James Nixey
Well, good evening and welcome, ladies and gentlemen. If I might start on a slightly unusual note, I realise that not everybody on this meeting is British or even in the UK at the moment, but nonetheless, I hope you won’t mind if I – on behalf of my institute, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, of which the Queen is the Patron, but I wish Her Majesty and all her family all the best at this difficult time. Our thoughts are with them.
I’ll continue in the usual vein, and it’s also welcome back, ladies and gentlemen. I hope you’ve had a good summer, and as it’s been raining outside my house all day, I see that my use of the past tense for summer looks to be correct. But of course, if you’re Ukrainian especially, but even if you’re concerned about European security even, summer cannot possibly have passed without concern.
Some people are calling this a war of attrition, but of course, looked at from just a slightly different angle, in Putin’s invasion of democratic Ukraine is still really in full swing. So, today, upon returning from many people’s summer breaks, if not everybody got one, then we thought we’d treat this as an update session, if you like, from Chatham House Analysts, one Professor, two Senior Research Fellows, not covering every angle, of course, because there are so many, but looking at the Ukrainian and Russian military states of play, the Russian domestic, that is to say, elite and popular attitudes, the Western response, and the regional fall-out.
So, to do this, as I say, we have three outstanding Russia and Eurasia Programme stalwarts, and I may chip in as well, but primarily we’ll be hearing from Mathieu Boulègue, Nikolai Petrov, and Kataryna Wolczuk, in precisely that order. Just a couple of admin points before we begin: we are on the record today, probably obvious, but worth saying, and we’ll put up a recording online if it all goes well. Please, ladies and gents, put any questions that you may have, in the usual vein, to – into the Q&A. I think the chat is disabled, or at least it will be, so, Q&A, and I’ll bring you in orally, ideally, but if not, I will happily read out your questions, of course.
Okay, that’s it, more than enough. Mathieu, I’m going to turn to you first. We are almost seven months into a particularly vicious war, and it’s seen some swings already, right, with advantage apparently swinging between the two principal players. So, what’s your assessment of where the chips lie, Mathieu, and however much into the future of a war and its outcome you dare to expand upon would be very welcome. Thank you very much.
Mathieu Boulègue
Thank you very much, James. So, we are indeed six months into the three-day war that Putin, sort of, sold at least President Xi Jinping, and probably most of the Russian population as well. So, six months onwards, I usually say that modern warfare is not rocket science. So, once you have less moving pieces than at the start, it starts to become a bit easier to, sort of, predict. So, I at least have a sense of predictability of where things are going, and where things are going now is, sort of, straightforward when you look at the main moving pieces. So, I will be, sort of, looking at these main moving pieces and trying to make sense of the short-term future of the conflict and where this might be going in the years to come.
So, let’s backtrack to these main moving pieces that we have now. You’ve all heard about these offensives and counteroffensives that Ukraine armed forces have been conducting for the past few weeks, and how the Russian armed forces are trying to either resist or push back against said counteroffensives. So, two main moving pieces: the first one, and definitely the most interesting one at the moment, is what is happening in the South, very close to the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts, region of Ukraine where things have actually been moving not necessarily in the favour of Ukrainian armed forces, but definitely with this, sort of, counteroffensive that Ukrainian forces have been doing to contest Russian positions, to try to make occupation more complicated than necessary for Russia.
Let’s be clear about what a counteroffensive is, because there’s a lot of demystification around that. This is a tactical movement, this is not a strategic, sort of, changing of the tide of war, kind of, movement. So, if you’re looking for, sort of, quick victory for Ukrainian armed forces, to push back against the invader, look away, because, a) the counteroffensive is very much tactical, and it takes weeks before it actually has any, sort of, real effects on the ground.
From what – the information we can gather on the ground, it seems that Ukrainians are really trying to contest Russian positions, more than try to take over more territory, because taking over more territory bears the risk of not being able to keep it, to withstand potential attacks against said military gains.
There is of course, in Kherson more specifically, the natural border of the river that Ukrainian forces are trying to get to, to try to contest Russian positions, mostly the groundline of communications, and this is where we will potentially see a multiplication of these counteroffensives that could actually reach a higher level of strategic effects on the ground as they, sort of, grow in size and complexity.
It’s also a great way for Ukraine to capitalise, in terms of public relations and communications, to prove that they are able to launch, a) genuine counteroffensives, and that it would be great if they could do it a bit later with more military equipment coming from the West, right? So, it has a big communications angle. This is war. There is propaganda on both sides. This is it.
The second main moving piece is Donbas, which has taken a, sort of, backseat now because the steamroller of Russian advances is slowly starting to stop, or at least grind to a halt. The Russian army is not going to collapse, right, something that you can read sometimes in the press, that both armies could collapse. Collapsology and military studies don’t really go well together, armies just don’t collapse, so, the Russian forces are looking at this stage, at trying to gain as much land and territory as possible before the conflict and the positions start to freeze, literally, speaking of the winter, and I’ll come back to it.
So, Ukrainians are making the most also of the fact that the Russian forces have to reallocate troop and equipment from Donbas to the Southern offensive and to the Southern war effort, and we’ve seen a particularly successful counteroffensive of Ukrainian forces in the region of Donbas very recently. So, it is also showing that Ukrainian positions and the ability of Ukrainian military forces to withstand six months of war do complicate the cost benefit calculus of Russia, trying to, sort of, mitigate what is happening in the South, between Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and Donbas more specifically, with probably still the willingness of Russian forces to conquer, that, sort of, link that goes from Izium in the North down to Slavyansk and Kramatorsk. But I don’t see how this is realistic, in terms of military advances, because once again the steamroller of Russian advances is slowly going to a halt.
Now, when we look at the short-term, sort of, evolution of the conflict, I see several, sort of, pathways. The first one is, by winter, as positions will start to freeze, literally, what we will see is Russia increasingly digging inside Ukrainian and occupied Ukrainian territory to make sure they create a form of fait accompli on the ground that will be strengthened by lines of defence, second lines of defence, third lines of defence, through mining parts of the territory, putting up or building up trenches as they are, and as they already are in Donbas for instance, to basically physically integrate, by force, parts of Ukrainian territory, conquered by force in the first place.
So, while we will have by winter probably, as once again positions will literally freeze into place, we will have the transformation from movement warfare to position warfare. And this is where Russia will try to keep digging up lines of defence inside Ukrainian territory, which leads us, sorry, to this, sort of, second position or second, sort of, short-term evolution, and this is already something that we have been seeing, for the past few months, in terms of no longer weak signals, but very strong signals coming from the South and Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, and further to the region around Mariupol, is the forceful integration of these conquered territories into the Russian Federation.
It’s a bit like the three stages of a demonic possession, right? The last one is integration, so, fir – you know, Russia cannot lead these territories by example, they cannot lead them by proxy, like they did with these People’s Republic in Donetsk and Luhansk. Believe it or not, nobody wants to be denazified in Kherson or Zaporizhzhia, shocking, so, they have to integrate by force. And this is done increasingly, and this has been done for weeks, by basically removing the layer of what makes these territories Ukrainian: culture, religion, money, with the hryvnia being replaced by the rouble, patriotic education, education, col – you know, curricula inside, in the school, administrative layers and so on, to turn it into something Russian. And this is what we will have, in terms of a potential fake, completely fake referendum.
As you can imagine, Russians have already now, sort of, pushed back the dates of these referenda. It would have been in summer, now it’s set for November 4th, as it is, it might be pushed back, and it will be pushed back as Ukrainian counteroffensives try to contest the ability of Russian occupation to keep these territories, to integrate them.
You cannot integrate if you have an active war, and you can only do so when you have a form of position warfare, and when your lines of defence are solid enough that you don’t really fear a counteroffensive from your opponent. So, this will be done in conjunction with a, sort of, freezing of the military lines by winter.
And then, to be discussed and to be continued, in terms of, will we see a potential spring offensive or counteroffensive, depending on which side of the border you sit? I don’t really see it happening either, because both armies will need time to recuperate, in terms of the tempo of rotation for military personnel. But also to rejuvenate their stock, in terms of military equipment, so, I don’t really see a major offensive in the spring, or counteroffensive, going forward. Which means that we’re, sort of, already looking into, unfortunately, a third phase of this war that actually started in 2014 when Russia first invaded Ukraine.
We are in phase two right now, with the 2022 invasion or reinvasion. What we will probably have in a few year,– give it five, ten years, I don’t know, is probably the preparation already going ahead in the Kremlin of Moscow coming back for more. More territory when they actually have rejuvenated and recuperated, in terms of troops and equipment, a potential new phase of this war, as once again military positions will freeze, literally, and Russia will dig in inside of Ukrainian territory.
Don’t misunderstand my words; the conflict will not be frozen. Wars are never frozen, people die every day, but the positions themselves will turn once again from active movement to a more war of positioning, and what you were saying, James, in terms of a war of attrition, which is also loaded terms, whereby no opponent can actually take over militarily or achieve strategic effects that change the tide of war. So, this is pretty much where we are, between a rock and a hard place for Ukraine, but also for Russia, because this will be a costly war. Not just in terms of military capabilities, but also this capacity of Russian forces to keep this line of defence, as Ukrainian forces keep gnawing at them and keep trying to contest lines of communication, resupply areas, training areas, staging areas of the Russian occupier in Ukraine.
So, once again, a very contrasted picture, but I would also try and go outside the box of what, you know, is established, and this is not just about the short-term, this is about the next, next war, in a way. Because there is absolutely no guarantee that whoever comes next in five, ten years after Putin, unless he’s still in power, won’t try to come back for more of Ukrainian territory, once they actually have the ability to do it, militarily speaking. So, a lot, unfortunately, to behold and a lot more pain and injury against a free and sovereign Ukraine, I’m afraid.
James Nixey
Mathieu, thank you very much indeed. I know we do a lot of geopolitics here at Chatham House in the broad brush, but it’s so important that people like you have a good command of the detail of what’s going on, literally on the ground. So, that is incredibly useful and I’m sure we’ll come back at you, but what I did take a lot from that, primarily from that myself was that this is about positions and not territory, and the – and inter – just your very last points are very interesting, about no major offensive expected in the spring.
You – one might query your very – one of your last statements about Russia coming back for another bite at the apple in five to ten years’ time, not least because potenti – presumably, Russia will be weaker in five to ten years’ time, one would wonder, I know you’re saying it will restock, but then there’s other arguments beyond the restocking there. And I wonder what Kolai might think of that, in a way, because Kolai’s going to talk to us a little bit now about the Russian end.
Kolai, we’ve discussed this in so many fora of late, what this war is doing to Russia, to the many Russias out there, actually, so, I’d be grateful if you could divide your initial remarks between what it’s doing to elite cohesion, what it’s doing to the people at the top, where we’re looking at. I know in the past you said there’s no signs of a real elite breakdown, other than little bits on the side, but nothing really significant. But also, if you’d like to talk a little bit, please, about the levels of popular support, and I know in the past you’ve told me about 60/20/20; 60% really in favour of Putin, 20% not sure and 20% against. I wonder if that has changed anymore, but if you – I know we could spend an entire day on both of those topics, Kolai, but if you could just do it in your ten minutes, and divide it between the two, I’d be very grateful. Thank you.
Nikolai Petrov
Thank you, James. I’ll give several pieces or bricks which, in my view, look more stable than those presented by Mathieu. My first brick is that Putin, after failing to win with a throw, he is judo player, applies a painful technique, and this is about the war of attrition. So, he switched to a long game. He did change game plan.
Russian economy appeared to be much more sustainable that it was expected a while ago, and now the government is saying about three to 4% GDP fall by the end of the year, and 12 to 14% of inflation, which looks pretty good against the background of many other European countries.
Elites: elites not only are consolidated, I would say that they are concreted. They are not so much elites, they are cogs in the machine, meaning that they do not have any room for manoeuvre, because the system has changed from the besieged fortress to the submerged submarine. There is no way elites can demonstrate their lack of loyalty, vice versa, that’s why we do see very consolidated Putin’s elites. The situation can change, but only in the case if the popular support will go down, essentially.
It’s not taking place so far. Putin still keeps being a very popular leader, although we have to ask another question, whether you are eager to come to the war and to fight. Russians are much more – much less eager to answer in positive way, and this is important because Putin and the Kremlin, they are afraid of mass mobilisation, and that’s why what’s going on now, it’s a kind of buying, well, prospective soldiers. So, we do see so-called volunteer battalions in regions, and they are now something about 10,000 soldiers, and it can increase. So, the reason why they are eager to participate in the war is that they are offered pretty serious money, which is several times higher than the average salary in their regions, and many regions are pretty poor.
Regime, due to all these factors, looks rather stable and resilient, so, there is no way to wait for any kind of elite split, in near future at least, and I think it’s very important to understand that in the course of the next year or couple years, regime looks pretty much stable. So, the West and Ukraine should be ready for the war of attrition. There are – there was the article by a Ukrainian Military Commander published yesterday, where he discusses the plan for 2023 military operations and in Russia, they did start construction of two new armoured factories, meaning that both sides are preparing for pretty long-term war to continue.
We’ve seen first signs of the exte – of the intensive gas war started by the Kremlin, and yesterday Putin did – questioned the grain deal achieved, and it’s another leverage, which can be used and which will be used. So, I would like to end by the well-known expression attributed to many different persons, including Winston Churchill, that “Russia is never as strong as she looks, and is never as weak as she looks.”
James Nixey
Thank you, Kolai. Yeah, I’ve always agreed with that one, although I wish I had, sort of, a penny for every time somebody had quoted a – done a Churchill quote during a Russia seminar, I’d be a rich man, but at the same time, I think that is probably one of his better ones, quite frankly, as far as Russia is concerned.
What I certainly take from that, Kolai, if anybody was looking to – for any solace or joy, is in fact that the re – this regime is looking pretty solid. I somehow, for what it’s worth, I’m challenging my own team here, but I can’t help but think that there are so many people in the regime who, obviously, with Putin as the undoubted King, it seems to me that there will be people who are – obviously they’re too afraid to do anything or to say anything, but who will be quietly very perturbed by this. They may not be Western liberals or our people in particular, but it does seem to me that there must be people who – I don’t know if they’re going to necessarily form any kind of movement, who would be distinctly – who, over time, their concerns about this path that Putin has led them on will come out more and more, is for what it’s worth.
But, Kolai, if I may say, I wouldn’t mind a little bit more for you before I turn to Kataryna, just very briefly, on levels of popular support. You talked about the regime a little bit, but I wonder if you could tell me a little bit about the regions and the cities and how Putin is faring, just give me another couple of minutes, would you, if Kataryna doesn’t mind waiting?
Nikolai Petrov
Yeah, absolutely. The level of popular support is pretty high. We can speculate about different sociological polls and about the meaning of any kind of sociology, if there is authoritarian regime and any respondent is afraid to express his or her real position. But we do see real signs of the fact that Putin still enjoys popular support and majority of Russians, absolute majority of Russians. It can be, well, explained by very different ways: by psychological protection, nobody wants to see and to understand the horror of the war, which is going on, and the Kremlin keeps propaganda and keeps information controlled in a way which doesn’t allow ordinary Russians to see all horrible things connected with the war.
So, we do hear 60 to 70% popular support, but it’s very different by regions, you are right. The Kremlin, by the way, is very flexible. Now elections are going on, and there will be voting this Sunday, and those regions, like Moscow and St Petersburg, where the popular support of the military operation is lower. Leadership of these regions is allowed not to attract attention to any symbols connected with this war, and to keep quiet and not even to attract attention to the fact that Moscow is buying soldiers in order to send to this war.
There are not only official, but inofficial sociological polls, which do show slight decline of the support, but it’s going on much slower than it was expected. The general expectation was that when the summer ends and everybody will come back home from summer vacation, the reaction onto the war could change in a very essential way. So far, we do not see any signs of this, but it doesn’t mean that will not take place in near future.
James Nixey
Very interesting point to finish with there, and that’s, I suppose, what I was ma – getting at with the elites, you don’t see any sign of it right now, but it might – doesn’t mean to say it won’t take place in the future, but we may slightly differ there, but that’s not important. But what I really take from that, Kolai, is this point, very interesting point about not so much self-censorship, but it’s almost self-denial about the horrors that are going on. I mean, that’s a fascinating, almost, you know, psychological, philosophical study there.
Kataryna, thank you for your patience, as ever. A couple of things for you, if I may. Firstly, at the risk of a plug, because, I mean, I know you wanted to talk a little bit about the regional fall-out, the regional implications to this war, which are just so immense. We’re doing a whole conference on this, just to say, on the 1st of December, there’ll be an announcement soon, but, Kataryna, I’d just love to know from you just how staggering are – is the regional fall-out from this? What are the most – what are the largest implications elsewhere, beyond Ukraine and beyond Russia?
And then, if you fancy, Kataryna, I’d just invite you to say a little bit about levels of support from the West, because it seems to me that it often feels as though the outcome of this war is dependent not so much upon Ukraine, which is giving us – giving it its all, but rather on, I suppose, Western levels of support, which are at once unprecedented, but also not entirely fully fledged, not quite what the Ukrainians themselves might wish for. So, a couple of tasks for you there, if I may. Over to you.
Kataryna Wolczuk
Great, thank you. Certainly from the UK perspective, the war has been dropped from the top, sort of, news stories, news always needs to be fresh, but that tsunami ripple effects are felt everywhere, as we know, and so, it’s worth focussing on the wider regional repercussions. But also to put it in a context, perhaps the concept – there used to be discussion for a long time, how divided is Ukraine? Is there one Ukraine or two? And there is no doubt that Russia actually was the factor which divided, or perhaps those, sort of, where the Ukrainian regions differed in their perceptions of Russia, in terms of history, language, culture and to what extent Russia was an enemy and a threat.
By now this discussion, we know, has become oblivious. Ukraine has proven unity and cohesion, and if there is anything, it is Russia, which unites Ukraine now. If we talk to any Ukrainian refugees, Russia is actually something, a powerful unifying force, depicted as an enemy state, but now the same question could be asked about Europe. Do we have – you know, does Russia unite or divide Europe? Is there one Europe or several, two or more? And it really depends where we look to – at – because my impression is, studying the region and Central Europe as well, is that we have about 100 to 120 million people living in the warzone. Those are people who are concerned, and they are basically either very frequently or frequently checking what’s happening in Ukraine, needless to say, including Ukraine itself.
For the rest of Europe, it is mainly a faraway regional war, which nevertheless has domestic implications. So, that’s an interesting, sort of, almost, sort of, Europe of two speeds and two perceptions of Ukraine. But before we look – go back to the – to Europe, wider Europe, perhaps it’s just worth focusing, in order to predict where this, sort of, Europe of several speeds is likely to go, it’s just worth having a look at Belarus, because Belarus tells us that both, not only Ukraine, but Belarus tells us about the future. And Belarus is one, sort of, arm in the Slavic triangle of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, but the two countries have really, vis-à-vis Russia, pursued a very different strategy, and what we see now, over the last six months, we can fairly, sort of, firmly conclude that by now Belarus cannot be recognised as a sovereign state.
It has, what we’ve seen, this creeping annexation of Belarus, and this happened in a very, sort of – under the radar, but the implications are massive, because we would not have the invasion of Ukraine the way we’ve seen it, without the protest and the – Lukashenko’s basically mortgaging Belarusian independence and sovereignty for its political survival, which means now that Belarus is – although formally it’s a party, it’s an aggressive state, at the same time we really have a tricky issue of what to do, and how to prepare for what’s going to happen in Belarus.
It is clear that for a long time the Belarusian opposition really played that issue, that it’s not geopolitical, it’s about domestic politics. But ultimately, we know that the future of Belarus will be decided, what happens, is premised on what happens in Russia. So, from that point of view, Belarus is a, sort of, an interesting case to warn us about what happens if that political, economic and security dependence is not tackled head-on. Ultimately, it becomes basically a string, which can be pulled whenever it’s convenient. So, Belarus is an – you know, and perhaps the most staggering example what we’ve seen, but every single country has been affected, including Moldova, and I’m only too happy to comment on this a bit later, but when it come – basically, when it comes to Europe, we can also see that we have this positioning vis-à-vis Russia done at different speeds and in different ways.
What is, for any expert on the region, what is so interesting, that in terms of energy, we used to have two Europes: the Europe, you know, the former Soviet Republics, which had one – for which one toolbox, Russian energy toolbox, or energy diplomacy was available, including basically a weaponization of energy dependence from 1993 onwards. The Baltic Republics, Ukraine, Moldova, they know all the story very well, but what – but, for the rest of Europe, it was a different, sort of, story, energy story. And what we’ve seen, over the last 30 years in the former Soviet countries, what is so interesting, that we are seeing the toolbox rolled out to Western Europe.
So, instead of having two Europes, in terms of energy dependence, we have now one Europe. So, the merger of the toolbox is incredible to watch, because it’s like watching a sequel to the film that we already know how it ends, because we have the cases of – we have the case of Belarus and of Ukraine, but also now of Bulgaria and other countries, and Hungary, we have signed a contract.
Once weaponization – this weaponizing starts, it’s a one-way street. The – it’s going to be used, every single aspect, and nothing is stable, predictable, but – apart from the fact that it’s going to be used. And in this context, the whole discussion about – the discussion – you know, energy prices, gas security, restore contracts, pipelines, we can be certain that it’s going to be used again and again. And obviously, this is then linked to that tsunami, sort of, ripple effect across Europe, in terms of inflation, energy prices and elections, and the rise of far-right and far-left political parties, which are now, sort of, coming to the stage, and countries are facing elections. So, it’s going to be a very, you know, as Mathieu has say, it may be a very, sort of, frozen winter, in terms when it comes to military, the military aspect, but in terms of politics, it’s going to be very explosive.
And it is worth also mentioning, in terms of the Western response, it’s not just about domestic politics, where we – the ripple effects are perhaps less direct, but very – you know, are going to be very powerful, including Italy and Austria, but it’s also about the EU as an institution. We’ve heard a lot about this geopolitical awakening, and there is no doubt that what would be inconceivable, before the invasion, now has become possible, in terms of the EU coming together and doing so many things, and yet, the more we look, you know, it’s the more, sort of, challenges they are.
And I would just like to touch on the final point, which is Ukraine’s candidate status. This is one of the things, which would have been inconceivable even, you know, eight months ago. Now Ukraine has been granted this status, unfortunately, it adds to the pile of problems with the whole enlargement strategy, and now Ukraine is added to the not-so-happy waiting room of the Western Balkan countries, and in a way the question is, which was asked about Ukraine so many times in the 1990s – or perhaps statement, that “Ukraine is too important to fail.” And from that point of view again, we have the Europe, sort of, of two parts, sort of, Eastern and Central Europe, which are really concerned and eager to bring Ukraine in, not in an, any special, sort of, on an, any, sort of, emergency way. There is no really fast-track way to join the EU, but at least they would like to make sure that the process is functional and Ukraine can be gradually integrated and membership offered in not-too-distant future.
Whereas other, you know, so many parts – member states in the EU regard candidate status as basically mission accomplished. As a geopolitical gesture that does – basically needs what – you know, provides this symoblis, but it’s not exactly that needs to be followed immediately. So, this is something that we are observing.
We also see, perhaps my final point, on top of what we’ve said about the war, we have really a strong dèjá vu in Ukraine when it comes to the, sort of, domestic discussion in Ukraine of the Central European accession countries in the 1990s. All domestic reforms are now linked to preparation for EU membership, and the big question is, to what extent this prospect is going to be – remain, sort of, valid, to what extent actually Ukraine – the EU does really take the steps to be able to basically admit Ukraine at certain point in not that too long future? And I’ll stop here for now.
James Nixey
Kataryna, thank you very much indeed for that, that was very comprehensive. I’m afraid that while you were talking, it’s just been announced that Her Majesty has actually died. What I’m going to do is, I’m not going to cancel this seminar. I’d like to actually hold a minute’s silence, and then we’ll carry on just for another 15 minutes, if that’s okay. The minute’s silence begins now [pause].
Thank you very much, any – everybody. If we could hold ourselves together just for a little while longer, I will begin the question and answer session and I’ll read out a couple of questions but, as I say, I’m sure I’ll finish in 20 minutes’ time.
Kataryna, thank you again. What I took from that was the importance of Belarus, its future is tied up, albeit Russia has lost, it’s divided Ukraine, and of course the “too important to fail” aspect and Ukraine’s membership and whether that can be expedited, so, I’m sure we’ll get back to that.
I’ve got a question for you, to start with, Mathieu, if that’s okay. Mathieu, Kieron O’Mara asks about a nuclear option, we discussed it before, how that clears it – has – “Have the changes of Russia pressing the nuclear button increased, decreased?” It’s still an ever-present threat, one assumes, but the – has there been any change in that, would you say, over the summer?
Mathieu Boulègue
Right, thank you very much, James. It’s a fascinating question, and it’s actually one of the myths and misconceptions that our team specifically, awesome team of MythBusters, as we call them, have been publishing recently, and I think, Tom, if you could pop the link to that report in the – or that project, sorry, in the chat, that would be great.
There’s a lot of misconceptions around the nuclear, the use of nuclear, the threshold and escalation in Russia, so, I’m not going to be discussing this. Tactical nuclear weapons are, sort of, another myth. It’s great if you want to flatten a city, but it’s a tactical weapon. It doesn’t change the tide of war, in terms of what you can hope to achieve, in terms a) of deterrence or b) in terms of genuine effects on the ground. So, I think that threshold was, sort of, that – that, sort of, discussion around the use of tactical nukes was very relevant at the early onset of the war, when they were still in decision in the Kremlin, what to do with that bulk of Ukrainian territory they wanted to conquer, with not enough troops, not enough equipment, and there were discussions as early as March/April, on that.
What we have now is a completely different ballgame that is equally interesting, is actually “nuclear blackmailing,” as I call it, as Russian forces have, sort of, taken hostage the nuclear powerplant in Zaporizhzhia, linking it physically to the Crimean grid and then using it now as, sort of, a Disneyland, sort of, military resupply. They have been putting up a lot of military equipment, resupply areas, munitions, stocks of munitions and so on, to basically turn it into a very secure zone, because who would be foolish enough than to try and attack a nuclear powerplant, right? So, this is nuclear blackmailing at its best, the way – and thank you, Tom, for the link, I’ll pop that in the chat, the way that they have been using this sort of blackmail, and the way they’ve been instrumentalising also the IEEA and the response to – in terms of investigation that, “Of course, the nuclear powerplant is going on, and is still producing power, and there’s no way that it would collapse or anything.” Also sending this clown of an official representative, that is also a form of humiliation for – against the West, and against international institutions.
So, there’s a lot of, you know, a mix of nuclear blackmailing and nuclear, sort of, bullying, as it is, going on by Russia, but if, you know, if – should we be scared that there is a completely rational decision by the Kremlin to use a tactical nuclear weapon, because they need to fallout of Kherson and because they’re no longer controlling Kherson, or because they want to raid Kharkiv because they can’t push towards the city? I would assume not, because the – and this is further to Kolai’s point, and I’m sure we can discuss that with Kolai, is that the regime seeks stability and survival, they are self-destructive, they are not suicidal.
The moment they use a tactical nuclear weapon, it completely changes the ballgame with the West and against the West, and I don’t think they are there yet. So, there could be red herrings and outliers, we know, there are a lot of moving pieces that we don’t know, but I don’t think that they are missing that sense of rationality that would talk them into using nuclear or tactical nuclear weapons.
It is a different form of rationality, of course, it is hard to put ourselves in the shoes of, you know, Kremlin decision-makers, but it is still a form of willingness to survive, willingness to remain stable, hence the note to my – to this question.
James Nixey
Thank you, Mathieu. Self-destructive, not suicidal, is what I took from that, but you were obviously more detailed because you know it intimately, thank you. Kolai, I’ve got one for you, and then I’ll turn to Kataryna. Kolai, I’m sorry, I just need to see who this is by, Yulia Vedienko asks about the support for the war. This is a little bit about the question I asked you, Kolai, or I mentioned after you closed.
He say – Yulia says, “Is the slight decline of support for the war from Russian society connected to the moral justification or is it really just – is it – or is it connected to disappointment with a failed blitzkrieg, and that this war is longer and harder than everyone expected? So, what – to what do you attribute, in other words, Kolai, a slight decline, even if it is a slight decline, in support, popular support?
Nikolai Petrov
Well, I would say that there are at least two reasons of this slight decline, in my view. One is mentioned by you, it’s the gap between expectations, connected with glorious Russian weapons and, well, relatively weak Ukraine, and the fact that the war is going on for that long means that something went wrong. Although Russian propaganda keeps the vision that this is not the war between Russia and Ukraine, this is the war where the West is using territory of Ukraine against Russia, and it helps to explain why Russian army is not that victorious.
But another reason is the cost, the cost which is more and more felt by ordinary Russians. For a while, even those companies which left from Russia were paying salaries, and the unemployment is pretty low, but now the time is coming when the cost of the war is felt more and more intensively by ordinary Russians, and comparing unknown goals of the war with very, well, directly felt consequences of the war, ordinary Russians can change their mind.
James Nixey
Absolutely, very interesting, thank you. Kasia, can I turn to you again, please? This is a question from Raphael Maretto. Raphael asks, basically, “How is the international community supporting Ukraine to avoid tougher problems, and how allied nations to Ukraine working over monitoring an evaluation to avoid the already weaponry illegal deviation being” – ooh, that’s a slightly difficult one to understand. Basically, if I’ve read it correctly, which I may not, I’m going to, sort of, precis, Kasia, just – if you could say a little bit about international support for Ukraine, bearing in mind, as you said, the necessity that it’s “too important to fail.”
What do you feel is going on, in terms of – and I suppose I’m – what I’m a little concerned about, Kasia, is that we talk about Ukraine’s reconstruction before the war has finished, before we talk about its victory, and a lot of people don’t like talking about its victory, ‘cause it implies talking about Russian defeat. So, where do you lie, if I can reinterpret Raphael’s question, perhaps not as he intended, where do you lie in the space between Uk – the need to ensure that we back Ukraine in a post-war situation, and the need to ensure that Ukraine gets to that post-war situation, having won? I hope that’s a little clearer, and I’m sorry, Raphael.
Kataryna Wolczuk
Thank you very much, James. I will just perhaps start with looking at Raphael’s question, because this is about, sort of, the debate which cropped up about, sort of, illegal so-called weapon trading and weapons disappearing. And this is perhaps, you know, part of the discussion about Ukraine, which really misses what’s happening, in terms of actually security being so predominant. And any weapon, which doesn’t basically end up in the hands of the Ukraine army means there are Ukrainian soldiers, which are going to be killed.
So, from that point of view, we’ve seen the securitisation of so many aspects, and it’s interesting that, you know, that narrative that, “Can Ukraine be trusted?” I mean, can Ukraine be trusted not to basically – to prevent its own soldiers from being killed? Is – that’s an interesting – we’ve seen a crackdown on corruption, not necessarily related to actually – not related to weapons, but to humanitarian assistance. So, there is a real, sort of, activism when it comes to every aspect of Western assistance to make sure that it is effective. And from that point of view, we have absolutely no basis whatsoever to say that, basically, what the West supplies ends up in other, sort of, war theatres, not least because it is actually acutely needed in Ukraine. And on the one hand, the glass is half-full, half-empty, is Ukraine sufficiently supported? Definitely more than we could expect six months ago, and many say, not enough to sustain the war at this level, especially when it comes to heavy weaponry and ammunition.
But, Ukraine, in a way, challenges so many aspects of policy, not only bilateral relations vis-à-vis Ukraine, but the broader toolbox of the West. And one of the formidable challenges is how to combine reconstruction while the, sort of, the war is still going on, with modernisation and with European integration. This hasn’t been done, and there are basically a lot of, sort of, discussion about this various proposals, but this needs a very robust structure, and we – I haven’t seen yet enough, over this summer, and I presume because of the summer this has been delayed, but the EU has a formidable experience of actually working very closely.
Ukraine would not be where it is without actually EU support, assistance and support and Western, in general, in terms of, for example, decentralisation, being a massive success story. A poster child not only of reform support, but actually of Ukraine’s, you know, meaning that Ukraine is much more resilient that it was expected. So, the – with the war, the whole reconstruction is an incredibly complex question.
One big thing, perhaps two little things I will just mention at this stage, grants versus loans, a big, sort of, tricky question. And the second issue is that there are lots of pledges, but not necessarily money coming, going to Ukraine. So, with big amounts of money, complex set of donors, this is not easy to handle, and I don’t think it’s, from that point of view, we’ve worked out the system, how to do it yet.
James Nixey
Yeah, absolutely right, Kasia. That also answers Sergei Masumienko’s question, but absolutely, lots of promises and not much in delivery. Kolai, I’m going to come back to you, and then finally to Mathieu. Kolai, I think the challenge to you, which is something I was going to say as well, it’s from Antoine Grison, is the point about the economy you made. You suggested – no, you didn’t, you said that their – that you – “that the Russian economy is more resilient than was expected.” That does contradict a lot of other expert opinion, I have to say. For example, as Antoine points out, there was a Yale study, I don’t know if you saw it, Kolai, about a month ago, entitled “Business retreats and sanctions are crippling the Russian economy.” So, I do think it’s worth a discussion at least. I mean, you and I have been in discussions with anybody from, you know, Vladimir Milov, who says that actually indeed, “that the Russian economy is being very deleteriously affected.” Gurdjieff says the same thing.
But we also know other Russians we’ve been communicating with who are actually not optimistic about the Russian economy, clearly, but it’s resilient. So, you obviously have, you’ve chosen a side now, Kolai, which is absolutely reasonable, but I wonder if I – but I could ask you to back it up, I’m – my – ‘cause I would say that the Russian economy has never been hit like this before, bearing in mind what it’s being hit with, and that it seems to me that it’s – it may be cash-rich, but it’s not able to sustain itself over the long-term or – and I suspect you believe that as well, over a longer-term, but it seems to me that this is – that the oil income is a temporary adrenaline fix rather than anything particularly reassuring, as far as the Russian economy is concerned. Over to you.
Nikolai Petrov
Yeah, absolutely, I do agree with you, James, and thanks to Antoine it’s possible for me to elaborate a little bit more on economy, and it’s showing not that bad now, but it’s understandable that, although being very primitive, some American experts did compare it to a school, which is very stable and there is nothing you can do against it. It’s deadly wounded, in my view, but primitive organisms like cockroach, for example, you can decapitate cockroach, but it keeps alive for a month at least, and this is the case of Russian economy. So, in a long run, it is absolutely not sustainable, meaning that the regime, which is based on this political-economic model, should change somehow. And there are at least three different factors, which are responsible for the development of economy, with regard to the war.
One is, Western companies are leaving, and this is what the Yale report basically is about. It’s important, although not that much, and we do have different examples, how McDonald, for example, has been replaced by a Russian business, and so on.
The second is oil and gas, and these sanctions led to the increase of prices, and the money given to Russian budget increased, or is kept at the same level. But the third and the most important thing is connected with cutting off technological connections, cutting off technological chain, which makes Russian economy absolutely unsustainable.
We do have automobile sector, for example, which lost 70%, and it can hardly recover. In aviation, it’s absolutely the same, and the term has been coined “cannibalisation” of the fleet. So, all these Western planes, which are kept by Russia, can be disassembled in order to keep those remaining afloat, and it can last for two years, for three years, and there is the programme adopted recently that Russian industry should construct replacement for these planes. And it’s absolutely impossible to imagine that this programme can be realised. So, what we see now, we do have very positive reports about present state of affairs, which does reflect partly the real state of affairs, but partly it’s propaganda, and even the government does have internal reports, which are showing the picture in a different way.
And second, there are different programmes promising to replace Western spare parts and Western technologies pretty soon. But China isn’t ready, and in the trade with China, Russia have – has now huge prophecy. It sells much more resources, but China doesn’t sell Russia needed, well, technologies and spare parts and everything else, meaning that Russian economy cannot survive under these heavy sanctions, in the long run.
James Nixey
Yeah, absolutely, Kolai, thank you for that, and it’s a good job we’re having an entire session on the Russian economy in our 1st of December conference that I mentioned earlier.
Mathieu, I’m going to come to you last of all, this will be the last question of this overshadowed event. Mathieu, would you like to say a little bit in closing perhaps about the military and tech sectors, and the effect of the war on – Russia’s military and tech sectors, that is, of course, and then also, related to that, there’s a question from Julian Nundy, if you can, sort of, juggle, Mathieu, about Russia’s, you know, so-called superweapons and its modernisation, you know, billions that it’s spent, and yet Russia’s seen no real positive effect of this investment, so, what happened there? So, two very much related points there.
Mathieu Boulègue
So, did the billions go astray? Yes, of course they did. Thank you, Julian, for your question. I was about to jump on it actually and, sort of, link it to the military industry and tech sector, ‘cause I fully agree with what Kolai said, it is unsustainable. I mean, I think that there’s also the, sort of, unacknowledged willingness in Western countries to bring the Russian economy down to the Middle Ages, and to deny Russia the ability to contest asymmetrically by systematically targeting those very segments that are actually militarily an impediment to Western dominance: electronic warfare, which requires microelectronic components that Russia has a really hard time producing. Air defence systems, which require very nice and supple military logistics chains and production chains that Russia will no longer be able to sustain, not least because they will have a hard time buying the machine-building tools to sustain them and to increase capability.
Further to that, you can take those superweapons, for instance, that, Julian and you were mentioning, the Wunderwaffe or the, sort of, Death Star systems. So, they look good for PR purposes and, sort of, Great Power propaganda, but the problem with these systems, and they are completely the opposite of what Russia does best, quantity over quality. Here you really have good or semi-good quality that actually doesn’t come cheap, so, you can’t really lose them. The fear of losing them is more important than your ability to produce them, and to produce them well, so, you don’t really use those systems. So, yes, you deploy them on theatre, yes, you test them, but you don’t really use them, because you either don’t have enough, or your fear of losing it. So, this is also one of the problems.
Space industry similarly. Space-grade technology and space-grade material will be hard to come by in the future for Russia, which will contest increasingly its ability to leverage space warfare, or to leverage space-based destabilisation. Same for the cyber realm, in terms of computing power, big data analytics and so on, as more IT Engineers leave Russia, as the country is, sort of, emptied of its bone marrow of what it, you know, makes it a, sort of, parallel superpower in computing science, will also deny the ability of Russia to contest symmetrically and asymmetrically moving forward.
So, once again pretty much an unacknowledged policy from the West, but very much something that will bring back Russia to, sort of, yeah, sort of, the Middle Ages of the economy with no – you know, with less teeth than before, in terms of their ability to contest asymmetrically and symmetrically.
James Nixey
Quite extraordinary, Mathieu, and possibly some comfort to many, actually, so very interesting indeed. Ladies and gentlemen, it’s two minutes to the hour. I’m going to bring it to a close. I do hope – I see we’ve lost 70 people over the course of this meeting, it’s quite understandable. I do hope no-one’s offended by my carrying on in any way. I had to make a call; it’s my responsibility. So, let me say in closing, obviously, thank you to Kolai, Mathieu and Kasia for carrying on through and really giving us the benefit of their wisdom and their knowledge. We’ll get back to you, we’ll do more on this. There’s some great chat in there, which I didn’t get to, I’m sorry. I’m very sorry, ladies and gentlemen.
I will say one thing in closing, then, which is, I met the Queen about seven years ago, that’s the last time I met her, anyway, and she asked me what I did, and she said – and I said I did Russia, I worked on Russia, and she simply said to me, “Well, I bet that keeps you busy, doesn’t it?” That’s it. Ladies and gentlemen, have a restful evening, and goodnight, and God Save the King. Bye, bye.
