Aston Horton
Hi, everyone, good evening, everyone. Welcome, thank you so much for joining us tonight. This is a Common Futures Conversations webinar on the Just Green Transition. My name is Aston Horton, and I’m a member of the CFC community. I’m from the US, but a dual citizen with the UK, and currently based in France, studying a master’s in Global Energy Transition and Governance.
Common Futures Conversations is a Chatham House Centenary project, centred on bringing together young people from Africa and Europe to develop their knowledge of the most pressing current issues. The aim is to give young people a seat at the table in important policy discussions. The CFC community conducts three-month policy design cycles, where we engage with special topics – or specific topics and experts, to develop our knowledge of the policy area, before writing our own policy solutions to address challenges and opportunities that we have identified.
This event that we’re hosting right now is the culmination of the community’s engagement with the just green energy transition. This was a particularly timely discussion following COP28 and the Global Stocktake, which recognised that fossil fuels are causing global warming, despite decades of warnings from Scientists. The CFC community is keen to keep this discussion moving forward and help steer policy in a way that will help the world achieve an energy transition that is sustainable and just.
I would like to extend a special welcome to members of the Common Futures community, comer – Common Futures Conversations community, as well as Chatham House members who are joining us for this event. I would also like to join – welcome everyone else throughout our external communities who are joining us for this event, or joining us today. Thank you for your participation. Just a few housekeeping rules before we get started. First of all, this event is being recorded and is not being held under the Chatham House Rule. This event is a webinar, and all attendees will be muted throughout, but you will be able to use the Q&A function to ask questions throughout the event. At the end, we’ll have a dedicated QA time, at which point you may raise your hand if you would like to ask a question out loud. If you are selected to ask a question, you will be granted the ability to unmute yourself. We will try to get as many questions as possible at the end of the event.
I’ll briefly introduce our esteemed speaker, before handing it over to him for his opening remarks. Dr Fadhel Kaboub is an Associate Professor of Economics at Denison University, though is currently on leave, and he is the President of the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity. He is also a member of the Independent Expert Group on Just Transition and Development, an expert group member with the International Tax – Task Force, and serves as a Senior Advisor with Power Shift Africa, which is why he is currently based in Addis Ababa. He has recently served as Under-Secretary-General for Financing for Development at the Organisation of Southern Co-operation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Dr Kaboub is an expert on designing public policies to enhance monetary and economic sovereignty in the Global South, promote resilience and promote equitable and sustainable prosperity. His recent work focuses on just transition, climate finance and transforming the global trade finance and investment architecture. His most recent co-authored publication is “Just Transition: A Climate, Energy and Development Vision for Africa.” He is currently based in Nairobi, Kenya, sorry, where he is working in climate finance and development policies there. Welcome, Dr Kaboub, over to you.
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Thank you, good evening, good afternoon, good morning, everyone, wherever you are following us from. Thank you for the kind introduction and for the invitation. So, I’ll limit my remarks to about ten to 15 minutes, and I’ll focus on our theme today, which is “Just Transition.” And I’ll start by highlighting this report that you just mentioned there, Aston, which we will drop in the chat for the participants. It’s called “The Just Transition Report,” and it’s published by the Independent Expert Group on Just Transition and Development, which was a group of experts convened by Dr Youba Sokona, who is the former Vice-Chair of the IPCC, from Mali. And what we tried to do in this report is put forward a long-term, coherent, comprehensive vision that simultaneously links climate, development and energy policies. And it’s written from an African perspective, but you could easily make the argument that what we’re presenting really represents a Global South perspective, broadly speaking.
And one of the things that I – one of the phrases I usually use to describe what we try to deliver in that report is the following, which is, “We can’t decarbonise a system that hasn’t been structurally and economically decolonised yet.” And what I mean by that is that the Global South, in general, and Africa in particular, has been assigned a particular role in the global economy during colonial times, and that role has been reinforced in the post-colonial era. And what we argue is that we cannot move forward under a just transition framework if we keep the Global South, and Africa in particular, playing that particular colonial role.
So, that role can be summarised in three major points. Number one, we were supposed to be the place for cheap raw materials for the industrialised world. Number two, we’re supposed to be the consumers of industrial output in our large consumer market, industrial output from the Global North. And number three, and most importantly, we’re supposed to be the place where obsolete technologies, assembly line manufacturing and this no longer needed in the Global North, is outsourced to us under the label of “development and co-operation and job creation,” but effectively, what it does is that it locks us at the bottom of the global value chain permanently.
So, these three colonial roles, you can clearly, you know, review the history of the last 60 to 70 years and recognise that Africa continues to play that role, and our argument is that a just transition cannot keep the same colonial structures, extractive structures. And I’ll give you one data point to illustrate how bad this extractive system is. If you divide the world into Global North and Global South, and net out all global financial transactions, that is foreign direct investment, exports, imports, remittances from workers, even illicit financial flows, interest payment, even debt relief and climate finance included, all financial flows, the net amount, the last datapoint we have is $2 trillion moving from the Global South to the Global North. That is money moving in the wrong direction.
Now, put that number side by side with all of our great efforts on the climate finance front. You have $100 billion promised, you know, from more than 15 years ago and never delivered, and whatever was delivered was loans, actually, 80% of it was loans. Then you have the Green Climate fund, the last replenishment of the Green Climate Fund barely reached $12 billion. And then, more recently, you have, of course, the Loss and Damage Fund, which was created at COP28 in Dubai, and the pledges that we have are $700 million, with an “m,” not with a “b,” not with a “t.”
So, at that rate, you know, we’re not going to decarbonise anything, and we’re not going to transform the colonial role and the extractive nature of the global economic architecture. So, when I say. “global economic architecture,” it’s the financial architecture, that’s the World Bank and the IMF, it’s the international trade and investment architecture, that’s the WTO, primarily, and it’s the international taxation architecture, which for a long time, has been in the hands of the OECD countries, until last November, with a UN vote to move the tax system, finally, into a US tax convention with one country, one vote. So, that’s the global economic architecture, that was not designed by us, not designed for us, so why are we surprised when we see a global economic architecture that’s producing colonial extractive results? So, that’s transformation of the global economic architecture is a prerequisite for a just transition.
And then I’ll zoom in, very quickly, on the African continent and zoom in on particular structures, three major structural deficiencies that must be transformed in the process of a just transition and the process of decarbonisation. So, when you look at the $2 trillion number of money flowing in the wrong direction, that extraction of wealth from the Global South, you zoom in and you realise that it can be traced to three major structural deficiencies, number one, energy deficits, number two, food deficits, and, number three, manufacturing deficits. There are other structures, of course, but these are the main ones.
When I say, “energy deficits” in the African continent, I actually include our biggest oil exporter on the continent, Nigeria. Nigeria today is energy insecure, energy poor. Nigeria today imports 100% of its gasoline, 100%. Our second largest exporter of oil on the continent, Angola, imports 80% of its fuel from international markets, and that is not by accident, that is by design. Number two, when I say, “food deficits,” according to the latest report from UNCTAD, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, Africa today imports 85% of its food, when less than 100 years ago, we used to be the bread basket for colonial powers. How did that happen? Again, not by accident, by design. It’s the rules of international trade that, you know, produced heavy agricultural subsidies in a few countries in the Global North and therefore, forced our Farmers essentially, out of competition when it comes to producing the core food items, the core food sovereignty items, wheat, rice, corn, barley and so on. So, we end up with the system where we produce what we don’t consume, and we consume that we don’t produce.
I’ll give you one quick example to illustrate. Ethiopia today is a country that has – I think the third largest export item is flowers, cut flowers, you know, cash crops essentially, flowers for Valentine’s. At the same time, Ethiopia today has 20 million people who are dependent on food aid from abroad, and it’s not unique to Ethiopia, of course. So, the transformation of the agricultural system to force us to specialise in cash crop production, coffee, tea, tobacco, fruits, leafy greens and cut flowers for exports, and we depend heavily on our imports of wheat, rice, corn and so on. So, that’s the food deficit.
Number three, manufacturing deficits, whereby the kind of manufacturing that we were allowed to have in Africa, in the Global South, is the kind – and I underline “allowed to have,” we can come back to that in the Q&A session, is the kind of manufacturing where you have to import the machines, you have to import the fuel to power the factories, we have to import the intermediate components to assemble with low cost labour, and we even have to import the packaging. So, you end up with an industrial manufacturing base that exports low value-added content and import high value added content. So, that’s a structural trap, so you can double, triple, quadruple your exports. You’re still locked at the bottom of the global value chain.
So, take these three structural deficits, food deficits, energy deficits, and of course, no country can function without food, without energy, right? Food deficits, energy deficits and manufacturing deficits, you have a structural trade deficit year after year, decade after decade, and a structural trade deficit weakens the value of your currency relative to the dollar, relative to the Euro. With the weaker currency, anything I import the next morning, food, fuel, medicine, you import it at a premium, you import it at a higher real cost. So, we literally import inflation in the most sensitive areas of the economy, food, fuel, and so on. So, that means our governments immediately have to move into a defensive mode, looking for immediate Band-Aid solutions to protect the most vulnerable from this imported inflation. So, what do we do? We subsidise food, we subsidise fuel, and that is a necessary, immediate mandate solution, but it can’t be sustained for 70/80 years.
Number two, our governments also ask their central banks to, “Please do your best to stabilise the exchange rate, defend the exchange rate,” stop the bleeding essentially, and the Band-Aid solution that Central Bankers do is borrow more dollars, and that starts to feed into the external debt cycle. And as soon as you have external debt, you completely rewire your economy to prioritise economic activity that will allow you to earn dollars and Euros as quickly as possible, and hence, the extractivism starts to accelerate, because that’s the fastest way to do it. And you start neglecting the foundations of economic development and prosperity, health, education, infrastructure and so on.
Now, the good news about these structural deficiencies, once we’ve identified them, is that the solution is right there, staring us at the face. The solution is to invest in food sovereignty and agroecology. The solution is to invest in renewable energy sovereignty, which is our biggest potential. According to the International Energy Agency, Africa by 2040, that’s the day after tomorrow on the clock, by 2040, with existing technology, not with future innovation, can produce 1,000 times its energy needs, 1,000 times. So, that is transforming the continent into not just an energy powerhouse but an economic global powerhouse.
And, number three, strategic investments in a different kind of manufacturing base, that is pan-African industrialisation to produce high value-added content not low add – low value-added content. Starting with basic priorities, we don’t want to manufacture everything, we want to manufacture the building blocks of development of prosperity, starting with producing the renewable energy infrastructure. Using the strategic minerals that we have on the continent, using the economies of scale that we have on the continent, to manufacture and deploy renewable energy infrastructure, to deliver electricity to the 650 million people who have no access to electricity today, not to prioritise exporting green electricity to Europe. Of course, we can export the surplus.
Number two, manufacturing and deploying clean cooking infrastructure for the almost one billion who are inhaling toxic fumes on a daily basis, because of lack of clean cooking infrastructure, of course, that’s mostly women and children. And number three, manufacturing and deploying the clean transportation infrastructure to link our economy, to build the foundations of the logistics of transportation. Of course, we’re not talking about everybody with their Tesla battery attached to their back, we’re talking about public transportation, high-speed rail, that’s the potential that we have, again, on this continent.
So, the good news about these structural transformation type of solutions, they’re not only solutions to the external debt trap, they’re not only a solution to the colonial structural traps that we still struggle with, but they, coincidentally, happen to be climate solutions, climate adaptation solutions. So, it’s a win-win, so when we talk about “climate finance negotiations,” going to COP, going to Bonn in the next couple of weeks, we’re talking about channelling climate finance strategically, in transformative ways, rather than channelling climate finance to continue the economic entrapment that we struggled with in the past.
So, the question becomes, you know, what is this climate finance? Does it come in the form of loans or grants? Does it come in the form of transfer of lifesaving technology, or does it come in the form of foreign direct investment that is extractive, right? These are the serious conversations we need to have when it comes to climate finance. Unfortunately, the dominant discussions about climate finance tend to be market-based solutions, derisking foreign direct investment, and things that don’t really have that transformative firepower that we’re talking about. That decolonisation of those economic structure, that becomes the prerequisite for this decarbonisation that we’re seeking. And I’ll leave it at that and I’m happy to answer any questions. Thank you, again.
Aston Horton
Well, thank you for those fascinating remarks, Dr Kaboub. I’m looking forward to digging into those more in the Q&A section, but in the meantime, I would now like to invite the members of the CFC community to present their policy ideas on the just green transition. These solutions were written in response to the prompt, “How do we achieve an energy transition that is just and sustainable?” The solutions that you will hear were the proposals that received the most votes from the CFC community. I’ll invite each community member to pitch their proposal for about five minutes before turning to our expert, Dr Kaboub, to provide brief feedback.
First up, we’ll hear from Daniel Gumbwa Bvalamwendo, a CFC member from Malawi. Daniel will be presenting his idea on climate resilience partnerships between Africa and Europe, very topical, considering the purview of our CFC community. Over to you, Daniel.
Daniel Gumbwa Bvalamwendo
Ah, thank you so much, Aston. My name is Daniel Gumbwa Bvalamwendo from Malawi. So, I will share my screen for my proposal [pause]. Hmmm. So, given our limited time today, I will ignore the usual protocols and dive straight into the presentation, my proposal for “Advancing Climate Resilience Partnerships in Africa and Europe.” As we all know, climate change is a pressing global issue that requires collective action. This proposal is built upon the successful collaboration between the African Union and the European Union in the COP26 Glasgow Climate Pact, aiming to further climate resilience efforts and foster community-based adaptation initiatives. Our focus is on achieving a just green transition, ensuring that benefits of climate action are equitably shared and that vulnerable communities are protected [pause].
The primary objective is to strengthen climate resilience in vulnerable regions of Africa and Europe by establishing collaborative partnerships between governments, non-governmental organisations, local communities and international stakeholders. The proposal consists of five key components. Stakeholder engagement, uniting all relevant stakeholders is crucial for sharing knowledge and expertise and the associated efficiency and effectiveness. For example, The African Climate Change Partnership brings together governments, NGOs and other communities to address the climate change challenges in Africa.
Point number two, knowledge sharing and community – and capacity building. Developing a comprehensive knowledge management system is essential for COP and best practice and in a very short time span around the world.
Point number three, funding mechanism. Establishing diverse funding source is crucial to support a wide range of climate resilience projects and initiatives. This will be achieved through the establishment of climate resilience plans and creation of public-private partnerships and the mobilisation of international [inaudible – 21:00] ecosystem-based adaptation.
Promoting ecosystem-based adaptations is vital for protecting and restoring the natural ecosystems while enhancing biodiversity, monitoring and evaluation. Implementing a robust monitoring and evaluation system requires tracking the progress and effectiveness of climate resilience projects. For example, the Malawi National Commission of – for Science and Technology tracks climate change impact and adaptation efforts in Malawi, while the European Environment Agency monitors climate change progress in Europe.
To implement this proposal, we will initiate pilot projects, like the Green Belt Movement in Africa which empowers local communities to take charge of their environment. We will organise multi-stakeholder workshops like the African Climate Change Conference, which brings together stakeholders to share knowledge and achieve best practices. Advocate for supportive policy frameworks like the European Union [inaudible – 22:18]. We will also establish this by establishing knowledge exchange platforms like the African-Europe Climate…
Aston Horton
It – Daniel, sorry, it’s a little hard to hear you. Could you –sorry, when you direct a little bit more to the right, it’s a little bit hard to hear you. Could you direct a bit more towards the…?
Daniel Gumbwa Bvalamwendo
Alright.
Aston Horton
Sorry, just having trouble hearing.
Daniel Gumbwa Bvalamwendo
So, on the point number five, scale-up successful pilot projects and replicate best practices, such as, the European Union Climate Resilience Infrastructure Initiative. We anticipate potential pushback from fossil fuel interests, nationalist governments and concerns about intellectual property rights. However, we believe that collaborative efforts and community-based adaptation approaches can overcome these challenges, for example, the Africa Renewable Energy Alliance promotes renewable energy solutions, while the European Renewable Energy Federation advocates for policy support [pause].
Measuring success. We will measure success through integration of climate resilience into national policies, encouraging African and European countries to integrate climate resilience strategies into the national policies and funding frameworks. Point number two, increase use of renewable energy sources. By promoting the adoption of renewable energy projects, such as solar and wind, in both Africa and Europe, we will track the increase in renewable energy capacity restored and the reduction in reliance on fossil fuels as indicators of success. Economic impact and job creation, creating green jobs and stimulating economic growth through [audio cuts out – 24:35] climate resilience projects.
In conclusion, I urge all you to join forces in advancing climate resilience partnerships in Africa and Europe. Together, we can build a more resilient and sustainable future for current and future generations. Let’s learn from our existing initiatives and scale-up our efforts to – let’s learn from our existing initiatives and scale-up our efforts to address climate resilience, particularly as we prepare for COP29. Alright, thank you so much. That’s all I have to present for today. Yeah, thank you.
Aston Horton
Good, thank you, Daniel. Dr Kaboub, any brief response to this policy proposal?
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Thank you, Daniel. It was a very thoughtful presentation and very thoughtful framing for, you know, how co-operation between the African and European continent can really deliver that kind of change. However, my comment is on the political, or I should say geopolitical, reality that we operate in, that we’ve operated in for a long time. And I’ll give you this because this is really something that I’m very passionate about, and you underlined it especially when you mentioned concerns about intellectual property rights, and when we talk about “transfer of technology,” that is really what we’re talking about.
Now, the way I frame it, so that we go straight to, you know, why transfer of technology, lifesaving technology, right, not all technology, is so crucial to these issues, it’s because we have a very simple principle. The idea that certain countries have exceeded their carbon budget, and other countries, the African continent in particular, we barely, you know, used 4% in our emissions, collectively, historic emissions, less than 4% of global emissions. So, there’s a – there’s the idea here of a climate debt, right? If you are in deficit, if you’ve overused your budget, right, you’ve exceeded your budget, you owe a debt, and that debt is owed to the countries that haven’t developed, haven’t exceeded their carbon budget.
So, the debt payment should come in the form – in the context of climate debt, should come in three forms, each according to ability, we should say, right? So, some countries can contribute in terms of debt payment by cancelling debt to the African continent. Some countries have financial resources, they have fiscal policy space, so they can contribute with grants that are channelled towards that structural transformation that I talked about. And that’s where co-operation comes in, of course, as you laid out in your presentation.
And the third form in which you can contribute to paying this climate debt, and contribute via co-operation, as you laid out, is by transfer of technology, and here’s the beauty of this. The beauty of this is that the key transformative sectors that we need on the continent, let’s say, renewable energy to start, and clean transportation, we actually, as a continent, have all the raw materials needed to manufacture and deploy renewable energy infrastructure. We have the economies of scale, which is what you need for manufacturing for industrial policy. What we lack is access to the technology, to actually manufacture and deploy the solar and wind and the entire value chain. And this is, coincidentally, the technology that is available in Europe, right? So, the partnership that you talk about has this massive potential to truly decolonise the African continent.
Now, with all the work that I’ve done and conversations I’ve had, especially behind closed door, candid conversations off the record, with senior officials in the OECD, the conclusion of these conversations is the following, “Nobody in the Global South is allowed to industrialise without our approval.” Because this is a question of power, it’s been a question of power since colonial times, and it’s even more important today. Because imagine Africa’s potential to produce 1,000 times its energy needs, and to have – to make essentially, OPEC look like child’s play in the energy system, right? Imagine the potential economic and geopolitical influence that the African continent can have. That is a real threat to the existing hierarchy of economic and geopolitical structures.
So, we have to completely recognise this, put it on the table, call it out and have candid conversations. Are we serious about a just transition? Are we serious about development in Africa? Are we serious about partnership? Because if we’re not, then the only thing remaining is the continuity of this economic entrapment and extractivism. And once we have a clear conversation about what needs to be done and the kind of partnership, then your proposal is exactly what needs to happen. It’s North-South, South-North, South-South co-operation on key areas that will deliver the just transition. And of course, the just energy transition on the African continent will deliver the massive energy surplus that is needed for Europe’s energy security, so it’s a win-win, but we’ve got to be very clear about how we get there. Thank you.
Aston Horton
Thank you so much, Dr Kaboub, and thank you, Daniel. So, onto our next presentation. We have Nour Mohamed, a CFC member from Egypt, who will be discussing her policy idea on a “Multi-stakeholder Intergenerational Platform to Achieve a Just Transition.” Over to you, Nour.
Nour Mohamed
Thank you so much, Aston. I’ll also be sharing my screen. Alright [pause]. Can everybody see my screen? Great. Yeah? Good, all good. Alright, perfect. Alright, so, this is the “Multi-stakeholder Intergenerational Platform for a Just Green Transition.” And before talking about what is this platform, I need first, to talk about the problem, because the first step to tackle every challenge, or every – to come up with a solution is to understand the problem. So, let me start with a question. Please drop an emoji in a chat – the chat box or in the Q&A box if you have ever felt the frustration of not being able to reach a policymaker or a decisionmaker, either in your country or globally, especially when it comes to issues related to the just transition or the climate crisis. I’ll give you a couple of seconds. Okay, there’s one.
Alright, I personally have felt that kind of frustration a lot, and I’ve shared that kind of frustration with a lot of young people, be it on the local level or at the international level. Because even when I escaped the lack of challen – channel when it comes to, like, the national level, and went to the global conferences, I found no meaningful space for young people or the people who are really affected by the climate crisis, like, women, children, people of colour, people of disabilities. And I’ve also witnessed the silos approach that is being adopted, namely the fact that we’re focusing on particular groups in silos, we’re not working altogether to try to see how we can move forward. And then the lack of consistency, because at the end of the day, if we have good conferences or big conferences related to the climate crisis or just transition that are very far-fetched out, with no consistent follow-ups, this leads to no proper action to tackle that kind of issues.
And then the last part of the challenge for me was the lack of concrete action plan, that includes all stakes – all stake – all the stakeholders, because action plans are there, but they are enshrined and they are not tackled, and people feel very confused, young people, as well as other stakeholder, as to what is their role in the bigger scheme of life to, you know, achieve the just green transition. And that is how I came up with the idea of the multi-stakeholder intergenerational platform for a just green transition, and this is a platform not for dialogue, because we have had a lot of dialogue, but it’s a platform for action, hopefully.
So, what is it about? It’s – well, basically, it’s a local qu – platform that is catalysing dialogue for action, that includes multi-stakeholders that are affected by the climate crisis and just transition, as well as key decisionmakers, who – as well as people from the private sector, who have the power to, you know, mobilise and push forward the issue of just transition policies and projects. And it’s being adopted from a youth sensitive, as well as a gender transformative lens.
So, how do we do that? Well, it’s basically, through meaningful inclusion of the various stakeholders that I’ve already mentioned, including people from the brown economy, because they are also an important stakeholder when it comes to mobilising things, when it comes to the just green transition. And then, also, it’s a platform to provide science-based and needs-based research, to also fit in those policies and projects that we need to adopt, in addition to a platform to create green standards, because without green standards, we do not understand what we – where we’re – where we are, what is greenwashing and what is not. And it’s also a platform for capacity building and education.
Accordingly, in this platform, we have six key committees or working groups. The first one is related to policy and project, and it’s mainly about reviewing, as well as initiating, just green transition policies by different stakeholders, so that the policies that are being adopted are being adopted from a bottom-up as well as a top-down approach. And then we have also, an R&D Committee, which I think is very, very, also, crucial, when it comes to researching the impacts of the climate crisis on the local communities, as well as researching different innovations and technologies. Because obviously, in the Global South specifically, we are lacking in that sector, as well as to, you know, have this kind of research fit into the work of the policy and Project Committee.
And then we have the Capacity Building Committee, and this is very, also, crucial, because it will work on the internal structure of the platform, where the – like, the stakeholders in the platform will be, having, like, the capacity building that they need to, you know, promote for the policy solutions that they want, or the projects that they want. As well as to be able to, you know, communicate with each other effectively, whether it’s people of disabilities, or any – like, people from the social spectrum. As well as an external Capacity Building Committee, where it also focuses on the reskilling and upskilling efforts that we need, be it for brown economy employees, or for young people in the educational systems who also need the green skills from a very young and fine age.
And then this brings me to the fourth committee, which is the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Committee, which would play a crucial role in setting up green standards, to avoid the greenwashing when it comes to a lot of projects that we’re seeing right now, as well as to report on the impact of the platform on a quarterly basis. This brings me to the fourth committee – fifth committee, sorry, which is the Auditing Committee. And this is going to be – to have, like, a consultative role, because at the end of the day, we need to avoid corruption, we need to avoid, also, conflicts of interest, in addition to complacency. Because we have a lot of amazing platform who have gone wrong because of corruption or complacency because there’s no follow-ups or proper accountability mechanisms. And last but not least, possibly one of the most important committees is the Treasury Committee, because if there’s no finance for such a platform, then it might crash and burn. So, it will be handling the finances, as well as the remuneration of the different participants of the platform.
And now you might thinking who would be the stakeholders of the committee? And like I mentioned, they are many, but if I, you know, do the normal stakeholder mapping of interest and influence, we have the ministries who have a lot of power and a lot of interest, these ministries. And then we also have green businesses, women groups, feminist, people of disabilities, who also have a lot of influence, but maybe the – interest, but the influence varies, depending on, you know, the country, the context, so on and so forth. And then we have, also, the brown economy piece who prove, like, a very, very – you know, a struggle to us, and an obstacle to, kind of – to such a platform to thrive, but also, they’re very important to be involved in such a platform. And regular civilians, whose interests also would vary, depending on their involvement.
So, how will this excessively idealistic idea come to life? Well, I believe four key pillars are needed. First is funding, second is an inclusive governing body for such a platform, and then incentives, as well as a concrete timeline with milestones. So, regarding the funding, I tried to diversify it in order to avoid, like I’ve mentioned, too much power in one entity’s, you know, hands. So, this way, if these entities withdraw the funding, then the platform will collapse, or it would put too much funding to pervote – promote further projects that they want. So, I divided it between the ministries, as well as the private sector, and well – as well, and left 30% for grants and donations, and I felt like donations need to be anonymous, also, to also, de – avoid the corruption or conflict of interest issue.
And why would these people commit? When it comes to governments, they have NDCs, even if they don’t believe in it wholeheartedly, there is, you know, financial and economic sense that comes out – behind this platform, as well as the picture, or the image that they portray to the outside world through the NDCs and their achievement. And then the private sector, it could be easily integrated in the CSR scheme, where they can, you know, have taxes or subsidies because they are being more involved in such a platform. And then the youth groups and CSOs, first and foremost, it’s obviously a platform that they’re lacking, as well as incentives, where renumeration would be given to young people, as well as other key, you know, players in this platform, who would be taking part in research, policy creation, so on and so forth.
So, who will govern the platform? I would propose that it’s 15 to 20 elected members from the different stakeholders that I have mentioned previously. There would be, kind of like, a national Steering Committee that is representative of much – as much stakeholders as possible. And then these Steering Committees will be setting up local chapters, starting with two local chapters, and then piloting and seeing how we can, you know, move on from that. And the key milestones for me is the creation of the Steering Committee, and then the creation of the local chapters, and after that having a report, you know, it’s – the projects obviously, and then the report, and hopefully, a conference or, kind of, a symposium to help people understand the impact of such a platform. And then maybe an institutionalisation in the government could be a good idea. It might not be, but we will see about that, but to ensure that this platform, you know, stays alive.
And, obviously, this platform does not come without weaknesses. Yes, it does have weaknesses, and it does have its strengths, as well as threats. So, when it comes to the strengths, obviously the diversity of the stakeholders is there, the scalability of the idea is there, diverse funding soldier – sources and inclusion. But also, we have the weaknesses related to the commitment of the people, because you never also assure 100% the commitment. Funding, sustainability, could also be an issue, because just having diverse sources of funding doesn’t mean that the fun – sustainability will maintain, but I hope that maybe with the creation of impactful projects, some of these projects could fit into the finance of the platform. And then the opportunities, obviously the NDCs, international conferences and the focus of the global, you know, community right now on the issue of climate crisis, but obviously, we have the threats of oil lobbyists, inflation, and all – obviously the ongoing wars take precedence. And obviously this depends on the framing of how, you know, we can tackle this kind of issue in tandem with the climate crisis, because they’re all connected.
So, yeah, this is the – pretty much is – this is the platform, and I believe that together we could really, really find a common language and a common ground for taking action. As well as to get over the frustration of feeling like old people are invading our space, or other people are invading our space, because actually, they were once the young people who didn’t have that space. So, to be able to move to forward, we need to move forward together and to believe that this is not an ideal, but a reality. Thank you so much, and I’m sorry for taking, I think, very long.
Aston Horton
Thank you so much for a well-rounded presentation, Nour. Dr Kaboub, any comments or questions?
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Well, thank you, Nour, for this very clear and thoughtful presentation. Very well structured platform, it has, you know, all the components that you need for participatory democracy to really kick in and produce the kind of result that we need on the climate front. The challenge, as you know, is the actual activation of these platforms, and that activation requires political will at a national and international level, which we get but we don’t – in action, and then the financing, the funding. And that is true both for the government sector, for the private sector, but especially the counter-funding, the counter-funding that goes towards the false solutions and the distractions, primarily from the fossil fuel industry.
So, I’ll zoom in a little bit my comments on that, especially because, again, in Africa, our biggest potential is the renewable energy sector, not the fossil fuel sector. And yet, we see not only national governments, you know, signing more deals, but also, fossil fuel companies coming in and, sort of, hijacking the climate narrative to their advantage. They go to a country and say, “Look, you didn’t cause climate change. You’re a sovereign country, you have the right to development,” and [audio cuts out – 43:14-43:22] the oil and gas directs, we need to push, because this is really a narrative argument. Because we’re not saying, we need to be, you know, anti-development, anti-job creation. If anything, our biggest potential for development, for job creation, is in the renewable sector.
So, if we take the economics seriously and if we do due diligence, like we’re supposed to with every project, and we’re supposed to assess the risk, right? And the science is very clear, the economics is very clear, according to the International Energy Agency forecast, global demand for fossil fuels is stalling and is going to decline, and every dollar we invest in fossil fuel infrastructure today on the continent is supposed to produce infrastructure that will be productive and profitable over the next 30 to 50 years, not just the next ten/20 years. So, investors who are putting money on the table, they expect due diligence from the process, and what we’re essentially doing is essentially, saying, “You’re investing in potentially stranded assets, physical stranded assets and financial stranded assets.” And if we take that point very seriously, then we’re actually committing fraud, by duping investors into putting money into stranded assets, and fraud is a serious crime that should be paid attention to.
So, the potential of renewable energy is undeniable, and yet, we put it side by side with the fossil fuel industry investments, and we’re effectively, committing a financial fraud, and that needs to be part of – the starting point of the conversation. Unfortunately, with what we’ve seen in the last few years, especially after the conflict in Ukraine, this dash for gas and dash for fossil fuel investments, in Africa in particular, to deal with Europe’s energy crisis, right? Because yeah, it was an energy crisis when the conflict started in Ukraine, but not recognising that Africa has been in an energy crisis for decades, nobody paid attention, with our potential for renewable energy investment is the largest on the planet.
So, these are the kinds of questions that, you know, create that obstacle for these platforms to really reach their full potential and really, you know – as I said earlier, you can’t dema – you can’t decarbonise a system that hasn’t been structurally decolonised yet. Similarly, you can say you can’t democratise a system that hasn’t been structurally decolonised yet, because these extractive structures are colonial structures, and our governments, when it comes to the funding – ‘cause we do have, potentially, the fiscal capacity to fund a lot of this stuff domestically. Except our priority is always to pay the debt, our priority is to buy the food that we need to import, so going back to the structural issues that I mentioned earlier.
So, you can have the best constitution, the most democratically – you know, the most democratic government in office, but their economy is steered from abroad. The pressure is to prioritise debt payment rather than prioritise funding the climate action and the transformation that we need. So, again, getting the structures right is important, but getting the politics and the economics right and the reality of these historic structures is also part of the challenge, as you know, that we’re facing. Thank you, again, for a wonderful presentation.
Aston Horton
Thank you so much for those comments. Last but not least, we have Sufyan Hatia, who will present his policy on “Green Bonds as a Method of Paying for the Just Transition.” Over to you, sir.
Sufyan Hatia
Good day, everyone, my name is Sufyan, and I’m honoured to discuss my policy solution for the just green transition. I have decided not to use a PowerPoint today, because I don’t want to bombard you with statistics and acronyms, and due to brevity, I would like to make it more personal and interactive. Climate change is a significant global threat, evident through rising sea levels, extreme weather and shifting agriculture patterns. To address this, we need solutions that are both effective and also inclusive, as Fadhel has pointed out. In our profit driven society, activists for just green transitions are consistently asked, “Who’s going to pay for it?” My solution is to answer this question through green bonds within an equity framework. My proposal focuses on creating a localised funding system, for environmentally friendly projects in at-risk areas, ensuring that no communities are left behind, whether this includes women, children, minorities, etc., people with disabilities. As Fadhel said, often, our solutions are reliant on measures within the capitalist system, which is part of the colonial process, the extractive economy in Africa.
So, my proposal is to aim to work within the system, to provide self-sustainability, to make it profitable for businesses to make Africa self-sustainable. In essence, my proposal aims to take influence from the successes of the Asian tiger economies in the past, the 70s and 80s, like, Korea, Singapore, and even the success of China, who worked within the capitalist framework and essentially, are more self-sufficient now. Of course, there’s issues within the country itself, but it’s a good framework to take inference from.
So, explaining green bonds, green bonds are financial investments that fund projects with positive environmental impacts. When individuals or groups purchase green bonds, they lend money to governments, organisations or companies, to support green initiatives. These bonds function similar to traditional bonds, but the funds are raised solely for environmentally sustainable projects, and investors earn returns through interest payments.
How would these bonds be issued? The transition bonds will be issued by a coalition of international finance institutions, governments and private investors. Unfortunately, we have to rely on the devil or the oppressor, to give – to get the money from them. These bonds will specifically fund projects that promote reforestation, water conversation and sustainable agriculture in Africa and Asia. To propel investment, high interest rates will be offered, the projects prioritise local employment and community collaboration. This is vital, we have to have local employment and community collaboration. As we said, our aim is not to come here as men with suits, as colonisers. This is for the people. We can work with United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Development Programme, etc., and independent committees, etc., to monitor fund usage and to ensure transparency and to prevent corruption.
The – our equity framework. The equity framework ensures that the green transition bonds benefit local communities inclusively. It mandates local stakeholder involvement in planning and executing projects, aligning with community needs and increasing local ownership. Special emphasis will be placed on engaging women, who play a crucial role in promoting sustainable practises. We’ll collaborate with state governments to guarantee security, while NGOs can fund training, schooling and provide aid. So, we don’t rely completely on NGOs, we don’t just give aid, we give industry and the potential for self-sustainable improvement, and comprehensive training programmes will equip local workers and businesses with skills needed for the projects.
So, I’ve chosen a few implementation regions, after some research. We propose implementing these initiatives within Botswana, Ghana, parts of Southern Nigeria and parts of Pakistan, and all of these are selected for their stability and also their role and how they’re influenced negatively by the climate crisis. For example, Botswana is stable and democratic. Ghana and Southern Nigeria are relatively safe, compared to Northern Nigeria. Northern Nigeria is facing more militancy right now, but of course, when these areas become more stable, we can lead – these projects can lead to nationwide implementation. In Pakistan, these projects will be based in Punjab and Sindh, which are more stable than Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan, who are going through insurgencies at the moment. It’s vital to take note and to make note that insurgencies and insecurity, militant insecurity, like, is present in many Global South countries, unfortunately.
So, implementation and maintenance, implementaining – implementing, sorry, and maintaining green transition bonds requires a co-ordinated effort, a coalition of international institutions, and we have to ensure financial transparency. Private sector partners will provide investment and technical expertise, and this technical expertise will come from them, but eventually, through my equity framework, is meant to be taken by the locals, taken by the people from Nigeria, the youth from Nigeria, the youth from Botswana, the youth from Pakistan, and make it self-sustainable. And community representatives and local governments will engage stakeholders and oversee local implementation, to ensure tangible community benefits.
So, of course, we have quite a few challenges. Securing sufficient funding can be difficult. Investors may be wary of financial risks in regional instability. Political instability and regulatory hurdles in target regions could lead to delays or project cancellations. It’s like trying to build a sandcastle during high tide, the conditions need to be just right. Additionally, some areas may lack the necessary infrastructure and expertise to implement green technologies efficiently.
So, measuring success. Success will be measured by environmental impact and native economic growth. For example, over a five-year period, what percentage of Nigeria’s machines and agricultural growth used within Nigeria are not exported? And long-term scalability, to ensure long-term scalability, our projects will be assessed for the potential to expand or rep – be replicated in other regions. This will involve evaluating local adaptations and developing universal sustainability metrics in collaborations with leading financial standard organisations. Will initiate cross-sector collaboration and host roundtable discussions to harmonise approaches. Given that this is a Chatham House event, for example, we can use Chatham House to disseminate research and have articles on this and actually reach out to other potential investors.
Well, and to conclude, while implementing green transition bonds prevents – presents many challenges, our comprehensive approach addressing these issues head on, by fostering robust international collaboration, ensuring strong governance and emphasising community involvement, specifically women’s critical roles, we can mitigate these barriers. Women play a pivotal role in promoting sustainable practices and building community resilience. Our initiative aims to create a scalable, sustainable and inclusive model for green development, benefiting communities worldwide. Together, we can ensure a just green transition that leaves no-one behind and isn’t relying on a extractive neocolonial system, and will secure resilient future for our planet. As Nelson Mandela wisely stated, “It always seems possible until it’s done.” Thank you so much.
Aston Horton
Thank you so much, Sufyan. Dr Kaboub, any comments, questions?
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Thank you, Sufyan, for a wonderful presentation and for a very clear, you know, exposé of what green bonds and green finance can really do to unleash the type of funding in the right direction, and to really leverage the incentive structures of the existing financial system to nudge it in the right direction. And as you know, many countries have been going through the process of trying to define what is actually “green,” right? And I spoke earlier about the idea of financial fraud, right? If we define a particular product that is associated with a particular project as “green,” then we want to ensure that it’s actually green.
But green not just in the sense that it’s producing zero emissions, or reducing emissions, or it’s producing green electricity, but it’s also green in the broader ESG sense of the term. Is it extractive? Is it, you know, creating further economic entrapment for a particular country? That is the part that unfortunately, not a lot of people are paying attention to, and I’ll give you an example. So, let’s say, we have green investment, say, in the green industrial zone in Namibia, which is one of the biggest – you know, the poster child of green industrialisation. Which is, you know, major investment, primarily from Germany, to build green electricity infrastructure, primarily green hydrogen, to fuel green electricity into that green industrial zone for manufacturing. Sounds great, except Namibia doesn’t really have any water to spare for producing green hydrogen. We say, “No problem, we have the ocean, we can do seawater desalinisation.” Now, seawater desalination is very energy intensive, requires a lot of solar and wind, which require massive land use, right? Is that still green? We can say, “Okay, it’s green.”
Well, what do we do with the salt brine that is the byproduct of the desalination? It’s typically dumped back in the ocean and has severe long-term consequences on marine life, it increases the salinity of the ocean, which increases the warming and kills the ecosystem over time. Now, is that still green? We can say, “It’s still green electricity.” Okay, so now we’re manufacturing stuff with that green electricity, what are we manufacturing? Are we truly industrialising Namibia to escape the bottom of the global value chain, or are we simply outsourcing obsolete assembly line manufacturing from Europe, to be assembled with low cost labour, with low cost energy? Is that still green? Well, according to CBAM, the Core – Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, essentially, the carbon tax, the – that the European Union is imposing, it’s still green. So, those green products that are assembled in that green industrial zone are now sold in European markets without paying the CBAM tax.
So, it turns out to be that this green industrialisation is actually an inflation management tool for the European Union. Is that still green? It is still green, right? And it turns out, also, that the CBAM tax and this green industrialisation that is happening in Africa is a trade weapon against Europe’s competitors, who if they don’t have access to a green industrial zone, they have to pay the CBAM tax. Does that still make it green? Well, according to the standards that we’re looking at today, it’s still green, but I have very serious reservations about what we call “green.”
So, I urge all of us in the climate finance space to really push hard for a very thorough and a just transition type of definition of what is a green financial instrument. So that when we unleash the potential of the private sector into this area, we know that it’s actually producing the transformation that we need. But if we – and so, it’s a whole spectrum of what we can define as “green bonds.” There’s the narrow definition, it’s just “producing green electricity,” that’s good, it qualifies, versus, everything else.
And it’s important not only because of the particular product that we call “green bonds,” but because of the potential that we can unleash from banks. As you know, there’s an organisation that was started almost a decade ago now, called the “Network for Greening the Financial System.” That’s the full name, but the acronym is the NGFS, Network for Greening the Financial System. And it’s a wide spectrum of ideas of how do we green the financial system, including green bonds, and of course – but one of the biggest, kind of, leverage that we could have, once we define what is actually “green,” is changing the capital adequacy requirement for banks, from the existing one, which is, you know, everything is included, to segregating, saying, “This capital requirement is for green assets, and this capital requirement is for non-green assets.”
And once you do that, you lower the capital adequacy requirement on green assets, once we defined what is “green,” then you immediately unleash the incentive for banks to fur – to move further into decarbonising their balance sheet, and decarbonising their lending and their investments, and that unleashes [audio cuts out – 58:49] further potential. And again, we need, otherwise, sort of, a Minsky moment of false decarbonisation by creating massive financial risks on their balance sheets. So, the devil’s in the detail in every aspect of climate finance, specifically when it comes to defining what is “green,” in the best sense of the term, because we want to accelerate this transition. Thank you.
Aston Horton
Thank you so much for that, Dr Kaboub and Sufyan. So, we’ve got time for about two questions. So, I’d love if anybody could raise their hand, we can unmute you to ask your questions. Otherwise, we’ll go to some of the questions that have been asked in the Q&A [pause]. Oh, yeah, Nada, I’ll – you should be able to unmute.
Nada
Alright, thanks a lot for these very insightful discussion, be it by the CFC members or by Dr Kaboub. It’s truly insightful, like, is a very – the understatement of the century. I have multiple questions but being mindful of the time, maybe I’m going to ask one of them. You mentioned in the beginning of the session that basically, the green solutions or green financial solutions that are being most promoted on the scene was concerning carbon markets, and it’s basically, not the best solution when it comes to the different stakeholders, that it’s basically, greenwashing. So, from what, I wanted to ask you, what do you see as the ideal financial tool that will be just for the countries from the South?
And maybe another very small question, how do you see the role of youth when it comes to holding governments accountable to the different finances that reach the countries? Because a big premise on which the Global North state that climate finance are not as big to the Global South is because of the issue of corruption, especially in the Middle East. Yeah, so that’s – these are my small questions, and maybe I’ll email you the rest.
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Thank you. Aston, do you want me to respond immediately?
Aston Horton
Okay, yeah.
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Well, thank you, Nada, for your questions and comments. I’ll put it this way, just so that we’re brief, and I posted a link to my blog and I answer a lot of these questions and discuss, you know, carbon markets and, you know, what we should be calling “pollution permits,” rather than carbon credits. But essentially, as I said earlier, we have a climate debt problem here, and if I owe you a debt – like, if I owe you $100 I’m supposed to pay, right? There’s – I don’t think it’s debatable, right? But instead, here’s what’s happening in the climate finance space. Instead of paying you the $100 that I owe you, I’m going to give you $3 and tell you exactly what to do with it, you know, to continue the entrapment. And then I feel really bad because you clearly need more climate finance than those $3, so I’m going to lend you $7, at concessional rates, you know, noblesse oblige, and, again, tell you exactly what to do with those $7.
And then I feel bad, you really need more climate finance, so I say, “Well, I’m going to give you another $10, but you really have to give me your forest for carbon credits, you know, for pollution permits.” And then I say, “Well, you clearly need even more climate finance to accelerate this just transition, so I’m going to invest another $20 in your economy, but have to produce green hydrogen for me, right, for my economy, not for your economy, and you have to de-risk it to guarantee my – you know, the profitability of my investment.” And I’m looking at this and say, “Wait a minute, you owe me $100. I’m not supposed to give you anything, not to give you my forest, my hydrogen.”
So, we have to completely reset the conversation about this thing we call “climate finance.” And as the Reverend Dr Martin Luther King Junior in the context of the civil rights movement once said, he said, “I have no time for the tranquilising drugs of gradualism and incrementalism and false solutions and these dangerous distractions.” And I think, for us, as Africans, and pushing our governments to stop taking these crumbs, to stop walking into these traps, and call it out and say, “We’re not going to negotiate on climate, on anything, unless we reset the conversation about how climate finance works.” Is it going to be further entrapment, sort of, greenwash, rinse and repeat, of the old relationships, economic relationship, or is it not?
And to go back to your comment, Nada, about the – about corruption, yeah, corruption is part of the problem, and the fact that we’re in a debt trap, continuously in a debt trap, means that the negotiation capacity of our governments is very, very limited. And I think that’s really part of the struggle, that we have governments who are willing to accept these financial crumbs, these false solutions, these distractions, because they need to pay for the wheat shipment that’s waiting at the port, and so, the debt is part of this entrapment that I described earlier.
And when it comes to the role of the national financial institutions that really continuous IMF and World Bank programme for decades, with these institutions literally dictating your domestic economic policy, the fact that we’re in a debt trap means one of two things. It’s either that these institutions are incompetent and we should not take economic policy advice from them anymore, or that this is intentional entrapment that is part of the continuation of this hierarchical relationship that we have in the global economy, and I think it’s the latter, and we need to call this out. But instead, we’re handing out, you know, climate finance infrastructure to the World Bank, to manage the Loss and Damage Fund and to channel, you know, supposedly, climate finance for transformation. It hasn’t happened in the past. Why should we expect it to happen moving forward, if the economic model that the World Bank still continues to perpetuate is part of that entrapment? So, thank you, again, for your questions.
Aston Horton
Hmmm, thank you so much for that and then, maybe just to wrap up, Egowa, are you there to ask your question from the Q&A?
Egowa
Hi, thank you very much, very insightful presentation from our speaker. So, to cut to the chase, my question was, with regards to the issue of the systemic problem of extractivism, to what extent can the colonial legacy, Europe’s colonial legacy, hinder the ability of African and European nations to achieve a just green transition? And how can historical and present issues which exist between the two continents be addressed to foster and harness multilateralism, rooted in the overarching principles of justice, to achieve a [audio cuts out – 65:59] the issue of new – and how transitions…
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Aston, do you want me to go ahead and answer?
Egowa
…to perpetrate neocolonialism? Thank you, so, that’s my question.
Aston Horton
Yeah, sorry.
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Thank you. So, a very good question, Egowa. Thank you for your question and for your intervention. I’ll give you an example, because when we say “extractivism,” we tend to think of mining and extracting resources, but extractivism is much broader than that. I use the term even in terms of extracting agricultural resources. The – I’ll give you an example. When the Ukraine conflict happened and we had this disruption and – of shipping, of grains, especially from Russia and Ukraine, we discovered, finally, the majority of people discovered, that this thing we call “food security” is actually a loaded technical term that’s been pushed on the African continent, in particular.
Now, who doesn’t like food security? It sounds great, in the colloquial sense of the term, except it’s a technical term that says, food security means you secure the nutrition of your people, either by producing the food, or by buying it, or by borrowing money to buy it from abroad, which is what we typically do, or even worse, by receiving it as food aid. Food aid is the worst thing you can do to your agriculture, to your Farmers, right? ‘Cause they can’t compete with free food imported from abroad. So, during colonial times, we used to be the bread basket producing the wheat and corn and soy bean and barley, rice, for ourselves and for the rest of the world, for colonial powers. But as soon as we started to gain independence – it started with the meeting in 1955, the Treaty of Rome, where European powers basically, said, “We have a food security problem on this continent,” in Europe, “and that needs to change,” because they became clearly, very dependent on the former colonies who are now becoming independent.
So, that started a series of conversations and eventually introduced the European Union Common Agricultural Policy, CAP, which is in place to this day. It’s a core pillar of the European Union, and that meant our Farmers couldn’t compete with the cheaper wheat and rice and corn coming from Europe. But of course, it’s not just Europe, because the US was doing the same, Canada, Japan, Australia, and the Former Soviet Union. That is why Russia and Ukraine dominate the grain industry. So, that redesign of the global food system that forced us into producing cash crops for exports, to be dependent completely on core crops produced in the Global North, that is part of the colonial and post-colonial structure that keeps us food dependent, food insecure and keeps us in debt.
So, if we have an honest conversation today with our partners in the Global North, saying, “Look, this is a climate issue, this is a food security issue, this is a hunger issue, rebalance the global food system in a way that allows us to have the equivalent of the European Union Common Agricultural Policy on the African continent,” and that will reduce emissions, that will reduce shipping, that will restore the quality of the soil. And that’s why I talk about, you know, food sovereignty and agroecology is not the same thing as food security.
And when it comes to, for example, what the French Ministry of Agriculture – if the look at the building, the sign on their website, it says, “The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Sovereignty,” not food security. But every time we talk about food issue on the African Con – not the same thing. And once we decolonise that conversation, then we can starting talking about, well, how can we rebalance the global food system and move forward under a just transition framework? So, that’s – hopefully that’s a useful example, thank you.
Aston Horton
Egowa, did you have a quick follow-up on that, before we wrap up?
Egowa
Yes, thank you, a quick follow-up to Mr Kaboub’s delivery. Considering again that Africa is the most sanctioned continent in the world, how can we possibly address the issue of, say, decolonising such things as food sovereignty, or dealing with issues like food security issues or other aspects of the transition, when we are dealing with a debt trap, we are the most sanctioned continent in the world, and people are not ready or willing to have these kind of conversations? And we also see that backlash from, you know, African countries also trying to, you know, achieve total sovereignty, you know, in this 21st century, the – with the – again, with the issue of neocolonialism. So, yeah, that’s a follow-up to what you just said. Thank you.
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Very good question. So, the first thing is that no African country can do this alone. We have to do this as regional blocs or as a continent, and that is, unfortunately, part of the problem that we have as we think we can fix these problems at the national level. Because, you know, the strength of the European agricultural system is not because France did it alone and Germany did it alone and the rest did it alone. It’s because they sat down and negotiated a Common Agricultural Policy and they committed to it with long-term [audio cuts out – 71:39] funding and political commitment, governments coming and go, right-wing, centre-wing, left-wing, the common agriculture that we need to have on the continent.
So, when we talk about “pan-African unity” and “pan-African co-operation,” it’s not a nice fluffy thing we say each other in Addis once a year when we have the African Union Summit. We need to recognise that this is an economic and geopolitical necessity. It’s not because we like each other that we co-operate. It’s because we have to, because nobody can get out of these traps alone. I hope it [audio cuts out – 72:14]…
Aston Horton
Amazing, thank you so much for that answer, Dr Kaboub, and thank you so much, both for your time and for your contributions today. Also, thank you to our three CFC panellists, Sufyan, Daniel and Nour, for your contributions and for your policy ideas, and thank you to everybody who attended today. I hope that everybody has a great evening [pause].
Dr Fadhel Kaboub
Thank you so much, my pleasure.
Nour Mohamed
Thank you so much, everyone.
