US ownership of TikTok won’t protect democracies from digital threats

Concerns over foreign-owned platforms may overshadow deeper-rooted threats in the global information environment. Beyond platform ownership, the US and other democracies need coordinated and consistent policy, aligned with democratic values.

Expert comment Published 8 April 2025 Updated 10 April 2025 4 minute READ

Isabella Wilkinson

Research Fellow, Digital Society Programme

Rowan Wilkinson

Research Analyst, Digital Society Programme

Last weekend, US President Donald Trump extended the 5 April deadline for TikTok to sell its assets to a US owner or face a nationwide ban, the second time he has postponed the ultimatum facing the popular Chinese-owned social media platform since returning to office. 

The delay followed a desperate scramble between ByteDance (TikTok’s Chinese parent company), prospective buyers and the administration to reach a deal. TikTok is not short on admirers: with over 135 million active users in the US, for many Americans, TikTok is the go-to platform for news, culture and entertainment. 

But the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act – passed with bipartisan support in April 2024 – issued a firm ultimatum to the platform: sell up, or be banned, citing significant threats to national security. Taking place against the backdrop of the intensifying US-China technology race, the order comes after years of US concern over Chinese-owned platforms and technologies. 

The debate over TikTok’s influence has exposed many weaknesses at the heart of US democracy and its information environment, but banning or changing the platform’s ownership alone will not fix these deep-rooted problems.

These constraints reflect a longstanding US policy belief shared by President Trump: that domestic control over digital platforms and emerging technologies helps guarantee safety, security, prosperity and sovereignty. Trump even suggested that the TikTok deal could be used as a bargaining chip in tariff negotiations. 

TikTok in the crosshairs 

Washington’s focus on TikTok’s Chinese ownership as a security concern is not new. US policymakers on both sides of the aisle have had longstanding concerns over the platform’s collection, storage and processing of data on US users, with anxieties over potential ‘backdoor’ channels enabling the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to weaponize extensive user data. 

In 2022, TikTok sought to assuage concerns by working with Texas-based Oracle to move the default storage location of US user data to their cloud infrastructure. But in March 2023, a relentless congressional hearing with Singaporean TikTok CEO Shou Zi Chew showed how pervasive security concerns remained. While Chew has insisted that ‘ByteDance is not owned or controlled by the Chinese government,’ he has also confirmed that the company’s engineers had access to some user data, which stoked bipartisan fears of Chinese technology and influence.  

ByteDance by no means operates free from CCP influence. In 2021, Beijing formalized its board influence over a ByteDance entity and for years, China’s digital regulator has enforced strict content guidelines on Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok. Human rights groups have criticized the CCP’s often heavy-handed influence over technology companies and the intimidation of their CEOs. 

Regardless of who owns TikTok, the platform’s design features can be exploited for influence campaigns and the amplification of content stoking divisions and targeting democratic values.

A lack of transparency makes it challenging to gauge the CCP’s actual sway over TikTok outside Chinese borders and whether, in the words of former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the platform is truly one of several ‘Trojan horses for Chinese intelligence’. TikTok’s ownership has also caused concerns in other countries, playing into fears that data collected by foreign-owned platforms could be weaponized to target their political systems – both a real risk and a source of panic. Pointing to scandals like Meta’s legal settlement over a data breach linked to the Cambridge Analytica consultancy firm,  Chew himself noted that US companies might be subject to similar criticism.

While a US company taking control of TikTok might placate Washington, it may not reassure other jurisdictions. In Westminster, concerns about online safety and harms – and particularly the protection of children online – remain the primary driver of action against platforms. For the EU, the misuse of platforms for disseminating disinformation targeting democratic integrity – including by groups linked to Russia and China – remains the biggest concern, stoked once again by alleged foreign interference via TikTok in the annulled Romanian presidential elections. 

Door locked, window open?

Enforcing a handover in TikTok’s ownership addresses some US national security concerns but is not a silver bullet for foreign interference and influence over digital platforms. 

Regardless of who owns TikTok, the platform’s design features can be exploited for influence campaigns and the amplification of content stoking divisions and targeting democratic values. In the US, TikTok is just one platform within an intensely polluted information environment, increasingly mediated by the unprecedented conflation of technology companies with political power. The country has now suffered through three elections where voters have confronted rife misinformation and disinformation on digital platforms. Key information battles of the 2024 election were fought on TikTok, with candidates flooding the platform to engage young voters.

The debate over TikTok’s influence has exposed many weaknesses at the heart of US democracy and its information environment, but banning or changing the platform’s ownership alone will not fix these deep-rooted problems. For foreign states seeking to stoke division in US politics and society, the Trump administration’s approach – focusing on TikTok’s ownership while deprioritizing counter-disinformation work– is akin to double-locking the front door but forgetting to close the upstairs windows. 

This saga has lessons for the US and other countries grappling with the influence of foreign-owned social media platforms, especially in Europe.

The US information space has major vulnerabilities that are at risk of exploitation by hostile foreign actors, including Russia. Top US security and cyber officials were also recently fired without official explanation, with critics of the Trump administration suggesting the decision had ‘put back’ US cybersecurity. The US State Department closed its Global Engagement Center last year after Congress withdrew funding, leaving it without an office dedicated to combating foreign disinformation. 

Foreign influence campaigns that rely on algorithmic amplification and the virality of emotive content might also seek to exploit Mark Zuckerberg’s changes to Meta platforms’ moderation policy or Elon Musk’s sacking of safety and moderation staff for X. Ironically, TikTok users migrating to Xiaohongshu (otherwise known as RedNote, a popular Chinese social networking platform) also raised similar national security concerns ahead of the postponed ban in January.

User data gathered on major US-owned platforms is also far from fortified: technology companies and data brokers are embedded in a complex web of data-sharing arrangements with third parties, some exploiting and profiting from sensitive user data. 

Regardless of their ownership, social media platforms expose users to both persistent and new risks. Many will remain a breeding ground for state-sponsored disinformation and online harms targeting children and minorities unless action is taken.

What can be done?

This saga has lessons for the US and other countries grappling with the influence of foreign-owned social media platforms, especially in Europe.

The US action against TikTok is part of a growing global trend towards technology sovereignty. The focus on TikTok’s domestic ownership has some strategic value, but threats to US democracy, security and integrity will persist unless stronger action is taken to combat domestic disinformation and foreign interference. Policymakers must rise to the challenge and soberly address these threats with coordinated and consistent policy on platform and content governance, while also protecting and strengthening counter-disinformation work.

In Europe, UK and EU policymakers are unlikely to ever share a common regulatory approach to platform governance, which is highly fragmented globally. Nevertheless, to address security concerns associated with foreign-owned platforms, a credible first step would be to ramp up information-sharing and coordination to combat hostile actors operating across different platforms. 

The UK and EU should also take steps to re-bolster global counter-disinformation work, for instance by supporting research that clarifies how different platforms are abused for targeting democratic integrity, intelligence sharing within NATO, and improving international coordination, leveraging Poland’s programme during its EU Council presidency. Without action, policymakers risk overlooking – or worse, enabling – the disintegration of the rights-respecting information ecosystem that is so crucial for modern democracies.