Georgina Wright
Good evening, everyone. A warm welcome on this rather cold day to Chatham House. My name’s Georgina Wright. I have just joined the Institute for Government as a Senior Researcher on all matters Brexit, but spent the last four years here at Chatham House, and it’s lovely to be back here. Tonight, we will be looking at the yellow vests. 11 weeks of protests started in December, and despite Macron’s decision to delay the fuel tax, we expect another 50,000 protesters this weekend across the whole of France. We know that the group of protestors are varied. It’s not clear, exactly, what they’re asking for, and, really, tonight, I am welcomed by this excellent panel right here, and we will be looking at, sort of, how can we understand this movement? Does it bear any resemblance to other protests in Europe, and elsewhere? What does this mean for President Macron, and what does this mean for Europe as well?
So, to my left, I am joined by Emily Mansfield, immediately to my left, Lead Analyst for France and Germany at the Economist Intelligence Unit. She’s also the Director of the Country Forecast Product Portfolio, which, if you haven’t seen it, is great. Just provides a lot of long-term economic forecasts all the way to 2050, and she was previously in France and in the US. To her left, Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at UCL, where he looks at European social democracy, French party politics, the French left and the rise of populism across Europe. And then to his left, Quentin Peel, a former colleague of mine and friend, who is an Associate Fellow here on the Europe Programme at Chatham House. Long career at the Financial Times, where he started in 1975, started off as Southern Africa Correspondent, and move – then became Africa Editor, moved over to Moscow, Berlin, Brussels, and can talk about pretty much anything to do with Brexit as well.
So, thank you all for joining me tonight. Just to remind you all, this event will be held on the record. It’s also being livestreamed, so welcome to our online viewers as well. You can tweet about this event by using the #CHEvents, and please, for those who haven’t put your phone on silent, just do switch it off. Great, well, I will turn to you, Emily, first, and maybe you could give us a brief overview of how’s President Macron feeling right now, and what are the reforms that are on the table, and do you think they’re going to be enough?
Emily Mansfield
Just a small area to focus on, then. I think if we really want to understand the gilets jaunes, we have to start by putting them in context. When Macron first took office, he promised to unblock France, get the country moving again. He had a wide-ranging set of reforms. He wanted to liberalise the labour market, build a more flexible social welfare system, and streamline public spending. The aim, of course, was to make the country more attractive to investors, and so boost job creation, but the problem was that these, kind of, big structural reforms take a really long time to actually see results. So, he moved to implement, perhaps, the toughest of the reforms as quickly as possible. So, the labour market reform bill, for instance, he pushed through straightaway.
By the plan – the time the next election in 2022 was on the horizon, so the plan went, these reforms would be starting to bear fruit. Macron would be busy implementing all of the more popular, sort of, centre-left policies that he had in his programme, but the problem with front-loading all of the really tough reforms was that he lost the support of a lot of the public. Started to be seen as out of touch, the President of the rich. The initial spark for the gilets jaunes was, of course, this hiking of fuel tax, but this was really just the last straw. People were already frustrated with stagnant wages, and with deteriorating public services, and a sense that all of these reforms somehow, were leaving the lower-middle classes, especially in rural parts of the country, worse off. So, the gilets jaunes were really quite a clear message to Macron that a shift in approach was needed, and he need – made two main changes in response.
The first was a major package of concessions that he announced in December. So, this is €10 billion worth of concessions, including a rise in the minimum wage, and the second was the launch of a national debate. So, this is a two-month public consultation that gives people a legitimate platform to express their grievances. Macron had begun his Presidency by fashioning himself as a very regal figure, and famously, a Jupiter, even, and this process brings him, really, back down to earth, and into much closer contact with people on the ground, where, arguably, he does tend to be rather more effective. It also gives him a chance to refashion part two of his Presidency, so that it’s a programme that’s worked out with the electorate, rather than just for them, even if, of course, he is, perhaps, only going to listen selectively to what they have to say. So, will it work? Will it defuse the anger?
I think there’s a short-term goal and a long-term goal here. The short-term goal of the debate is to ease the social unrest, and I think there’s a decent chance of success here. By widening out the dialogue to the whole country, Macron turns the protestors into a minority, and by showing that he’s open to negotiation, he makes those who refuse to engage with that process, look a little bit obstructionist. So, it’s quite a good strategic move, but the longer-term goal is much more ambitious. What Macron really wants to do is to re-engage the gilets jaunes with the political process. These are a very broad selection of different people, but a large proportion are from more rural parts of the country, or from lower-middle class incomes. They’re feeling economically insecure, they feel the social contract with the people in power has been broken, and, of course, they’re being courted at the moment, both by Marine Le Pen on the far right, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon on the far left. So, I think winning these people back over for the centre, and trying to break down the people versus the elite dynamic that’s taken hold, that’s going to be a pretty tough sell.
So, what does all this mean for the reform outlook in France? I think there are a few different ways the debate could play out from this point. In an optimistic scenario, there will be a handful of clear leading issues that emerge from this national debate, and that can be easily integrated with the Government’s existing policy programme. So, for instance, these could be further tweaks to the tax system to support purchasing power, there could be further labour market reforms to boost job creation, or there could be innovative ways to make public spending a bit more efficient. After all, these are all areas where the goals of the gilets jaunes and of the Government are actually fairly well aligned.
Of course, in a more pessimistic scenario, things wouldn’t work so well. We can easily imagine that, perhaps, the public will be more cynical than this. The consensus might be it’s too little too late, and it’s just for show, or that the debate itself has been circumscribed so much as to be meaningless. Issues like the wealth tax, which, there’s no chance that the wealth tax will be reinstated, as a consequence of this debate, and Macron has no intention of throwing away his whole policy programme.
That said, I think that the main risk that the Government is running here is if the public, for instance, demand more spending and lower taxes at the same time, and then the Government, of course, can’t deliver, and disillusionment deepens. But I think, if we take a step back, it is very much in the Government’s interest to present at least some selective concessions, some strategic postponements, and a good, healthy sprinkling of new ideas to at least give people the impression that they are being listened to.
In terms of the specifics of the short-term policy outlook, there were three headline topics that were meant to be being discussed at the start of this year in Parliament. Firstly, reforming the welfare system, secondly, reforming the public pension system, and thirdly, accelerating public sector job cuts. Suffice to say, these won’t all be going ahead quite as planned. I think we can expect more pressure from the social partners involved in the negotiations on the social welfare bill. It’ll probably take longer to pass that. Public sector job cuts are not something that can be discussed right at this point, that will definitely be postponed, and the pension reform, again, will probably be watered down, definitely postponed a bit. It will take longer to implement these campaign promises.
So, overall, I think we can probably expect a bit of a flurry of legislative activity around the kind of conclusions that come out of this national debate, but quite a sharp slowdown in the pace of implementation of Macron’s campaign agenda. Of course, some people were joking last year that, perhaps, if Macron kept up with the momentum, the pace of reform progress, he would’ve implemented his entire campaign agenda by halfway through his term. I think it’s safe to say that that’s no longer a risk, and I think he will have to be much more circumspect now. He’ll have to take more time to build consensus, and, perhaps, dispense with some of the toughest of the reforms he had planned.
The deficit is going to exceed 3% of GDP, once again, this year, and I think even after that fiscal consolidation will need to be slower than he had previously expected, but I wouldn’t say that this is a complete derailing of the Government’s agenda. I’d rather say it’s more of a strategic revision and a re-evaluation of the programme, with, perhaps – in order to effectively safeguard the rest of the agenda, and we could also see it as implementing this strategic pivot to the centre-left that he was planning for later on in his term, just a little bit earlier than expected.
Georgina Wright
Thank you very much for that. I know I have lots of questions, but I would not take the floor now. Philippe, over to you. I guess I’d be really interested in your views on, is this new? Is this a new kind of protest? We know that France has a history of protests, and some have led to meaningful changes, and in fact sometimes change in Government, as well? Is this new, and is – what are the impact for French politics, as well?
Professor Philippe Marlière
Okay. Good evening, everyone. Yes, it is new, but it is also old. So, it’s new and old, so that’s probably why it is, in the end, new, because we’ve never seen before such a social movement. Let’s call it a social movement, that’s the way Political Scientists called this, sort of, a popular protest. It’s been going on for ten weeks now, so we’re on into the 11th week. As you probably know, it’s Saturday, it’s weekly marches, blockades of roundabouts, a number of types of actions, which are quite unusual. So, what I’m going to try to do in, sort of, a very short period of time, is to offer a kind of snapshot of the gilets jaunes, who they are, you know, what do they want, and try to define them, because it’s really a highly unusual type of social movement. And, finally, my last point is, is to try to figure out; I know Political Scientists should be doing that, but to predict the outcome, which I believe is very uncertain. I think it’s very hard to predict what will happen next for the Government, for Macron, but also, in terms of the, sort of, the impact on French – on the French economy, on the French political life, in general.
So, the first point is, really, it’s new, but combining old and new aspects, and it’s a type of social movement, which is very uneasy to pinpoint and define. Secondly, it’s a popular movement. It’s not, if you like, something corporatist, you know, a certain segment of workers or certain category of workers. It’s really interclassist. You know, you’ve got into the melee all kinds of classes, social backgrounds, and, of course, you can define more accurately, the typical gilets jaunes, it’s more, sort of, male, middleclass, white. However, it’s, really, interclassist, as one says. It’s a combination, essentially, of lower-middle classes, independent workers, independent bosses, as well as, sort of, blue collar workers. It’s that type of combination, with, also, white collar workers in there. It’s people in employment. They’re not – it’s not – we’re not talking about the poorest segments of the French population. Long-term unemployed people are not there. It’s really people at work, but people who struggle to make ends meet and that’s why the rise on fuel really triggered the whole protest, because people are struggling financially. Middle of the month, having paid the bills, there’s no money left. That’s exactly what you hear when you talk to gilets jaunes.
They come, geographically from, as you say, you know, they’re not, essentially, concentrate in big urban areas. It’s, sort of, peri-urban areas, small towns as well. That’s where you find them. Quite unusual as well. The modes of actions are also very new, different. A very striking point is that the Smith’s representative democracy, they don’t want any representatives. You know, MPs, Mayors, the President, to start with, the Government, all out. The French call that [mother tongue – 15:08], from the verb [mother tongue – 15:10], to kick out people in power, in place, and, in fact, that really impacts on everyone. Don’t think that Le Pen or Mélenchon, the radical left or far right, are spared, you know, this sort of rejection. No, everyone. They don’t want any representatives. Even amongst gilets jaunes, you know, there are big internal fights. You know, we don’t want any spokespeople. You know, we are – everyone is equal. That’s, again, something which goes against the old tradition of, you know, trade unions parties, notably on the left, where you have representatives, spokespeople, designed people who speak on behalf of the group. You don’t have that here.
What is also quite striking is, normally, a traditional union, or left-wing march would be – protest would be, in the end, there’s an attempt to go on strike. It’s not simply marches, there’s an attempt to also try to impact on, you know, to blow up the economy. That’s really what’s, traditionally, unions on the left would try to do, at least in France, but I think, in general, it’s not what they do. They were doing the week. They go out on the weekend, you know, sort of, the day off, and they march in France, across France, different parts of France, or in Paris, some go to Paris. They block – although I think we’ve, sort of, seen the end of it, and Police intervene, as well. They were blocking, you know, sort of, roundabouts, which is always typical. They have so many – I think France has a record in the world of roundabouts. They’ve built roundabouts madly over the past 20/30 years. So, almost, you know, every, sort of – as soon as you get out of a major city, roundabouts all over the place. So, of course, it’s a very good choice if you want, really, to disrupt traffic, because you put yourself there and you block.
So, this is – so, it’s a kind of, on the one hand, a kind of a [mother tongue – 17:10], you know, a, sort of, coming of the French fall, as, sort of, relating to the sword of a peasant, a farmer’s revolt, and also Poujadism, named after Pierre Poujade, the man – a small shopkeeper, who rebelled against taxation and the state back in the 1950s. So, that’s – you’ve got a bit of that, to be fair. It started off as a tax rebellion. But, and this is where it’s so confusing, and really startling, is that the whole discussion, debate, moving on from this rebellion on tax, on fuel, now what you’ve got into debate, brought were, sort of, socioeconomic issues, bread-and-butter issues, salaries, employment, the state of public services. That is what you’ve got, this is very much, together with, also, claims for more democracy. Politicians do not listen to us. This probably will sound familiar with part of the pro-Brexit electorate. Notably, you saw that more working-class people voted for Brexit in this country. That’s exactly the themes here. You could hear at the time, and that’s very much what you find.
I think, also, in terms of symbol, they’re very interesting, the gilets jaunes, and I think that’s not part of the typical labour movement, socialist or union culture. They wear, first of all, those yellow vests, and I think, frankly, it’s a stroke of genius, from a marketing point of view, to wear those vests. They were imposed by Sarkozy, by the way, many years ago, as a, you know, every driver needs to have one in his or her car. You know, if you have a road accident you wear it, you get out, change a wheel, or something, a flat tyre, you wear it. And, symbolically, it’s very strong, I believe, because it’s really – makes the invisible people in society visible, very visible, in a way, you take to the street with those gilets jaunes, that’s striking, you can’t, miss them when you walk the streets and they’re there.
Also, I think it’s very unusual, for the left wouldn’t do that. When they march, they march along down the Champs-Élysées, and of course, symbolically, it’s very strong. This is where all the, symbolically, the wealth is concentrated. The left would march from Bastille to République, that’s what they do. Completely different symbols. They – people, when you talk to them, they say, “Well, we are the people.” They don’t say, “We are workers,” although they may be sociologically, objectively workers, but it’s nowhere the same. It’s not class-based. “We are the people,” hence the symbolic around, you know, the Marseillaise, which they sing all the time, and the tricolour flags. Not the red flags, there are no red flags in there. There may be leftists in there, as they are also people on the far right, but it’s the tricolour, because it’s unifying. If you put a red flag there, of course, there’d be people – some people wouldn’t be happy.
It’s funny, because they managed to do, out of the blue, to set the agenda around socioeconomic issues, bread-and-butter issues, moreso a pro-social justice agenda. It’s not new, you know. The left, unions, experts, academics, all sorts of people have been saying, “Well, France is really becoming more and more unequal.” No-one was listening. They did it. This is another very striking thing. I think it’s a reaction to Macron’s economic policy. I think you – really, I agree with that, and, clearly, the speed, the depth of his reforms, you know, attacking very important chunks of the French welfare state, the labour reform pension soon, welfare state, the railway soon, eye on the pipeline, cutting jobs in the public sector. This is really a very high-risk thing to do in France. He hasn’t done it yet, but people know that, and I think, really, they have opened the proverbial Pandora box, and I think it will be, in my opinion, very hard, now, for Macron to implement those reform, very, very hard.
The – before, just, concluding very briefly, and the last point is that another surprising thing, there aren’t many gilets jaunes in the end. If you compare with the past social movements, you know, historic, very strong ones, May 68, at some point, 13 million people were marching or on strike. 13, in May 68. 1995, you may remember, for about two to three weeks, important strikes in the public sector. At the time, two million workers on strike, and with a lot of support from the public. Anti-pension reform, under Sarkozy, in 2010, three million demonstrators. Here, at the peak of gilets jaunes, it was never more than 100,000 people across France. Across France, not saying Paris, across France. A typical march in Paris would be 10,000. Still, they managed to create such a buzz around it.
My last point, the outcome. It’s very uncertain. I think the political situation is very volatile. It’s, if you like, the continuation of a very unstable situation, which started off with the {residential election, two years ago, with the collapse of the two main political parties, left and right, Socialist Party, now, sort of, fighting for its life, really on the wane, and also the Conservative party, Sarkozy’s party, les Républicans, both doing very badly. And that, of course, was a chance for someone unknown, such as Macron, to seize opportunity and his, if you like, his political objective was to be centre-left and centre-right, the two together, something you don’t do in French politics.
Well, it seems that this gilets jaunes thing is going to make it more complicated for Macron, because the hostility, and I think I insist on that, the personal hostility of the public against Macron, President of the rich, arrogant, aloof, is, now, Macron is seen by the people, including by people who are not on the left, traditionally, as seen as the President of the rich, doing all those reforms for the rich, and against the people. You see, so that’s – the populist mood is very strong there.
There’s a very anti-elite, very anti-parliamentarian, very anti-tax, very anti-media mood in the public, among the public. So, lots of confusion, and this is my last word. I think this instability, this volatility, this re – constant realignment of French politics, I think, in a short-mid-term could, I’m afraid, benefit the far-right.
Georgina Wright
What a rather not-optimistic note to finish your presentation there. Thank you so much, and I think you – two points, really, and picking up on – very briefly on Brexit, not ‘cause I work on that, but, actually, today, Sylvie Kauffmann, the Editor of Le Monde wrote a piece for – in the New York Times, where she quoted an Advisor to Macron, who said, “We made a mistake in thinking that Brexit was purely a British problem. Actually, it’s a European problem, and the yellow vests are part of it.” So, there seems to be a, kind of, new thinking in Paris, or realisation, that some of the problems that are fuelling this protest are actually problems that are shared by other countries, close and distant. And, of course, the other thing we forget about yellow vests is, I grew up in Belgium, and they also have a yellow vest movement. They’re not numerous, but, you know, over Christmas, you – there were protests, shops were being closed down, and, of course, when Macron met Merkel yesterday, some German yellow vests came out to protest as well. Small in number, but it shows that it’s not just a French problem.
So, on that note, I’m – turn to you, Quentin. What do you think this means, really, for the EU? And it seems, from the two presentations that we’ve just had, that Macron’s going to find it very difficult to pass reforms at home. Is his best hope pinned on the EU?
Quentin Peel
Right, well, let’s try. Let me start, I mean, slightly unwisely, perhaps, by just suggesting one little trend that seems to be happening with the late – two latest polls. One, there is just a sign that Macron’s own popularity, or unpopularity, has bottomed out. The latest poll, in the Journal du Dimanche, showed that satisfaction rating was actually up four percentage points at 27%. It was at 23% in December, although [inaudible – 26:21] were down 4% at 72%. So, it’s not exactly a very positive poll, but it suggests that there may be, with the launch of the great debate, and the national debate, he may be moving it a little along the lines that Emily was suggesting there’s a chance.
And the second thing was the poll on the voting intentions for the European elections, and that clearly is something that is of huge concern, not just in France, but right across Europe, what’s going to happen in the European elections, a great worry that the Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen could actually come top in the French poll. Well, the latest poll suggested that Macron’s République En Marche! was running at 23%, which was five points up from December, where it was only 18%, whereas Le Pen, the Rassemblement National was down from 24 in December to 21%. So, République En Marche! does seem to have actually got its nose in front, but I think there’s anything to play for. It’s not at all comfortable. What Philippe was just saying about the meltdown of the two traditional parties, I mean, in the same poll the Socialist Party is running at 4%, and Mélenchon is running at 9.5%, and the Republicans, the Républicans are running at 10%, but Debout la France, which might be very much in the Le Pen camp, if they didn’t hate each other so much, at 7.5%. So, it’s actually a lot to play for, and that, I think, is making the rest of Europe very nervous.
And to what extent has it, therefore, all damaged Macron’s image in the rest of Europe, and indeed, his agenda? Let’s just remember, for a moment, where he started. One, his campaign for the Presidency was passionately pro-European, quite extraordinary for a French Presidential campaign of – that I can remember, that he was so pro-European, and remember the Ode to Joy played, sung, at his post-election, rally. And then, not too long afterwards, his extraordinary speech at the Sorbonne, where he laid out his European agenda, and a really, remarkably ambitious European agenda. Just a few things, common defence budget, maybe even a tax for the common defence budget, common intervention force, which, of course, the Daily Mail and The Sun would instantly call a European Army, European civil protection force, disaster relief at a European level, a European Public Prosecutor to fight terrorism, a much enhanced border control force, the one thing that has actually started to happen a bit more, a common asylum policy, something that the Germans would like very much, but also tax harmonisation, company law harmonisation, a digital Europe. So, all these things, it was right across the board, he was rather less ambitious in what he spelt out he wanted on Economic and Monetary Union, and that underlines one factor of what that speech was all about. Of course, in Britain, where we are utterly obsessed with our own perception of Europe, it was, “Oh, this is Macron putting his, you know, his anti-Brexit speech. This was telling the Brits, really, that Europe,” no.
This speech was primarily about wooing the Germans, and wooing the Germans with this European agenda that they could buy into, hence going very easy on the Economic and Monetary Union, but it was a plea to Germany. He said, “This is not a French agenda, I want a Franco-German agenda.” He wanted a new Élysée treaty, and, as you will have read, and so on, yesterday he got it. Was it yesterday? Yesterday he got it. The Treaty Aix-la-Chapelle, or the Aachen Treaty. Now, straightaway, we can see from that, and the reaction all over has been more symbol than substance. None of the things that he put up in [inaudible – 30:07] have really been picked up and run with, but why not? Is this about him being, now, rather damaged goods in Europe? Is it the gilets jaunes effect? I would argue no, it’s actually the German effect. It’s German hesitation on having that ambitious French agenda, but, nonetheless, it’s absolutely true that Macron’s European ambitions have had to be reigned back. Maybe not just because of the gilet jaunes, which is, after all, only ten weeks old, but nonetheless, the inevitable backlash against his domestic reform agenda.
Right from the start it was absolutely clear that domestic reform had to be his top priority. He had to get France right before he could really hope to get Europe right, but nonetheless, I mean, there he was out there wanting to launch a European – new European party, take on the old centre-right and centre-left and have République En Marche! at a European level, and there was huge good will and sympathy. I mean, this was the man who’d made sure that Marine Le Pen did not emerge in France as the new President, which would’ve been, certainly in German eyes, a complete disaster. So, goodwill and sympathy, but, actually, he’s not getting listened to, to the same extent. He’s still admired as a young, dynamic, highly intelligent and passionately pro-European leader, and one thing I was talking to colleagues in Brussels, and they were saying, “No, there is still a spring in the step of French officials in Brussels,” unlike there was under François Hollande, where there was, really, France was on the backfoot.
So, that spring is still there, but nonetheless, it’s a retreat. Of course, the Aachen Treaty and the Franco-German, you know, “We’re together again, the motor has not stopped,” is instantly dismissed as, “Oh, France and Germany trying to dominate and dictate to the European Union,” but precisely the modesty of the document shows that, actually, they know they cannot do that any longer. What they are is, if you like, to coin a phrase, the backstop to European integration, rather than the drivers from the front, but the other thing I think that there’s still considerable goodwill and sympathy is because that gilets jaunes movement does represent something that is popping up, in many other countries of Europe. It’s no places it identical, but nonetheless, that backlash against the political class, against the capital, against the inequality of incomes, the rural against urban, the small town against the big city.
I want to ask Philippe later whether – because I think something that is very striking, perhaps partly of where the Brexit vote was strongest in Britain, and where the gilets jaunes are strongest, small towns whose high streets have died. This is actually not so much about austerity as about social and technological change. Going to small French towns when you discover that there are no businesses in the centre of town any longer. It’s the [inaudible – 34:16] marché on the outside of town, and in town, there’s a few Estate Agents and a few Hairdressers, in other words, a couple of cafés, and that’s it. Where’s the Butcher any longer? So, I think there’s an element of social change behind it.
Anyway, the – now, one most obvious thing that ma – that has, to an extent, weakened Emmanuel Macron in European eyes, he’s going to bust his budget deficit rule, 3.4% this year. So, having come in and instantly got 2018 under control, he’s going to bust it in 2019. Now, you would expect the Germans to be rather cross about that. We’ve hardly heard a peep out of them. The Dutch are quite cross. They would be, though, they’re very [inaudible – 35:03], but the Germans haven’t said anything. Oettinger, the German Commissioner in Brussels, after all, is responsible for the budget, did make a mild criticism. “Macron,” he says, “has lost his authority with his 2019 budget, but it is crucial that Macron continues his reform agenda, especially in the labour markets, and under that condition, we will tolerate a national deficit higher than 3%, as a one-time exception.” So, special arrangement. No wonder the Italians are a bit cross, but Berlin stayed quiet.
Anyway, all eyes now focused on those European elections. Is it right that this trend has him coming back and he will do better? He hasn’t really got a platform in the European elections, and he’s not – he’s trying to negotiate with the liberals now to have – put something together. Last word, ano – on the Aachen Treaty, then, much more modest than, I think, Macron would have hoped for, but the problem is partly German as well as French. It’s much more about aspiration than it is about delivery. It’s certainly not an agenda for dramatic European integration. Of course, instantly, the sympathy for him is the absurd fake news backlash that he got.
One of the elements of the Aachen Treaty is that there will be much closer co-operation between border regions, and indeed, in certain circumstances, if they want to have a cross-border investment infrastructure project, they will be able to have a derogation from national law. This was instantly seized on by the far-right and the far-left in France as, “The German’s are going to take Alsace and Lorraine back from us, it will go.” Well, I think that has shown some of the absurdity, but Macron is going to be very focused on his domestic challenges, and so is Angela Merkel. She’s got the AfD to worry about, and not only European elections, three state elections in the new – in Eastern Germany, coming up this year. In all of them, both the Alternative für Deutschland, similar to the gilets jaunes, in some respects, and the far-left, Die Linke, could do really quite well. So, they’re both very nervous about what’s coming.
Georgina Wright
Right, thank you, Quentin. I know I abuse, slightly, timing, but I think those are really important contributions, and we’ve gone and covered some – a lot in that space, from Macron, and what does it mean for him, what does it mean for French politics, and finally, what does it mean for Europe, and the EU? I have questions, but I feel that I should give you a chance to ask your questions. So, if you do, just try and catch my atten – grab my attention. Yes, at the entrance, if you could just wait for the ro – microphone. Yeah, just here, at the front, the lady, please.
Member
Hi. Do…?
Georgina Wright
Sorry, if you could just say your affiliation – name, and affiliation, that would be good.
Member
No worries.
Georgina Wright
Or just affiliation, sorry.
Member
Good evening, my name is [inaudible – 38:13]. Sorry. I have two comments and one question, please. The first comment is on your point about old and new. I’m wondering how – to what extent, actually, we are seeing very old patterns, just with a new way of expression, using social media. Before, you mentioned that we were really focusing on economic blockades. With such power through social media, is it really needed anymore, in that you can actually work week and just, you know, do as much with, you know, half the people, and only, like, a few hours per weekend? So, that’s my first comment, and, maybe, subsequent question.
And the second comment and associated question was about the national debate, which I think is important we coin as debate and not consultation, because it would undermine the very democratic tools that we already have in place, and would, you know, kind of, suggest this is taking over. My question here is, how do you think President Macron could communicate on this to maintain momentum, and to fight against the – again, against the very attractive social media, you know, short messaging? And how can they crediblise a methodology, which is going to be hard to put in place? You know, like, are they going to have a lot of inputs? You know, like the authority of this is going – and the communication on those topics that come up and arise is going to be, for me, like, the main challenge. So, on the tactics side, I think there’s still a ton of, you know, challenges to overcome.
Georgina Wright
Right, thanks very much.
Member
I would love your reaction on this.
Georgina Wright
Just a question here. Yeah, just here, thank you.
John Holmes
John Holmes, a former British Ambassador in Paris. As people were saying, the movement was, in some ways, new, but the tradition of going into the streets, obviously, is not new. What I found surprising was the level of public support, apparently, according to the polls, for what was a relatively small number of people, as Philippe was saying, and also a group, which was fairly anarchist and, actually, rather violent in lots of ways, and yet, they seem to attract 60/70% public support for what they were asking for, which wasn’t very clear. Maybe that’s declining now, I’m not sure. That’ll be interesting, whether that’s really happening, but why did they get so much public support when, as I say, they were a relatively small group of people coming from nowhere, without any real representatives, and actually disrupting normal life, to quite a large extent, for ordinary people, and smashing things up that are of common interest?
Georgina Wright
Thank you. I was going to pick up on that point, actually, and none of you mentioned violence, but, obviously, this has been quite a violent move. There was another question over here, yeah.
Kamil
I’m Kamil, and I’m a Reporter for Political [inaudible – 41:15]. It’s a Sudan-based newspaper, and I – my question is, you said it would be hard for Macron to implement his structural reforms. Do you think he will still be productive as a President, for the remainder of his campaign, or his remainder of his Presidential years, or is this the end of – or is he going to become another President that is just running the clock down until his next election?
Georgina Wright
Great. Is this the end of Macron? And then just one question here, yeah.
Charlie Oliver
Hi there, and my name’s Charlie Oliver, I’m a Member. I just wondered if you could expand on the use of media, ‘cause if you’ve only got 100,000 protestors, and that’s low for France, then how come they’re getting so much cut through?
Georgina Wright
Great, thank you so much. So, maybe we can tackle the first question, really, which is, it’s a new protest with bits of old mingled in, but there are definitely new means that are being used. Obviously, social media, technology, violence could be another one. How can we explain this, and what does it mean for Macron? Philippe, do you want to kick off?
Professor Philippe Marlière
Yes. In a sense, it’s a new package, but the, sort of, the goal is still the same, or the same political objectives, you know, but just labelled, and the mode of action is different, in the sense, is what you said. I’m still not convinced that it’s absolutely an older way of doing, because if you compare, you know, as I said it in my presentation, normally, big social movements would be – of course, there’s a French tradition where the masses, the public, sort of, make its grievances to the state, much more than in Britain. The state, they request the protection of the state. That’s what they do, the yellow vest, through Macron and the Government, the state. The French talk a lot about l’état, the state. The state is there to protect them. That’s very important, the French psyche, this story of the state, but what is different?
Normally, social movements are essentially – the big ones are, to use the left-right divide, are on the left, the unions, left-wing parties. What you’ve got is a combination of public protest, meetings with members of the Government, MPs, you’ve got that. We’ve got that in Britain as well, but also, you know, like in Britain, workers will go on strike. It’s not happening here, and that’s really, normally, it’s always, you know, in a, sort of, Labour movement tradition. This is if you want to really impact on the economy, you go on strike. Otherwise, marching is fine, but there’s an impact. In a sense, their – it is impacting their marches, but up to a point, because it seems to me, next, we will be into the 11th week of that, what have they gained? They’ve gained a bit. You know, Macron has changes – tax on [inaudible – 44:16] has been taken off, but he hasn’t made, you know, further concessions, really.
So, they marched the march, and in the meantime, that gives me a chance to address the issue of violence. It seems to me that the two parties, they are polarisation and radicalisation, both sides. Don’t think it’s only the protestors. There’s a very heavy-handed Police repression of the protestors, and the protest. It’s unseen, even comparing to May 68, with a, sort of, Police, heavily armed, using flash balls, with very serious injuries to some people, and there’s already ten people who died, by the way, indirectly or directly as a result of the – of that. Not killed by the Police, although some have – really, extremely, people losing hands, eyes, things like that. Extremely violent protest. It’s really – I remember, you know, taking to the street as a student, as they – we all do in France. When you’re a student, you protest, it’s a part of the – it’s a national sport. Of course, there were, sometimes, you know, moments, a bit of tension, and Police, you would probably be occasionally beaten up by a Policeman, but if you see – go on YouTube, you see the scenes are really horrific, both sides. There’s really radicalisation.
So, that’s really also new. So, I think there’s something new going on, because you can’t label this movement left or right. It’s a mix of everything. The use of media, I think it’s – level of support, yeah. It’s apparently very high, yeah. It seems to be a bit of a, sort of, a protest by proxy, in a sense not everyone will be ready to wear the yellow vest and fight the Police, or march, or spend the night outside in a roundabout, but there’s sympathy for what they do, because people understand, and I think that the issue here is poverty. They are – there’s a lot of poverty in France. People are fed up, so I think this is probably why it is popular. It doesn’t mean a majority of them. It’s only a minority of people doing that, but by proxy, there’s a high amount of sympathy, which could go down if, of course, the situation deteriorates because of violence. Of course, it’s like in May 68, De Gaulle was, really, almost, on the verge of quitting at the end of May. He went to Baden-Baden, came back, called an election, won it, and he won it by a landslide, because people were getting – although there was lots of support initially, got a bit fed up with students, you know, rioting and burning cars, and I suppose that’s in – that’s probably what Macron has in mind now.
Georgina Wright
Thank you. Thank you very much. Maybe we could turn to the question about it being a debate, ‘cause I think that’s a really important question, actually. How does that work, ‘cause Macron obviously has a reputation of hearing, but not necessarily listening? Is this really going to make a difference? Can we rely on these [inaudible – 47:27]? Are they going to track public support? Is it enough to shift public opinion, in your view?
Emily Mansfield
Well, we’re still in the early stages, I think, to be able to gauge whether or not this will work. The initial polls were showing that about 70% of people were planning to at least take part, which seems a, sort of, positive place to start from, that people are willing to engage. I think, yes, from Macron’s perspective, this is a slightly risky strategy, because if he does take it seriously as a debate, there is a risk that he will be pushed into a corner, or that people would demand things where his hands are tied, and that he can’t possibly deliver, and it’ll only make disillusionment with the Government worse.
So, he has done, in his initial letter to the French people, he did his best to circumscribe the terms of the debate. So, he’s got these four areas that he wants people to address. He’s got a few red lines that he’s not willing to consider, and he’s got some, sort of, prompt questions that he wants people to think about. So, he’s trying, already, to set the terms of this debate, and the risk there, of course, is that the people then turn around and say, “Yeah, well, but you’re not giving us the chance to say what we want to say.” Of course, on the flipside, the opportunity that this gives is that he will be able to construct something that is, perhaps, a coherent response, but that also fits with his policy programme, because he will be able to say, “Look, actually, we’re aligned. We want the same thing, in a lot of ways. We want more jobs, more secure jobs, less inequality,” and there are ways that he could make progress on those that aren’t too far off his existing reform plans, that would be a question of re-ordering or revising, and that would then look like he’s responding to this debate. Whether or not that will be enough for people to look and say, “Yes, he’s listened to us and taken this on board, rather than just doing what he was planning to do all along.” I think that’s still a little bit up in the air.
I think the final point I just wanted to make was perhaps about the question about how they’re attracting so much support when they are so vague, and I think perhaps it’s almost an advantage to be so vague in their requirements, because it means that the public can project onto them what they want, and you could almost hear, parallel to Macron, when he was first campaigning to become President, a very vague, exciting, but not very pinned down sort of a platform. That got a lot of interest, and the irony, of course, now, is that he’s no longer the anti-establishment up-and-coming. He, in fact, is the establishment, and now it’s somebody else with this vague, exciting proposal.
Georgina Wright
Great, thank you. Quentin, I was wondering if I could ask you that question specifically about media. Why is it, do you think, the media is so interested in this? And you referred to today, even, Merkel and Macron meeting, and how some fake news had, you know – they’ve taken control of that narrative, and they changed it. How much of a role do media outlets have in this, in understanding the protest, in fuelling it, or, you know?
Quentin Peel
I think that – I must admit, this is slightly guesswork. I think the traditional media is quite scared. They’re no longer in control of the agenda. There is a social media agenda out there, which is not part of their mainstream world, and they don’t control the debate. They don’t frame the debate any longer. So, I think the media is, in a curious way, really on the backfoot here, whether it’s television, or – and so, you will see an element, perhaps, of the media bending over to be more sympathetic than they might otherwise be, because they’re desperate not to, you know, look out of touch, but at the same time – yeah.
So, I think, now, to take this grandé [inaudible – 51:24] and – I got a rather interesting little insight into the one in Normandy, where there were 600 Mayors. Now, the first thing that you must say straightaway about that is that, I think, that the protestors have really tried to reject the whole thing. “Oh, the Mayors, they’re all sold out, anyway. They’re all bought, and so on,” but, actually, they’ve all opened up these [inaudible – 51:46], and their Mayor is – complaints books, really, and in which I think you’re seeing a lot of people saying, “We want more power back to the provinces, back from Paris to the provinces, and so on.” The report back from the meeting I heard about was that, one, the Mayor went in, who I talked to, went in with pretty low expectations. He came out saying, “Macron is quite extraordinary in his command of the subjects and the agenda. Absolutely fantastic command of detail.” On the other hand, he talked for three and a half hours, which was far too long, and, therefore, was he really listening, and I think…
Georgina Wright
Yeah.
Quentin Peel
…the jury is out.
Georgina Wright
Thank you very much. Yes, I’ll just take this question first, if that’s okay? Yeah, follow-up after, yeah.
Roddy Cutra
Thank you. The – yeah, the mic works. Thank you. Roddy Cutra, I study at UCL. I was wondering, and this is, maybe, perhaps, the question of the century, but you were saying that – Quentin was saying that the ultimate cause of, you know, the yellow vests, Trump, Brexit, all these things is, you know, high street and small cities dying, getting disrupted by the supermarkets, the Butchers are gone, and that’s an issue. Now, with, you know, the rise of eCommerce, this is probably going to get disrupted even further. So, where do you think this is going to be leading to? You know, more extremist movements that are going to create further problems? Is there going to be some political solution across the board, or what do you think might realistically happen?
Georgina Wright
Great, thank you. Do you want to quickly follow-up on your…?
Member
Thank you, sorry. My media question was partly intended to cover social media.
Georgina Wright
Social media, okay.
Member
So, if there’s 100,000 people from different parts of France getting together, how did they get together? Did they use social media? If they did, what did they use? How did they make it compelling? How is it different from all the other random events on Facebook people don’t look at?
Georgina Wright
Great. Also interesting that Macron’s Élysée is using social media as well. They have YouTube channels, Facebook li – Instagram lives, and all sorts of things, so, yes. Just a question here, and then I’ll take that.
Gillian
Hi, and my name is Gillian. I have a question about, sort of, the creative prospects for deep political reform in France. So, we’ve had various Presidencies addressing the need for deep, sort of, social welfare reform, labour reform to align a bit more with the rest of the world, and on every occasion, these have, basically, been side-tracked, derailed, with every, kind of, different approach that’s been used. So, what do you see these prospects looking like?
Georgina Wright
Thank you, and last question, right here, yeah.
Vincent Champion
Thank you very much, and Vincent Champion, Chatham House Member and Journalist. You were mentioning, Professor Marlière, the lack of – the big battalions haven’t come out, that you can’t see this in conventional left-right terms, but to what extent are they just keeping their powder dry? I mean, three or four years ago, when the big court reforms were made, really, they’re just part of the problems, because they just – the Government didn’t want to take the unions on. It was just too disruptive to trade at the ports. Look at the situation with the railways. If he tackles it, you were saying you thought it might put – he’s in a weaker position, regarding his agenda, but if he tries to [inaudible – 55:17] knows their status, what’s going to happen then? I mean, surely that will bring – won’t that provoke the strikes and the big social disruptions, then? Thank you.
Georgina Wright
Thank you very much. Conscious that we have three minutes and probably a lot of hungry people here. So, I will ask you to be brief, but great sets of questions. You know, are we missing the bigger picture? Obviously, there’s going to be disruption in work patterns. You know, what’s that going to do? Is this just one protest, the beginning of many protests? Coming back on social media, is this an opportunity for deep political reform, or is Government just going to side-step it? And finally, should the left-right really be engaging in how, or is it a choice that they are not? Maybe, Quentin, I’ll start with you, and then I’ll go in reverse order. If you…
Quentin Peel
Well, I’ll just have a quick word on the first question, there. I mean, I think, yes, this is a real challenge. I wasn’t saying this is the sole cause, but I was saying that this, if you like, that the dying of small-town life is a factor of technological change, and I think, if you go round this country, and say, “How can you tell the places that voted Brexit?” one of the reasons is count the charity shops, count the pound shops, and count the disappearance of – and people at the roundabouts in France were saying, I think, you know, “I can’t get my cup of coffee in the café any longer. I can’t get my [inaudible – 56:50].” That was really coming out. So, I do think that the technological change, quite as much as, you know, the arrogance of the political class, or the austerity, and so on, is a factor that hasn’t really been focused on.
Georgina Wright
Thank you. Philippe?
Professor Philippe Marlière
Well, if you want to understand, or try to understand what’s going on around those yellow vest, I think you’ve got to spend time on Facebook and Twitter. This is where they are, especially Facebook discussion groups, which they’re using, really, to the full, and although they reject a representative there are four, five big names, now, which have become household names in the movement, where they’re really round their page, with a million followers. Absolutely amazing, you know, in a space of a few weeks, and those guys are completely – were totally unknown, ordinary folks three month ago.
So, that’s really where they are, even to the point, and the mainstream media are really playing catch-up. They are employing, you know, Libération, Le Monde, all the major media, one person to really spend all their working hours, you know, on – in the social media, to try to report and understand what goes on. So, that’s the way they communicate. You know, it all started off via Facebook, and there’s also lots of hostility towards mainstream media. It’s amazing, with abuse at Journalists, physical attacks as well, really nasty. They don’t trust the media.
Social change, yes, I agree with your point, Quentin, but I think I’d like to, sort of, combine it with another, sort of, dimension, which is the, sort of, shrinking of the social state in France, you know, and the French are very much attached to their public services. It’s really part of their identity and they lament, and I think you start hearing, in France, things I’ve been hearing for a longer time in Britain, I’ve been here a long time, which is, you know, health doesn’t work anymore. You know, waiting lists are too long. You would never hear of waiting lists before in France, until recently. Education, too many pupils in classroom. You will never hear of people – transport…
Quentin Peel
You’ve got the anti-immigrant thing coming in there as well, too many immigrants in the queues.
Professor Philippe Marlière
Little, little, which is surprising, because there’s the far-right in there, but the – and I was fearing that. You know, immigration, refugees, Islam, which are, sort of, very sensitive topics in France. They do not feature, or very little, and every time, in a roundabout, one person makes a racist statement, majority disagrees. So, that’s really something interesting, but I will leave it there, ‘cause I don’t want – yes, your question about the reform, I think it’s easier for Macron to take on all the unions, all the left, than to take on this small number of yellow vest. Yes, yes, it’s a fact, because I think the yellow vest, fortunately, or unfortunately, are representative of the public mood at large, in France today. That’s why he’s got to be careful.
Georgina Wright
Thank you. Last word to you.
Emily Mansfield
Very quickly. I think your question is the perennial question, of is it possible to reform France? I think we shouldn’t forget that Macron has actually made quite a lot of progress already. He has passed quite a lot of quite controversial reforms, making it easier to fire people, pushing employers to hire people on permanent contracts, rather than all of these short-term contracts, which are so commonplace nowadays. So, a lot has happened. We’re not going to see the results of those changes for another, probably, couple of years, particularly with the economy slowing. It’ll take quite a while for that to filter through, but I think he’s shown that it is possible to make some reforms. That said, things will slow down now. I think the big question is, can he really build a convincing narrative around why people should go along with these reforms, why it’s important for France to, maybe, make some of these big structural changes. So, that’s the big question I think we need to leave with.
Georgina Wright
Great. Well, thank you so much to our panellists, and to all of you for joining us this evening. I certainly found it a very stimulating discussion. If you could join me, please, in [applause]…
