Vassilis Ntsouas
Hello and welcome, everyone, to this Chatham House members’ event. This webinar – my name is Vassilis Ntousas. I am the Stavros Niarchos Foundation Academy Fellow at Chatham House, hosted by the Europe Programme and today, we will try understand whether, and the extent to which, Europe can actually assist in rescuing multilateralism. This Monday, this week, the UN celebrated its 75th anniversary with a high-level event aimed at reminding everyone that multilateralism matters. And, of course, this was deemed a necessary reminder because the pervasive feeling is that multilateralism, virtually of all stripes, is at risk. This, despite the fact there is an urgent need for collective global responses, and this was illustrated in an almost visceral manner by the COVID-19 pandemic. But despite that, despite the need for common answers, the multilateral system is confronted with an almost existential crisis, affected by deep legitimacy issues, by machinery, a set of mechanics that are often out of sync with the global realities they’re meant to tackle, and of course, the fact that challenges to the system now originate not just from the system’s known antagonists, but also from former champions of it.
Now, against this backdrop, the EU, the European Union, has emerged probably as the most significant actor who is willing and able to stick its neck out for the system, and invest in not just defending it, but also reforming it. But, of course, the EU being a multilateral institution itself, is facing a defining choice about how to do this. How to do it well, efficiently, how to do it best, given the urgency of the situation.
Now, to answer a little bit of that very important question, I am really very happy to say that we have a very – we have a great panel of speakers joining us today. Our first speaker is Professor Patricia Clavin, who’s Professor of International History and a Fellow and Tutor in History at Jesus College at the University of Oxford. She’s written and she’s published extensively on the history of international and transnational relations in the 20th Century. She recently also published a history of the League of Nations, so she will be bringing in this more historical perspective.
Next, we have Dr Richard Gowan, who is the UN Director for the International Crisis Group, where he oversees ICG’s advocacy work at the UN. I trust and believe he’s joining us from New York, so perhaps he can give us a little bit of as taste of what is happening in New York during the General Assembly this week.
Our third speaker is joining us from Brussels, Dr Elena Lazarou works as a Policy Analyst at the European Parliament’s Research Service Institute since 2015, and she recently published a paper on precisely the topic that we will be focusing on today. And Elena is also an Associate Fellow with the US and Americas Programme at Chatham House, where she focuses more on Brazil and Latin America.
And last but not least we’re joined by Dr Daniela Schwarzer, who’s Director DGRP, the German Council on Foreign Relations, and previously, she held senior positions at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where she served as its Senior Director for Research, heading its Berlin office, but also its Europe Programme, and then prior to that at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the SWP.
Now, before starting with our conversation, I’d like to remind everyone that this event is on the record, we’re on the record, and please, indeed, you are encouraged to comment on Twitter using the #CHEvents. Let me also tell you that this event is part of a series of events that Chatham House is organising on the occasion of its centenary this year and is based on a recent article on The World Today. A link to the article I think will be shared with you shortly in the ‘Chat’ box. The article is the second in a series of articles published by the Europe Programme that look at key themes in European political discourse from the last century.
Final reminder, please submit questions throughout the event, but please do it, using the ‘Q&A’ function, and not the ‘Chat’ or the raise hand function. Of course, once we reach the Q&A section, we would like you to speak using your microphone. If you do not wish to speak, please indicate this when submitting your written question.
Now, onto the discussion. I think I’m going to start with Patricia. Patricia, there are plenty of observers out there who suggest that what we’re experiencing today, the crisis of the multilateral system, resembles, carries troubling echoes of the interwar period. So, I’d be curious to hear your thoughts on whether these analyses are accurate, and looking back to look ahead, I was wondering if you can tell us what lessons we can learn from the history of the League of Nations and beyond, that can be translated into more meaningful action about the current demands for institutional renewal. And of course, how can Europe apply those lessons correctly today? Patricia, the floor is yours.
Professor Patricia Clavin
Thank you. Thank you, Vassilis. So, I suppose my starting point, really, would be to remind everyone that though it’s 75 years for the UN, the other big centenary for Historians is it’s 100 years for the League of Nations, and the League of Nations is the founding institution, not just as a predecessor for the UN, but actually for a great range of non-governmental organisations at the same time, including Chatham House, so there’s a sort of network structure that blooms in the aftermath of the First World War. I think in terms of troubling echoes to the interwar period, there’s no doubt there are some, but I think there’s a danger of being too reductive about the way that we see the history of the 1920s and 1930s. I think, in the first place, it’s important to separate the two decades. There’s a tendency to jump straight into the aftermath of The Great Depression, because it’s true, we are still, I think, part of the way the current pandemic is affecting us and is reshaping or threatening the established multilateral order, is in the consequence of the 2008 financial crisis.
But the 1920s is, in some ways, a more useful way of thinking about the moment that we’re living in, and sometimes we think about that too much, in relation to the failure of the United States to support the international order after Wilson created the League of Nations and established the Fourteen Points. There’s also, though, the moment that, and this is, you know the more positive side, one might say, that the British, the French and the European powers stepped in and actually dominated the work of the League of Nations. So, really, it’s European states that found and run the League and establishes – established key norms, and also, practices that are foundational to the management of multilateral system and also international institutions. And so, that’s a kind of – the legacy that Europe has, of course it’s a global one, because partly the system is globalised through the imperial presence of those powers, and sometimes I think that’s part of the difficulty that Europe and indeed, the UN has also had, is coping with that imperial legacy for its work in a global setting, because we’re quite keen to forget our imperial history but, you know, that the presence of that lays very heavily in the world order.
But I think another way of understanding the problems of the 20s and 30s is to remember that what emerges – so, well, I’ll finish my point about the 1920s. The first thing is that actually the League of Nations is able to bring some level of stability to a very turbulent world of the 1920s. There’s actually wide-scale violence, disease, economic instability, in the first part of the 1920s, and the League is able to try and stabilise that and develop this institutional framework. The problem that emerges, during the course of the 20s and in the aftermath when The Great Depression hits, is what you have are rival attempts to create a different world order. So, there’s sometimes a tendency to imagine what we’re going through now is a people for or against globalism, for or against a global order of some kind.
I don’t think that’s the way to see what happens in the 30s. Germany, Japan, and Italy actually offer a different global order, and so, it’s partly that I think is one of the ways, it’s an insight of the 20s and 30s that helps us understand the world that we’re living in, and actually, those challenges were louder than the internationalism that lived on. So, I think the other thing to say is that co-operation, and technocratic co-operation particularly, continued throughout the 30s and 40s, and it’s that – those efforts to standardise and to have bureaucratic structures, and also, to incorporate non-governmental organisations, that lives on after 1945.
But that’s also a problematic history, which people who worked for the League recognised. They argued that one of the problems with the world after 1945, was there was a disjunction between the technocratic and scientific way of thinking about problems of stabilising multilateralism and dealing with shared global challenges, and the representative view of the public. And I suppose that’s, you know, to get to your second question about the lessons that we could learn, one of them was a core way that the League of Nations, in its founding, generated enormous international enthusiasm. It’s not just that Wilson cooks up this idea and it’s a good idea, that creates, you know the League of Nations in 1920. It’s actually that it speaks very strongly to people’s desire for peace and international solidarity around a set of centralist, centrist shared norms.
That’s different to the communist vision. This is a sort of capitalist vision, which is recognised by some people who are supporting it still, to be problematic, but that’s one of the insights. And I suppose the other one I would finish on, is that the big challenge that the League had, and in some ways the UN had too in its founding moment, was that it had to make very big claims about what it could achieve, in order to secure legitimacy and secure support, you know, they’re very, very grand claims about bringing peace, security, stability, prosperity, health, and so on, right across the range. And that, of course, is what people want, but it also becomes the measure by which those institutions are judged, and that seems to me to be a much higher bar, and to take the politics out, people who are working for them recognise it’s quite difficult to do that. So, I think I might stop there, if I may.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Just many thanks, Patricia. Just, but if you had to quantify it, would you – would it be accurate to say that the current system is facing a crisis, but we’re not there yet? Would that be an accurate description?
Professor Patricia Clavin
I think so. I mean, yes, you’re right, and I think it’s also to say that it’s important not to undervalue the interconnectedness of multilateralism and the role of small and middling powers. Those are the ones that made the multilateralist system, to some extent, work in the 1920s and 30s. The problem is that the divisions emerged quite strongly, not just about the failure of American leadership, but also between the British and the French and some other powers over economic and financial questions, and they struggle to co-ordinate and co-operate effectively in the face of, of actually, pretty effective diplomacy on Germany’s part. So, we’re not there yet, and it’s important to recognise, in some senses, that turbulence is part of what these – what the multilateralist system is there to cope with, it’s not about stability and then periods of instability. Instability, historically, seems to be there almost all of the time.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Right, many thanks Patricia, let me turn to Richard. You heard what Patricia said, and perhaps one can doubt we are very interconnected right now, but that doesn’t necessarily translate to more deeper co-operation. But since you are there, you are focusing on the UN, you know, and you know the politics around the UN quite well. The EU has often portrayed itself as an almost indispensable actor in this effort to renew and defend the system and uphold the values and its ethos, and so on and so forth. But is Europe really an indispensable force in this domain, as it likes to portray itself? And I suppose given that you are where you are, and given your deep knowledge of how sclerotic and cumbersome some of these discussions at UN level can be, would you be able to trace any tangible, any concrete areas where you do see the EU as the best example of a global actor to induce positive change? Richard?
Dr Richard Gowan
Okay, well, thank you very much for inviting me to the conversation. I think I’ll answer your question by [audio cuts out – 16:01] at the outset, which [audio cuts out – 16:03] in New York. Now, this is an unusual General Assembly week because leaders are not actually meeting in Manhattan, they’re sending messages via video. But yesterday was the big day and what did we see? Well, we saw President Trump give a seven-minute speech, an exceedingly short speech for a US President to the UN, which was mainly devoted to attacking China. And then, a little later, Xi Jinping gave a longer speech, I would guess about 20 minutes, which was very measured and was all about how China is investing more in the UN, and Xi offered, you know, new funds to the UN to fight COVID. And then, a little bit after that, the first big name European came on the screen, and that was President Macron on France, and he talked for 48 minutes, vastly longer than anyone else was speaking for, and that, I would say jokingly, captures the situation we have at the UN at the moment.
We have a US that is very spiky and is taking a very aggressive approach to multilateral diplomacy, and more specifically, sees the UN as a space where it needs to counter China, and that has become a dominant narrative, in US discussions of the UN, in recent years. You then have China looking for greater power and responsibility within the UN system, and here there is a difference to the 1930s because what we see is a rising power and a revisionist power in China, but one that actually wants to work within the main multilateral framework rather than walking away and setting up alternatives. And finally, you have the Europeans who talk a lot, and keep on telling us how much they like multilateralism. But you sometimes wonder whether they really do have quite as much significance to the UN as we would like to claim.
But having laid that out, I would actually say that I think that Europe remains an indispensable actor, genuinely, in the UN. But it has to decide whether it’s a supporting actor or a lead actor, and what do I mean by that? I think that for most of the post-Cold War period, Europeans and the EU as a block have seen themselves as leaders on many multilateral issues, and I think climate change is probably the most obvious example, but there are many others. And the EU is talking a lot about co-operation in the digital sphere right now. But the EU has always worked under the aegis of the US leadership in the UN and there’s always been a sense that while the EU leads on specific issues, the US is the overall hegemonic power in the multilateral situation. And what we’ve seen, in the last three and a half years, essentially since President Trump took office, is a fundamental challenge to that set of assumptions.
We’ve seen the US step back from its leadership role, sometimes explicitly, as in its decision to withdraw from the WHO, and sometimes more subtly, as in ignoring a lot of European diplomatic work on issues like Libya in the Security Council. And on the other hand, we have China, which is not yet a hegemon in the UN system by any means, China’s power at the UN is overrated, but it is an emerging leader and it does have ambitions to be a peer leader to the US in a multilateral system. And the question is, can Europeans continue doing good technical work, and this reminds me of what Patricia said about the technical aspect of multilateralism, can we keep on doing the good technical work, which we have kept doing, actually, even in the Trump era, in terms of promoting useful processes around climate change, promoting useful forums around COVID-19? If there is actually a big power battle going on above us between China and the US, or is there a way, and here I will stop because this is the existential question, is there a way for the Europeans to become a third pole, to actually be an equal to China and the US in multilateral debates? And I think that’s the question that is really facing individual European countries and the EU in New York and Geneva right now.
So that’s my main message, and I’ll just put in one footnote because this is Chatham House. We’re talking about Europe and the EU, of course we should mention Brexit. And here I just want to have a positive note, which is that actually at the UN, Brexit has had virtually no observable effect on UK-European co-operation. Most obviously on Iran and the current Iran sanctions’ debate, but much more generally, the Europeans and the Brits are working very well together in New York. There’s a specially good German and UK co-operation in the Security Council. That may not be indefinite, but it is one area where we don’t seem to have all the problems that are currently creating turbulence in the chat.
Vassilis Ntsouas
I was going to ask whether you included the UK, and we are Europeans, meaning British people and continental Europeans. But I’m also tempted, just to very sneakily to ask about the Internal Market Bill now. I know it’s unrelated to our discussion, but do you see any gravitas this could have, if it’s voted as is on the stature of British foreign policy going forward? And the complementarity between British foreign policy and European foreign policy going forward?
Dr Richard Gowan
I’m sure it would have effects in many areas, but Daniela and Elena will have a greater sense of how it will play out in Europe. I have to say that [audio cuts out – 22:29] come up as a real point of substance in discussions I’ve had in New York recently. Here, focus has much been – has much more been on in the Iran snapback issue. And everyone is, as I say, pleasantly surprised that when it comes to Iran, the UK has thrown in its lot very explicitly and very firmly with France and Germany to defend the Iranian nuclear deal against Trump, which was not something that Diplomats were certain would be the case, as recently as June and July.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Right, many thanks, Richard. Now, turning to Brussels and Elena, Elena, and given your work in Brussels and the sort of deep dive you take almost every day in the specifics and the minutiae of European foreign policy formation, I was just wondering if you could focus on the concrete tools, the modalities at the EU’s disposal, that the EU can use to close the gap between what Richard also indicated, the gap between its rhetoric and its actions. And if I also might add, also because, you know, because Richard mentioned it, you know, the tools and modalities at the EU’s disposal against the backdrop of this intensifying rivalry between the US and China. So, does it have the tools, does the EU have the tools, and does it have the room for manoeuvre to exercise them? Elena?
Dr Elena Lazarou
Thank you. Thank you, Vassilis, thank you very much for inviting me, I’m really honoured to be part of this panel. In fact, Richard really brought me to where I wanted to start, actually, because I think the big question about what the EU says and what it does, when it comes to multilateralism, is one that a lot of people are thinking about. And I wanted to start by saying the EU has been talking about being the major defender and proponent of multilateralism ever since its existence, it’s been in this older 2003 European Security Strategy, for whoever remembers, in the treaties, in the global strategy. So that is there. I think it’s undoubtable that in terms of rhetoric and what it propon – it is the biggest perhaps proponent of multilateralism today. But what I think has fundamentally changed, and I think we saw this very much in the State of the Union address – of the European Union address a few days ago, is that while before there was a sense that the EU was a proponent of multilateralism and the need – the present need was to defend and to reform multilateralism, I think now there is really a sense of an existential threat to multilateralism. I think President von der Leyen called it a creeping paralysis, but there is a sense that now is a moment where more action has to be taken.
At the same time, as Vassilis wrote in his article, and I think as Patricia also suggested, we have a renewed realisation of the fact that multilateralism is about its institutions, but at critical moments it’s also about the great powers behind that are part of it, and how they – their attitude to it. And the bigger question I think lying around this discussion is, is the EU a great power? And as such, will it have the capacity to influence the future of multilateralism?
So, with these sort of assumptions, my first point is that yes, I think the EU does have tools, and I’ll go into them in detail in a minute, and I also think that it has start to put those tools into place and into action. Not just recently after COVID, but for the past few years, arguably coinciding with the EU’s decision to sort of step up its identity as a foreign policy actor, its decision to be more strategically autonomous, and I’ll explain this in a minute. But where do these tools come from, because I think this is important when we think about what tools does the EU have in this sort of – in this effort to reform and to uphold multilateralism, I think part of the source of these tools is, of course, the treat – is the treaties, the EU’s own institutions and resources. But we also have to remember that this is foreign policy, so it’s also about the member states, their foreign policy resources, and their place in the world. So, it has to do both with the EU level, but also with its member states. And that’s important, I think, because the categ – to understand where these tools lie, and how they’re implemented, we also have to keep in mind that we’re talking about the EU and its member states.
Roughly speaking, and as I mentioned in the paper, and thank you for mentioning it, I think we have, sort of, five categories of ways in which the EU is mobilising its tools, or should mobilise its tools, or is attempting to, to sort of defend its vision of multilateralism. The first broader category I would call the – a more sort of co-ordinated and autonomous EU foreign policy, and this in itself has a lot of components. Of course, the most important component is getting the EU member states to agree amongst them on having solid and robust common positions on issues, which go on the multilateral agenda, and I’m sure Daniela will speak a lot about the internal dynamics of that.
But also, when we think about ongoing processes, the MPT review, global compacts on migration, a number of issues on the multilateral agenda, where we still don’t have all the EU member states on the same page. And I think there are various attempts right now to implement parts of the EU’s treaties that work towards this goal, that have remained underused. It’s important to remember as well that it’s part of treaty obligations for member states to represent EU interests in their multilateral engagement, including those which are part of the Security Council. But I think there’s a big emphasis on that, and this quite nuanced debate right now about co-ordinating EU foreign policy further is really part and parcel of whether the EU can really appear as a great power, as a power in this discussion about multilateralism. And of course, it has a lot to do with China and the US, because only a solid robust foreign policy of the EU would also be the advocate of a, sort of, common united front towards the US and China. We’ve seen that not all EU member states agree on the strategic outlook on China. We have different and more nuanced approaches of member states towards the US. So, I think, part of not being a card, but rather a player in the US-China-EU triangle is to have this very, sort of, unanimous and co-ordinated approaches to the two.
The second category of tools, which is of course important, is those related to trade, and to agreements with third countries and different types of partnerships. I think it’s no secret that trade is, perhaps, the EU’s strongest tool, being a trade block of significant importance. And here, I think as well, recognising that multilateralism is also about getting others onboard, its ability to promote an agenda on, for example, trade and climate, trade and health, now more recently there’s a new initiative on that, trade and human rights, all of these sort of issues and their inclusion in agreements with third parties, I think are a broad part of what can be done.
That leads to my third point, which is about partnering and partnerships, again, a tool that the EU has not only in trade, but in other areas as well. And I think there is a very pragmatic move towards strategic partnering rather than strategic partnerships at the moment, which means a recognition of the fact that multilateralism is multilevel. We’re not going to get everyone on the same board for the same type of issues, but definitely through partnerships with – issue-specific partnerships with partners, the EU has the possibility to build coalitions, which will support eventually a multilateral approach to issues. And I can mention here discussions recently on the highest level with Japan, Korea, and India on digital issues, or we have other countries, which commit to non-proliferation through agreements with the EU.
And then the final point, just quickly, I think leading by example is something that the EU needs to do, and there it has a lot of tools. Because it’s also about what the EU is doing internally to implement that which it advocates on the multilateral level. And here, for example, the implementation of the Green Deal, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda, which that’s advocating on the UN level. Data issues, refugee issues, burden-sharing issues, I think really the world is looking at the EU and thinking yes, it’s a proponent of multilateralism, but is it doing what it says inside? And I think this is really a big part of its tools, and its leverage, and its challenge. I’ll stop here.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks, Elena. So over to Daniela. Is this all enough? I’m asking this because, yeah, I’d be interested to hear your thoughts on the politics side of things, so the tools might be there dormant or asleep, but can the EU use them? What is the relationship between the internal multilateralism, the way discussions are held, and the way decision are made internally, and the external multilateral performance of the EU, of the block, in the various institutions, the various multilateral negotiations, normative processes and the like? You know, how can the block realistically aim to defend multilateralism, when its own divisions often prevent it from doing so and, for instance, Elena mentioned the Global Migration Compact was a non-binding agreement and, yeah, not all member states, you know, agreed to it and some actually voted against it? So, how to square the circle, essentially? Daniela?
Dr Daniela Schwarzer
Thank you for that question and thank you for having me on this great panel. So, I think a first answer to this very, sort of – to your question, which requires a complex answer, is the EU is or performs best, in those policy areas where competence has actually been transferred to the EU level. And Elena mentioned trade, and I think this is a clear example of where this works, as long as the member states manage to mandate the European Commission to negotiate, this usually works quite well. Of course, we have seen cases where internal domestic politics, and often a mandate was given, for instance, on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Agreement that was a big surprise because suddenly, we had very fierce domestic debates on whether this should happen or not. But generally, I think this is a very clear rule, once the EU has the competence to do something, this is sort of the best that can happen to the EU to act as a global actor.
Now, this is not only a question of building trade deals with others, but it’s really also the EU’s role in precisely the reform debate on the WTO. So, here, another problem emerges. The EU, or the European Commission, has proposed its own ideas how to reform the WTO, and very clearly taking into account the US criticism of the WTO. So, this was a very smart move in an era where the US President basically questions the mere existence of the WTO and thinks it’s not in the US interest to be within it, to pick up the criticism and then translate it into a reform proposal.
However, if on the other side of the Atlantic you have an administration that doesn’t even want to engage in the debate, at least from the White House, maybe the trade part of the government, you see that if your partners don’t want to work with you on a reform of institutions that in the end serves the interests of all, you can’t achieve much. So, I think the US is the key driver for Europeans and I’m not only thinking about Brussels, but really member governments, to question their approaches towards reforming multilateral institutions, and that means they have to position themselves on several issues.
One is, of course, who are the partners with whom we can either reform existing structures, or partners with whom we can build new multilateral approaches, and Elena said at some point sometimes very focused on certain policy issues. And here, as I said in Berlin, I’d like to briefly mention the German approach that this current government has launched, together with France, that is the alliance of multilateralists, which basically is a way to respond to the US withdrawal from the multilateral system, and to, say, we create a loose alliance. And Germany and France were the initiators, and they did this of course with European partners, but also with other international partners at the same time. But this is a hardly institutionalised alliance, so there’s no Secretariat, Germany or France don’t Chair it, it’s just a regular meeting, and by now, there are several thematic threads, which have led to certain agreements on particular issues.
Now, in my view, this is a way of working around the fact that we, in some cases, have very well-established large multilateral institutions, but we know that irrelevant places of this organisation, for instance of the UN Security Council, at this moment in time, you have players who don’t want to reach multilateral answers to a number of problems. It doesn’t mean general blocking, but at least, on some key issues, there’s no willingness to co-operate, so other ways need to be found.
It’s also an answer to the increasing systemic competition that we are perceiving, and so the expectation really is that we have to find a way to not only deal with partners who maybe don’t want to co-operate, but also, we have to start defending our own system. And so, the alliance of multilateralists, but also closer ties with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, an example with the US, it’s not [inaudible – 37:28] as it used to be, from a European perspective, it’s really becoming key.
Now, looking at the EU internal dynamics, of course it would be great if this pressure that is coming from the outside would translate into very far-sighted national approaches to EU policymaking. Basically, looking at the big picture and realising if we stand together, this is basically the only way how we can defend own interests. But the reality of course is that, in particular in foreign policy, but also co-operation on defence and security, the EU doesn’t have competence. So, the whole situation entirely relies on either the possibility to forge a consensus, or the willingness to move ahead in small groups.
Here, the Iran policy at the JCPOA is one of the key examples of the past years. On the flipside of this, we see at this moment the impossibility for the EU to agree on sanctions on the Belarus case, because of one country, kind of, taking this question hostage for a different conflict that is in our name.
So, I will close, because I am conscious of time, with a final observation on the challenges that the EU is facing. We are both at a moment in time where structures around us are changing quite rapidly, and power relationships are changing. So, trends that we’ve been discussing since the 1990s about power shifts from the West to East, etc., this is accelerating and what the EU stands for is a multilateral system, based on Western liberal nuance, and ideas of order. And so, the task is to really provide for solutions, let’s first look at our neighbourhood, where the EU can make offers at a moment in time where regulation and structures of order for some of the key topics that determine our future, are missing. And I would just briefly like to mention the Belt and Road Initiative, which is quite often seen from a political perspective, and from a sort of investment-trade perspective. But we can also look at it from an order perspective, because what is happening, in particular in the field of digital, is that China is slowly, but surely establishing certain norms and ways to deal with certain delicate issues, for instance with regards to data, in more and more countries moving closer to the European Union.
So, while we, at this point, are not in a position to take a global approach that is in the short-term successful, of course we have to look at this from a global perspective, but we see things changing on the ground, basically, while we speak. And so, in my view, the European Union needs to be far more proactive in picking up these issues and work on two areas, basically, the global level, but then also, in our neighbourhood with a more regional approach.
The same applies to security questions, I’m happy to discuss that further, but we have a huge issue not only with the European security order since the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and there’s a sort of ongoing conversation of how an EU order looks. But we have also created a situation through Europe’s absence and the US withdrawal from the Middle East, that on one hand, we have a key interest in stability in that region. But on the other hand, we are not a player at the table where structures of regional order are actually being negotiated or enforced through military means. So, the challenge is big and it’s as much about structures as it is about acute crisis management, always bearing in mind that the short-term crisis management in some way may prescribe the future approach to creating that global or regional structures for them. Thank you.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many, thanks, Daniela, and indeed, worth a point that is often missed in the analysis is the fact that, you know, if we talk of disorder, global disorder, that sometimes comes from a Western-centric perspective, because we might have more order than we would like, given that many powers, not least China, are engaging in power order shaping. So, many thanks, indeed.
Now, moving onto the ‘Q&A’ section, I think we have about 20 minutes, again, please continue submitting questions using the ‘Q&A’ function. We already have plenty, and please speak, using your mic, asking your question, and if possible, clarify the speaker the question is intended for, and if you do not wish to speak, please indicate this when submitting the written question. Let me start with a question by James Nixey, because I think it’s a very good segue to what Daniela was talking about. James, do you want to ask that question [pause]? Maybe I can ask the question on behalf of James and I think it’s an interesting question. So, James is asking if we could say something about the pros and cons of full inclusivity versus exclusivity, so, i.e. niche groups or clubs. Not so much in the UN which, as an institutional structure, inclusivity is pretty much a given, but in other multilateral organisations or settings. So, this idea of plurilaterals essentially is, you know, internal or external coalitions of the willing. I know it’s been touched upon, but given unity is very rare these days, I want your take on whether this could be a meaningful, impactful way forward, for the EU, but also for the multilateral order. Who wants to take this? Perhaps we – Daniela, go, please.
Dr Daniela Schwarzer
No, I think I was just sort of coming in…
Vassilis Ntsouas
Okay.
Dr Daniela Schwarzer
…to help out, but Richard also has touched on this topic.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Richard, why don’t you go first, yeah.
Dr Daniela Schwarzer
I think for maybe I’m looking down.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Okay, Daniela, you go, please, yes.
Dr Daniela Schwarzer
Thank you. For the EU as a multilateral system this is clearly a thing to do, and how is the big question here. So, there have been several examples, successful examples where initiatives by only a small group of countries led either then to a full EU-27 or former times-28 activity, and this was only then possible if the countries that started this initiative did it with, first of all, not too homogeneous starting positions, but really presenting a certain spectrum of views in the European Union. But then, not only showing total openness to integrate the others, but I also firmly believe that the closer then smaller groups of countries work through the EU institutions, the more likely it is that in the end, this brings about an EU position or even an EU policy. And so, I would always say of course, I mean, at a moment where large multilateral structures don’t deliver what we want them to, in the amount of time we need them to, it’s always good to have countries who work in small groups. But the institutional component and the moderating function of institutions, and an institutional frame where conflicts can be worked upon, and where you have support structures to actually help build a position and hold negotiations, that shouldn’t be neglected at all. So, you know, I wouldn’t argue that it is a promising way forward to basically the EU-27 aside, and just have Paris and Berlin and maybe London and so on, work on their own thing. But really continue to go back to the EU institutions because it makes it more credible, and more reliable for those countries who may not be in the inner circle on a certain position.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Richard?
Dr Richard Gowan
Yeah, I was going to make a similar point regarding the E3 versus the EU. Because sitting in New York and not just on Iran, what’s been striking, in the last couple of years, is that the E3 is gaining momentum as a format. Now we’ve seen the E3 engage on issues like North Korea, and this seems to be popular in Berlin, Paris, and London. Actually, that does, to some extent, come at the expense of the EU as a group in UN discussions. There is a sense that the big three prefer to work together, on an informal basis, rather than, sort of, prioritising the EU route, even for France and Germany. So, I think that is a tension that will need working out.
The other point I wanted to make is, we’re taking quite a Eurocentric approach to this discussion, but we should – I think we should be humble about the fact that other regions, and for example the African Union, are developing their own multilateral or regional structures and, in those cases, Europe has offered a lot of support. I think it benefits from working with organisations like the AU, but they won’t always start with our set of values and norms, and I think we’ve got to get used to that. So, sometimes, we have to realise that we’re on the outside orbiting other people’s regional clubs, but the existence of those clubs may still be broadly in Europe’s interest.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks, Richard. Patricia, you also wanted to say something.
Professor Patricia Clavin
I think Elena was before me, but I just added something into the Q&A chat, which was about the non-participation of, historically, the United States, though it wasn’t involved in anything before 1945 formally, it was involved in an awful lot of things. But I think the other thing, you know, historically that follows on from what Richard’s just said, is that it’s one of the things that I think historically was masked for so much of the 20th Century, when we think about it as an American century, is that it masked the loss of European pre-eminence that actually started to happen much sooner. But at the same time, there’s a limit, even for a state as powerful as the United States, when it comes to shaping the world in its own image, and I think that’s the other thing that history teaches us when it comes to hegemony, you know, it really, really has very big limits.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Right, many thanks. Just moving onto the next question, I like this question by Sas – Jasdev Rai, which essentially is about the – this moment in time where we find ourselves, which is that the US is deeply ambivalent as to whether the system it has long led actually facilitates or rather constrains its interests, and whether – and at the same time, Beijing is selective about the extent to which it is worth accommodating or abandoning the system in its current incarnation. So, Jasdev is asking “The US is frustrated, it can’t use UN to pushback rivals, China wants to fundamentally change UN towards a multilateral and multi-civilisation institution, so I guess the question is, where does the EU fit in, in this?” So, since this is a UN-specific question, perhaps, Richard, we’ll start with you.
Dr Richard Gowan
Sure. I mean, firstly, let me make a point about China. The rise of China in the UN, as I said at the outset, is a major phenomenon that is changing diplomacy throughout the UN system. But I sometimes think we fall into a trap of overestimating China’s strategic genius, and we sort of spend a lot time talking about how Chinese Diplomats think in generations, etc. Seen up close, they’re just like most other Diplomats, they get some things right, they get some things wrong. China’s main priority at the moment is trying to secure leadership posts in middling UN agencies, like the Food & Agriculture Organization.
Now, there was a big fuss when a Chinese national took over the FAO last year, against European opposition. But if anyone here could actually name any previous Heads of the FAO or tell us what the FAO does around the world, I would be impressed. And so, I think that we need to be realistic that a lot of the battles are not really existential, they are more about positions, power, technical priorities, just as they’ve always been.
But where does it leave the Europeans? What has interested me is that I feel that seeing China as a rising power and feeling concern about the position of the US, a growing number of countries do look to the Europeans as a reasonable third pole, that can be worked within the UN system or through structures like the alliance and multilateralism. And in the past the Europeans were, as Patricia suggested, often seen at the UN as, you know, slightly post-colonial, still stuck in the past, condescending towards other powers. I feel those accusations are gradually declining, and actually, the Europeans are seen as easier partners than the Chinese and the US, although, you know, some of that post-colonial baggage is still very much there in the picture.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks, Richard. Elena, do you want to come in?
Dr Elena Lazarou
Yes, thank you, and perhaps I’ll start by bringing in something I wanted to reply to the previous question on, but it fits in there. I think we have to acknowledge the fact that today, and I think it’s the first time in two decades, more than the – more than half of UN members are characterised as authoritarian regimes by those who evaluate the quality of democracy. So, that in itself, when you link it to this question about China and the US, is a worrying fact for those who still support multilateralism in the UN on the basis of key liberal values and, you know, non-relativist interpretations of human rights, etc. So, I think in this moment those countries do look to the EU to perhaps defend and promote a system of multilateralism or manage to reform and reinvigorate it in a way that will still manage to get a broad consensus on, on those basics. Because it is a very difficult moment, if you think about this issue with democracy. So, I think that’s one thing that the EU brings in, in this moment, especially with the doubts that exist about the US and its withdrawal from all the multilateral agreements that we all know about.
I think the second thing the UN – the EU is doing quite openly, I think, is trying to bring in a number of new issues that are – that new – that you create new structures within the UN to deal with them, and climate now is not that new anymore, but artificial intelligence is new, and the EU does have a strategy on that, and it is very much trying to bring this to the UN level. So, on these new issues, these new structures may reflect different dynamics and, in many ways, some of them are maybe less controversial. So, climate for example, under a new US administration may not be as controversial. We saw Xi Jinping yesterday commit to more climate goals. The EU does and imagining a US administration that would also be onboard, and that in itself would be very much an issue where you could see some multilateral co-operation going forward, with these three onboard.
So, I think that’s the double role of the EU right now, it’s sort of to remind and bring some value to these, these values that are now being contested or relativized like human rights and democracy. And on the other hand, to bring these new issues, which its own experience of technocratic co-operation on, and multilateral co-operation on may really prove of use, because looking to the future, it seems that we’re not rid of any of the traditional threats, if anything these past years, they’re all back with a vengeance, but the new ones are not gone either. So, these new issues, digital data, climate, biodiversity, I think there’s a clear role for the EU there, within the UN and within more plurilateral formats, which require plurilateralism in the first instance. So, for example, connectivity, that begins as a bi-regional project sometimes, EU-Asia, EU-Africa, and then you can take it to the global level. So, I think that’s where the EU fits in.
Vassilis Ntsouas
And many thanks, Elena, and I think the real question that comes out of what you just said is whether the EU would be willing to accept a less privileged position, in the new institutions that would be set up, or in the old institutions that will be reshaped as new power arrangements crystallised. I guess that’s a question for a different event. I would like to come to two questions by Richard Hart and John Mason, who essentially are asking the same thing. Richard, why don’t we start with that? Richard Hart?
Richard Hart
Yes, thank you, can you hear me speaking?
Vassilis Ntsouas
Yes.
Richard Hart
Great, thank you, I’ve mastered the technology. So, my question really is about the limit to which multilateralism and liberalism goes, and whether it needs to limit its ambition. And my point would be that Brexit was an example of us losing a member state from the European Union, and I wonder whether that was a case of multilateralism overstepping the mark, and actually threatening state sovereignty or certainly perceived by some of the member states. In which case, should we limit multilateralism and perhaps reign at a lower level and a return to something more like the EEC, given that trade has been so important in the discussion so far? Thank you.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks. Can I combine that with a question by John Mason, John? Okay, I’ll just read it because I think it’s a nice part.
John Mason
Can you hear me?
Vassilis Ntsouas
Yes, please, please.
John Mason
So, my question just to read it out, is, can multilateralism be saved in Europe by the emergence of more networked, decentralised European integration, and that more accurately represents local people and communities and their interests, and also just re prosperity more broadly?
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks. So, I guess we’re questioning how much elasticity can the EU afford to have internally, and whether more elasticity, in terms of unity is needed for the EU to be able to project its interests in a more respectful way? Daniela, since you spoke about more Brussels being oftentimes the best answer, so exclusive competence being the occasion with – in which the EU does perform best, maybe you can take that one?
Dr Daniela Schwarzer
Yes, very happy to do so. Now, the first question was, has the EU overstepped the limits of multilateralism, has it gone too far? And I think recent history has shown us for some yes, for others no. And the current political debate that I think is most interesting in that regard, is the question of how can we act in a sovereign way? And you will find some, and I would say the current UK Government would make that case, sovereignty is best located at the national level, and there’s something of a vision how an EU or former European country, let’s say of the size of the UK, can actually projects its power and pursue its interests alone in a world which it – in which it rebuilds its own relationships with partners. And then there are others, and I belong to those, who would argue that we have lost quite some sovereignty, for instance, in the area of technology, in the area of defence and security, and we can no longer solely rely on the alliances and basically, the degree of co-operation we have. And I would think that in particular in the realm of technology and defence, there’s a strong case to make to actually step up European co-operation to regain sovereignty together in a very rapidly changing world.
If you take – if I take one more example to illustrate my point, European integration has gone very far in particular for those countries who have decided to join the euro. Now, we have a shared currency, which complements the single market, but its international role is really not fully developed. So, I think the legitimate question here, and I would again say it’s best solved through a stronger European federalisation, is how can the euro can actu – how can the euro actually be used as a global currency, vis-à-vis the US dollar, in particular to strengthen Europe’s autonomy and sovereignty in the world. And I don’t believe, you know, looking at Germany, which is the largest economy of the EU as it stands today, I don’t really think Germany alone had a chance if we left the single market, if we left the currency union, if we said, look, everything, in terms of defence and foreign policy, is just our own, that we would be able to pursue our national interests and have the stability we need around us, if we left the EU. So, I do dare say we are better off if we actually stay together and look at global power shifts, and look at new threats and challenges, and find ways to pursue our policies in a European way.
But that does not mean everything has to be European and I have found this at the point of the second speaker very, very important. Basically, the internal diffusion of power and the question of how can we strengthen not necessarily the national level, but really the regional or local levels, for some areas where the EU simply, you know, has nothing much to add, and I think this is one of the questions that will gain importance. It’s a question of problem-solving, not only by local and regional governments but increasingly also by the involvement of civil society, I think that’s really the way forward, and it may actually not only lead to a rethink of governance internally, but it can also be guiding our thinking about our external policies and our foreign policy. Because what we realise is, for instance, if we take the climate issue and we think of a Trump two-term, Europe will not be working with the US administration on global climate policy. We’ll be working with Governors, with Mayors of large cities, we’ll be working with NGOs, and CEOs of large companies, who are ready to implement the climate goals, and that may actually bring us to the same result. So, this is also a hopeful message, really, you know, to think about where are the actors, in particular given the new challenges in health, climate, tech, that are willing contribute to governance, but based on the norms that Europe stands for, which are basically liberal, Western, democratic values.
Vassilis Ntsouas
And many thanks, Daniela. Elena, I understand you have to leave, so do you want to go next?
Dr Elena Lazarou
Oh well, I wasn’t going to comment on the Brexit question, I think Daniela has covered, but I did want to comment on the global cities as well, because I actually had it in my initial point, I just didn’t have enough time and I definitely think that beyond everything else, the new multilateralism, if we can call it that, will be multi-stakeholder and that includes the local cities. You mentioned my Brazil affiliation, and cities like Sao Paolo, major G20 cities, are cities of – that have – carry with them a lot of diplomatic weight, in terms of global diplomacy on the cities’ level in various areas. So, yes, I think this is something that the EU should be working on, thinking for the future, and I was – it was one of the reasons why there was a hope the Conference on the Future of Europe would take place in person, because I think there was a plan to have a big representation of local authorities. So, I definitely am onboard with Daniela on this. And thank you very much, I take this opportunity to thank you for the invitation again.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks, Elena, many thanks, Daniela. Certainly, harnessing subnational diplomacy should be a key priority for the EU going forward, ‘cause we need to remember that it’s not just about those able and willing, but those relevant in each policy domain and I’m talking about partnerships.
Now, perhaps one last question addressed to Patricia and Richard, which is the question by Trisha de Borchgrave, and I might have grossly mispronounced that.
Trisha de Borchgrave
Hello, can you hear me?
Vassilis Ntsouas
Yes.
Trisha de Borchgrave
Yeah, don’t worry about the name. I wanted just to ask, going back to Patricia’s point, which I thought was really interesting in terms of the League of Nations and the beginning of the UN agenda, which really had these huge global claims that you were talking about, which was part of the, sort of, the founding flaw of these multilateral institutions, you know, asking perhaps too much, being too ambitious. And I’m wondering whether that’s the same case with the SDGs today, because it is a huge ambition, and what I think is interesting is that if you’re in parts of Asia, the average Asian citizen knows what an SDG is, and their governments are quite closely aligned to SDGs and they’ve made it almost part of their ideology, in some ways. But in Europe, it’s pretty much absent, you know, I’m not saying among you and among people who listen to these kinds of discussions or are involved in them, but the average person in the street has no idea what an SDG is. So, could Patricia maybe address that? Are we sort of inherently flawed? I find them very inspiring and, I think, you know, one should, but are they flawed in their ambition, and also to get there by 2030? Thank you very much.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks. Patricia, before you answer, I have to excuse Elena and Daniela because I understand they have to leave, we’ve run a little bit over. So, Patricia, why don’t you go and then a last jab by Richard, perhaps, just to finish this off, whether the UN is currently over-promising and under-delivering. But Patricia, first, over to you.
Professor Patricia Clavin
Well I think historically, part of the challenge is that it spoke to people’s desire to build the world anew after two major wars. I mean, that’s where you have the founding charters for both of these two institutions, and actually, some of that rhetoric came from the ground up, that’s what makes it, especially in 1919, a very exciting moment for Historians to look at, is that the very grand claims of things like the desire for self-determination. So, I think you’re right on the one hand, these things are inspiring, and they inspire particular actors and individuals who take on a historic importance and commitment, but they also, in some senses, imperil the organisation because they’re almost designed to fail from the start. But I think it’s recognising the way that you’ve put it, really, that it’s aspirational and it’s – but it is used rhetorically by the opponent of those organisations to say, well, they haven’t achieved these things.
All of these things are – have political elements to them, and they carry risks, as well as reward, I think. I mean, Richard can probably speak more specifically to that, but certainly, you know, taking your point about this, in relation to the way that states line up, this is where decolonisation comes from. It’s the commitment to self-determination and the way that the permanent mandates’ commission of the League starts to ask more probing questions about the nature of imperial governance, not really intending to get rid of it, but rather to improve it, that ultimately proves the undoing or, is one of the key elements, in the undoing of the system. Because it globalises a language of rights that generates a much more – well, a decolonised world order, organised around the primacy of the nation state. Thanks for the question, Trisha
Vassilis Ntsouas
Patricia, many thanks. Richard? And perhaps, as a last point, Borrell, the High Representative, tweeted yesterday in, yeah, a key quote from an Op Ed he wrote that “Phrases of multilateral system, the rules-based international order, seem vague and lack ring of American – America First, or take back control.” So, they lack emotion. So, I guess if you can factor that lack of emotion, you know, when you assess these efforts to actually save the system going forward.
Dr Richard Gowan
Sure, let – and two points and, firstly, in response to Richard Hart’s question, although I think he may have dropped off. You know, I would just always be a little cautious, when one praises sovereignty in multilateral institutions, because the problem is that it is one thing, whether you’re for or against it, for the UK to reclaim sovereignty, but we don’t always necessarily like it when China asserts its sovereignty over Hong Kong, for example. And so, we’ve got to recognise that the stronger we are in favour of sovereignty, the more we have to recognise that other people will do stuff with sovereignty that we don’t like, and to some extent, we may have to accept that.
In response to Trisha’s question, firstly, I mean, look, the SDGs I think are inspiring in many ways. It’s a very, very ambitious agenda for the UN. But I think most people would recognise that in communication terms, the SDG package is too expansive, and it contains too many details and targets to be easily understandable. And that is why I think that it has not always resonated, you know, in perhaps Europe or indeed the US. Nonetheless, I was very struck, watching the General Assembly yesterday, that President Ramaphosa of South Africa did a really great job, and you should try and find his speech, framing some of the key points in the SDGs, especially the fight against extreme poverty, as being central to the response to COVID. And I think COVID is going to shake up a lot of our working processes, across multilateral institutions, the post-COVID recession is really going to challenge a lot of what the UN is doing, and I think it will be possible to perhaps repackage key points from the SDGs and other international agreements, as part of a COVID response, and António Guterres is thinking very hard about that. At the end of the day, to finish, does the UN overpromise and underdeliver? Yes, of course it does. But I still think there’s probably an argument for a UN that overpromises and underdelivers rather than a UN that underpromises and then will probably still underdeliver.
Vassilis Ntsouas
Many thanks Richard, excellent way to close the discussion. Many thanks to all speakers, for their expertise and insights, it was really a very nice discussion. It’s a huge topic, and unfortunately, I’m afraid it will continue being under the spotlight until we reach that new order, when the new power arrangements have crystallised. I would also like to thank all participants for their active engagement, and of course, I would also like to thank the Members’ Events team, and my colleague, Amrit, for their assistance in organising the event. Have an excellent afternoon. Many thanks, indeed.
