Oyrsia Lutsevych
Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House. Welcome to our discussion today called “Ending the Russo-Ukraine’s War: Scenarios and Consequences.” My name is Oyrsia Lutsevych. I am the Head of Ukraine Forum, and Deputy Director of Russia and Eurasia Programme here in Chatham House. We are on the record today. We have an amazing audience here in the house, but also, quite a lot of participants online. So, we are also livestreaming this event, and you can later share the recording, and feel free to share the information you hear today using #CH_Events.
So, this is 733rd day of a full-scale invasion, and now nearly ten years of the – Russia’s attack on Ukraine, that started with the annexation of Crimea. And there is a saying in Ukraine that, “if there is – if Russia stop fighting, there is no war, but if Ukraine stop fighting, there is no Ukraine.” Today, we are where we are, there is still war and there is still Ukraine, and we are in this precarious moment of this dangerous confrontation.
And I am joined by an amazing Chatham House home team. This is all our experts, and I’ll introduce them as they are sitting next to me. To my left is James Nixey, the Director Russia and Eurasia Programme. Next to James is Natalie Sabanadze, she’s our Senior Fellow in Russia and Eurasia Programme. Patricia Lewis is the Director of International Security Programme, and last, but not least, is Keir Giles, Senior Consulting Fellow at the Russia and Eurasia Programme.
So, we’ve – we decided to share our thoughts and our analysis about where we are in this war. We had a internal meeting, under the famous Chatham House Rule, on the 29th of January, to discuss possible scenarios where this war may go, and what are the consequences of these different pathways? Because honestly, you could say we are at a certain crossroad in this war. Some of this analysis is now publicly available on Chatham House website.
James Nixey wrote an expert comment called “A Long War Works Against Ukraine – and the West’s Own Security,” you can find and read it. But now, we don’t have to read, we can hear James, and I would like to bring it straightaway to him, by – would like to ask James to share the evolution of this war. What kind of war is it?
James Nixey
Hmmm hmm.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
And what is the current state, both on the battlefield and politically?
James Nixey
Right.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
James.
James Nixey
Thanks very much, Oyrsia, thank you, everybody. ice to see you all here. So, this war – is it – can you hear me? The microphone’s on, yeah? Okay, it’s not clear. It was a long time in the making, and it happened because Vladimir Putin told us how he saw the world and we saw it differently, but we didn’t tell him that we saw it differently. And I don’t mean to sound too much as if I’m blaming the West, but in a very specific sense, I am. But Putin was quite clear, multiple times, not least in Munich in 2007, that he saw the post-Soviet space, at the very minimum, to be Russ – under Russia’s supervision.
And we thought we could square that circle. We smiled, did deals, shook hands, created fora for discussion, we constantly looked at prospects for co-operation. But we did ignore Russia’s howls of protest that, in its words, we “didn’t respect” its “security concerns.” Just to be clear, I don’t mean that we should have listened to him, as in we should have acceded to his requests and demands. I mean that we should have listened to him and clearly communicated that those demands would never be acceded to, and that we saw Ukraine as a real country, and that there would never be any concession to Russia’s demand that it has privileged rights.
Instead, we ignored that most difficult problem, we engaged in false resets, which were never going to work, and which encouraged Putin to carry on encroaching. So – and we said to ourselves, “Oh, it’s just what Russia does, it’s Russia being Russia.” And so, Putin, therefore, tested the waters in 2008, in 2014, and he found the West to be pretty accommodating, but it still wasn’t enough for him. He wanted – either it was going too slowly or he didn’t – he needed some, sort of, official recognition or affirmation. And so, he offered us then a couple or draft treaties, or draft agreements, which were actually ultimata, and they demanded, of course, no enlargement, no NATO enlargement, especially for Ukraine, and no NATO forces in the countries which had joined NATO after 1997. So, you can make an argument, I think, that those proposals were designed to fail, but they were certainly impossible to accept. And so, to sum up, I suppose, the war happened because we disagreed at the most fundamental of levels, and Putin wasn’t prepared to live with just agreeing to disagree as we were. So, that’s how I see this war as having started.
And in terms of where we are right now, sort of, the second part to your question, look, long wars ebb and flow in terms of who has the upper hand. At this point, it has to be said, that as far as a frontline on the land is concerned, Russia has a, sort of, a triple advantage right now in terms of ammunition, personnel and military industrial capacity. And so, therefore, the Kremlin does seem to feel that it can prevail in a war of attrition, no matter who is President in America, I must say. Trump may be preferable, but Biden will do perfectly well. After all, there’s little difference for Ukraine between a President who can’t provide the funding and a President who won’t provide the funding, as for Ukraine anyway. Might be a difference for us, but not for Ukraine.
And it shouldn’t – I just – I suppose it shouldn’t surprise us that although Ukraine has recovered large swathes of territory, but the remaining 18% is the hardest to regain. But it has to be said, though, that had the West provided Ukraine with the weapons that the country’s leadership had requested at the beginning, missile defence systems, long-range missiles, fighter jets, tanks, then it’s very conceivable the war would – might look a lot different now.
And so, I suppose because Russia has some sort of tactical advantage right now, then – some – and some recent successes, you do hear more voices saying that “Ukraine must sue for peace right now.” But that, surely, is an argument that the Kremlin is perfectly happy with, and that’s why I think it’s very hard to countenance that, sort of, idea at this stage. I certainly think it’s what the Ukrainians are more afraid of than anything else, that they are being forced into some form of negotiation, of being let down again, as they’ve seen themselves and others, notably, Georgia in the past.
So – and it’s also – when all the indications are that the Kremlin is hell bent on decapitating the Ukrainian leadership. Medvedev was tweeting just today about wouldn’t stop until Kyiv has fallen, and Odessa’s a Russia city, then I think, you know, it is a – sure, ultimately, it’s a myth to say that Ukraine can’t win. But this is where I’ll end on, absent renewed financial legal aid assi – and lethal aid assistance then, the darker scenario, which is actually almost any other scenario other than a Ukrainian victory, is actually perfectly plausible.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Thanks, James, you mentioned the word – the war of attrition, or attrition, and it’s interesting to think whether this is a scenario that Putin wants to impose, the, kind of, dynamic in this war where he believes, you know, representing or running Russia as a authoritarian system, he can marshal those resources while here in the West, all the pressures of public opinion and domestic politics can actually weaken that alliance that the Ramstein group and then the, system that Ukraine had, that underpinned a lot of Ukrainian military successes in 2023. So, thanks for bringing them in, and also giving us a bit of a telescopic view on how we ended up where we are.
So, I now would like to bring in – onto Natalie, and to look at an important theatre of war, which is the Black Sea, because that’s where the war started, from the Black Sea. There has been a lot of, you know, movement in there, unlike, perhaps, on the land frontier. And just before that meeting we had in Chatham House, I mentioned, on the 29th of January, and today, there has been, you know, another A-50 radar planes shot over Russia, that, kind of, complicates its air control over Ukraine. So, where are we now on the Black Sea, and why do you think that is important for this war?
Natalie Sabanadze
Thank you, Oyrsia. It’s a bit difficult to squeeze the entire region in five minutes, but I will do my best. The future of Black Sea as a region, wider region, very much depends on what will happen in Ukraine and how this war will unfold. If I were to single out some characteristics of this area before the war, I would say it was characterised by variable geometry, which is often referred to because you have all sorts of different players. You have three NATO members – three EU members, NATO members, EU members, you have Russia, you have aspirants. So, it was a very fragmented region. It was also very much characterised by Turkish-Russian franimosity, which is both friendship and animosity, depending on circumstances, Russia’s power assertion, security deficit and Western neglect, and that was before the invasion.
All those characteristics are still there, except for the Western neglect. So, it becomes a real area of contestation now with Russia. For Russia, historically, this has been extremely important, Black Sea, for its self-perception of a great power. And for Putin, in particular, if you recall his speech ten years ago, at the Crimea’s annexation, he stated that “Crimea is very much part of the Russian identity, Russian heritage, and this is where Russia’s renaissance, this, kind of, new modern revival, will begin.”
And he says that when Russia, basically, lost Crimea, because it became part of another state, Ukraine, which had a strange idea of wanting to be sovereign, Russia was robbed, and then it was too weak to respond, and now it was getting what belongs to Russia rightfully. So, this is the approach that Russia has to Crimea, but in that speech, it also mentions that Crimea is not enough, it’s the entire south and east of Ukraine, because alone, Crimea is not viable.
So, ideally for Russia, what they would want is to cut Ukraine off of the Black Sea, take Odessa, which would cripple Ukraine economically and also, provide access to Transnistria. However, the plan is stalling, and it is stalling because Ukraine is having surprising naval success for the country that has no navy. It has managed to launch a pretty effective and successful asymmetric operation against a much more powerful rival, an enemy, and a lot of Military assis – analysts are now looking at the use of drones. Very simple, basically, boats that are packed with explosives, that have been used so effectively, and how this is going to change the conduct, the future conduct, of the war.
At the moment, what we know according to various estimates, but according to Ukrainians, 24 warships have been sunk, one submarine, that is one third of the Russian fleet, and Russian fleet is, kind of, retreating to safer harbours. And one potential such harbour is in the occupied Georgia’s region, Abkhazia, in Ochamchire. This is a very small harbour that Russia has been controlling since 2009. At the moment it’s not deep enough, it’s only nine metres depth and can only harbour petrol boats, basically. However, the construction seems to have begun, at least the images demonstrate that, and the Russian’s have declared that this year, in 2024, it should be operational.
This is, of course, very important, because it brings – kind of, expands the theatre of conflict, and brings Georgia in. Abkhazia is occupied by Russia, but de jure, it is Georgia. And if Russia is going to use that base to attack Ukraine, then obviously, Georgian territory becomes a legitimate target for Ukrainian retaliation. So, a potential escalation can take place there, or expansion of the theatre.
Another, kind of, statelet which is the, also, creation of Russia, is the Transnistria, which is part of Moldova. As long as Odessa stands, there is a separation. However, if there is an unfortunate scenario and Russia manages to fulfil its plan, then obviously, Transnistria becomes incredibly vulnerable. There is no reason for Transnistria to remain separate. There are some movements now, already, we’ll see if we can discuss it later, and Moldova will be destabilised, of course.
And now I’m just quickly moving into the scenarios. Moldova will be destabilised, so will Georgia, and the influence of Russia will increase, irrespective of the candidate status, I think, there. With Moldova’s destabilisation, I think Romania becomes very vulnerable, and we are always talking about, sort of, Baltic states and Poland being at the forefront, but in this case, I think we also have to watch Romania. And if, for instance, Odessa is taken, then Russia – the Romanian speaking minorities become under Russian jurisdiction, and that could be a potential for provocation.
And just to finish, in principle, if Russia succeeds, then Black Sea for Russia would fulfil its initial function, what it wants Russia to do, which is to use it for the power projection further, particularly in Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans, and there, there will be lots of opportunities to put pressure on Europe through, for example, migration, through Eastern Mediterranean. And also creating this, kind of, axis of hybrid regimes in the Western Balkans, and scenarios could look quite challenging for Europe and European security.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Thanks, Natalie, and I think it’s important to recall that story, because it often goes unnoticed with more with a focus on the land war, and how, if you remember at the beginning, it was almost, you know, the – considered too escalatory to attack Crimea since the start of the war, where there were fears of how Putin will retaliate if this happens. But as we see, Ukrainians have successfully pushed Russians and destroyed quite a lot of airfields and airplanes on the Peninsula itself, and most importantly, not just for Ukrainian’s economy, but for global food security, are now able to use the trade routes and to build sustainability of Ukrainian’s own, you know, revenue base to finance the war. Because that Black Sea is so important for Ukraine’s economy. Thanks for bringing it in.
And I’d like to now invite Patricia. You know, there’s been a lot in the news, obviously, about the stalemate, about the deadlock, you know. And now even, again, between that meeting we had in Chatham House and today, Ukrainians had to leave Avdiivka, there is quite serious Russian push from the north around Kharkiv, but they are – they feel like they’re on the winning trajectory. Whereas US is not coming, the ratio to artillery, the deficit, and Ukraine is starving in artillery, and we may see, eventually, some kind of a ceasefire agreement, if Ukraine is not able to sustain, you know, the war.
So, if – and this is a hypothetical scenario, of course, we are discussing, if we see that happening, how should we in the West, and not from Ukraine’s perspective, I think that’s important, to interpret such – whether – I mean, I would say intermediate war ending, and what are the likely consequences of such event?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Thanks, Oyrsia. I mean, it’s – this is a very difficult thing to discuss, and I think it’s really important that, you know, in putting this forward, I’m not advocating this position, but I do think we need to think it through. I think the most important thing is that there should be no forcing of Ukraine into anything. Having said that, of course, Ukraine was forced into the war by Russia, right? And this is not Ukraine’s…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
A proposed…
Dr Patricia Lewis
…wish.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…impression.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Yeah, it’s not Ukraine’s wish to be at war. So, I think it’s really important that we see this as thinking these things through for two purposes. One is to, if you like, head the possibilities off at the pass. To think about what might come out of such a negotiation, if such a negotiation were to come, and to think about the best ways in which we could support Ukraine, and that – so, that would be if Ukraine wanted to do this.
And then the other would be to think through about how to think about the longer term future, as well. So, in that, I would say that we cannot trust – we cannot build trust into this – any negotiation. There have been so many broken agreements by Russia, and by others, but by Russia particularly, in this case. And so, what we have to do is if we – if Ukraine wants to go down a ceasefire or a peace agreement approach, we have to build it without trust. We have to build an agreement that does not take trust into account. So, in other words, it’s resilience to the breaking of trust, and that’s not easy, but it’s actually – it’s a much better approach, I think, than a lot of the treaty negotiations that we do already.
So, what I would say is that if – President Zelenskyy and his government, they’ve got a really delicate problem, because in all negotiations, when you’re winning, you don’t want to negotiate. When you’re losing, that’s the worst time for you to negotiate, right? Because when you’re winning, you can at least play from a point of view strength, when you’re losing, you’re at the mercy of the other. And finding that optimum sweet spot, because, you know, you’ve got to get both sides to negotiate, it’s when both sides realise, essentially, that they’re either heading into a very long attrition war, or a stalemate, in which neither side can really win. And that’s the point at which you get a genuine negotiation, right? So, that’s really important to notice.
And I think that there are so many factors coming up, and there’s always this, you know, tendency to say, “Oh well, you know, we’ll – let’s see what happens with this,” but I think the big one is – will be the US elections. It’s hard enough now, with a President, an administration, that supports Ukraine. If we me – were to move into another type of US administration in which that support could not be taken for granted and that we might see more support for Russia, we could – President Zelenskyy could end up in a really difficult position, and Putin knows that, right? So, this is where I think the delicate balance of pain and gain has to be really thought through.
So, I think there are several types of deals that could be done. The most likely, it seems to me, is what we would call a ceasefire, or a pause, and we’ve all heard about that in the context of many things, but you can have very long-term ceasefires. The good thing about ceasefires, of course, is that you’re not essentially negotiating a treaty. You’re giving a pause, perhaps to negotiate a peace settlement later on, perhaps to re-arm, of course, on both sides, perhaps to wait to see what happens with different political arrangements and different events as time goes forward. And we can think of one very long ceasefire from the early 1950s on the Korean Peninsula, but, you know, it’s held, mostly, I mean, there’s bits of firing across it, etc., but compared with what – a full-out war, it’s been, in that sense, successful. But it’s never led to a peace treaty, it’s never led to an agreement.
So, you could have then, you know, a ceasefire and then a peace settlement, or you could go straight to a peace settlement, but I think, given all the history, that’s unlikely. So, if we went for a temporary ceasefire, how would it be structured? So, you could – I think in a ceasefire, what you wouldn’t want to do is cede territory, because that would be much, much bigger negotiation, and that would be a – more the terms of a peace settlement. So, a ceasefire would, essentially, freeze the conflict, with perhaps a demilitarised zone, that’s possible, in between the two countries.
It could be policed, it could be policed by the UN, it could be policed by a European force. It’s very difficult to know how that might work, given the way Russia behaves and Russia thinks, but it’s possible. And, of course, it would be a de facto, not an in law, cea – borders, so they wouldn’t – the shouldn’t be ever set into law, as a result of a ceasefire. And it can be done quickly, but of course, they’re very vulnerable to breaking, but it’s not like breaking a treaty, and we’ve seen Russia break so many treaties now, and agreements.
And things – because of the monitoring and verification, and you can enforce a huge amount, in a ceasefire, you can find out quite quickly when things are – you know, small, little transgressions across the border, etc., or whether or not it’s the beginning of a larger breaking of the ceasefire. And things, of course, can go wrong in a ceasefire by accident, so that has to be factored in, but they also can go wrong on purpose, and that has to be factored in. You might want to, as a result of a ceasefire, also set up parallel trap talks, between the US and Russia, also, perhaps all sorts of parallel trap, about things like sanctions, etc., which probably would be included in any ceasefire agreement.
And then, I think it’s about the long-term vision as to what could be built on from such a sys – a situation. Whether or not you would see it as just a delay to give some pause in the fighting, to give some regrouping, etc., and just think, well, this will – there will be war again, and that might be one way to think about it, and it might be a realistic way to think about it. Or it might be that because of external political factors, it starts to look better, and you could start to build on it in a different way.
So, I think that it’s really about the issue of preparation for all eventualities that we need to think about this. It’s not necessarily that we – obviously, we would want Ukraine to win, but if Ukraine wants to go for a ceasefire, we have to think about how we can support them, and how it will help European security in the longer run.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Thanks, Patricia, and it’s important that you brought in the trust part, and I was thinking that, of course, Ukrainians have lost trust with the Russians because of the history of Minsk agreements and protocols and more than 200 rounds of negotiations, when at that time ceasefire wasn’t holding. But, also, I think, deep down, Ukrainians also mistrust the West, with the history of the Budapest…
James Nixey
Hmmm hmm.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…memorandum, but, also, what the West did after the Minsk protocols, when there was that moment to perhaps really deter Russia from another invasion, whereas that didn’t happen. But important, you know, kind of – it’s important to understand how that could work, whether this could work with Russia, whether this could work with this particular man in charge of Russia. All these questions remain open.
And, also, I think the internal domestic drivers of that, right, are important. US, you mentioned, but, also, Russia internally, there’s been the death of Navalny, again, recently. Since we met speaking about scenario, that wasn’t the case, now he’s dead, and, also, Ukraine’s own consolidation of resources to mobilise for the victory Ukraine wants to see. Lots of these internal questions…
Dr Patricia Lewis
I think, Oyrsia…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…open.
Dr Patricia Lewis
…what I would say is though that-post 2014, and then post-2022, I mean, anyone who doesn’t recognise what President Putin is and what President Putin and his government is doing, is wilfully blind, right?
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah, yeah.
Dr Patricia Lewis
So, I d – I think there is no possibility now there could be misinterpretation.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah, thanks.
Dr Patricia Lewis
I think that…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Thanks for pointing that out. So, now, would like to move to Keir and ask him about, given these – I don’t know if you agree with me, but that we are, in a way, at the crossroad of this war, there are different choices that could be made, how this war will evolve, and what are the consequences for the West in this? Because clearly, Ukraine has put its 10-ten point peace plan, as Zelenskyy said, he said, “This is how we want this war to end.” But is Ukraine enabled to win this war this way, or end this war this way, and what would you say is at stake for transatlantic community, NATO, here, the UK?
Keir Giles
Thanks, Oyrsia. I’d like to start by picking up on a point that Joi – James made about the way this war was long in the making. I was reminded this morning by Anna Morgan, from the Russia and Eurasia Programme here at Chatham House, that five years ago today, quite a few of us were sitting in this room talking about how Russia was going to behave and what Russia was going to do. It was at the launch of a book called – which subtitle was, “What Drives Russia to Confront the West?” And a large part of the conversation then was, effectively, a warning, talking about how, if all of the issues that James listed were not addressed, we would see another major crisis, another conflict with Russia. And sure enough, three years later, that happened.
And I mention that now as a shameless advertisement for the expertise that is concentrated in the Russia and Eurasia Programme of this building, and also a suggestion that, from time to time, it is worth listening to what that expertise produces in terms of assessments and predictions, even if what they say is unpleasant and inconvenient.
But coming to Oyrsia’s question, you also asked me earlier what the possible range of outcomes would be, and what the most desirable ones would be, and during the exercise that gave rise to what we are hearing today, we were thinking about different possible scenarios, different possible outcomes to the conflict. And of course, the optimum one is a realisation of that 10-point peace plan that’s been put forward as long ago as October 2022, by President Zelenskyy, and what would actually resolve the conflict?
And let’s not forget, only two of those ten points are actually to do with territorial control. The rest is about longer term security, of which Ukraine regaining its sovereign territory is only a small part. And obviously, that’s the most favourable outcome, but it’s always been on the optimistic side, and now it seems to be receding even further because of the interruptions in aid, particularly from the United States, and we don’t know how long that interruption in support is going to last. Because even if Congress takes its foot off the hose of support for Ukraine, it’s going to take time for things to come back online. And the question is, how much will Ukraine lose during that time? And we may, in the long run, be faced with some grim accounting. Who has killed more Ukrainians? Which of Russia’s tools has accounted for more death of innocent people, Iranian drones, or North Korean shells, or US Republicans?
So, short of that, there’s a spectrum of other possible outcomes. There could be a substantial Ukrainian advance, it’s still possible. There could be a ceasefire and a freezing of the conflict. There could be, God forbid, complete defeat of Ukraine, with the entire country overrun. All of these things we considered during this exercise. But the question that Oyrsia posed for me is, “What exactly should the West do in all of those different situations?” Now, that, in a way, is one of the easier questions to answer, from all of these different variables that we’ve seen. Because what we discovered in this lengthy and detailed discussion was that there is no plausible outcome left that does not absolutely require the maximum possible support to Ukraine, but also, massive reinvestment in countries’ own defence, and not just the frontline states, but across Europe.
So, let’s consider each of those outcomes in turn. If there’s a Ukrainian victory, without deep change in Russia, not just a change of leadership, but actually societal change, that changes all of the Russian preconceptions about the country and its place in the world, then you have a resentful Russia that continues, once again, to rebuild its forces to have another go after a certain period of time has elapsed. In just the same way that we saw President Putin with his 20 year programme of preparing for war. So, in that case, Ukrainian victory buys time. It buys time for Europe, it buys time for this belated start to rearmament, to meet the threat, and giving the opportunity to assure long-term peace, by being sufficiently strong, not just in the frontline strait – states, but across Europe, to deter Russia from future aggression.
What about the middle ground, what about a ceasefire? Well, in that case, as you heard from Patricia, Ukraine needs the support to defend itself and to make the ceasefire work, because there is absolutely zero expectation that Russia will abide by it. So, Ukraine needs to make it clear to Russia there will be consequences for breaking the ceasefire, and consequences that Russia will not like. That means, too, massive support for Ukraine, and also for the frontline states, to ensure that they are not an alternative target. This, too, buys time, but less of it, and it is a race in rearmament between Ukraine and Russia for who can be in a credible defensive position fastest.
What about Ukrainian defeat? Then you have Russia that is not only stronger, not only emboldened, not able – not only able to conscript and dragoon into its forces all of those Ukrainians who will be under occupation, but also, a Kremlin that is still more convinced that overt aggression is the route to achieving what it still wants, that means that the whole of Europe is at risk. Because let’s not forget, where President Putin has laid out the boundaries of his ambition, it doesn’t stop at Ukraine. It lay – it overlays countries that are full-fledged members of the EU and NATO, which mean, if we are allied with them in any way, we, too, are at risk.
So, what should be done? What we’ve noted over the last few months is a disconnect, a complete gap between what Military Analysts, Defence Analysts, serious Russia Analysts, are saying, all pointing to the threat from Russia, but in capital cities west of Warsaw, little action and no urgency to deal with the threat. Now, a few days ago we have a press briefing, a media event, here at Chatham House, and I said then that – I pointed to the crescendo of warnings that we’ve had from Defence Ministers and currently serving military leaders, senior Miliary Officers, including here in the UK, about what is coming down the track towards us. But no evidence that the highest political level has understood the scale of the threat or tried to explain it to the public. And I concluded, if action comes too late to avoid disaster, it will have been because of criminal complacency at the highest political level.
Now, I stand by that. It is fainting bizarre that we still see charts of NATO members saying which ones have met their pledge to spend 2% of GDP on defence and which have not, as though that was some kind of meaningful metric of defence capacity. It is long past time that that is an obsolete measure of commitment. It was always a symbol, it measures input, not output, but now it’s a symbol in reverse. Those that have not met the country – the 2% pledge should see it as a badge of shame, because it is indicative of the lack of statesmanship, the lack of leadership. It’s indicative of a nation’s refusal to take seriously its duty to safeguard not only its allies, but also, its own citizens.
So, I’ll conclude just by saying, the conclusion that we arrived at, across the board, for all of the possible scenario outcomes that we considered, was that it is long past time for Europe as a whole to look to its own defence, thank you.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay. Thank you, Keir, and again, something that did happen between our meeting and today is these bilateral security agreements, agreement on security co-operation, that have been signed with the UK, also France, Germany, Canada, Italy and Denmark. So, we have a group of countries who are trying to structure some kind of more sustainable security relationship with Ukraine, and we can discuss that in Q&A if people are interested, but that’s – that is something, a new evolution of the situation.
So, I’d like bring it back to you, the audience, and, also, online audience, because there are a lot of questions, and I’m sure you have a lot of questions, and given how full this room is, I don’t want to ask any questions from me. So, if you can just raise your hand, introduce yourself, and I will also do the same with people from the webinar. So, yes, the ladies there, please. If you can just stand up so that we can see you, if you please. Thank you.
Phoebe Page
Hi, I’m Phoebe Page, Ukrainian Institute, London. Keir Giles, you were just talking there about the disconnect between the political elites in the West, and sort of, the serious Russia experts and think tank experts, and completely agree, and was wondering how you think that disconnect might be best closed, and if it is possible to close that gap. Thank you.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay, we’ll take one question here, yeah. If you can – no – somebody there. If you can just, if – address to somebody, it’d be easier, ‘cause there are four speakers on the panel. If you would like to address your question.
Brunello Rosa
Yeah, Brunello Rose, Rosa and Roubini Associates. To Keir, supr – I suppose. So, a potential deal that could be thought of, and of course it would be damaging for both sides, and that could make it realistic, is that Ukraine gives up 18% of its territory, the one that Russia has conquered, but at the same time, it joins NATO immediately, so that Russia doesn’t have an incentive to restart the war a month later, or two years later, as it was suggested before. How realistic is that deal? Of course, in – also, in light of what potential President Trump said regarding the intervention of the US in defence of NATO countries in Europe. Thank you.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay, so we’ll take those two for Keir, and one for James that is coming here from the internet, “To what extent we shall take seriously Putin’s demands that NATO pulls back to the borders of 1987, before enlargement?” Keir.
Keir Giles
Okay, certainly. What would actually close the gap? What would convince Western European leaders that the time is now to actually look to their own protection? Sadly, precedents suggest that it is only disaster that will do that, because we have had so many incontrovertible indications of what is coming, so many demonstrations of Russia’s intent, so many wake-up calls on which the snooze button has been pressed, over the last couple of decades.
And what concerns me, particularly thinking about this country, is the consistent habit over time of starting wars by losing disastrously, before getting its act together, at enormous and tragic cost in the lives of good men and women. So, I fear that if there has not been anything yet which has convinced people of the urgent and increasingly strident warnings actually being correct about the predictions for what Russia is trying to do, reconstituting its forces, saying it intends to do, then it takes an actual demonstration of the damage that can be done to countries like this one to shake our highest political leaders awake. I wish it were not so.
On the deal where Ukraine gives up an area of its territory in exchange for immediate NATO membership, in order that Russia is deterred from taking any more, it’s not an implausible suggestion. But of course, it is not something that can be forced on Ukraine. As we’ve heard so often, it is not something that the Ukrainian leadership and Ukrainian society is anywhere near likely to acquiesce to. Because in part, what are we, in that case, in that scenario, abandoning the people in the occupied territories to? It is a savage and brutal military occupation. It is a situation where people don’t know from one day to the next whether their children are going to be stolen. It is a repeat of the deportations and enslavement that we saw in the middle of the 20th century. Who among Ukrainian Politicians or anybody it on them would have the moral courage to say, “Yes, abandon these people once again behind the new Iron Curtain”?
And even then, your second point, do we actually trust NATO guarantees anymore? Well, in an era of a possible approaching Trump presidency, we should also bear in mind contingencies. Not planning for a dissolution of NATO, because America doesn’t have to dissolve NATO in order to undermine its entire premise of deterrents, all that has to happen is for President Trump to say, “You’re not going to turn up.” So, yes, we should be looking, in Europe, to a future which is self-assured and is not so dependent upon the United States as the underpinning of deterrents, and that, too, is a process that should have started long, long ago.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Before I give Patricia opportunity to comment, also, just to bring the latest public opinion that I’ve looked up before coming here from Razumkov Centre, in January already. So, you can say, after quite, you know, painful counter-offencing campaign and a little success on the battlefield, 3.6% say they’re willing to stop the war now, 13% say they would agree to the pre-2022 line. So, you think there’s quite a lot of fortitude to fight, and we can discuss intentions of why is this the case, but, Patricia, and then to James.
Dr Patricia Lewis
Just a bit on what Keir said. I think that, you know, one of the problems we would have with a territory in exchange for membership of NATO, etc., deal is that it’s – we’re not there yet, certainly, and we may never be there, and I would be very cautious not to try to do an end state deal. We’ve seen what happened post-Crimea, and the Minsk agreement, but we also, I think, need to understand what Russia will be like once the fighting stops, and if we see continual aggression, continual – then we’ll know much more. That’s why I’m quite – I’m not advocating any one position, but if I were to say – I feel most concerned about going to an immediate final state agreement or peace treaty just because of the situation that we’re finding ourselves in, which is quite reminiscent I think of the late 30s in Europe, in some respects.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah, so on the question of how literally and seriously should we be taking Putin on this…
James Nixey
Hmmm, yeah.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…1997…
James Nixey
Yeah, so the question…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…disengagement, then.
James Nixey
…the question refers back to the December treaties…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yes.
James Nixey
…of 2021, again. And I did mention that, you know, there’s a – certainly, a common view that they were designed to fail. That does make sense, because it was so unrealistic – I mean, even if they weren’t – even had we acceded to them, Russia would have got what it gotten what it wants, so Russia won either way. It was, as you know, amassing troops on the borders during that time anyway, but I mean – and there’s a certain irony though, because actually, there weren’t any NATO troops at the front – on the frontline states, until Russia annexed Crimea. It was only then that we put them forward, in fact. But, I mean, it’s – to be honest with you, it’s a purely – it’s a hypothetical now, so it’s – you can’t even consider it now, because there’s no way they’ll withdraw.
But at the time, I mean, yeah, they would – the – I mean, it is quite – I mean, I think it was said at the time, even before the invasion in February, they were not treaties, they were ultimate. Bu, again, we did not take that as seriously as we should have done.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
But I think, also, we can interpret it as the way of Putin’s strategic objective is to break away this transatlantic…
James Nixey
Sure.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…if you want…
James Nixey
Sure.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…Truman Doctrine approach to security. What it is, what NATO was created for in 1949, exactly to, you know, prevent…
James Nixey
Yeah.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…Soviet Union at the time to roll over…
James Nixey
It was…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…Europe.
James Nixey
…designed to destroy NATO, to…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah, exactly. So, before I – I see lots of hands, just want to ask one question, because that’s an issue that, you know, is still being floated in the air. Alexander Rosselli, and maybe Natalie could take this one, “What about a neutral Ukraine,” but here’s comma, “internationally guaranteed?” Would that be some – I mean, peop – this is the reaction, we – I mean, we have an answer to that but I think…
Natalie Sabanadze
I don’t know…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…it’s important to…
Natalie Sabanadze
…what that means.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
You don’t know what that means, okay, well, that’s an answer, it’s a good one. But if you – seriously, if you want to read a bit more about this particular dangers of the solution, we have this report, “How to End Russia’s War,” in one of the chapters, which of course, sorry for shameful promotion, is exactly why this is a dangerous pathway for – not only for Ukraine, but also, for wider Europe.
Let’s take more questions from the audience. I’ll see the hand over there, and then, yes, the gentleman here, yes.
Charles Kingswell
Charles Kingswell, a student at LSE. Last year, late last year, the Latvian Government put forward a proposal to spend 0.25% of GDP on aid to Ukraine and…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Estonia.
Charles Kingswell
…suggests that – Estonia?
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Estonia, yeah.
Charles Kingswell
Yeah, Estonia or Latvia, and they put this forward at the end of last year, and the idea this would be $120-ish billion, and if the US were not to do it, it would be about 60 billion, and this would be enough to, sort of, maintain NAT – maintain Western support for Ukraine. Would that be enough, and is that proposal realistic?
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay, that’s a good one, and the gentleman here in the first row, and then – yeah. Just introduce yourself, please, sir.
Alberto Portugheis
My question is…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Could you please introduce yourself?
Alberto Portugheis
What’s that?
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Just introduce yourself.
Alberto Portugheis
My name is Alberto Portugheis, and I work against all wars in the world.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah.
Alberto Portugheis
That is I work for world demilitarisation…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay.
Alberto Portugheis
…because I…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
If you can just ask your question…
Alberto Portugheis
…because I…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…because there is lots of hands.
Alberto Portugheis
…because I lived seven years in Geneva…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah.
Alberto Portugheis
…in close contact with the United Nations, and with all departments of the United Nations.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah.
Alberto Portugheis
And I ended up, after those years…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Could you please ask your question?
Alberto Portugheis
…calling…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Because there are so many hands.
Alberto Portugheis
…calling the United Nations a international war club, and I called there is Security Council, “Insecurity Council.”
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay.
Alberto Portugheis
And so, I just wonder, how do you think that Politicians can produce such miracles, like promote a war industry and create peace at the same time? I find it…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay.
Alberto Portugheis
…an oxymoron, total – it’s the same as saying…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay, thank you, we understood the question. We’ll take it back to the panel. Yes, the lady over there, yes, yes.
Kseniia Yehorova
Thank you, Kseniia Yehorova Loughborough University. I was wondering is there any thought that the world, and especially the West, in not only dealing with ending the war, but also, with changing Putin’s regime? As Keir mentioned, even if Ukraine receives a complete victory, how long Ukraine and other countries will stay in peace if Putin’s regime continues to exist? So, basically, the new Russian democratic regime could change so many issues, like immediately stop the war, contribute to Ukraine, and reassure the rest of the world in the peace. So, are there any opinions about different approaches to the – Russia right now, like support and fund, for example, Russian opposition, or anything similar? Thank you.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Will you take that, James?
James Nixey
Yeah.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
So, maybe we’ll start with Estonian plan, ‘cause I know, Keir, you know it quite well, then maybe Patricia on the UN, and then Russian opposition to James.
Keir Giles
Sure. The Estonian plan, which we can be quite brief about, the questions were, is it enough and is it realistic? Well, the Estonians put a great deal of effort into explaining precisely how it would be enough and it would be realistic, that’s the whole basis of the plan. They wanted to make it something feasible and not daunting for European states to sign up to. And the whole purpose of it was demonstrating how little investment is required to safeguard the future security of the entire European continent.
Compared, and they pointed this out really quite bluntly, compared to the much greater sums that the EU, for instance, has spent on anti-COVID measures, on energy subsidies, on paying people more when their energy bills are high, etc., etc. Compared to that, the figures that the Estonians are putting forward for their long-term plan for convincing Russia that its war is unwinnable, and let’s not forget, this is not an immediate miracle solution, it stretches over years, are really quite small beer. It is less affordable if the United States is on board, but it is still perfectly feasible within European budgets. That’s really the whole point of their plan.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay, and…
Dr Patricia Lewis
So, conflict prevention, deterring conflict, deterring more, is really important. And what’s clearly happened here is that all of the prevention techniques that the UN has built up over many years and understood, all of the ways that we understand about deterrents, have not worked, and Russia was not deterred from invading Ukraine, and may not be deterred from invading others.
So, when that happens, the UN Charter is quite clear, is that you have the right to self-defence, and that is what’s happening now, is Ukraine is just defending itself. Putin could end this war by just reversing what he did, pull out, right? Unfortunately, you know, Ukraine’s been forced into this situation and has to defend itself. Going forward, we have to rethink, it seems to me, our prevention techniques, our deterrence techniques. We have to understand much better what prevents and what deters. And we have to understand how much resilience we need to build in the system, how much funding we need for equipment. What would actually work to deter such an adversary, an enemy that would just march into your country over several years – this is not – you know, 2022 was not the beginning of this war, right?
So, we really have to understand that in order to really understand what prevents and what deters, and actually, reinforce what the international community has always been set up to try to achieve. That’s the only answer I can give to that.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
James?
James Nixey
Yeah, can I just say – so, very quickly on defence spending…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Sure.
James Nixey
…and then I’ll answer the question. But on defence spending, I just want to say that Russia is spending 7.5% of its GDP on defence…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah.
James Nixey
…and, actually, an awful lot more…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
And more.
James Nixey
…and an awful lot more on security, overall. And in fact, it’s that which is fuelling the Russian economy. So, the war economy is dri – Russian war economy is driving the war, so he is in a situation whereby he can’t stop, because that would actually tank the Russian economy?
Dr Patricia Lewis
And, can I just say, that, actually, what we need to supply Ukraine with isn’t that expensive.
James Nixey
Hmmm, sure, yeah, absolutely.
Dr Patricia Lewis
You know, we’ve seen the impact of very cheap things like drones…
James Nixey
Hmmm hmm, yeah.
Dr Patricia Lewis
…we’ve seen the impact of very cheap things like ammunition, we – and look at the way in which Ukraine has been able to adapt an awful lot of systems. They don’t even have to be, like, state of the art, or anything like that…
James Nixey
Absolutely.
Dr Patricia Lewis
…the sort of thing that we’re spending a huge amount of money…
James Nixey
Hmmm hmm.
Dr Patricia Lewis
…from, and we should take some lessons from that.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah, and that’s…
James Nixey
I didn’t answer the question…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Before you…
James Nixey
…sorry, yeah.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
But just on…
James Nixey
My fault.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…spending, because I think it’s an important point, and one that the, kind of, Russian narrative wants us to believe in, is that we are spending such huge amounts of money on the – on Ukraine. I mean, again, in that report in June, we said the joint transatlantic community spent 0.95% of its collective GDP, and in terms of weight and technology and assistance, clearly, if Ukraine is backed by the West, Russia has very little chance of achieving its war objectives. But if Russia’s…
James Nixey
Yeah, sorry, I didn’t answer…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…internal…
James Nixey
…the question, I’m sorry, yeah.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yes, I think that that…
James Nixey
I’ll do that, hmmm.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…is something, as a constituent part…
James Nixey
Yeah.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…to how this war will end, what will happen domestically…
James Nixey
Yeah, so…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…in Russia, and how can we, in a way, support Russia to the right path, as well? Can we?
James Nixey
So, first of all, I mean, you can get yourself into knots by thinking that we desire a change of regime, but we don’t want to engage in regime change, and that does get a bit complex. But – and I think that what we have to remember is that any new post-Putin regime will not be lovey-dully – lovey-dovey, touchy-feely, democ – liberal democracy. And, actually, this is my main concern, that we beco – that there will be – they’ll – leaders will want to extend olive branches to a new Russian leader, and that’s when concessions that you may not want to concede may come in. And I get – I suppose that’s my greatest fear, but, you know, and – you know, even Navalny was, as we know – you know, actually had nationalist inclinations, and he was not a Nelson Mandela of Russia.
So, I think we have to – I mean – and again, so I suppose, going back to the – we need to engage in evidence-based policy making with a new regime, and to understand who it is we are dealing with, before you can come to any conclusions about what it is we may offer.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Natalie?
Natalie Sabanadze
Yeah, I just want to add that I think we have to keep in mind the staying power of autocratic rulers…
James Nixey
Hmmm hmm.
Natalie Sabanadze
…because unlike dem – in democracies, where a – in a misadventure like this will definitely cost you an office, here this is no guarantee, not only guaranteed, but we can expect that Putin can survive a serious setback, and remain in power, as long as he can provide benefits to a close circle. And as long as the sanctions are not biting enough and he has those resources, I think there is a big chance that he stays. So, it might be even premature to think about post-Putin. We have to think still now how to deal with this regime.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
With Putin, yeah. Yeah, the question there.
Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze
Yes, hi, my name is Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze. I’m Ukrainian MP. My question is, maybe first to Patricia, is there any realistic reason to believe that Russian Federation would like to actually negotiate? Because we, from Ukraine, do not see any possibility that Russia would actually try to really negotiate anything but capitulation of Ukraine, and that’s probably the only line that their negotiation comes from.
Secondly, maybe to Keir’s, as well, you’re talking about the disaster that maybe bring the Western political leaders up to the task. Every single day, there are quite a few disasters that are happening across Ukraine, so I’m just wondering what exactly has to happen? Is it – are we talking something that actually brought the attention of the West back to understanding, much better understanding, back in 2014, what is happening on our territory, when the MH17 was downed by the Russian troops? Is that type of a disaster that you are talking about, that it has to be dealt with on the – you know, with the citizens of NATO countries, or EU countries?
And, third thing, maybe developing the question with regard to Russian Federation, is there any analytical thought that is being put to the question here in Chatham House, what kind of Russia would we have to deal with and that we should not be afraid of even dissolved Russian Federation after the end of this war? Because it’s not maybe even about – exclusively about Ukraine’s victory. It’s about Russian defeat, and I have not really heard the – you know, that type of line here, because it’s about punishment, isolation, weakening and real defeat of the Russian Federation. Thank you.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Well, thanks. It’s great to have voices straight from Kyiv, so thank you so much for speaking up. And over there, yes?
Andriy Gusarov
My name is Andriy Gusarov. I am from Kyiv, also from Kyiv, from Ukraine.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Right.
Andriy Gusarov
But not MP member, foreign policy and expert. I have one question to Natalie Sabanadze. As you know – as we know from the media, that soon, President Zelenskyy will go to Armenia…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Hmmm hmm.
Andriy Gusarov
…at the beginning of the March, and we also know that there is a very high probability that he visits Azerbaijan, and we don’t know whether he visits Georgia. So, between the Russian troops in South Ossetia, and between Russian troops in Armenia, there is Georgia. So, how are you, personally, analyse and your personal opinion about the probability or the escalation situation in the South Caucasus in the next years?
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Okay, thank you.
Andriy Gusarov
Thank you very much.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Let’s bring it back to the panel, because there was a lot of issues on negotiations on what must – what has to happen for the West to mobilise, and on what are we researching on the future of Russia? And then Natalie to you, let’s start with Keir, and then go this way.
Keir Giles
As briefly as possible, because we are hurtling towards…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Five…
Keir Giles
…the end here…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Five minutes.
Keir Giles
But the question, briefly, was…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Three minutes, we will..
Keir Giles
…how bad does it have to be to get people to pay attention? Would it be MH17? I suspect it would have to be worse than MH17, because what was the result of MH17 beyond the Netherlands and Australia, the two countries most directly involved? Was that the wake-up call that was required? No, it takes more.
Coming back to the – to Estonia, the – what we have at the moment in downtown Tallinn is billboards put in front of buildings, showing the effect of Russian missile strikes. You see the building behind; you see what it would look like after it’s been bombarded by Russian missiles. I would like to think that that would not be what is required for Western Europe to wake up. Of course, those who are in Tallinn, they aren’t the people who actually need to be told what the problem is. They live…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah.
Keir Giles
…next door already.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Hmmm, thanks. Patricia?
Dr Patricia Lewis
Yeah, I mean, I think we know what it would look like, and, you know, we do a lot of scenarios and game-playing and everything, and the whole idea of that is to get people to imagine what things could be like. So, I would say, in terms of – I think it’s a really good question as to what would get Russia to negotiate, and I think I would say this. Russia has already lost, right? It lost really the end of February 2022, in which it did not succeed in its initial intentions. And ever since then, it’s essentially been, you know, fighting marginal gain in a very brutal way, with a lot of threats, and, you know, don’t forget all the nuclear threats that it made.
But I think there has to be a sense of worry in Moscow about sustainability, population sustainability, etc. Because although autocrats, you know, can move on and so on, but they still need some acquiescence of the people, and I mean, we’ve seen this. And they tend to like the idea that the people really love them, and they don’t want to, sort of, deny themselves that. So, I think the sense of stalemate is really important, and for that, I think – this is what I meant by you don’t want to be – is – you know, Russia will only negotiate if it thinks that it can be in a situ – it could get worse for Russia, and Ukraine needs to also understand that, in order to be able to negotiate. And if you were to be negotiating a long-term peace deal, that would be much more difficult, and that would take a long time, as well. Whereas, negotiating a pause or a stop can at least begin, and you can then start to see what might happen.
I would say, as well, don’t forget other countries in this. So, you know, we’ve talked about the various peace plans, but China’s had quite a big impact, and China, I know, has – over the nuclear issue, what we’ve seen is a convergence of China, Germany and the United States to work together so that Russia would stop the really quite terrifying nuclear threats that it was making. And I think that we have some very interesting behind the scenes players, where Russia is highly dependent – it’s not only China, but highly dependent on the sales that it’s making, be that energy, be that other commodities, throughout the world, that, you know, would like – probably like to see quite an end to this. So, that could be one of the drivers, but I might be grasping at straws at that point.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Natalie, and then you, James.
Natalie Sabanadze
Yeah, thank you for the question. One of the reasons why President Zelenskyy is not visiting Georgia is because relations between Ukrainian and Georgian Governments are rather frosty, as opposed to Ukrainian and Georgian publics. Georgian Government has supported Ukraine in international fora, but it has been – it has done about – that’s it, despite great demand from the people to be more vocal and more supportive. It justifies it because of basically prudence, saying that there is high level tensions, in – particularly in the occupied regions, and Russia might turn its attention there. And, basically, the message they are sending to the public is that “we need to preserve peace at any cost and promote development.”
There is also a domestic political factor, because President Zelenskyy is seen as an ally of the current Government’s domestic rival, which sits in the prison right now, and the domestic politics has been trumping foreign political and national security interests, unfortunately, in Georgia, lately. There is a risk of escalation, the one that I’ve spoken about, especially if Georgian territory, occupied by Russia, but still is used to attack Abkhazia. But what I am more worried about is this, kind of, slow, incremental, growing Russian influence on Georgia, also, on Abkhazia. They’re pushing now foreign agents law, in order to basically stifle any opposition within Abkhazia which can be more pro-independent, and the growing influence of Russia on Georgia.
Ukraine war will be, of course, critical. It will promote democratic change, not only in Georgia, but also, all over region, and Ukraine can become a very important security actor. Georgian-Ukrainian co-operation, under different government, I think, can be essential for changing the, kind of, balance, and introducing greater stability in the Black Sea region. All of this in principle is possible, but depends on the positive outcome of the war.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Thank you.
James Nixey
Yeah, and so, I would just say in response to Andriy’s question, and you can ask the Georgian President herself…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yes, that’s true.
James Nixey
…this time on Wednesday, on this stage, when she will be here, or if you don’t –I’m in your position, and Oyrsia, and I can ask her. In terms – Ivanna’s question.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
And it will be livestreamed, I imagine…
James Nixey
Yeah, exactly.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…so you can also see the answer to the question.
James Nixey
Yeah, in terms of Ivanna’s que – Ivanna, you’ve always been a good friend to the Programme, and Orysia’s Ukraine Forum, in particular, so thank you for that. In terms of the future of Russia, well, as you would expect a Russia and Eurasia Programme to do, it – the – its long-term future is one of – absolutely, one of our key priority areas. We began to work on it last year, Duncan Allan produced a paper. Its conclusion was that in the event of Ukraine getting more or less what it wanted, then actually, we would be dealing with a deeply resentful Russia, and it would be as troublesome – I don’t like to use the word nettlesome, actually, that underplays it, but it would be as difficult an interlocuter as ever. So, it’s – so don’t – so, a Ukrainian victory, more or less, would not result in easier relations with Russia, was the conclusion.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah, and then, I think that’s something we also see with our interaction with policymakers, is that the thinking has sha – has started about what could be the strategy vis-à-vis Russia, but it hasn’t really penetrated much of the thinking. And I am apologising, I cannot take so many questions from the audience. You want just to finish, yeah?
Dr Patricia Lewis
I just want to – for us to end, just for a moment, just to remember all the people who’ve been killed and…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yes.
Dr Patricia Lewis
…injured…
James Nixey
Hmmm.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
Yeah.
Dr Patricia Lewis
…in this terrible war…
Oyrsia Lutsevych
And…
Dr Patricia Lewis
…and the last two years.
Oyrsia Lutsevych
…it’s important you mention this, and as we close, I would like actually to bring in the words of Volodymyr Vakulenko who has been killed. He’s been a Ukrainian Writer, who lived in Izyum, who was occupied by Russia, the city was occupied, and he was writing a diary as he was under occupation. Before he felt the risk to his life, he buried it in a glass jar in the garden, under the cherry tree, so archetypical Ukrainian. His father knew where it is. He told it to his friend, Valeria [means Victoria] Amelina, who was also killed.
But his words, in this diary, one of the entries said, “You can get used to anything. What matters is what sort of person you are left at the end of it.” And of course, Ukrainians are now, in a way, victims of it – their own resilience, getting used to this horrible war. But I think the message from Ukraine, the way I see it, is that we can come out as better world, out of this, if we do the right things today.
So, I would like to thank you all for following what is happening, for engaging, for acting, for coming today, and would like to thank the panel. And you can rely on Chatham House to bring you more analysis and research about this Russo-Ukrainian war, and keep in touch with us. Thank you so much [applause].
