Dr Yu Jie
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, welcome back to Chatham House. I’m Yu Jie. I’m a Senior Research Fellow on China with Asia-Pacific Programme. Delighted to see many of you in here today and we’re going to be dealing with a relatively easy subject, that is China’s choice in this current Russia’s invasion in Ukraine, and to what extent that will be impact on China’s domestic economic development and, also, to a large extent, and how that’s going to impact on China’s position in the world.
Now, as a friend of mine told me that it seems to me that China has all their cards on the table to be able to play a much greater role as being the international mediator for this war. But however I consider that, by having all the cards on the table, it’s not necessarily a good thing, because the choices are too many and, therefore, how to make the right choice that is good for the country and that is good for the world, and that seems to be – going to be a very stringent test for the Chinese leadership.
Now, today it’s not having me just speaking here, but instead, having three distinguished expert who has worked on China-Russia relations for quite some time, to lecturing and to educate us. So, joining me today we have Dr Zhao Tong from Carnegie Endowment of International Peace and Carnegie-Tsinghua Center, from Beijing, join us. And then we’re also delighted to have Dr Natasha Kuhrt, who is a Senior Lecturer at War Studies at King’s College in London, joining us from London. And last, but not least, we also have Dr Marcin Kaczynski [means Kaczmarski], if I pronounced your name correctly, apologise if I did it wrong, and then, who is also Senior Lecturer on China-Russia on International Relations at University of Glasgow, joining us from Glasgow.
So, welcome to you all and, before I start, just to declare that even though we’re holding an event within Chatham House today, the event it is now on the public record, which will later be available to the public, because this is a part of the series of War in Ukraine that Chatham has dealt with in the past few months. And, also, for any of you who are very much interested in asking questions, please put your questions in the Q&A function and I will not be looking to the chat box. So, if you have any questions, please put it at the Q&A function and I look forward to look into your questions.
Now, given what we have discussed so far, after this nearly three months of this work in Ukraine, there has been so much discussed in the West that China’s position, or China’s role as mediator, or to a large extent, that China will be affected. And we seem to hear so much about the Western commentators and commenting on China’s position, but we hear very little from experts and specialists that are based in China and to taking different views and different voices and, also, those voices and views are slightly different from the government position. So, we’re delighted to have Dr Zhao Tong here to enlighten us on what do you consider are the so-called China’s perception on this war in Ukraine? So, Professor Zhao, the floor is yours.
Dr Tong Zhao
Oh, thank you so much, Dr Yu, for inviting me. It’s a great pleasure to be here. I think, personally, in order to understand Chinese position in the Ukraine War, it’s really important to recognise the existence of a very serious information gap and a perception gap between the Chinese society and the Western societies. Many people in the West are truly surprised by the narratives promoted by Chinese Government to Chinese state media, but the fact that Chinese state media is repeating much of the Russian narrative and Chinese experts also repeat the same talking points.
But I want to say that, based on my observation, I think that China genuinely believes in much of its national narrative and many Chinese senior officials, experts, they genuinely share the Russian perspectives on many issues, including about the nature of the war, the role played by Western countries, by the United States and by NATO in this war. And, you know, even our many basic factual issues, including whether Russian forces committed crimes in killing civilians, whether the US operated secret biolabs in Ukraine to conduct illegal research on biological weapons, even on those basic factual issues, Chinese experts, for the major part, genuinely believe in the Russian narratives. I think that’s something Western countries need to recognise. It’s not just propaganda; it reflects real Chinese belief. And for those few Chinese official experts, who know more, you know, even for them, I think they feel justified for China to promote those alternative facts, because they believe that it’s the Western countries who are masters in using this information to achieve their geopolitical goals. So, it’s fully justified for China to do that.
So, this is the Chinese mainstream perception. I just think it’s important to recognise that and important to convey to China the point that perhaps this is not necessarily in Chinese own interest. I don’t think this has been recognised by China itself, but maybe in dealing with China, it’s important to start to really driving home that point, because that presents a major obstacle for constructive discussion data between the two sides.
I understand that there is a lot of interest in knowing how China views the economic impact of the war, on China. So, even though I’m not an expert on economic issues, I will try to briefly summarise, for the rest of my time, about Chinese views of the economic impact on China. There is a lot of, I think, concern here in China about, you know, the increasing oil price, gas price, which could lead to overall price growth in downstream industries in China. The result concern by rising food price – food crisis, which can also lead to downstream price growth and there is concern about secondary sanctions and how they might affect the operation of Chinese banks and other companies. There is also a lot of concern about the long-term economic impact, whether Western countries will reorganise global supply chains, whether they would impose stricter export control policies against China and make it harder for China to access Western high technologies in the future.
But many of these specific debates, there are still major internal divisions. For example, the impact on China’s energy security and how China should deal with it, some people – some experts here argue that, you know, China should use this opportunity to make use of cheap Russian oil and gas. But others believe, you know, the biggest lesson China should learn from this war is there is no real friend to – or enemy and China shouldn’t be overly dependent on any energy, you know, exporting country.
But ultimately, I think what decides the results of these internal debates is how Chinese leadership indicates their policy preference, because for – if you look at China’s overall policy in this war, it’s very much a reflection of how Chinese top leadership personally views Chinese interest and Chinese policy. There were initial expert debates about whether China should distance from Russia and side more closely with the rest of international community, blaming and criticising Russia. But after the top leadership are starting to show their interest in prioritising China-Russia strategic partnership, that internal expert debates starts – started to fade and no longer really matter.
And in this highly centralised political system, you know, it’s not surprising to see, you know, the increasing internal incoherency between different elements of China’s policies. The one last small point I will make is this war reinforces the Chinese concern that China might face similar Western pressure in the future, in the China-West confrontation, and to of – you know, to mitigate the impact of future Western sanctions and pressure on China, China needs to be ready, China needs to be more self-sufficient in key economic and technological sectors. But that policy, promoted by the top leadership, for China to be more self-sufficient, is intention with China’s, also, very strong interest in preventing economic and the technological decoupling from Western countries. But there is no deep and comprehensive thinking, I think, about how to square with these two different policy priorities.
But you know, there are other examples, but I don’t have time to elaborate, but I think we are going to continue seeing more and more internal coherencies in China’s foreign policy, including in the foreign and security policy experts of China’s policy towards the Ukraine War.
I’ll stop here, thank you.
Dr Yu Jie
Thank you so much, Professor Zhao. I very much agree with you. Seems to be that the economic foreign policy priority doesn’t really go hand-in-hand and seems to be plenty of contradiction in the Chinese foreign policy these days.
Now, there’s one question, follow-up question, that I’d like to ask you. To what extent are you going to interpret the so-called China-Russia co-operation has “no limit”? It seems to be that phrase of “no limit” has been widely reported across the Western media. And, of course, this is all open for interpretations and recently, the Chinese Ambassador to United States has suggested that “Even if the co-operation has no limit, but it come within certain conditions.” So, how do we interpret this so-called Beijing-Moscow co-operation has no limit?
Dr Tong Zhao
Well, I think that’s exactly the question many Chinese officials and experts are asking themselves, because it looks like the no limit position is very much coming from China’s top leadership. And President Xi personally is very committed to the special partnership between the two countries and he seems to want to stick to this partnership, even in the aftermath of the Ukraine War. And because of the increasingly obvious top leadership preference in preserving this unlimited partnership, the officials and experts at the operational level are trying to understand how to really design policies that would be aligned with this top leadership preference, but also be flexible enough to advance Chinese interests overall.
So, you know, I don’t think China itself has a clear answer. Many of the specific policies, concrete policy issues, are being figured out as people, you know, conduct, you know, business deals with Russia, and you know, try to evaluate and re-evaluate China’s position over time, making small, you know, modest readjustment to ensure the top leadership is happy and, also, China gets a more positive response from the rest of international community.
Dr Yu Jie
Thank you so much for these very illuminating comments. Natasha, I’m going to come to you next. I mean, in all the conversation you explained to me that since the contradiction between, on the one hand, that China claimed itself to be the so-called “responsible great power,” whereas on the other hand, China seems to stress very strong criticisms regarding the civil society in Ukraine and also regarding, you know, the sense of the heroic fight of Ukrainian population. So, do you think, actually, China or Beijing will be managed that, to square that circle on one hand, while claiming itself on the international stage being a great power, then on the other hand, showing very strong reticence when it come to playing a mediating role for this war in Ukraine?
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
Yeah, I mean, there certainly does seem to be quite a big disconnect, certainly if we’re viewing things from London, or from Brussels, or Washington, you know, between China’s, you know, bid to, if you like, be this responsible great power. You know, and I think it’s – obviously, we’re not just talking about being a member of the P5, although, of course, that does connote a certain responsibility to maintain international peace and security and, apart from the General Assembly, the UN Security Council has been largely absent during this war.
So, you know, in a sense, you can argue that this is the, kind of, you know, time when China should be stepping up to the plate, if you like. And, you know, also, I think, you know, there’s a sense in which China, you know, in a kind of, narrative sense, I guess, has always presented itself, to some extent, as aligning with the, kind of – you know, the sort of, Davids of this world against the Goliaths, you know. So, there’s a sense in which it could’ve, if you like, aligned itself with Ukraine, but it hasn’t.
And, you know, I think this idea of the, kind of, studied neutrality approach, if you like, that China’s taking – or the other day I was in a webinar with some Chinese Scholars who said, “Instead of neutrality, we should use the word independent.” I mean, they’re, kind of, fairly similar, but I think China is also wanting to, kind of, try and suggest that it’s not actually neutral, but maybe more impartial and, of course, being impartial isn’t necessarily the same as being neutral. But even so, it does look very much as if China has been carping from the sidelines, you know, obviously, criticising, very much, you know, Western diplomacy, so-called “megaphone diplomacy.” It’s been doing that for quite some and, also, presenting the war, as the previous speaker said, very much, you know, as a kind of – it does see it very much as a battle between Russia and the West, which is how Russia has been presenting it, as a kind of, proxy war between Russia and the West.
So, this isn’t just a war between Russia and the Ukraine and it seems very much that China did underestimate – and well, we, possibly, ourselves, also underestimated, you know, the kind of unity and resolve, both within the EU, but also in a transatlantic sense. And Biden, of course, has really made it his mission to, kind of, you know, bring the EU and the US back together, bring Europe and the US back together in a way that, of course, Trump, you know, had – was trying to do the opposite, in many ways.
And speaking just to a point in the questions, as well, and the point made by the previous speaker, I think China certainly is, very much, looking at this. While I wouldn’t want to say that Taiwan and Ukraine are the same situation at all, on the other hand, China can’t help but be watching, you know, the reaction in the West, in particular, to this war, and seeing what the, kind of, policy responses are, in terms of the sanctions, you know, and the unprecedented nature of these sanctions. You know, so, you know, were China to intervene in Taiwan, make a move on Taiwan, then, you know, what kind of reaction could it expect, if you like, from the West? Although, of course, you know, that would probably be much more about the US. On the other hand, you know, with the Indo-Pacific tilt of so many countries more recently, including the UK, you know, you can’t rule out support, quite strong support from certain European countries, as well.
Obviously, regarding the EU, China is quite a key factor, actually, in EU-Russian relations. The EU has, of course, criticised China, as has NATO, but Russia remains the main threat there. You know, China is still – the, kind of, label, if you like, attached to China, is, you know, strategic competitor, you know, whereas Russia is the malign revitalised power and, you know, Russia is seen as a disruptor. So, the EU also has a dilemma as to how to engage with China. You know, China has a dilemma in how to engage with the EU, as the previous speaker mentioned, but the EU also has a dilemma, because, you know, the EU, in a way, still does need to engage with China in a way that it doesn’t have to with Russia, of course. You know, China may, in the longer-term, be somehow still important, as well, for Europe, in terms of security, because if China – you know, were Russia to lose this war, then China might, if it’s being flexible, it might actually then change its position.
So, I think we can’t rule that out, because it will really all hinge, very much, I think, as well, on, you know, Russia’s performance, which, obviously, has been, you know, less than impressive so far, militarily. I mean, we can’t predict what will happen, but you know, it would have implications, I think, also, for Central Asia. We need to think about what would happen in that space, because that’s obviously the key part of the BRI and, you know, hitherto has been this, kind of, rough division of labour in Central Asia, between China, you know, providing the, kind of, the economic clout, if you like, and Russia seemingly acting as security provider. And then, with the events in Kazakhstan earlier this year, we saw that Russia did, indeed, step up to the plate when it was called on to do so, in a way that China still can’t.
So, I think China is also watching, very much, to see how this plays out militarily, because Russia impressed China, I think, in Syria and China is still learning militarily, right, you know, from the West, but also from Russia. And part of their co-operation, in defence terms, is very much about that.
So, I think it’s a kind of, test for China, it’s a test for the EU, as well, and you know, over time, we might see differences, again, emerge between countries within the European Union, within the European space. We can’t rule that out, but also, perceptions may diverge between the US and the EU. So, I think there are a lot of, obviously, questions here, but China, you know, if it maintains this, kind of, flexible approach, you know, perhaps it may benefit China in the longer run.
Dr Yu Jie
Thank you, Natasha. Flexible might sound ideal, but however, my question to you is, do you actually consider China has missed the opportunity to mend its relationship with European Union, given the current relationship is really in stalemate ever since 2021? So, do you actually consider, because of China’s reticence on this war in Ukraine, has actually made the Europeans feel that somehow we have lost the hope for China, in this case, with been playing more proactive and being a mediator?
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
I’m not sure that we can necessarily say that definitively yet. I mean, you know, I think there are – I mean, I think there are problems – you know, Eastern – certain, kind of, countries in Eastern Europe, I think, have those memories of Communism and so on and so, for them, China is a communist country, is a kind of – you know, is problematic. But I think there are still many ways in which, you know, the EU leads China and it leads China on things like climate change, as well. So, although normatively speaking, if we start talking about norms and values and so on, you know, obviously, China’s approach is, kind of, unacceptable, but I have a sense that, in the longer-term, there will be more pragmatic considerations.
Dr Yu Jie
Well, let’s wait and see whether Beijing will gradually shift in its position. Now, Marcin, I’m going to turn to you, as yourself being a longer-term observe – long-term observer on China-Russia relations. Do you really see much difference between this current E – sorry, China-Russia, Beijing-Moscow, strategy alignment than compare with the China-Soviet Union alliances back to 1950s? I mean, what’s your view?
Dr Marcin Kaczmarski
Thank you. Thank you for this important meeting and thank you for your opening questions – question. I’m – I would start with the observation that the Sino-Soviet – responding to your question, Sino-Soviet relationship was supposed to be another type of no limits relationship, which was highly asymmetrical, with the Soviet Union having an upper hand. And what I would argue is, today, is the – actually the end of the no limits partnership, because regardless of what Tong discussed about, the wish of the Chinese leadership, what we see, is that the leadership, even if it is a clear guidance, it doesn’t attempt to force these guidelines on Chinese matters. And what we have so far is that the risk drawing normative, political and radiological convergence between China and Russia, China supports the Russia’s rhetoric and Russia’s justifications for war, but at the same time, what we don’t see is help in by-passing sanctions, help in relief – providing an economic relief for Russia. So, what I see here is China – is the work showing clear limitations to the relationship, in the first place.
The second element that we see is the asymmetry between China and Russia’s, kind of, rhetoric at – with the war. So, it is not only the – what we have seen for the last decade or so, the economic asymmetry with China’s economy continuing its rise and Russia’s struggling to modernise its economy. Now, what I think is even more fuelling the asymmetry is Russia’s military blundering in Ukraine, ‘cause so far, what Natasha mentioned, Crimea intervention in Syria, they provided Russia with some kind of an equaliser vis-à-vis China. Whereas Russia could not compete with China economically, it could always present its military effective – efficiency as a way of bringing some balance into the relationship. What I would assume Beijing expected in the beginning of the war was a quick victory. What – they might have been justified to expect that Russia would succeed in its war in – against Ukraine very quickly. As it didn’t happen, now this last remaining asset of Russia in bringing symmetry to the relationship, has turned out to disappear.
But what I would argue next is that China – as I understand the Chinese policy, the Chinese leadership is still hesitant which way to go. So, firstly, whether to use this opportunity and entrench its position, especially in the Russian political economy. And here, I would look at whether China decides, at one point, to step in and offer financing and investment in key Russian companies, Rosneft, Gazprom, perhaps another financial support through Nordic. It would – at the same time, it’s – it would be very risky, because it would mean direct – indirectly helping Russia to bypass sanctions. And while there would be a prize for China, in a sense of making Russia its – even more dependent on China, and securing energy supplies from a relatively safe direction, it would still risk, not only secondary sanctions, which were mentioned by my political source, but – by previous speakers, but it would also mean bringing the EU and the US together, which I would assume that at this – the outcome that China will do a lot to avoid, to – not to help European and American leaders to be – to come closer with each other.
But at the same time, staying on the sidelines, especially with how the war is going on, brings certain risk of Russia losing the war and what it does – what does it mean to China? How much would it involve the West and also make West – make the West more willing to contain China in the – in East Asia and thing, especially with regard to Taiwan?
So, to sum up, I would say that, in the short-term, regardless of what Beijing does, the relationship with Russia is relatively safe. So, either China decides to step in and, in a sense, turns Russia into its asset in global competition with the US, or the relationship will stay at this level, with close political co-operation, but without substantial economic dimension. In the long-term, and we can return to this issue in the Q&A session, in the long-term, I would see the risk for China related to the domestic political change, which will come one day in Russia, and any new leader, regardless of close to Putin or not, will have the opportunity to reassess the relations with China. So, I would stop here.
Dr Yu Jie
So, if I got it right, basically, you’re saying, yes, political co-operation is absolutely fine with Moscow, but however, when it come to economic co-operation and then, that seems to be Beijing will have more – ring more strings and putting – imposing more limits. Is that what you consider?
Dr Marcin Kaczmarski
That’s what I would see, especially that – from the Chinese perspective, it is still the markets of the European and the US matter. So, I would see the extent to which China is willing to help Russia in the assessment how long-term is the competition with the US? Is there any possibility for China to, in a way, take a break in its competition with the US, or does China need Russia?
Dr Yu Jie
Surely, I mean, I entirely agree with you. Actually, I was even looking into Russia’s capital market was not even open to the Chinese capital market investment at all, even ever since they have declared a so-called “comprehensive strategic partnership,” so it does come with some limits.
Now, let’s go into a fist of really good questions from all of you audience in here. Now, the first one, may I invite our longstanding Russian expert, Mr James Nixey, our Head of Russia Programme in here, to ask his question to Professor Zhao. James.
James Nixey
Okay. Can you hear me?
Dr Yu Jie
Yes, I can hear you, yeah.
James Nixey
Thank you, Cherry. Very nice to see you, Marcin and Natasha, who I know very well. Thank you very much, indeed. So, I wasn’t expecting to talk, but my question was actually for Dr Tong Zhao, if I may. There was a well-known article by Hu Wei, published in the beginning of – middle of March, I believe, which argued, quite surprisingly, that “China should set its stall,” really, “more along with the United States’ position” and really needed to “get away and isolate itself from the Russian position.” And considering he – I don’t know, you will know more than me, but he has an official or a semi-official role, I – this caused a great deal of perplexion. I – so, I was wondering if you had any sense of where that was coming from, was it sanctioned, was it not sanctioned? Did it – were there any reverberations as a result of it? Was it significant, or am I overplaying it? Thank you very much.
Dr Tong Zhao
Well, thank you for the question. At the early phase of the war, there was, indeed, a lot of internal debate, especially among the experts, you know, foreign policy, security policy experts, and, you know, Hu Wei was, you know, a very important example of those experts who believed that, you know, that even this is – you know, that the Russian invasion is clearly committing a major crime and violating international laws and major international principles. And China should certainly distance from Russia and should use this opportunity to further stabilise China’s overall relationship with Western countries. Because that’s where Chinese strategic interests rest, is the Western market, Western investments, Western technologies, that would secure China’s long-term economic development.
And – but I think, you know, the – you know, the reason – you know, according to comments by his colleagues, by colleagues of Hu Wei – by the way, as you have said, Hu Wei is a Councillor of China State Council, so he has some semi-official status and his view is certainly valid within the system. But according to his colleagues, that the reason he chose to wrote a piece and publish it on the social media is because at that time, he knew that this – his view wouldn’t be viewed very favourably by Chinese top leadership and if he wrote a international policy memo, that memo probably won’t reach really high levels and have a major policy impact. So, he decided to publish it on social media and hopefully, by gathering public attention and interest and debate, and that, you know, just stimulating public debates on this issue, it would indirectly contribute to internal policy debate at high levels and, hopefully, affect policy debate at, you know, at that high level.
So, initially, he knew his view was controversial and soon after, I think the signals that came from China’s senior leadership became increasingly clear that China wants to prioritise its strategic partnership with Russia and China is going to criticise the Western countries. So, after that became clearer and clearer, I think those internal debates gradually faded. There are still some debates by experts, but those today are mostly around the more specific policy discussions.
Recently there is a important article written by [Gao Yusheng – 34:35], who is a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. He was a member, but he was important public figure and he, basically, published an op-ed on a Singapore newspapers, basically, saying, you know, “Russian invasion was wrong, morally and legally, and China should take the right side of history by, you know, standing against Russia.” But again, the fact that he decided to publish it on a foreign newspaper, again, shows that people in the system know that there is a real limit on what they can debate and discuss and the [inaudible – 35:18] manoeuvre specific issues is very limited.
Dr Yu Jie
Again, thank you so much for this very illuminating insight. Now, I’m going to turn Marcin and Natasha in here. When we’re talking about these two countries, China and Russia, we seems then, to be focusing quite a lot regarding individual leaders and now I would like to invite Rodrigo Moura to ask his question. Rodrigo, the floor is yours.
Rodrigo Moura
Thank you, Yu Jie. So, yeah, I would like to understand what’s your view on the personal preferences of the two leaders and how does that affect the current situation and, also, how do the current headwinds that they faced, both militarily and economically, affect their personal standards?
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah, Marcin, Natasha, either of you.
Dr Marcin Kaczmarski
So, perhaps I will go first, then.
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
Okay, yeah.
Dr Marcin Kaczmarski
For sure, it is – as has already been mentioned, the guidance on the relationship goes very much from the top. But what I would like to draw our attention to is that what we have seen, since the beginning of the pandemic, is the limited amount of contacts between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping. They talked a couple of times on the phone and using their video communication. They met once for a couple of hours. So, if we take a look – and we haven’t heard much about Xi Jinping calling Putin, or the other way round, since the war started. So, in this sense, I’m not sure how much the personal relationship matters at this particular stage. So, for sure, it matters in the long-term perspective, it matters for – it has helped a lot to push actors in both Russia and China towards closer co-operation. Also, in Russia, it closed down the opportunities for the discourse that would be more sceptical towards this co-operation. But I’m not sure how the situation looks like nowadays, given the really limited amount of contacts between both leaders, and I will just stop here.
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
Yeah, I mean, a lot has been made of the, kind of, personal, you know, almost bromance, if you like, between Xi and Putin. I mean, you know, you could just point to the fact that, obviously, by comparison with Putin’s relationships with other leaders and perhaps also for Xi, you know, it seems like a very strong relationship. But you know, I’m not sure that on its own merits, it’s necessarily of that great significance. I mean, obviously, there were lots of photo opportunities in the past, before the pandemic, you know, at the Far Eastern Economic Forum, flipping pancakes together, that type of thing. You know, there are, obviously, no opportunities like that now.
I mean, clearly, you know, for both Russia and China, you know, this kind of individual, sort of, friendship or closeness could be presented very much as, you know, the two great powers in solidarity together. You know, they’re both P5 members, both nuclear powers, you know, and of course, also, you know, very much, often within the context of the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, for example, which now contains India, Pakistan and the five – and of course, four of the Central Asian countries, and so on. So, in those, kind of, forums, if you like, I think, was always very, kind of, useful to, sort of, show the two together, you know, to show the way in which normatively, they espouse the same kind of ideas, you know, and you were saying, kind of – or similar visions, if you like, perhaps for regional order in Central Asia, for example. So, yeah, increasingly, I think those opportunities are not coming their way.
I think there was another question about – I didn’t quite catch the second part of the question about the military headwind, but you know, obviously, both Xi and Putin now are, kind of, seeing Ukraine apparently prevailing over Russia, or at least seeing the way in which Russia, you know, which is a big military power, is, to some extent, coming adrift, failing in Ukraine. And I think this is – there are going to be certain lessons drawn from that and Putin is the Commander in Chief, so that will, you know, have, maybe, some effect, as well, on – eventually, on Xi’s perception of Putin.
Dr Yu Jie
So, perceptions does matter. Now, I’m going to put an atomic bomb in here, because inevitably, that the part of the world that always try to compare with the current Ukraine situation and vis-à-vis the likely outcome of the Taiwan situation. Now, I would like to invite Michael Harvey to ask his question, if he may.
Michael Harvey
Hello, hope you can get my question.
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah, we can hear you, yeah.
Michael Harvey
Oh, thank you. How closely is China looking at the West’s reactions and responses to Russia’s invasion and possible conquest of Ukraine in relation to a potential invasion/conquest of Taiwan? What lessons are China likely to draw from this? And I would just like to add, we’ve seen the effects of European sanctions on Russia and the effects on the European economy. What would be the effects on the European economy, or the world economy, for sanctions against China if China decided to attack Taiwan?
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
I did actually address that question in my presentation at the beginning, but you may not have joined the meeting yet, at that point. But I mean, I would say that China’s watching the events pretty closely and I certainly think that while you can’t compare completely Taiwan and Ukraine, obviously, China may draw some lessons from this conflict and from the way in which the West has been reacting to Russia, which is the West has shown quite a high level of unity and cohesion that maybe came as a surprise to China, as well as to Russia.
Anyone else wants to come in on that?
Dr Tong Zhao
I’ll be happy to add a couple of quick observations. I very much agree with what Natasha already said, but I think Chinese evaluation of the implications for Taiwan, a straight contingency, are still evolving. Initially, China was really shocked, as a level of, you know, local resistance in Ukraine and their military capacity to fight back and, also, the level of Western support, really, comprehensive support, military support and, you know, crippling sanctions on Russia and the likelihood that Russian economy might, you know, even collapse. And that could even lead to internal social instability and maybe even regime change in Russia. So, that really challenged a lot of China’s exist – pre-existing assumptions in a hypothetical military operational against Taiwan. Because China, I think, mostly assumed that a military operation would be a quick victory. Chinese people would, basic – accept the, you know, the – they’ve – you know, a new reality on the ground. Western countries wouldn’t even have time to respond, even they wanted to respond, their sanctions, the pressure, that isolation wouldn’t have time to really have the imp – have real impact on China. And all those assumptions, I think, are being challenged and need to be reconsidered.
And – but I think, over time, some of those reflections are being, again, re-evaluated, because as the time drags on, it looks like Russian economy is doing okay. Russian people are generally optimistic about their mid-term and long-term economic prospect and Russia is not necessarily international isolated. There are so many fence sitter countries in the world. So, maybe that mitigating impact on Chinese interest in a military operation against Taiwan is decreasing over time. I mean, in general, I would say that Ukraine war makes it even less likely, and you know, I say the initial chance for China to deliberately initiating a war against Taiwan in the near-term future is low, but the war makes that even lower as a result.
But I will – also want to quickly add that Chinese military strategies are clearly learning specific lessons. One lesson, for example, is that China needs, probably, to launch a major and comprehensive blow to the Taiwanese forces at the very beginning of the war to avoid Russian mistake of spreading their forces too thin and going into Ukraine in an incremental manner. That means a future military operation could be even uglier than the Ukraine War and, you know, leaves less opportunity for Taiwanese forces and Western forces to react.
It also means that the war reinforces – again, the war reinforces the Chinese perception that, you know, this is, basically, anarchic world that we live in. When it comes to geopolitical interests, no-one cares about rules and norms and principles. So, ultimately, it is material power that matters. So, if China wants to achieve its core national interest of unification with Taiwan, it has to depend on its own military power and comprehensive national power. That means China probably will double down on its current policy of comprehensive military modernisation, which will probably make the risk of arms race in the region even higher.
And the war, I think, encourages the thinking in some Chinese expert community that the example that Russian’s decision demonstrated, even though the result is not good, Russian military is not doing well on the battlefield, but many Chinese experts seem to still aspire the – admire the Russian decision-makers’ resolve to defend their co-national interest against perceived Western hostility. So, there may be this growing thinking that for major power like China to eventually rise, to be respected by the rest of international community, China also has to stand up against perceived Western aggression sooner or later. I think that will make – also have implication for the Taiwan contingency and it’d make – would make mistakes over defending Taiwan even higher, because Western countries would believe that Taiwan is becoming a frontier for defending Western values, Western norms, and Western order. So, I think, you know, that makes it even more important that we, you know, make very rational and careful, prudent policies to avoid unnecessary conflict or inversion [inaudible – 47:48] in this part of the world.
Dr Yu Jie
Well, thank you for very candid comments, Tong. Marcin, would you like to add something? No, okay. Right, okay, let’s go for next question. Now, I’m going to ask on behalf of the audience – hold on, just give me one second, let me find it, because they keep jumping back and forth in here. Now, this probably relates to international order question that, obviously, is a question come from Omewa Ken and he’s a Nuclear Scientist. And he ask, “Neither China nor Russia sees the current international order as being legitimate. Putin has, again, highlighted how China and Russia have committed themselves, developing a new model of so-called international relations, and obviously, that so-called new model of international relations have all different kind of interpretations.” Now, could I start with Marcin, this time, first, and what is really, in Russia’s view, how the international politics should be organised, and equally, this ans – this question would go for Natasha and for Zhao Tong, as well.
Dr Marcin Kaczmarski
Thank you, and thank you for this question. As we can see from the war in Ukraine, a couple of currents of force that were present in then randomly thinking about international politics can came together. So, it – firstly, security is on top of any other considerations. Secondly, what Russia wants to achieve is the European Order without the US. This is ultimately what it boils down to, so, divide the European and – states and the US. And this is something which is probably another big surprise for the Kremlin, that the West reacted quite differently than in – during the previous crises.
But it is also the sphere of influence, which is at the core of Russia’s understanding of international politics and this sphere of influence can take a number of degrees, with direct control, as we now see, as Russia clearly strives to occupy certain parts of Ukraine. Political subordination further in the mid-range, if I may put it so, and a kind of, grey zone, especially in terms of security, when it comes to sub-states and Central European states, or the so-called new members of NATO, so those accepted after 1999. And I think this is something which is at the core of Russian – of the current Russian leadership and substantial part of elites thinking about those international colleagues with other non-Western powers exercising similar spheres.
Dr Yu Jie
Natasha, Tong, anything, yeah?
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
Yeah, I mean, I think China and Russia seem to, yeah, share quite a similar view of world order. I would say Russia, certainly, yes, sees itself as a kind of – a great power, partly based, also, on its position in the region, as a regional power. You know, in a way, the idea of, you know, regional hegemons, you know, who then translate that power globally, as well, and so, you know, obviously, if you see that they each have their, kind of, own regions, if you like, and I think – I mean, I think Russia, increasingly, you know, operates like a, kind of, great power. It would like – it would probably like a kind of, return to the Concert of Europe idea.
With China, I’m not sure that Russia and China have identical views on what a world order would look like – a different world order would look like, and I think if you look at – you know, they both have this quite civilisational rhetoric now, as well, and China increasingly. So, you know, when China talks to the Central Asians within the Shanghai Co-operation organisation, they very much talk about, kind of, inter-civilisational dialogue and they, kind of, promote themselves as being able to, sort of, to speak to the Central Asians in a way that, you know, Westerners are not able to, partly because they are not, you know, emphasising human rights and so on and they’re not espousing Western liberal norms.
And I think Russia, perhaps, similarly so, but I think that this – these increasing emp – the increasing emphasis, if you like, of both Russia and China on these, kind of, civilisational identities and approaches, means that there is a potential – I mean, I don’t want to get into a, kind of, Huntingtonian, kind of, you know, Clash of Civilisations approach, but I do think that, you know, they don’t necessarily – while they may be against a, kind of, Western liberal order, I’m not sure that it’s clear, you know, what they want the alternative world order to look like in normative terms. I think it’s much more just about great powers.
Dr Yu Jie
Great. Tong, would you like to add in?
Dr Tong Zhao
I’ll be happy to jump in quickly. I think this, again, reflects the very serious information gap and perception gap between the two sides. Most Chinese officials, experts, general public, genuinely believe that this war was a result of the Western promoted values order and Russia was forced to fight back. It’s, basically, a – well, the inherent hegemonism in Western strategic culture and political values that, in the long run, contributed to the war and the war is also a result of internal political problems and shortcomings of Western systems, right? It’s a result of unchecked interests of Western military industrial complexes. It’s a result of Western internal political lobbying. It’s a result of Western internal political struggle, political polarisation, that are contributing to the world. That’s the real and genuine Chinese mainstream view. So, if we really are serious about reflecting on the war from the Chinese perspective, then this Western dominated pow – values and norms and order needs to change. I think that thinking becomes more popular today in China.
But how to change, I don’t think China has a real idea. I mean, Chinese promote a lot of generic and the abstract ideas to build a community of common destiny for human beings and most recently, Chinese Government came up with the Global Security Initiative, a big, big idea, big initiative. But again, there appears to be a lack of substantive content. And – but I think there is this growing sense here, in Beijing, that China may needs to be more on the offence to push against the Western ideas, values and norm. The war wouldn’t go down by itself if China – if people don’t push it. So, I would expect a more open confrontation between the two sides, without substantive exchanges of views and proposals and that is really worrisome. If we can somehow direct the rhetorical confrontation between the two sides into more substantive debate over specific policy disagreements, I think that will be a more constructive way to address the differences and concerns of the two sides.
Dr Yu Jie
I think you just averted World War Three, Dr Tong, here. Now, very, very final question squeeze in and, also, this is going to be your last worlds for all the panellists, and we’re now looking to the nuclear option. Now, could I invite Rollie Schwartz to ask his question? Rollie.
Rollie Schwartz
Thank you very much. Can you hear me?
Dr Yu Jie
Yes, we can hear you.
Rollie Schwartz
Fantastic. So, there are two linked questions. I hope that won’t take up too much time. But the first one is if, and you know, potentially, is still a big if on some parts of this, Russia was to use chemical, biological or at the most extreme, nuclear weapons in Kraine – in Ukraine, what is your assessment of how China will respond under each scenario, so chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear? And linked to that, to what extent do you think China could play a role in de-escalating Russian activity, should Putin move towards some sort of CBRN attack?
Dr Yu Jie
Anyone?
Rollie Schwartz
Thank you.
Dr Tong Zhao
Well, I’ll be happy to try first.
Dr Yu Jie
Very quick.
Dr Tong Zhao
Firstly, I think…
Dr Yu Jie
Very quick, huh?
Dr Tong Zhao
Yeah, yeah, you know, firstly, I don’t think China share the same level of concern as Western countries about the chall – about the risk of Russians resorting to nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. You know, the Chinese expert genuinely think that Russia decision-makers are simply using signalling of – you know, to deter or discourage Western further intervention, perceived Western intervention, including resorting to stronger economic pressure measures against Russia. And, also, they don’t believe Russian decision-maker, President Putin, is irrational or crazy or being – or, you know, being circled – being a corner in the small circle, don’t have – doesn’t have good access to information and making crazy decisions. So, China – there is not much debate, discussion, around those trained scenarios.
If that happened, I think China would be wor – very worried about the implication for global stability, especially, you know, at the regional and international level and how that would affect China’s overall interests. But even in that scenario, I don’t think China would go against Russia and criticise Russia. Given how China has perceived the nature of this war and everyone’s role in it, I just don’t see China believing Russia is ultimately responsible, even it took very extreme measures to defend its perceived interests.
Dr Yu Jie
Natasha, Marcin, final words?
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
Well, I’d, kind of, largely agree, really, and I mean, and I also, personally, think that that is the way that Putin behaves. That’s the way that, you know, Putin, you know, threatens a response. You know, it’s the kind of rational madman, kind of, idea, isn’t it? You know, I think it is much more about, you know, signalling and trying to deter the West from further support to Ukraine and so on, rather than, you know, an actual threat of nuclear war, and he has threatened it before, I think, in 2014, as well.
Dr Yu Jie
Marcin.
Dr Marcin Kaczmarski
If I would just add that if any power were to play a mitigating role, it can only be China, in terms of persuading Russia not to go to the extremes. Although I am also very sceptical about the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, but I would not go as far as to explore it.
Dr Yu Jie
Well, on that positive note, I really want to say huge thank you to all three of you to have enlightened us on this extremely complex evolving subject and, surely, we will invite you back to the building very soon and try to help us to understand and try to navigate, you know, the real complexity on China’s position on this war in Ukraine. And, also, late next month, we’ll be in London Conference and we’re going to dealing with a similar subject on the panel, as well. So, I look forward to seeing many of you actually physically in the building and I look forward to have further discussions, on China, Russia, Ukraine, again.
So, let me – please join me to thanks Dr Zhao Tong, Dr Marcin Chin – Marcin Kaczynski [means Kaczmarski] and, also, Dr Natasha Kuhrt, for all your fantastic contribution here today, and let me wish you a very good evening, or very good afternoon. Thank you so much, bye, bye.
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
Thank you. Thank you.
Dr Marcin Kaczmarski
Yeah.
Dr Natasha Kuhrt
Marcin, it was a pleasure.
