talking about is, you know, personal data, and so, we’re going to have to figure out how much of smart manufacturing, how much of IoT stuff, is actually personal data. I can talk about that more at another time, but that said, guys, I really think, although data localisation is on the rise, it is a nothing as a barrier to market access, compared to internet shutdowns, a nothing. Every time India turns off the internet, 1.2 billion people, at least, are offline, and that is huge for market access and I don’t understand why trade agreements don’t discuss that. Censorship would be another issue. So, these are barriers to trade, but the ones that we’re addressing are not the biggies. Here’s another one coming, and I’ll be really brief, the conflict between source code requirements and GDPR algorithmic regulations, which I’m sure Anu can talk about more eloquently.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you.

Susan Ariel Aaronson

So, yeah, sure.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Before I – and let me just get some other people back here and there, and so, I’m going to bring in a couple of folks, if I can, right now. I know I want to unmute, if you can, Tom Kedrowski, Yousef Alawad, and I’m going to ask Lesley’s question for her in a minute, Lesley McKenna, and I will also ask Kristina Barbov’s question in a minute. But Tom, you’re unmuted, go ahead, and I’m going to take them altogether. So, take in – then I’ll turn to our panellists to reply, but let me get all the questions on the table, so we don’t spend too long. Tom, over to you first. You’re unmuted, go ahead.

Tom Kedrowski

Thank you very much, Robin. So, I wanted to ask the panellists, can long-term transatlantic governance co-operation survive the increasingly polarised nature of domestic politics, and in fact, can the very entities that Politicians that are seeking to regulate them be the actual glue that’ll hold it altogether? Thank you.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks for that question. Right, have a think on that, folks, and Yousef, please, you’re unmuted, go ahead.

Yousef Alawad

Hello. Thank you all to the panellists, a very, very interesting discussion. My question is actually directed to Anu directly. You spoke very briefly about this idea of America being this, kind of, haven for entrepreneurship, both from a regulatory and also, a kind of, somewhat of a cultural perspective. Can you expand a little bit on what this means in practice, i.e., some of the policies that allow this to happen? And, also, what tangible policies would need to be implemented in Europe to compete with this? Thank you.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks for that, Yousef, and I know that Anu touched on some of those issues, I think, in one of her earlier comments about, sort of, venture capital and so on. But Anu, I’ll let you come back, ‘cause you might have a couple of other points you want to bring in there, specifically. And let me ask two questions for people who can’t unmute. Kristina Barbov, and I think – I suppose her line goes – is maybe a mirror image to Tom Kedrowski’s first question. Kristina says, “Even if there is a clamour amongst US citizens,” so this, Susan, might be for you, “for greater protection, will it actually get through the democratic process, given the very effective lobbying taking place by hard tech up on Capitol Hill.” So, Susan, I’ll give that to you, but anyone can touch on that if they want, but I think that’ll be specific to you.

And Lesley asks, Lesley McKenna, asks the question whether you have “any thoughts on how governments and businesses on both sides of the Atlantic can better support the development of digital infrastructure in emerging economies? What should we be doing to provide alternatives to the Digital Silk Road?” And actually, I might use that, if I may, to hook, Rhys, over to you, in particular, ‘cause actually, standards might be part of that. I mean, I know there’s many other things in there, but Rhys, that might be a doorway into the standards question that I know I’d like you to touch on, as well.

So, where shall we go? Yous – so, Susan, do you want to take on Yousef’s question about, you know, the idea of America being a haven for tech entrepreneurship, but can you actually get through on this? Oh no, sorry, that was – I’m doing the wrong way around.

Susan Ariel Aaronson

That’s for Anu.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Tom’s question. Thank you, Tom’s question, yeah, or maybe it’s Kristina’s question. Kristina’s question about the clamour for users and so on, if you can do that one first, Susan, yeah?

Susan Ariel Aaronson

You know, I’m actually quite optimistic about regulation. There’s a lot that the Biden administration can do through Executive Orders, which is not always the most democratic route, but it’s already happening. Also, I do think, and Casper could say more eloquently than me, companies want regulation. They don’t want the patchwork, and you know, we’ve seen it at the state level, it’s really dangerous and costly. So, I do think we are going to see competition policy and personal data protection and regulation. Even though it’s in the interests of a Republican to cut short Biden at every turn and deny him policy success, there’s just so much pressure in the United States. Moreover, even though I do think you see a lot of commercials online about how companies want regulation, but they only want certain regulation, and they do – they have captured both Republican and Democratic members, I do think that there is a sense that United States has to say something here and I see more and more evidence that the United States is going to move in this direction. Our allies won’t let us not and we have no credibility if we don’t regulate our own companies, especially because of this – the dangers of the current model to democracy.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Good points. I’m going to keep moving through, so we don’t lose time. Actually, Anu, would you mind taking on Yousef’s question there about – well, you’ve got it there in front of you and so, I won’t repeat it again? Over to you, Anu.

Anu Bradford

Yeah, absolutely. Yousef, thanks for a great question. So, I think – I talked about the risk-taking culture and I think where the Americans beat the Europeans is the mix of ambition, confidence and appetite for risk-taking, which all has served America well. There are spectacular failures, but that also then nurtures those successes, and that is – part of this is culture that is harder to replicate, but in part, there are laws. Like I was mentioning bankruptcy codes that make it fatal to fail, and I don’t think failure is fatal. In the US, well, you just can go and raise money for your other venture. It, at least, shows that you’re trying hard enough. So, that is one example.

And let me, maybe, go a little bit deeper to illustrate one of my favourite topics that I’ve raised when we talk about this issue, is immigration, and if you think about, then, the US talent, it is not all US talent, but it’s also the US has the best universities and the deepest pockets, then, to fund the innovations. And there was an interesting statistic that I came across when we were trying to measure the AI capabilities, and they were these Researchers that looked at one of the most selective AI conferences on deep learning and where do the submissions that get accepted? There was 20% acceptance rates, where do they come from? And 60% of those came from the US institutions, Google being number one, Stanford University being number second, and against this 60% coming from the US, there were 11% coming from Chinese institutions and 10% from Europe. But if you look at, then, the undergraduate degrees of those Researchers that now work in those US universities and US companies, 29% had an undergraduate degree from China, so they were the leading ones. American undergraduate was the second one, 20% and European undergraduate degree was 18%. So, there are smart innovative Europeans that are contributing towards some of these creative innovations, but normally, they make their way to the US companies and US universities.

So, again, the concrete thing is to really think proactively and strategically how to make Europe a magnate, by welcoming foreign students, creating them a path for residency and citizenship and incentives to innovate in Europe, as well. And I already mentioned earlier, venture capital funding can’t really compare what’s happening in the US. We’re pretty good when it comes to startups, but it’s harder for companies to grow. So, for instance, the whole idea that the Capital Markets Union needs to be completed, it would have an immediate and tangible payoff when it comes to the tech future of Europe.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks very much, Anu, for that. I’m sure that – yeah, ‘cause there are a few people in London, at least, hoping that the EU doesn’t resolve that problem, so that the UK can carry on, perhaps making its own moves forward. But I return to you now, Rhys, I mean, maybe just use the doorway, if you want, of Lesley’s question about “What are we doing to provide effective alternatives to initiatives, such as the Digital Silk Road?” But if you wouldn’t mind also just tipping over to the whole issue of digital standard setting, which we know the Chinese are very focused on right now, and where – you know, how we can, in the UK, and likeminded countries, can make sure the right standards are being incubated for the long-term. Over to you, Rhys.

Rhys Bowen

Thank you, Robin. I’ll start at the standards piece and actually move out to the kind of, the development question. So, we, in the UK, probably about two to three years ago, made, I guess, the kind of, leap from seeing standards as predominantly a technical issue, into something which much greater strategic – geostrategic, sort of, implications. And we’ve invested quite a lot of resource in that over that period of time. We saw, I think, a real change in the global debate around this, in my view, around the introduction of the new IP proposals about 15 months ago, into the ITU, which I think act as a wakeup call for many democratic countries about the risks of actually not being more active in the kind of, standards environment. And there’s been a, I believe, a much greater desire to co-operate and co-ordinate in the time since and the G7 last year was an example of that, but there are, kind of, other initiatives as well, I think, about where we’re trying to get together.

I think there are some commonalities of approach and one of the key things, I think, that there is a consensus around, around democratic partners, is this is a multi-stakeholder space and actually, for the vast majority, this activity is led by private sector firms with other private sector firms, and so, the role of government is, by necessity, I think, a more limited one. But I think there is also a sense that there is a role for governments, for the public sector, in a sense, to in – to give a clear sense of what we see the core values, the core vision that we see the standards and, essentially, consistent with. And in my belief, the kind of, Alliance for the Internet proposal I mentioned before, is a, kind of, example of that, about where there’s a conversation around how values can shape our, kind of, standards environment.

More directly, about the kind of, issues around the Digital Silk Road, I mean, just one particular example I’ll give here. We’re doing a lot of work in the UK around telecoms standards and that’s partly driven by what we’re calling our Telecoms Diversification Agenda. There’s a major security element to that, as well, but there’s also an economic component, and our sense was the consolidation of the telecoms supply market around quite a small number of producers, including Chinese producers, was not good for the market either. And so, by driving standards, in this case, the open round standard for radio equipment, is an opportunity both to try to achieve security benefits, but also make the market more competitive. And I think that will actually give, you know, countries in Africa, countries in other places around the world, a greater choice of more cost effective products, but also products which, you know, come from a variety of sources and that will allow people to make choices of that sense, as well. So, I think there is a link between security and the economic. I think standards is a way to, kind of, drive that through. Thanks.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Many thanks, Rhys, and that – I think that connection is really interesting and should be a source of common approach, if I would put it that way, as we go forward. Look, we are coming to the close, so what I’m going to do, I thought I would turn, Casper, to you. I mean, not that you have to take all of Tom’s question, but I suppose one of the questions is whether, actually, companies themselves might be the ones trying to demand or drive a demand for greater transatlantic convergence. And maybe you could even take on the standards question as well, whether the companies themselves are helping, you know, provide that infrastructure, that demand, for shared approaches and so on, for the long-term. Could you just say a word about where you think companies themselves are trying to create that linkage across the Atlantic and make sure that we don’t spinoff into two alternative poles, and any other points you want to pick up on from what we’ve said so far.

Casper Klynge

No, absolutely, thanks a lot, Robin. Perhaps just to try and throw myself into a very, very dangerous place by saying a couple of words on why I think, actually, corporate affairs or lobbyism is not necessarily only a bad thing, and of course, that’s, sort of, you know, part of my job. But it goes back to the question that Kristina had in the Q&A, because I do think there is an impas – important part of the work that we’re doing in trying to bring, you know, the private sector closer together with governments or together with regulators. And, you know, you were kind to refer to the job I had in a former life and I think what I was trying to do, on behalf of a small government in Europe, was to try and create, sort of, an opportunity to have exchanges where the public sector better understood the private sector, what kind of technologies would be coming in our direction, how do we regulate it, how do we adapt to the new world?

But I think what people sometimes miss is, also, the fact that, you know, the team we have here in Brussels, of course we follow very closely what happens in the European Union, but we’re also helping to translate Europe to, in my case, to my mother ship back in Seattle, in Redmond, and I think that translation aspect actually builds a better understanding. It, you know, hopefully removes misunderstandings, but it also means that once in a while, we have discussions with our Engineers, or with our business colleagues, and saying, you know, “We actually need to build these kind of technologies, because when we look into the crystal ball, there is no doubt about it that this is a concern today in Europe, or around the world, and we have to adapt and align our technologies, rather than the other way around.” So, it’s just, sort of, a small, pathetic attempt of trying to defend the role of having, sort of, Ambassadors in both directions.

And then, just to piggyback on what Rhys said, in terms of, sort of, developing economy, because in many ways, I’m actually very happy about the question that came in, because this is one of the areas where I think there is huge opportunity for transatlantic collaboration. And if I just focus on the continent closest to where I’m sitting, Africa, I think, you know, nobody’s in doubt that when we look towards the digital economy, when we look at Africa, also, you know, hopefully soon post a global pandemic, there is an enormous need for investments in digital infrastructure and skills in cybersecurity, and if not, we’re going to have a lot of challenges. I think, you know, a lot of citizens in Africa, a lot of countries will have huge difficulties coping in a digital economy that is going to be extremely competitively – competitive globally.

So, I think this is one of the areas where, frankly speaking, we need multi-stakeholderism, we need collaboration across the Atlantic in making sure that both the European Union, the US authorities – Rhys, I’ll throw you into the mix here, I hope the UK will be part of this, as well, but we need to focus a lot more in making the investments that are going to be absolutely necessary in the next couple of years, in the next couple of decades. And I mentioned at the beginning, Robin, and I’ll promise to shut up, that I think we’ve been through a couple of difficult years, in terms of transatlantic collaboration. I think we’re all looking for opportunities for finding those areas where we can get, you know, Washington and Brussels closer together. I think there are huge opportunities around Africa, and in terms of developing a stronger partnership, that will be enormously beneficial for a continent that I think deserves it more than ever.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thanks very much. Look, I’m – we’ve gone, as I said we might do, five minutes over. There’s a couple of other questions in the chat, but I don’t think we’ll have opportunity to get to them all right now. But I’m just noting Elizabeth Shaunessy’s question about – following up to Susan, that “maybe US legislation might actually be able to address some of the surveillance questions that the EU is concerned about.” We’ll see on that, but I – you know, I’ll let Elizabeth decide if she wants to – sorry, Susan might want to write an answer into that, ‘cause we haven’t got time to get to the whole thing right now.

What I did want to say was a big thank you to our panellists, our four panellists, for addressing what is a massive subject, both with, can I call it strategic perspective, but also some really good precision on very specific examples of how we can make things better and the kind of initiatives that we’ve undertaken right now. There is a link in the chatline to the Chatham House paper that just came out looking at areas for transatlantic co-operation in this area, including the UK, and it did focus very much on digital trade, which we’ve talked a little less about, but also on digital standards, which Rhys raised at the end. And those are the two areas that we felt, at Chatham House, that might be the best opportunities to be able to do something about.

What I would say, then, is that this has been a very helpful session. We’re really at the frontend, still, of this subject. As I think Anu mentioned at the beginning, AI is going to open up a whole new vista of areas where if we do not achieve transatlantic co-operation, we’re not going to have in a way the, sort of, digital hinterland and the data hinterland that we’re going to require to be competitive, as likeminded countries with our other partners, then being at the forefront of all the new technologies, that Susan, I think, alluded to in her remarks, as well.

So, we, certainly, at Chatham House, will be trying to work towards closer collaboration across the Atlantic, but also to Rhys’s point, to make sure we’ve got – and I think Susan’s, as well, we’ve got a number of other countries that are likeminded and share the same objectives in here. And I will finish by saying, right at the end, Casper’s comment that we need to include African countries very much in that mix, I think is spot on, and the inclusion of South Africa, even if it was just one African country in the G7 Summit on this back in June, was an important nod, at least, in that direction, and long may that continue.

So, thank you very much, everyone. Thank you, everyone, for joining us. Apologies for the slow start, but a very quick end, with wonderful comments by everyone. We look forward to keeping in touch. Keep in touch with us, we’ll keep in touch with you. Thank you, speakers, ‘til next time. All the best.

Anu Bradford

Thanks everyone.