The European Union’s role in a changing world

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Okay, ladies and gents, thank you so much for joining us here this evening for the European Union’s Role in a Changing World. We are here to celebrate and to mark the publication of the latest issue of International Affairs, which has a special section in it on the liberal order, the EU and global political justice, and we’ll hear more on that theme later. If you haven’t already read that section, and of course, it’s available for all members online, there are some hard copies over the other side of the room. So, please feel free to help yourselves to those.

So, a warm welcome to everybody here to Chatham House and as you’ll be well aware, Chatham House has been convening discussions on big issues in international affairs for over 100 years, and we’re obviously delighted that everybody can be here with us to help us continue with that tradition. My name is Richard Whitman. I’m a Senior Fellow at UK in a Changing Europe. I’m also Senior Associate Fellow at RUSI, and I was formerly of this parish. So, it’s very nice to be back here.

Let me introduce our other speakers. Online with us this evening we have Shada Islam, who is an influential – very influential Brussels-based commentator. She is very well known inside the Brussels beltway, so she can give us the take on the temperature in Brussels. She’ll be known to many of you here from her Brussels-based global strategy and advisory media company, New Horizons Project, which she was Founder and obviously, also still heads. She has a number of academic affiliations, including the College of Europe, and she’s also the recipient of a significant number of awards, including being in the top 50 influencers in Brussels, 2023 Woman of the Year in Media from European women internationally, and she was, of course, Director for Europe and Geopolitics at the Friends of Europe thinktank from 2011 to 2020.

Second of our speakers is Hans Kundnani, who is an Associate Fellow here at Chatham House on the Europe Programme. He was previously Senior Research Fellow and Programme Director. His life before Chatham House was at the German Marshall Fund and the European Council on Foreign Relations. And he is the author of a book that if you haven’t read it you should put on your Christmas list if you are interested in things European, Eurowhiteness: Culture, Empire and Race in the European Project, which is a provocative read. I mean that in the positive sense in terms of stimulating all sorts of thought about Europe and European integration.

And the last but by no means least, Professor Helene Sjursen, who is Research Professor at ARENA Centre for European Studies, which is the University of Oslo. She was the Scientific Co-ordinator of the GLOBUS project, of which she’s better placed to say something rather than me, which was a EU-funded Horizon 2020 project. And the research from that project I think comes through very nicely in the Special Issue of International Affairs, or certainly the ideas, but more to come on that later. Helene, I think, is known as one of the clearest and insightful academic writers on things European Union foreign policy and its broader international role. So, we’ll be hearing from her in a little while.

So, just a little bit on our topic for this evening. I mean, in a way, it’s difficult to know where to start, and obviously, we’ll give you a chance to come in later. Those of you who are online, please put your questions in the Q&A, and I’ll talk about the modalities for those in the room. But clearly, we’re at a moment for the European Union in which it’s a significant challenging environment for the EU to operate internationally, both geopolitically and geoeconomically. The EU’s had some plaudits for the way that it responded to the War in Ukraine, but that now appears to be a response that’s under some stress.

The EU faces significant internal challenges, not least the politics of individual member states, but also, how it’s going to embark on a significant – the most significant enlargement project that the EU has ever undertaken with the enlargement to Ukraine. But also externally, and as we’ll hear from our speakers, the external environment is also very challenging for the EU’s model of politics and the EU’s model of political economy. So, each of our speakers is going to introduce some ideas for five minutes or so, then we’ll have a discussion between ourselves and come back to you. So, would be grateful if you could start to formulate your questions or comments to the speakers as they deliver. So, Shada, over to you.

Shada Islam

Thank you very much, Richard, and hello everyone. I’m – apologies that I’m not really in London; I couldn’t come this evening. So, Richard, as you’ve said, a moment of very, very direct challenges to the European Union. We’re going to focus on foreign policy, I think, rather than enlargement or the internal growth of the far-right within the EU, but the external challenges. So, two wars in our neighbourhood, the Russia-Ukraine war where the European Union has shown a degree of unity, increasingly fragile unity, but still effective geopolitically. And then, of course the Israel-Hamas conflict, which has highlighted divisions which could be quite fatal for Europe’s geopolitical reputation and the so-called geopolitical Europe we’re talking about. So, really, we’re living in Brussels at the moment in the foreign policy world in two parallel universes, sort of, schizophrenic.

So, let me explain a little bit what I mean. Six quick points. I think the first one, really, is that the EU has still not really recognised or acknowledged that it is a changed world, so hence your title is very, very apt, and not just slightly changed or changed on the edges, but really seriously transformed. And that it really is now a multipolar world where countries have agency and self-confidence and are increasingly assertive on the global stage. And that this multipolarity also means that countries across the world, like the EU, by the way, are not really eager or willing to make binary choices, like, between democracies and autocracies, which is being fed to us sometimes. And so, this us and them scenarios are not very valid. It’s really, as has been said, and I’ve been saying for about three years, a mix-and-match world, a pick-and-choose world, and countries are working on the basis of issues and topics, so not really ideologically aligned, but transactionally aligned at moments.

The second point is a lot of people here in Brussels are still quibbling over the term Global South, and I find that rather peculiar, because I think we have to now recognise that there is a collective Global South. It is contested, it is fragmented, there is no real leader, but it is a reality, it is a phenomenon that we have to deal with, and the demands for reform that are coming from the Global South is something that we have to take quite seriously, and we’re not doing that.

The third point, I think it’s a real challenge to our identity. You know, we talk about strategic autonomy, it comes and goes, that discussion, but it is there with us, and yet we’re at the same time, tied to the United States, of course, from the security point of view. And the war, or Russia-Ukraine War, has of course highlighted Europe’s strategic dependence on security on the United States, but there is also still this aspiration of strategic autonomy. Whether it’s in security, trade or foreign policy, this talk of perhaps building a third pole when it comes to US-China relations, you know, instead of the binary, sort of, choice, but having actually a third pillar, a third concept of co-operation or co-existence. So, all of that creates a certain tension within foreign policy conversations.

Now, there’s also, of course, because of the Israel-Hamas conflict, the Israel-Palestine conflict, more and more accusations of double standards and of hypocrisy on the part of the European Union when it talks about adherence and commitment to the multilateral rules-based order, and yet has been very reluctant until recently, and very cautious, about calling out Israel’s violation of the law – humanitarian law, or the rules of war, as they are called. So, countries in the Global South which once looked at the EU as a guardian, as a custodian of the multilateral rules-based order, and they were told that this was the case in the Russia-Ukraine War, are finding it very difficult to accept what is happening now and are calling Europe out.

The fifth point, Richard, is really something that Hans has talked about and written about, is this reluctance and unwillingness in Europe to recognise and acknowledge, once again, the legacy of colonialism which weighs very heavily on its relationship, increasingly so, I would say, because Global South countries are calling it out as colonialism, and our participation in the trade of enslaved people. This has become a big, big issue in Europe’s relations with Africa, in – with Latin America, where in the recent meeting with Latin America, there is actually a reference to Europe’s colonial legacy, and this is very difficult and very awkward for the European Union to realise and recognise, though there have been some, sort of, apologies that’ve been given.

So, what happens next, is next year we have elections to the European Parliament, there will be a new Commission. We’ve had elections in Netherlands, and we’ve seen the shocking, if you like, success of Geert Wilders, the far-right party, anti-Muslim, anti-Islam, anti a lot of things that the European Union stands for, including climate leadership. So, are we going to, sort of, move towards this far-right, sort of, view of Europe, the Orbán view of Europe, if you like, and how will that affect and impact on our foreign policy and on our geopolitical reputation?

Now, finally, my five minutes are running out, I think the European Union, for all the criticism of it, can, if it wants to, play quite an important role, quite a, I would say, active and constructive role, in this new transformed multipolar world. But in order to do so it has to actually start listening to the Global South, and it has actually to start projecting itself in a more humble and I would say, less arrogant manner, to – when it talks to Global South countries.

Final word. A lot of the EU Ambassadors, the European Ambassadors across the world, have come back to Brussels recently and told European Union institutions, Ursula von der Leyen, the Commission President, Josep Borrell, the High Representative, of the problem of double standards and how difficult it is for them to actually talk about rules-based order or European values, given the current European stance in the Israel-Hamas conflict. I’ll end there.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thank you very much, Shada. I should’ve said, of course, in my introduction that the whole event here is on the record, and ditto for the Q&A after. So, thanks very much for a set of clear points, and I think some really interesting issues that we can pick up in our collective discussion. But first, Helene.

Professor Helene Sjursen

Thanks very much, Richard. I will make a few remarks that are addressing primarily the first two questions that were raised in the invitation to this meeting, so what are the challenges facing the EU today, and what – how might the EU adapt and evolve to these challenges to remain a relevant actor? And I would like to flag one particular challenge, which is linked to the nature and characteristics of what is often referred to as the liberal international order that the European Union is a part of. So, this is a concern that comes, in a way, prior to specific policy issues that the EU has to tackle, but that still, I think, conn – indirectly connects to those, because it has to do with the terms on which the European Union engages with other countries in order to tackle such issues.

So, as we all know, this assumed liberal international order, which has enabled the European Union to thrive as an international actor, has come under increasing pressure. Russia’s War against Ukraine is perhaps the clearest illustration of the challenges facing such a notion of international order. And we see the Union shifting to focus increasingly on security concerns, and on developing and strengthening capabilities to allow it to effectively promote its interests and values, and as well as the liberal order that it sees as – itself as part of.

So, when suggesting that there is a challenge with the liberal order, I’m not aiming to argue against the EU’s efforts to reinforce its autonomy or action capacity. For sure, in view of the upcoming presidential elections in the US, such an issue is a pressing one for the European Union. Rather, what I’m suggesting, is that efficiency for the European Union does not only depend on capabilities, but first and foremost, on legitimacy. And that the bate – the whole debate emanating from the European Union on the need to strengthen its action capacity seems to presuppose that the particular view of what a well-organised international system should look like, which is represented by the notion of a liberal international order, can be acceptable to others. And this presupposition might, in fact, hamper the Union’s ability to engage effectively with other actors, such as states from the Global South.

For sure, it’s not a matter of the validity of the core principles of the rights of the individual, equal treatment etc., which are seen – described as, or considered to be part of the liberal order. But rather, my suggestion is that the advocates of such an international order have taken too lightly on the point that in order to be free and equal, people need to give themselves those rights. In the notion of a liberal international order, such rights seem merely to be proclaimed as a part of the liberal order. They are defined as pre-political, but in order to be acceptable to all that are affected, those affected need to be part of interpreting and reinterpreting those rights.

So, my suggestion then is that as an advocate of a, kind of, liberal international order, the challenge for the European Union is not only one of double standards, but it’s a challenge that’s linked to the standards themselves, and how they come about, who – and who has a voice in interpreting the meaning of those standards.

So, in response to the questions that were raised in the invitation to the meeting, what are the challenges facing the European Union today, and how might the Union adapt to these challenges in order to engage effectively with third states? The argument that I want to put forward is that the Union needs to rethink its understanding and approach to international order in a manner that does not only proclaim rights, but that enables people to give those rights to themselves. So, the Union needs to focus on the institutions and procedures of international order and contribute to reform those in a manner that allows for participation and voice, also for the Global South, who do not define themselves as unavoidably part of this order in the first place.

So, this is a principled critique, but I think it’s one that finds its echoes, for example, in the demands for reform of the United Nations, and also, more generally, reflects the demands for a voice and ownership, which our first speaker also raised. Thank you.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thanks very much, Helene. I mean, I think that there are lots of questions there, I think, about how, you know, how the EU can do that when it’s also, at the same time, sort of, you know, seeking to muscle its way in and establish, you know, a place for itself. But, you know, that’s something we can get into in our collective discussion. Hans?

Hans Kundnani

Yeah, thank you, Richard, and thank you, Shada and Helene. So, I guess I’ll say a few things, kind of, in response to both of you. I – and so, I suppose it’ll fall into two categories of the liberal international order, which you talked about, Helene, and then the way in which the EU is changing, and its role in international politics, in response to Shada.

So, I guess, you know, to start with on the liberal international order, I mean, I, you know, tend to be rather sceptical of the whole concept, to be honest. You know, Graham Allison called it conceptual Jell-O, and I think that’s right. I find it just really difficult to know what we’re talking about when we talk about the liberal international order. You know, my best attempt to try to make sense of it is to, sort of, say, well, look, you know, first of all, it’s evolved over time, right? I mean what the liberal international order was in the immediate post-war – post-Cold War – sorry, post-World War Two period is totally different to what it’s become in the post-World War – post-Cold War period, and, you know, a big part of how it’s changed, by the way, I think in some negative ways, has been as a consequence of actions that Europeans and the West has taken.

Secondly, it has these different elements, right? So, you know, you can break it down in different ways but, you know, I’d want to at least distinguish between a, sort of, security order, an economic order and a human rights order. And then thirdly, you know, for me the thing which I really struggle with in terms of the liberal international order, is in what sense is it liberal? I just don’t understand this. Are we talking about liberalism in a, sort of, political sense, as opposed to, you know, say, authoritarianism? You know, which is how I think – it’s one of the ways in which John Ikenberry understands it. Or are we talking about ec – liberalism in an economic sense as opposed to, sort of, you know, mercantilism? And again, this is one of the elements of it, you know, that it’s supposed to have something to do with free trade. Again, that’s gone further in the post-Cold War period so it’s, you know, sort of, complicated. Or are we – or is it liberal in the IR sense, right, as opposed to a realist order, whatever that would be?

So, I just find it really difficult to, sort of, wrap my head around what we even mean when we talk about the liberal international order, but then, if – you know, to pick up on your point, Helene, about how – what I took you to be saying that the EU ought to do, to, sort of, somehow redress some of the imbalances in terms of the liberal international order. So, then let’s take as an example, you know, the international financial institutions, and in particular, the IMF, where the Managing Director of the IMF is reserved for a European. And this goes, too, to Richard’s point, right? So, concretely, what is the EU supposed to do about that? I mean, to meet your concerns, it should really give that up, right? But that then cuts completely against the idea, which it seems to me, and this brings me then to what Shada was saying about the EU and its changing role in the world, that the EU is moving in completely the opposite direction, right, which is to at least try to think in a more hard-headed way about its interests. And so, I think that’s a massive tech – contradiction there, which the EU hasn’t begun to resolve.

So, in terms of the EU’s – sort of, the way it thinks about its role in international politics, you know, there was a time when it thought about itself as a normative power. Richard’s colleague, Ian Manners, wrote about that, but as I think Shada mentioned, you know, in the last few years, all of the talk has been around, you know, strategic autonomy and European sovereignty and a geopolitical Europe. Again, I don’t know what any of these concepts mean. I mean, when people talk about geopolitics, you know, sometimes that’s just used as a synonym for international politics. Sometimes it’s used to talk about the role of geography in international politics. Sometimes it’s meant to, sort of, capture some kind of alternative to power politics. Sometimes it’s used to capture a, kind of – a shift away from economic liberalism, towards something more like protectionism. When Ursula von der Leyen talks about a Geopolitical Commission, I think it mea – she means it in that way.

So, I think this is another, you know, example of the utter confusion in the EU about what its role is. I read a piece called “Europe’s Geopolitical Confusion,” and so, again, I don’t think it’s begun to think about how it would, you know, even respond to this question around, you know, this one example, question around the – you know, its privilege in the IMF.

And that then finally, and this is where I’ll stop, brings me to the question about the colonial legacy of the EU that you mentioned, Shada, and that as you say, I’ve, you know, been thinking about a little bit. Because here again, you know, it seems to me that rather than taking this more seriously and then thinking about what it would mean to actually, you know, be serious about the legacy of European colonialism, which could, for example, mean beginning to think about a project of reparations, my sense is that in the last two years since the war in Ukraine began Europeans are moving in precisely the opposite direction, right?

There as an embryonic discussion about this, but my impression, and I don’t know if this is – you share this, Shada, in Brussels, my impression is Europeans, since the War in Ukraine began, now feel as if they have the moral high ground, in particular in relation to the Global South. What I’ve seen Europeans doing over the last two years is lecture the Global South. And I’ll give you one example of this, which, as I say, illustrates how Europeans are moving in the opposite direction of beginning to think about a project of reparations, which is that two weeks into the War in Ukraine, Lithuania stopped a shipment of COVID-19 vaccines to Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, because it abstained in the UN on the Russian invasion, right?

And, you know, I think that, kind of, says it all, really, about the, kind of, moment we’re in. That’s before we even get onto, you know, Gaza, which you mentioned, Shada, and which I think really does, you know – I don’t think it’s just that the Global South, sort of, increasingly looks at Europeans as being hypocritical. I think they are in real – I think it’s exposed the liberal international order as, you know, as, really, a lot of nonsense, frankly.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thanks for being so unclear, Hans, as your view. Shada, can I come to you first? I mean, Hans has, sort of, characterised what I put in short, and – a, sort of, utter confusion really, in terms of the – where the EU is, sort of, hive-minded in terms of it being torn between this, sort of, desire to put itself in a position in which it might exercise power in the environment that it finds itself in, but in some sense, sort of, lacking the capacity to fully move into or equip itself with the means to be influential. I mean, you seemed to be alluding to that in your points. Are there any – where do you think it’s going to end up? Where do you think the EU’s at, at the moment, and do you think it’s going to remain this, sort of, fudge or mass of uncertainty?

Shada Islam

It is, as Hans has said, a very confusing moment, and a moment of great tension between different ideas, different visions of Europe. Now, over the Russia-Ukraine War we’ve seen very effective and quick decision-making by the EU, by the Commission itself, you know, moving into defence and security, sending the weapons quickly, the sanctions etc. That’s been quite effective, and I think actually has been quite impressive, I think, for the world, because we didn’t expect such quick action. Now, we can, you know, we can now see some of that consensus unravelling, but it was there, and I think even the most sceptical people would be impressed by how quickly things were being done. I, myself, I have to say, was quite impressed by how quickly and how in a consensual fashion this was being done, right?

But now, fast forward to 7 October, and I would say that all that high moral ground and all that, sort of, admiration that there was, to some extent, at how quickly the EU was responding to Russia, you know, cutting back on energy, oil and gas, moving to – you know, taking stone – firm steps, all of that, all of that has come crashing down. Crashing down in a very, very, very catastrophic way for the European Union. Great reputational damage across the world, I would say. I mean, obviously not in the United States, but also, and this is important, Richard, also in our own streets, in our own neighbourhoods. Pro-peace, pro-Palestinian demonstrations are happening every week here across the European Union, and I think that’s a indication of how distance – how disconnected some of our leaders are, the geopolitical leaders, from the reality of what many of our people want.

So, there is this constant tension between two visions. The soft power vision, you know, which sees itself as a giver of aid, you know, assistance, open markets, all those things that I think are impressive, and a peace project, if you like. And then the reality of, sort of, having to navigate in a very, very harsh and challenging world. And as Hans has said, you know, the question of reparations for colonialism has not been entered into at all and cannot be, because that’s the kind of issue that will then take us into, you know, aid issues that is completely unresolvable.

And my great concern, I have to say, Hans, you said how – Richard, where are we headed? Well, if we do keep drifting to the far-right, if we don’t have a centre that holds, if the centre Politicians keep adopting the rhetoric and the stances of the far-right leaders, then we’re in trouble in foreign policy terms. Many of our far-right Politicians are very pro-Russia, for instance, just to give you one – they’re very pro-Israel, just to give you another example. So, this is going to be, I think, quite a challenging moment, next year, for the European Union.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thanks very much, Shada. Helene, I mean, Hans has, sort of, served up all these contradictions that seem to make it really difficult to – for the EU to, sort of – to pursue this endeavour of a pursuit of a liberal order, you know, which in many ways, is just the – one of the most powerful stories that the EU tells about itself. And, you know, in that sense perhaps calls into question the EU’s, sort of, you know, capacities to keep itself moving forward. But I think your, you know, your view is definitely that you are much more optimistic, if I read you correctly. However difficult it is, and I think, you know, colleagues within the Special Section, obviously, take different views about the EU’s capacity for influence and to accommodate itself to a changing order, which may not be as liberal. I mean, what’s – you know, how do you push back against Hans and Hans’s argument?

Professor Helene Sjursen

Well, first of all, Hans, thank you. You gave me an opportunity to, sort of, advertise this Special Section and my own article in there, because the first part of that article is about the concept of a liberal order, and my argument is that this concept is ambiguous, slippery and contradictory.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah.

Professor Helene Sjursen

So, I completely agree with you, and I think one thing that you didn’t mention, but which I think is at the core of the contradictions within the concept of liberal order, is the fact that it’s supposed to be a rules-based order, but it’s at the same time, a hegemonic order.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah.

Professor Helene Sjursen

So, those two things are quite difficult to reconcile, right? Even if the argument is that the United States is a benevolent hegemon, even so, I think hegemony in itself cannot really be reconciled with a rules-based order, in the sense that it alludes to a notion of equal treatment, right? So, I completely agree with you, that the notion of a liberal order is ambiguous, it’s slippery and it’s contradictory. It’s very hard to nail down exactly what those who talk about a liberal order actually mean.

But at the same time, I think it’s not a notion that we can just set aside, because it’s a notion that’s alive out there in the literature on IR, and that is also referred to by our Politicians. So, at the same time, it’s an idea that actually has an impact on the way people, actors, define their policies. And my conclusion in a sense is that at the core of the liberal order is a normative claim about what a well-ordered world should look like, and that is very vague, and in real terms, it’s not realised. But it’s still something that is out there and, sort of, establishes a promise, which it fails to live up to, in my view. So, that’s on the liberal order. I agree with you that it’s ambiguous.

In terms of, so, what should the EU do? I’m sure there are people in the audience who are much better than me at answering that. I’m a Researcher, I’m not a politician or someone employed to develop actual policies. My concern is that before we start thinking of what to do, we need to be sure about what is at stake. That’s – so it’s, kind of, an argument at a different level, and I worry that some of the answers to what the EU should do does not sufficiently take into account what is actually at stake. So, there has to be a coherence between those two things, in my view. And it may well be that the EU is moving in the opposite direction of what I suggested in my opening five minutes, but I didn’t claim that the EU was moving in the direction that I was suggesting. I was merely asking, is this the direction in which the EU should be moving, given what is at stake? So…

Hans Kundnani

Which direction?

Professor Helene Sjursen

You are arguing that the EU is moving in the opposite direction of that of, for example, reforming the IMF in order to ensure more equality of representation.

Hans Kundnani

Right.

Professor Helene Sjursen

And this may be correct, but that was not my point. My point was should it, right? So, it’s not – I wasn’t making an empirical observation, I was making a principled argument.

Hans Kundnani

Yeah.

Professor Helene Sjursen

So, I suppose that’s how I would push back to Hans’s comments.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Others in the audience may well also have a response to Hans, and we’re going to come out in a moment. But before we do, I mean, one of the things that hangs over this for me is also, you know, the partnership that’s been existent between the US and Europeans. And obviously, we’re at a moment in which, you know, we’ve already had a questioning of the enduring nature of that partnership under the first Trump presidency, and now obviously, see possible currents in US politics that may call that into question much more in the future. Not just about an individual, but about the way in which the US is thinking about its place in the world.

So, I just wonder, before we come out to the Q&A, and there’s actually some questions in here on the chat, so it’s my, sort of, segue to the open conversation, it’s what the US does to this discussion that we’re having here. Because it seems to me one of the things that happens – you know, Europeans have had a lot of luxury to indulge in their thinking about how they might think about their place internationally, and they don’t have that, kind of, ability to indulge themselves anymore, I would suggest. And that puts them in a different place from perhaps where they were at the turn of the century, where there was this, sort of, suggestion that, you know, Europe was in some way back as a collectivity, because it had a clear sense of what it wanted to do internationally and how it wanted to do it.

So, that was almost a sermon, wasn’t it, rather than a question? But I guess I’m asking whether you’re able to say something short, snappy and pithy about, you know, whether the US really throws up for Europeans such an important set of issues, that it really does make what we’re talking about a bit of an also ran kind of debate. Or a debate between Europeans, you know, rather than a debate that we really need to be having, which is, how do we respond to the US disappearing and thus, not having the luxury of thinking about these, kind of, things for ourselves? So, maybe Shada first, and then Hans, and then back to Helene.

Shada Islam

Did you want me to go first?

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Yes, please, Shada.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Ah, okay, alright. Right, so on the US, I think the Europeans are, obviously, as you’ve said, you know, very dependent on the security umbrella that the US provides, and that’s not going to go away however much we spend on defence and increase our budgets. I mean, the US is going to be there, and much needed. But there is a deal – great deal of concern here, obviously, about what happens next with Joe Biden and Donald Trump, and there are people who are obviously trying to accelerate the strategic autonomy discussions, but then, we’re caught up also in this subsidy race with the Americans with the Inflation Reduction Act, etc.

So, it is a fraught relationship at times, but under the current Geopolitical Commission of Ursula von der Leyen, of course, on many issues in foreign policy, including the Middle East and China, and Russia, we are, Europeans, very, very closely aligned with the United States at the moment. So, I think that is something that we need to take into account. We – as far as I can tell, on issues to do with China we’ve never been as closely aligned with the US view as we are at the moment.

But if I may, Richard, there are a couple of things I just want to say. There is this idea that – you know, you asked me about what happens next, and you’ve seen now over the Middle East how member states individually, Spain, Belgium, my country, Slovenia, Ireland, these countries are breaking away from what I call the institutional straitjacket of the EU when it comes to the Middle East. Because, you know, there are certain, sort of, red lines that cannot be crossed because of Germany and its history, etc. These countries are now moving on their own and taking responsibility, in a sense, to salvage Europe’s reputation worldwide on what Helene calls the “liberal rules-based order,” to try and safeguard some rem – you know, remnants of ethics and morality, given the destruction of Gaza.

So, I think that this is something that I think is also going to be happening more and more. If we’re always trying to find a common position, and we can’t, countries will have to break away from this stranglehold that we have through the collective EU treaty and work on their own, and I think this is going to be something that we have to watch out for.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thanks, Shada. So, Hans, then Helene.

Hans Kundnani

I’ll be extremely brief, ‘cause I know you want to get to questions. I mean, I suppose I don’t quite share the, sort of, the – this, kind of, fear of this nightmare scenario of Trump coming to power again and then, you know, pulling away the US security guarantee in the way that I think a lot of people do. Partly because I – you know, I don’t like Trump, obviously, but I do have some sympathy for the restrainers in Washington who do actually – well, I guess there’s two versions of this that I sympathise with. One is the, you know, the view that you hear from some people in D.C., which is that the US needs to focus on China, and Europe. It’s, you know, extremely rich continent and it should be able to take care of its own security. I can see that from an American point of view. And second, I also, you know, sympathise with the restrainers, who think that, you know, American military power hasn’t necessarily been good in the liberal international order, and it actually might be good if the US pulled back a bit.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Helene?

Professor Helene Sjursen

Yes, what should the Europeans do in response to changes in the US? I would say that the European Union remains a resource or asset for the EU member states, and that it’s an asset in a sense that it allows the member states to resolve all those global challenges more easily than what they could do on their own. So, in response to a withdrawal or reduction of the role of the US in Europe, it seems to me that for European states, the European Union is still their best bet.

Then I’m thinking of global challenges, such as climate change, for example, which is, I would say, one of the largest challenges the world is facing, and for those, kind of, transnational challenges. States cannot solve them on their own. They need the kinds of institutional framework that is provided through the European Union, but they also need to engage effectively with the rest of the world. So, yeah, the European Union would still be my first answer.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thank you very much, Helene. So, we’re open now for questions. There’s roving mics, so if you just want to raise your hand. Just over here first, please. If you don’t mind introducing yourself.

Tom Reilly

Thank you very much. A really interesting conversation. My name’s Tom Reilly, I’m from Covington, which is a US-based law firm, but I do public policy in the UK. One of the things that you’ve, sort of, skirted around but you haven’t addressed, is migration, and this is obviously a really important issue. We see it with the moves across Europe, and that has to be confronted. There is, of course, a risk that once you talk about migration, you begin to play on the preferred ground of the hard-right, and if Brexit taught us one thing, it is that as soon as you start ceding ground to the hard-right, they will take it and demand more.

In order to compete against that, you need some sort of compelling vision for the future of Europe. I’m not hearing it here today, and I wondered if, for example, the concept of a multi-speed Europe, which might weaken Europe, might strengthen Europe, would be an attractive alternative vision, ‘cause I think that’s what Europe needs if you’re going to, sort of, have a role for Europe in a changing world. So, I’d be really interested to hear what you think that vision might be. Thank you.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thanks very much. Can I come to you, Shada, first, the vision thing?

Shada Islam

Right, yeah. So, the question about multi-speed Europe, variable geometries, and all of this flexible Europe, I think, you know, we’re – we will never go away from that, and it exists in reality, of course it does. You know, you’ve got Schengen, the border-free area, you’ve got the Eurozone, you’ve got all kinds of social things that some countries are not part of. So, that is a reality, but going forward, I mean, this brings us to the question of enlargement, as well, and, you know, we’re committed to enlargement to the Balkans, now Ukraine, Moldova, and more. Turkey, of course, falls by the wayside when we talk about this. So, you know, there will have to be, and there is currently the European Political Community, as well, which is really just a huge talk shop.

So, I think all of these things will continue to, you know, gain some traction, but in the end, I think there’s nothing like the European Union when it works together, when it’s efficient and streamlined and it works with all its heart, and it works effectively. And I agree with Helene that I think, you know, the EU, when it is a collectively, can be a very strong partner for the United States and for the rest of the world. And at the moment, I’m hearing from a number of my friends and colleagues across the world who feel rather betrayed by the European Union because the European Union did come across, as Hans has said, you know, a normative power of sorts, but still, a power that supported human rights and international rules, and helps civil society across the world in many, many very direct and indirect ways. And having seen this, sort of, contradiction and double standards over Gaza, a lot of these people feel extremely betrayed.

And finally, on migration, as well, I mean, this is, I think, you know, a really Achilles heel of the European Union. It has been spinned all over by the far-right Politicians. The mainstream has adopted the narrative of the far-right, and the reality of the fact that we need labour, we need foreign labour, we need skilled and unskilled labour, and that, you know, there is plenty of room in the European Union for asylum seekers and refugees coming in, they do not have to be kept in detention camps, I mean, all of this is forgotten. So, sane voices, cool heads, everything has now disappeared because we’re in thrall of the far-right in all of our narratives when it comes to migration.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thanks, Shada. Maybe I could just add into that question, maybe to Hans, then Helene, is also, you know, the idea thing. What about the leadership, you know, where might the leadership come? Where are the ideas entrepreneurs? Where are the big thinkers within the EU who are going to put the EU in a place in which it can cope with all of these challenges that it has coming at it? You don’t have to answer that if you don’t want to.

Hans Kundnani

I mean, it’s – I think it’s, sort of, implicit in what Shada has already said. I mean, to me, it seems to me that the, you know, the direction in which the EU has been moving over the last decade, against the background of the rise of the far-right and, you know, the – I guess with the refugee crisis in 2015 as a critical juncture, it seems to me it’s moving further and further to the right. And I think the question that, you know, is – that now has, you know, become – sort of emerged, I’ve been writing about this in the last few months, is that I think we have to start thinking about the possibility of a far-right EU, you know, after the next European Parliament elections next summer. You have this convergence between the centre-right and the far-right, particularly on these questions around identity and immigration and Islam. That’s clearly the trajectory that the EU is on, and I think the question is, just how far does that go?

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Helene?

Professor Helene Sjursen

Yes, there was a question at the beginning with – that had to do with migration, as well. I’m not a migration scholar, so – and I can’t really provide, sort of, technical suggestions as to how to resolve that challenge for the European Union. There is an article in the Special Section on migration, and my colleagues who wrote that are extremely critical to the way the European Union has tackled migration. And in general, I think that’s – the critiques that they raise are very reasonable. I mean, it’s a huge problem that the European Union has not handled the question of migration in a manner that is in line with its own principles.

Hans Kundnani

Can I add one more sentence on that? Which is, I just – I do think it’s important, since you mentioned Brexit, to distinguish between freedom of movement on the one hand, and the question of, you know, immigration from outside of the EU, in particular asylum. These are two totally different questions.

Professor Helene Sjursen

Hmmm. When it comes to the far-right, I used to think that the far-right could not, sort of, take over the European Union because they are nationalists, right? So, how can they possibly agree on governing the European Union together? It’s – that’s a contradiction. But I’m realising that this – for some reason it seems that they meet and talk collectively about the European Union, and this, of course, is a great worry. I’m not sure I see where the leadership will come from, Richard.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Yeah, yeah. I know you’re desperate to come back on that one ‘cause you’ve written on that, but I want to take some more people…

Hans Kundnani

Yeah.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

…from the floor first. At the front here, please.

Caterina Cognini

Thank you very much. Good evening, my name is, I’m a master’s student in European Affairs at Science Po, LSE, and I would like to ask a question to Mrs Islam to reflect, actually, on a, sort of, I think, inconsistency that she made in her initial remarks. You mentioned that the geopolitical European leaders are in some ways dis-attached from the reality of the streets with their controversial pro-Israel view, to your opinion. But I’d rather say that the result of the Dutch elections actually tells us the opposite. That actually, in that sense, the – maybe the streets represent a, sort of, more vocal minority, where actually the tendency we are seeing in the European more centrist electorate is actually not going in that direction. So – and I think that’s something we’re going to see very much, also, in the European elections. So, thank you very much.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thank you. I’ll take a couple more and then we’ll come back to the panel. So, at the front here, please.

Barry Buzan

Yeah, thanks. Barry Buzan, LSE. I’d like to push Richard’s question a bit further about the US. I mean, several of the panellists noted that in a sense, Ukraine had given the EU its geopolitical moment and it had performed actually rather well, to everybody’s great surprise. Now, however, when we think about next year, if the Republicans win in the US, almost no matter who it is that becomes President, the EU is going to face a make-or-break moment on that geopolitical face that it had put on. I mean, the basic question is, do you think it’s likely to step up and support Ukraine, even with a much weaker or completely absent American backing, or is it going to fold up and kowtow to Russia, and what on Earth would that do to its internal politics, speaking of the right?

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Thank you. One more and then, we’ll come back to the panel. Just at the back, please.

Member

Thank you. I want just to talk about in general. I mean, we all talk about Europe as one entity, but we hardly can put our finger on any position, and the chronology in the last few decades is getting more fragmented. Where is the – where do we search in the horizon? I mean, more integrity of Europe, would be that a solution with all the separatists’ voices? Thank you.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Great, thank you very much. So, Shada first, I think, then Helene, then Hans.

Shada Islam

Right, it’s a very good question from the LSE student on Geert Wilders and how his election – and, you know, that the streets are actually moving towards that. I think what has happened, if I may, is that we are normalising, in all of our discourses in the political landscape, we’re normalising the far-right. I mean, I see this even now. Geert Wilder – I tweeted about this actually this morning, Geert Wilders has now been whitewashed, if I could put it that way. You know, yes, he is the far-right, but, you know, he’ll be in a coalition so his voice will be muted. He, you know, he is not calling for Netherlands’ exit from the EU. He’s going to tone down his pro-Russian – and, you know – pro-Russian attitude. He is not really, you know, such a bad guy. He’s Geert Milders, not Geert Wilders.

So, a lot of this is happening, and I think the progressive, frankly, have left the vacuum, have left a space open for this kind of discussion normalisation. So, I think the streets – the young people, and I do firmly believe that young people are progressive, are pro-peace and do want a Europe that is open and progressive, but they need to have – find the right leaders to connect with, and to bring their voice to the political assemblies, and at the moment that is not happening. We need charismatic, interesting, and honest leadership from the progressives at the moment, and that is, I think, the big challenge facing our political communities.

There was also a question about integration. Look, the European Union has always faced the challenge of countries that do not always agree. At the moment, we have, you know, we have Hungary, we have countries that are – Slovakia, up and down all the time, constant friction, etc., but I think in the end, the countries do stay together. But I do see, and I have said that, I do see a part of Europe that will start working more independently, especially on issues to do with foreign policy, because if we can’t get results collectively, we’ll have to start doing this on a national level. And we’ve seen it now, as I said, with Belgium and Spain over the Middle East. Thanks.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Helene, then Hans, yeah.

Professor Helene Sjursen

So, if the US withdraws with regard to Ukraine, will the EU fold up? We don’t know, right? We can’t predict, but the European Union has committed to enlargement to Ukraine. That’s a pretty huge commitment and it’s one that it’s difficult to disentangle itself from. So, my two pence would be the European Union will not fold up, but obviously, the largest contribution to the support of the Ukraine, it comes from the US. So, perhaps rather than folding up the crucial question is, how much can the European Union actually do? Can it compensate completely for a US withdrawal? No, I don’t think so, but I don’t really see the Union dropping Ukraine if the US pulls out.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Hans?

Hans Kundnani

Thanks. So, first of all, I can’t help but say in response to Shada that from the data I’ve seen, young people in – certainly in France, but I think in the Netherlands as well, are actually voting disproportionately for the far-right, right? So, this is actually unlike Trump, right, where older people are voting for the far-right. It’s actually the reverse situation, which is partly why I’m getting more pessimistic.

And then, on Barry’s great question. So, I teach a class at the Collège d’Europe on European Foreign Policy from the end of the Cold War to the War in Ukraine, and I just did this course. And I asked – basically asked the students to, sort of, tell me, like, what’s changed since the end of the Cold War, because it feels to me when you look at this story, that it’s this – it’s, you know, the same thing over and over again.

So, in particular, you know, you said, Barry, you know, this is the geopolitical moment for the EU, right, and that is the way that it’s been framed, right? It’s this, kind of, you know, moment of awakening. I mean, there’ve been so many of these moments of awakening, right? And I – you know, if you think back to 1991 when Yugoslavia starts to break up and the wars in the Balkans start, you know, famously Jacques Poos, who’s then the Luxembourg Foreign Minister, says, “It’s the hour of Europe,” right? And then twice in the 1990s, you know, Europeans depend on American military power to solve, first of all, the conflict in Bosnia, and then Kosovo, right? And it’s just been the same story, you know, all – over and over again, and to me that’s been the story of Ukraine, as well. It’s demonstrated, as I think Shada said, you know, European dependence on American power.

So, then, you know – and then, what’s very striking to me, as well, is that the reflex of the European Union, at this moment when it thinks that it’s going through this change and it’s becoming geopolitical, right, and Joseph Borrell, the EU High Representative, is saying, “We need to learn to speak the language of power,” and as Shada mentioned, you know, Ursula von der Leyen has proclaimed a Geopolitical Commission, the first instinct of the EU, as opposed to NATO, is to reach for enlargement, which is the oldest foreign policy tool that the EU has. I mean, in fact, it’s what the EU had before it even had a foreign policy, was enlargement, as a, kind of, a substitute for a foreign policy. So, it’s gone back to that, you know, earliest, kind of, reflex, except now it frames it in geopolitical terms, right, and says this is a geopolitical necessity now, enlargement, right? This is not about, you know, EU normative power, as it was in the 1990s and the 2000s.

And then, to answer your question, Barry, about, you know, what does – what actually does the EU do, does it step up? I mean, I guess I want to say that, first of all, it’s not just about Ukraine, but as I mentioned, there is also this question around the – you know, an even bigger question around the US security guarantee to Europe and the future of NATO, right? So, it’s not just about, you know, do you support Ukraine? There’s a much more existential question, in a way.

And so, I’m much more pessimistic than you are, Helene, that Europeans do step up. I find it very difficult to see how they do that. I certainly find it very difficult to see how the EU can do that. I think there might be a way in which – I mean I think, by the way, this is where the UK’s role becomes very, very interesting, because, you know, obviously the UK can’t fill that gap completely, that’s left by the United States, but it can play a, sort of, an important role, and I think that’ll be one of the questions. But then I think it’s very difficult to say, Barry, what exactly happens in that situation. I think you start to get a lot of things going into flux.

So, based on the experience of the first Trump administration, I wonder whether, if a second Trump administration really were to, kind of, pull the plug, as it were, that then you start to get all kinds of bilateral security arrangements. And so, for example, during the Trump administration, I wrote a piece about – it was called, you know, the “East Asianisation of Europe,” you know, that you move to something more like the Asian model of security. You saw that, for example, with the way that Poland started to, kind of, try to develop, you know, a much closer bilateral – you know, and starts to make an offer to the Trump administration about a bilateral relationship.

So, I think we start to get a lot of things in flux, but I don’t think it’s a, sort of, simple binary of, you know, does the US continue to support or not? And I also don’t think it’s, you know, quite as simple as does the EU step up or not? I think everything just, kind of, goes into flux at that point, and I find it very difficult to predict what happens.

And one final thought is – in terms of the far-right, because you asked about the politics, that’s complicated as well, because the far-right doesn’t have a united position on Ukraine. It’s not as if, you know – sometimes people like to think that, you know, the centrists are pro-Ukraine and the far-right are pro-Russian, but it’s much more complicated than that. I mean the far-right government in Poland that just got voted out of power was pretty pro-Ukrainian, until it wasn’t.

Professor Richard G. Whitman

Listen, the best panels always leave so many questions unanswered, which is why we have a drink upstairs, to get stuck into those. So, those of you who are in the room, I hope you’ll join us to continue the discussion upstairs. Shada, my apologies that you can’t join us for that, and those who joined us online, I mean, there were some really cracking questions around geoeconomics and so on that we didn’t quite get to, and I want to thank you for those. And we’ll obviously share them with the panel, so you could take them up bilaterally, and I’d encourage you to do so.

So, thank you, everybody, for being with us here, but most of all, let me thank our panel, to Shada, to Helene and to Hans, for their provocation to get us to think harder about where the EU is heading, for their polite disagreement on where the EU might be at. And I think…

Hans Kundnani

It wasn’t really…

Professor Richard G. Whitman

…also, importantly, you know, they posed a whole series of questions that I’m sure International Affairs, as a leading journal of thought, will think about publishing more on. But also, I hope, as I say, we can carry on discussing upstairs. So, thank you, all [applause].