Israel–Palestine: How is the war changing Israeli politics?

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

[Music] Hello, welcome. I am Professor Yossi Mekelberg and I’m an Associate Fellow of the MENA Programme here at Chatham House. It is my privilege to welcome you all to this latest webinar, which is part of the Chatham House series on Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which today, we have the good fortune to have with us three prominent observers, Analysts of Israeli politics and foreign relations to provide us some interesting insights. And we’ll concentrate today is how is the current war changing Israeli politics? And I will introduce our distinguished speakers in a minute.

Let’s meet – start with some housekeeping matters before we dive into our rather complex topic. First, the discussion is on the record and being recorded. I would like to encourage you to tweet using #CHEvents, Chatham House Events, and the handle @ChathamHouse. And please submit as many question as you like using the Q&A box that will appear at the bottom of the Zoom feed, which, after our initial discussion, I will ask some of your question. Depends on the time that we’ll have, that – our panel.

Let me start by saying, you know, it is the 96th day since – of the war, and first, it started by the horrific terrorist attack by Hamas that claimed the lives of approximately 12 hundred Israelis, that – and more than – taking more than 130 people hostage, I mean, more than 200. 130 are still in Gaza as hostage. And this was followed by Israeli massive retaliation, which, according to the Health Ministry in Gaza, killed more – 23,000 Palestinians, most of them non-combatants, and also landed Israel with charges in the ICJ. Moreover, I think we are also facing the threat of this war spreading to other forums in the region, opening the door for other rivalries and enmities to surface.

However, today we like to concentrate mainly on how this has affected, and will continue to affect, the Israeli society and politics, both domestically and internationally. This, I should say, of course, is a massive challenge to try and unpack, but we have these three distinguished speakers, and let me introduce them in alphabetical order.

First, Dr Thabet Abu Rass, Co-Executive Director of The Abraham Initiative, has a long association and leading position in Israeli civil society and academia. After six years of serving on The Abraham Initiatives’ International Board, Dr Thabet Abu Rass joined as a Co-CEO in 2014 the Abraham Initiatives, the Jewish, Israel and Palestinian organisation that advances social inclusion and equal rights for Israel’s Palestinian citizens, by influencing public policy, shaping public opinion and demonstrating practical models for a shared society. Dr Abu Rass has, also, many publication, media articles, on Israel-Arab and Jewish relations.

Second, Dr Nimrod Goren, Senior Fellow for Israeli Affairs in the Middle East Institute. Dr Goren is the President and Founder of Mitvim, the Israeli Institute for Regional and Foreign Policies, Co-Founder of Diplomeds, the Council for Mediterranean Diplomacy, and Co-Chair of regional initiatives at President Isaac Herzog Israeli Climate Forum. Nimrod holds PhD in Middle Eastern studies from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and was a Hubert Humphrey Fellow at Syracuse University.

Last, but not least, Mairav Zonszein, Senior Analyst on Israel-Palestine in the International Crisis Group. Mairav joined the ICG in 2021 as a Senior Analyst on Israel-Palestine. She’s responsible for covering Israeli domestic politics, relation with the Palestinians, and regional conflict settings and policies. Mairav is an Israeli American Journalist and Commentator who has covered Israeli politics and US foreign policy for over a decade. Her work has appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post and many other publications, and she is also Founding Editor of +972 Magazine, and contributor to Jewish Currents. She has an MA in nationalism studies.

So, welcome, all three of you. Let me start with posing you almost an impossible task, but I think if anyone can, you can, of taking, in four or five minutes, an outlined – what for you are the most important changes that you have observed that are taking, right now, place in Israel society since 7 October, and where in your opinion it leads in terms of domestic developments, but also in relations with Palestinians and far beyond? So, in a way I’m asking you a bit of reflection, what happened so far, and trying to – gazing a bit into the crystal ball, and let me suggest – let’s start with you, Mairav. The floor is yours.

Mairav Zonszein

Thanks, Yossi. I’m happy to be here with all these panellists that I admire, and thank you to Chatham House. So, there’s really a lot that I could unpack here. I guess I’ll try to stay focused on one notion, which I think is that 7 October, which has now become this ominous and horrifying date, was in many ways, one of the most significant moments in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, and I would say we are now in the most, kind of, determining inflexion point of Israel-Palestine relations since 1948. But at the same time, what happened on 7 October was not a break from everything we know about the situation in Israel-Palestine. It was actually a continuation, I think, of a lot of the trends and the policies, and the behaviours, and the threats and the risks that we’ve been dealing with really from the very, very beginning.

So, you know, we had a far-right government in place with some of the, you know, most destructive policies on Palestinians, the highest death toll, even before 7 October. We had unprecedented mass protests against the far-right judicial reforms before 7 October, and so, it’s important to look at all the processes that were happening. Also, the crisis in general and Netanyahu’s leadership, the fact that he lost legitimacy, the fact that the security establishment was warning him and telling the world that they don’t trust him on security, and this was all happening before 7 October. And then 7 October happens and you have a very, very clear failure, you know, across the military and political echelon, but first and foremost, with Netanyahu.

And then, now you’re seeing that, on the one hand, which is very, very, I think, rare for most conflicts in most countries, where you have absolutely no legitimacy for the political leadership, but full legitimacy for the war that’s being waged. And so, I think there is a lot of interesting paradoxes and gaps in how things are happening. So, for example, Israel started this – I mean, obviously, the attack was something that still is causing enormous grief and trauma, and is an open-ended grief and trauma, that we’re still discovering the scope of it, and at the same time – sorry, somebody’s just walked into the room.

So, you had this reaction where we have to get rid of Hamas, and the position has been also that we always wanted to get rid of Hamas, we just didn’t have the public support to do so, and now we have it. And in essence, the Israeli leadership has promised to get rid of Hamas, which is something that I think is likely unachievable, for various reasons that we can get into, but my personal opinion is that it has promised something that it cannot make good on. And we’re three months into this and I think we’re seeing that a lot of the reality of that is coming into focus.

And so, the question is, how are Israelis going to respond to the fact that they are being promised one thing, but are seeing something very different? And I think this is most acute in the hostage crisis, and in the fact that there are, like, 200,000 Israelis displaced in two different areas of the country, in the North and the South, who have no idea when they can go back home. And this is an unprecedented event in Israeli history, and the Israeli leadership has promised to dismantle Hamas and to push Hezbollah back up, and until that happens, those people are not going to want to go back. And so, Israel has almost, you know, put on its own – on itself a limit and a restriction that makes it even more difficult to return to any kind of normalcy.

And so, I think what we’re seeing is a culmination of 20 years of a rightward shift, of the death of the peace process, of the notion that only through unilateral military action can we achieve things. And I think, unfortunately, the immediate effect on that is that Israelis are hunkering down in saying we have to – you know, there’s a lot of support for the war. But I think more and more, we’re starting to see cracks, and we’re starting to understand that – as things will progress, Israelis will realise that there needs to be an alternative, and that even those in the opposition are not offering that alternative. And unfortunately, I’m very concerned that this war could drag on and on for months and months and months, if that alternative is not presented both externally, by foreign actors, primarily the US, but also internally, by Politicians who provide a real clear alternative that involves a political solution. I’ll stop there, and get into more…

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

Yeah. Well, yeah, Thursday I met a group of Teachers in one of the high schools of Tel Aviv and I found the people, the Teachers, are actually less confident, less democratic, less protective of human rights. The unprecedent distribution of arms within the Israeli society is really scary now. Israel is the – it’s already militarised society, we find Israel today is more even mitalira – militarised. There is no real gatekeeper against the violation of human rights in Israel.

All of this in advance to say that the war has had an extreme impact of the Israel society. The Israel society is still in a trauma three months after – three months since the atrocity of 7 October. We see that the Israelis are still in – actually in a trauma, that – like, and the amazing thing that nothing – like, nothing happened before the 7 October, and they are conf – considering that day, and nothing is – should happen after that.

I believe that the Israelis already know that the last war with – those war, actually, they didn’t achieve the objects, the direct object that’s this of toppling Hamas, and returning the Israeli – kidnapped Israelis, actually. And I believe there is indirect objects that – also, that some of the Israelis, some of the Politicians, they did think about it, and they didn’t reach them, mentally scratch the Palestinian not to repeat such atrocity. I think we are far from that. I believe that many Israelis believe, also Palestinians, believe that Hamas won the war already from the first day, and I think there are some Israeli officials, and military officials, and the Minister and the government believe that the – if we can just push for a little transfer of Gazan from Gaza Strip to Sinai Peninsula will be great. Also, they fail to do that.

So, so far, none of the – those achievable, actually, and I think that those major conceptions had fallen. Managing the conflict rather than solving it, it’s already fallen. Also, it’s impossible to continue with the normalisation with some Arab regimes, dictatorship regimes. It’s not going to happen by – with upper – overpassing the Palestinian issues, and I believe that also Hamas, Palestinians and the Arab world have all deterred, it’s another fallen conceptions. I’m not sure that the Arabs are really deterred.

I am saying that I think we should, all Israelis here, we should look to what happened after condemning that, okay, the atrocities, and say that clearly, nothing really can justify such atrocity of 7 October, but also, nothing can really justify the killing of thousands of civilians in Gaza. Even 7 October event cannot really justify that, okay? I believe that it’s a wake-up call for the Israeli establishment to reconsider their political views, and for those in the Israeli public who are at less sensitive to atrocities committed by Israelis in Gaza, we should, I believe, try to suggest something now. It’s either now or never.

There is a big opportunity, okay, from this crisis, that Israel should adopt. It’s not Israel, I think, the international community, the friends of Israel, should pressure Israel to give some hope to Palestinians, and to go to a – I will say that – a peace summit that can guarantee a Palestinian independent and sovereign state alongside Israel. I believe we lack real leadership in Israel and among Palestinians. We think – we should think about changing leadership in both countries, in both nations, in Palestine, and also, in Israel. I believe that changing the political leadership in Israel is – it’s imminent. Now Netanyahu is actually – only 15% of the Israeli public believe that Netanyahu is the most desirable Prime Minister, and we see that this fall, really, is going down, yeah, and so, it’s imminent, to change political leadership.

The problem’s that Gantz will build a unity ques – a unity government in “the day after” that consist of the good parties. Yes, we see personal change with the Israel leadership, but we are not going to see a real paradigm change, and this is a real problem. A unitary coalition that will include right-wing parties will keep the status quo as it is right now, will not bring – take us to peace. And also, I would like to suggest, as I’m a Arab Palestinian, citizen of State of Israel, that the political parties in Isr – of Israel in the left and in centre have to change their strategy of advancing a political partnership with the Arab citizens, with Arab political parties here.

I believe the Arab citizens, who are – consist of 20% of the total population, they are actually a political – our peace power – peace force that should be utilised. Alienate the Arab community, alienate the Arab political parties, is bad for the left and the centre of the Israelis. If we want to see change, real change, we should adopt political partnership with the Arab political parties. I will stop here. Thank you.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you very much, Thabet. It raises a lot of issues, but I’m sure there will be questions, and keeps – keep putting your question in the Q&A. Nimrod?

Dr Nimrod Goren

Thank you, Yossi, it’s a pleasure being here. I will follow up on what Thabet said, because we are reaching a phase in which the need for domestic political transition in Israel from an Israeli perspective is becoming vital to both achieving whatever is possible within the war objectives, but to also achieve any progress towards better relation with the Palestinians, and any advancement towards a two-state solution. Because, and I think Mairav spoke about it as well, there is a general, mainstream consensus, let’s say, in Israel, about the objectives of the war as has been spelled out, meaning making sure that Hamas is not governing Gaza anymore, making sure that Hamas cannot pose a military threat on Israel and making sure that the Israeli hostages are released.

And those three goals, and we can debate, you know, which of those is more likely and which is less and under which conditions, definitely Israel needs to have more time and freedom of action in order to reach whatever it can on those. But that time and freedom of action, it was, basically, bought throughout the last three months by willing to accommodate all kind of international demands, especially Americans, on the humanitarian issue, at least to a certain extent, like, the threshold of the humanitarian aid. This is becoming not the case anymore, and we’ll see it with the American visits and the American terminology, the need for Israel to engage in strategic planning on “the day after,” being willing to see progress towards a two-state solution, is becoming a pre-requisite for continued American support for what Israel needs in order to achieve the gain.

So, the domestic political card is becoming very, very important, and we see it also playing out in the international relations, and you can see more and more statements coming, let’s say, from Washington, criticising the composition of the Government, and making the case that Netanyahu will eventually have to choose which will be his composition, whether with the moderates or the more extremists. What Washington cannot say but Israelis can, is that it doesn’t matter what Netanyahu chooses, Israel needs a new type of leadership, okay, and there need to be a change in the leadership of Israel in order to see any constructive progress out of the war and towards peace.

And in that regard, we see an interesting process happening within the Israeli political system, in which, as was mentioned before, the levels of support, of trust in Netanyahu, is dropping. It has been the case before 7 October, as we saw the judicial overhaul. It was largely unpopular within the Israeli public. But definitely after 7 October, Netanyahu is being held accountable for the policies that he led before, the concepts on the Palestinian issue that, basically, failed, the conduct on the day itself, and his conduct as Prime Minister ever since that doesn’t seem to be giving Israelis what they expect from their leadership, but rather, is very much keen on political survival.

So, you see a public opinion that is shifting away from Netanyahu, but in quite a paradoxical way, going both ways. So, in terms of ideology and ideas you see public – people going more to the right-wing, becoming sceptical of progress towards peace, sceptical of the Palestinians, not to the extreme right, perhaps, but more to the right. But in terms of projected electoral behaviour, you’ll see people moving towards the centre and preferring Benny Gantz as possibly the next Prime Minister.

Now, this is not a sustainable situation, probably, and you will most likely see an emergence of some grouping within the Israeli right that challenges Netanyahu. So, this will still be at play, but definitely, the political process in Israel that is currently on low key, because there are many who say, “Well, it’s not really legitimate to talk politics at a time of war,” but when the war in Gaza is shifting to a phase which is of lesser intensity, and the internal disputes happening after the Supreme Court ruling, also, are coming back to the forefront, whenever Gantz and his party are leaving the Emergency War Cabinet, then the political debate will come loose. And I think that’s where we’ll see this debate happening.

Now, it won’t lead to a change that totally changes Israelis from left to – from right to left, but it may lead to another government, like the Bennett-Lapid style, that may be very diverse ideology, but focusing more on good governance and enabling regional relations to move a bit forward, and enabling some of the international things that should be done on the Israeli-Palestinian issue that does not involve Israel directly. Like the reuniting of the Palest – the West Bank and Gaza, bringing back the Palestinian Authority to rule the Gaza Strip as well, spelling out a incentive for peace, spelling out a diplomatic horizon. All of that could be happening more likely with a different Israeli Government.

Playing also on what we see already going on between Israel and the Arab State, with all the criticism which is being voiced on Israeli actions from the region, we also see a relative resilience of Israel-Arab relations, even in spite of the war, and we can elaborate on that later. So, I will stop here for now.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you very much. You set the scene perfectly to – I think for a lot of the issues that we can discuss in the next 40 minutes. I would like to start with you, Mairav, because you’re talking about a legitimate war, but not a legitimate government or leadership. But then, there is another issue of legitimacy, the legitimacy of the way the war is conducted, which is another aspect to this. How do you think this actually can be all squared? And if this is the case, is there also, you know, in many ways, a case here to say that – ‘cause the argument you don’t change government during war, but if the government is not seen by the people as legitimate to fight a war, and then, there are question about the means that it’s conducted, is there a case for calling election or changing within the current Knesset the composition of the coalition?

Mairav Zonszein

Well, let’s be clear. I think Israelis think that the war not only is legitimate, but I don’t think that they’re questioning the means being used in this war. And in fact, we’ve heard from many public officials a lot of incendiary and genocidal language that, you know, is reflective of a base and a country that isn’t questioning the means to the end of this war. So, the illegitimacy of the means is really coming from Palestinians, and from the US, and from other actors.

And on that point, I just want to say that I think a big part of the reason for that is twofold, they’re being connected. One is the media in Israel. The mainstream media in Israel does not show what’s happening in Gaza, it does not interview Palestinians in any, kind of, basis, really, at all, not just in Gaza, but in general. And they provide a very, ver – I mean, the Military Reporters are essentially just, you know, representing the IDF. There’s no critical perspective at all, and it’s, kind of like, maybe obvious to some of us, but it really has a huge effect on the ability for public discourse here to question not whether or not Hamas should be – let’s say we agree Hamas shouldn’t be in Gaza, but how do you achieve that end? That’s not being questioned at all.

And the second, is this notion of – just the dehumanisation of Palestinians, which we’re now seeing the culmination of, but to an extent that it’s not just dehumanising them on a human level, but on a political level. That they are not a people that deserve to have political engagement of any level. And I think 7 October was a direct expression of the fact that when you tell – when you think that you can just forget about two million people over there, that are an hour away from where I am, that somehow, the problem will go away. So, it’s not just dehumanising, it’s also coming back to hurt you because you’ve basically said you don’t need to deal with it, and then it comes back.

But as far as, I guess, you’re asking whether the legitimacy of the leadership is going to change during this war, I think Nimrod mentioned that it could be that now in this – I mean, this war is an endless war right now. There’s no end in sight. There’s no clear victory being defined, there’s no clear end being defined, and I think to answer a question that I think I saw, Netanyahu clearly has an interest in prolonging this war for his own political survival. But there are also things that are going to start happening and that are already happening, which is calls for elections, which is fatigue by the reservists, which is all kinds of things that we don’t know exactly where they’re going to go, but I do believe that in 2024 something will have to give.

And I think, as Nimrod also mentioned, and Thabet, it’s absolutely clear that this government cannot reach a solution to this war. That this government, it’s not – when they say there’s no day after or there’s no strategy, there’s no endgame, there is a day after, there is a strategy. It’s to continue to fight and to have no Palestinian state or solution, ever. And so, that is something that Israelis are not challenging enough, clearly, but that the rest of the world is clearly seeing, and that the US knows but is still not willing to do anything about, for its own reasons. And so, these things are coming to be very, very clear, and my hope is that Israelis will demand a change in the leadership.

Now, how that happens, I don’t know, when it will happen, I don’t know, but the problem is also that even if you do get Netanyahu out, that’s not enough. They’re – people are challenging Netanyahu. They’re not challenging the policies and the views that Netanyahu represents, which are not, you know, exclusive to Netanyahu, and Netanyahu and the far-right have already become one Gush, one bloc. So, Gantz is not in that bloc, but he’s also not providing an alternative that I think will actually provide a, you know, a different scenario. Now, he could move, he could change, but, I mean, we are stuck, I think. As long as there’s no alternative in political leadership and no external pressure, then we’re stuck in this endless war, right now.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thanks, Mairav. If I can ask you, Thabet, you know, in the light of what Mairav said, and also, what Nimrod said earlier, how do you see the Arab-Israeli community react to the – because Nimrod talks about, you know, that actually the relations, the Arab-Jewish relations within Israel is – proved to be robust during the war. But what developments you see – we’re talking about “the day after,” but maybe we should talk about the month and years after as a result of something of this magnitude. But how do you see where the Arab-Israelis will see the community going, to which direction?

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

Well, let’s remember that we are a minority within Israel, we are – have dual cit – dual identity. We are Palestinian – the majority of us, Palestinian citizen of State of Israel. We are Israelis, but also, we are Palestinians. We are actually benefiting from the peace between our country, our people, the most, and we really the lo – the big loser of any war. Just imagine, the rockets, Hamas rockets, cannot distinguish between us and between Jewish people inside Israel. Some of the Arab people, especially Bedouins, were among the kidnapped and the killed people in the 7 October, and they are – and now, the big thing that we have relatives in Gaza. Half of my family live in the refugee camps of Jabalya and Beit Lahia, and 21 people already killed from my extended family, from my mum’s side. Just – we are suffering of this war more – just like, twice, I would like to say, okay.

So, we really would like to see a ceasefire to – just to reach some conclusion to this war, and I am saying I don’t believe that there is a military – from the first day, I said that “There is no military solution to the issue of Gaza.” Just let us remember, we, the Israelis, occupied Gaza since 1956 11 times. We’re repeating that again and again, and I think still, there are some Israelis wanted to see a Gaza disappearing in the Mediterranean, and still, Gaza is there. I remember that some of my relatives really – lost in the Mediterranean, they are looking for freedom, just to look for a place where to work, and Egypt and Israel prevented from Gazans to leave Gaza before 7 October, okay?

Now, we are here citizen of the State of Israel, we are looking for integration. Within the State of Israel we are citizens, we are discriminated against. There are a series of discriminatory law. The big one is just to remind all of us, Nation-State Law that really discriminate us and see us as second-class or third-class citizens. Israel is behaving like a Jewish suppress – supremacy regime, from our point of view. And the Nation-State Law, in the first article, if you look at the first article, talking about only the Jews, okay, have the – actually the sovereignty for the whole territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. I think it’s actually eliminating the desire of the Palestinian to have their own – the self-determination and the right for independent and sovereign state within – alongside Israel, even that.

So, what we would like to see is changing Israeli discourse, political discourse. The Arab citizen, while they want to strive for equality in Israel, there is no law of equality in Israel yet, okay? In the same time, we would like to be part of any change to our peace, for our people and for our country.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you, Thabet. Let me just express that I was sorry to hear about your loss in this war. Nimrod, on this note, and of course, on some of the question that are asked because, you know, talking about opportunity, talking about alternative, that was mentioned, is the two-state solution still a possibility? And if it’s a possibility, do you think – what modality you can envisage of a two-state solution that we can look forward to?

Dr Nimrod Goren

Well, it’s definitely not around the corner, the two-state solution, and there is a discourse going on for years on whether it’s still alive or dead, or feasible or not. I think for many Israelis and for many Palestinians that’s the best solution that we can identify currently as the immediate step to resolve the conflict. There are all that kinds of discussion about next steps after the two-state solution, maybe for confederation, other co – types of co-operation. But reaching a two-state solution, I think, for [inaudible – 32:54] Israelis, or for most of them, that’s the goal. And even if we think this is difficult to do, this is the responsibility or, you know, what we need to step up to try and do as much as possible.

And therefore, if we try to look at the current situation and see how it can move towards a two-state solution, first, we look and get inspired from previous guises in Israel regional relations and how they were transformed into better relations. And of course, the key example that people go back is the Yom Kippur War 73, and then seven years later the peace with Egypt. So, that’s, kind of, an inspiring story from the past that shows that a very bad reality could be transformed. Of course, that transformation went through political leadership change in Israel at that time.

But then again, the question is, who is taking action? Assuming that the Israeli political timeline that we discussed before is a long one, it won’t happen in the coming months. Even if Netanyahu is ousted, even if a more moderate, more open towards peace government is being put in place, that is not in line with the political timeline of the US and the EU. Both are going towards elections. So, when we hear the very positive language coming, let’s say, from Brussels, about, “a real opportunity,” and “Now or never, now is the time to advance a two-state solution,” and when we hear American administration talking about that, when we check that vis-à-vis the political reality in terms of timelines of changing Israel and Palestine, it’s not very likely that we will see this big peace summit and the big breakthrough.

So, then the question of what should be done and what are the gradual steps towards that? And again, first, we need to have a unified Palestinian leadership that controls both the West Bank and Gaza, which is capable, which is moderate, which is legitimate. We definitely need a change within Israel. We have to take a look at the multinational efforts to advance peace that are taking place, that began before 7 October.

One channel was the American-Saudi channel of normalisation with the Saudis, between Israelis and the Saudis. This channel that is still in the making, we heard about it this week that there are still debates about that, should be clearly linked to progress towards a two-state solution, and like what we saw in previous normalisation agreements, okay? The second channel is what the EU led starting in September, what is called a Peace Day Effort, which is a multinational attempt to create an incentive package to be presented to both Israelis and Palestinians by the international community, to show tangible benefits of peace, right?

So, those processes have value if they reach their end goal, whether it’s linking normalisation to Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, and the international community beginning by putting a very credible, or clear at least, diplomatic horizon for a two-state solution. Creating a mechanism in which international countries can work together, instead of that quartet that has been in place for 20 years but is not functioning anymore, what is the international mechanism? And once there is an international debate, putting forth what should be the parameters and the benefits of a potential, possible peace deal. That will help empower at least those in Israeli and Palestinian societies that support peace to have the sense that their arguments can be a bit stronger and could be backed a bit more effectively by the international community and the regional countries. But it will take time.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thabet, Mairav, on this issue of two-state solution, views?

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

Yes, I believe that the international community today is accepting the two-state solution as the ultimate solution, but we should think out of the box. It’s not enough today to talk about two-state solution. We are here and they are there. I’m asking where I am, am I here, or there, okay? I think I am here and I am there, too, with my people, the Palestinians. So, I believe that there are two states and one homeland, to consider the all area – the whole area as one homeland for Arabs, Palestinians and for Jewish people, okay? If there are some Jewish people who would like to live under Palestinian democratic state, I think we should allow that, okay? And I think we should find a just solution for the issue of Palestinian refugees, and we should think about Jerusalem as a united city for all, for Israelis, and for Palestinians.

So, yes, two-state solution as self-det – as – to – just to promote the rights of self-determination for two people, in the same times, we should find a way how to keep the homeland as one homeland for all of – all the people.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you. Mairav, on this one?

Mairav Zonszein

I mean, I – you know, as bad as the situation is and as far off as it seems that there could a – I do think that what happened now exposes – it really exposes how much unilateral military force by Israel doesn’t get the job done, ultimately. That’s not something that necessarily the Israeli public feels, but I see that very clearly, and when, you know, when people say to me, “How are you going to make peace with Hamas?” it’s, like, “Well, look at Egypt and Jordan.” Those have proven empirically to be the most effective ways to reach stability in the Middle East.

So, you know, whether it’s two states or one homeland, that doesn’t really matter to me, but at this point, the – I think the way – the reason we got here, primarily, I mean there’s a huge crisis in Palestinian leadership, but there’s also a crisis in Israeli leadership, and the international community has allowed Israel to reach a point of total impunity for its actions. And I think a lot of the reason we got here is because of that. So, I actually think that the US role here is critical and that it could really change the way things look, and it’s not doing that.

And so, in some ways, we even have a bigger opportunity now to actually put together the normalisation deal with Saudi Arabia, together with the interest that many have in the – against Iran and its access, to, kind of, de-escalate all of it by putting in what would have to be major Israeli concessions on the Palestinian issue. And so, that would force something to start to move, and then Israelis amongst themselves will have to deal with the repercussions of what that means. But they’ve never had to do that until now, or at least not in a very, very long time. So, that would have to happen and I, unfortunately, believe that it’s only going to happen through external pressure.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you. Let me take two questions from the audience, by Kieran O’Mara, that ask about the power if it’s [inaudible – 39:30] if, you know, you think it’s actually increases. To follow that, Alistair Bird ask, “If there is a new coalition which excludes Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, what would be the implication for them if the political power outside government will be seriously disruptive to any new government, in particular in relation to the changes likely to be required to settlements on the West Bank?” So, who would like to take this one?

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

I believe that Netanyahu normalised Ben-Gvir’s ideology, put him in the government, and knows how bad vulnerability is during a wartime. We see the incitement of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich and they are pushing Netanyahu to, I will use that word, atrocities in Gaza. And I believe that what we are witnessing within the Israeli society, all of the Israeli society is moving to the right, but the right, the extreme right, maybe it will get some more votes from the right itself. We don’t see a, kind of, polarisation, left and right, in Israel. We see the centre is moving a little bit to the right, but the centre understand more and more that there is a need for a just – for such a solution.

And I don’t think the Israeli political map are really ready for a solution without the help, I will say, of the Americans, of the international community, of the friends of Israel. Yes, the Israeli community – the Israeli society is passing through very tough times. We thought that over time – the issue of the fear discourse that came from the Shoah, the Holocaust, 80/90 years ago is still there, but I think this – it’s what happened for many Israelis, this is what I’m hearing, and the 7 October, it’s a little Shoah. So, the fear discourse within Israeli, it’s really very, very strong nowadays, but we have to distinguish it from politics of fear.

Netanyahu and Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are really using a lot of politics of fear, from the Arabs, from the Palestinians. We didn’t talk anything about what’s going on in the West Bank. We should pay attention to what’s gone in the West Bank, not in Gaza. From the 7 October over 350, maybe around 400 Palestinians already killed, a lot of them because of the pushing of Smotrich and Ben-Gvir in the Government, but also because of the extreme settlers who are chasing Palestinians in Area C and others.

So, all in all, I would like to say that we should consider – now, hopefully the political map should consider – find ways to seclude extreme people in the political map within the Israel society. I know it’s fantasy, maybe, right now, but just to remind all of us, just few years ago, really, people consider to – just to throw away from the political map extreme people from the right and from the left.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Any more?

Dr Nimrod Goren

Yes, I think the good part of the story is that when we look at the public opinion polls, it’s not as if the extreme right parties are on the rise, okay. This is not happening now. What is happening, and that’s problematic, is that those who support those parties that, of course, are becoming more legitimate within the younger population, are dramatically empowered, okay? Those people that support Ben-Gvir and support Mo – Smotrich, because of the prominent position that those two have gotten within the Government, and all that comes with it, whether it’s responsibilities, and budget and legislation, those guys have much more power within the society.

And we see it on a daily basis happening on the streets of Israel, very – things that are very destructive, or very negative, I think, to how mainstream Israelis view it, and also, the understanding of those extremist statements and policies throughout the war have caused Israel lots of trouble, okay. And probably you know well, if all those lists of Israeli Ministers and members of Knesset who came out with all kind of really radical, really extreme statements, that will be cited this week in Hague, by the way.

So, if the Israeli society understand that those extremists are causing damage to national interests, not because it’s a left or right issue, then in the next election cycle, you may see this contained. But if it is contained it goes to other very clear right-wing ideological Politicians that are just less extreme, okay? So, it will be perhaps going to this new right-wing party that may emerge. So, there is a give-and-take over here, but we also need to take into account that it’s not only Ben-Gvir and Smotrich. Many of these voices are within Likud as of today, and Ministers from Likud are voicing the most absurd statements. So, it’s not only about containing the far-right, it’s about making sure that what we see in the polls today, that Likud is cut, let’s say, almost in half, that will be the case the day when Israelis go to vote.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Let’s assume that we have a – you know, Israel is having elections in six months’ time, and actually, the public moves to the centre. In practical terms, what would it mean? What will it mean in terms of policies? Maybe start with you, Mairav, because you spoke about the alternative. So, if there is a centre-right, and there is a – we are, kind of, again, asking you go again to gaze into your crystal ball, so, there is a Gantz-led government, what are the changes that you can envisage?

Mairav Zonszein

I mean, I really – I don’t like to predict, but also, I would not subscribe to those definitions. I don’t think Gantz is centre. I think Gantz is on the right, and I think it’s just everything has moved. You could call it centre-right, you can call it soft-right, I don’t know, but he’s not a centrist. Even Yair Lapid is not a centrist, as far as I’m concerned. Put to the test, in the past Lapid has not proven to be a centrist, but that’s also because the bar has moved so far.

But I mean, I do think that a government without the far-right parties, you know, with Gantz in – you know, would change a bit the positioning of Israel. The problem is that I’m not sure that it would not just produce – provide, which – what the Bennett-Lapid Government did, which by the way, did some of the most right-wing actions of an Israeli government when they outlawed Palestinian civil rights organisations, I’m not sure that a Gantz Government would do that. It might just provide a fig leaf; it might provide a pause. So, I’m not actually convinced that it would do that.

I think what we – what I – you know, my analysis is that it will – you have a far-right and a right, and then, you have a left that has no political power, really, and the centre is lost. And it’s looking for political representation that it doesn’t have, and part of the reason is because you don’t have anything being offered, and that what the left is offering, people aren’t buying. So, it would take a lot longer, I think, in Israeli politics, for there to be a real shift that would make a difference in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Okay. So, Nimrod, you would like to comment on this?

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

Well, maybe we look to the political map in Israel a little bit different. Still, I think, there are some people who are really centre in term of the issue of democracy, but this is not enough, I guess. I believe that we should judge people, also, in the issue of peace, and unfortunately, right now, this is one big failure of the protest in Israel, that they’re chanting all the time, “Democracy, democracy,” and then they refuse to connect the issue to the peace. So, they didn’t educate the Israeli public for such a important issue for the Israeli public.

So, I believe that the coming government, that should be led, by the way, I believe, anyway, with Gantz, Gantz will lead the coming government, it must be a unity government. There is no other way. Because of the Israelis now, they are chanting everywhere, “[Mother tongue], we will win together, we will do things together. Together, together,” and they need this – and I think the issue of the war, actually, at least the atrocity, Hamas atrocity, became a centripetal force binding Jewish people together, and they will continue in this course.

The question, what the Americans will do. I wish to see President Biden taking this ticket to his – in his campaign in the coming election in the United States, say, “I’m going to give hope to the Israelis and the Palestinians and to achieve peace, a just peace, two-state solution.” So, we are – heavily depend on the international community, the help of the Americans and others. If you – we cannot rely on the political map in Israel. It’s not going to change a lot. Still people, because of fear, and some of it genuine fear, yes, we cannot really state when Israelis will make peace. No, they need a lot of help from outside of the country.

Dr Nimrod Goren

Yossi, if I may add a few words on that. I think, first, it’s very important that if we go back to the modality of the Bennett-Lapid Government, it’s, like, the best-case scenario in Israeli politics at the moment. Unfortunately, we need to make sure that such a government will also include the Israeli left. And the Israeli left currently in the Parliament has only four seats, if you look at Meretz in Labor. And to make sure that this process that we are now entering of political renewal also includes the rebuilding of a centre-left, left-wing, Zionist Israeli party that is capable of getting into the Knesset with as much vote as possible. And we see processes going on both within Labor, that is going for new leadership, and maybe a merger with Meretz, maybe the entry into politics of all kind of those who emerge for leadership positions within society, as part of the broad democracy protests.

So, that’s something that I think will be a challenge, or a goal for us, to make sure it is happening, and if a government like that is taking office eventually, I think you will see an empowerment of the professional bureaucratic service. Especially the foreign service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That was one of the dramatic changes that you saw in the Bennett-Lapid Government, that foreign policy was not anymore the personal domain of the Prime Minister, but was rather dealt with in a more professional way, enabling Israel, even though it didn’t make progress with the Palestinians, to make progress with Jordan, which is a very important relationship that is now in crisis with Turkey. That is in relationship to the now crisis with Doha’s Arab state, that we’re willing to engage, with the EU even, with the convening of the Association Council.

I think there’s a lot that could be done. Even if a government is making only limited progress on the Palestinian issue, it would create a totally different international environment for Israel to be also pushed and encouraged to make more progress towards peace.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you. Let me take a question from Karina Liedberg. She ask, you know, “Yuval Harari has spoken repeatedly about the fact that parties on both sides are too traumatised at the moment to think beyond their immediate pain, or see the other side’s pain, and therefore, that others need to take charge of leading efforts towards peace and reconciliation. And if he’s right, who do you think should play such a role?” I think we can divide it into, kind of, obviously, the impact of the trauma on both sides, and again, if there is a trauma that paralyses the political and social processes, who can actually help out with that? Mairav?

Mairav Zonszein

I mean, I’m not sure what the person means by it. Like, a third party in Israel or Palestine, or…?

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Probably, probably.

Mairav Zonszein

I don’t know, but I mean I – the one thing I’ll say is that there is trauma and that this war is creating generations and layers of more trauma. And I am not convinced that what Israel’s doing is going to lead to the eradication of Hamas so much as the birth of a lot worse, newer things. But there is trauma, but there’s also weaponisation of trauma, and there’s also an occupier and an occupied. And so, the trauma, for a second, we need to put aside and realise that there’s a long-standing occupation that needs to end, and I don’t know who’s going to take responsibility for that, but that, to me, is at the core of the issue here.

Dr Nimrod Goren

Yeah. I will think, obviously, that first, we look into home-grown solutions, you know, how do you rebuild the cam – the peace camps and also, empower those that are already believing in peace? And that, I think, goes through the resumption of people-to-people engagement, interaction between Israelis and Palestinians. In the past when we used to talk about people-to-people we spoke about broadening the peace camp. I think now it’s much less ambitious than that. It’s just keeping intact those who still have hope for peace and are willing to act for peace, so they have constructive interactions with people on the other side.

You know, I think our generations that met consecutively, Palestinians or Israelis, in different locations around the world, now this is not something that most Israelis have a chance to do. Many Israelis, even those who support peace in principle, have never met Palestinians for some substantive dialogue. I think that’s something that should be prioritised after the war to enable those who are eager to promote peace, or open to that idea, to meet each other, to be in touch with each other. We see the Americans having increased funding for that allocated, I’m not sure how effective it’s being implemented, so – but this is a priority, also, for other actors.

And a word on the third party. Of course, the US will remain important, but you need to look also at the Mediterranean aspect, and Thabet, you mentioned the Mediterranean several times in different contexts. But if we look at the Mediterranean as a sub-region in which Israelis and Palestinians are managing to co-operate on different levels, and they do on the Medit – Middle Eastern level, you know, whether it’s a union for the Mediterranean in which Israel and Palestine, yes, Palestine, are equal members, or the Izmit Gulf, where you see the same. So, that, kind of, hybrid sub-region that enables all, kind of, softer co-operations on vital issues, whether it’s energy and climate, and water, it can be a space that will be empowered in order to bring the people together into some, sort of, a co-operative mindset, let’s say, more than they have now.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you.

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

I cannot – to that, I think there is enough power still in the Israel society. Yes, Israel society is in crisis, but still, there are a lot of power within Israel society. When I look to the civic society in Israel as really proud or very vibrant, very active society, and trying, actually – doing a lot of the work of the Government right now in this crisis. So, I – but we cannot really rely only in the civic society. I believe that if we can get rid of Netanyahu, personally, honestly, personally, will at least demise the extreme right-wing of Israel, thing will start to change within Israel.

Now, all we need is to give the Palestinians some hope. I believe giving Palestinians some hope, and legitimise Palestinians as partners, this will help to reach out to the Arab countries. Right now, Israel is actually promoting peace, okay. No, it’s not a peace with Saudi Arabia, promoting relation with dictatorship regimes. What’s important is to see that the Arab masses, okay, really think about the Arab – the Israeli masses, the Israelis here, we see that this is – are deals with regimes, important for Israel, important for Saudi just to confront Iran, for example.

But I think that the fact that we are jumping on Palestinians, jumping on the Palestinian Authority, okay, that it’s not the real representative of Palestinians, is really bad. We should give – respect Palestinians, show that – improve their own lives, and give their ho – them hope, I think change will start. We are not asking for immediate change, dramatical change. No, it’s not going to be. But gradual change can happen, and there is enough power within the Israel society to make this change.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you. Well, we have only a few minutes, so I’ll just try to bring together a few question and move a little bit to the, kind of – how the domestic scene correspond with the international one, because there are some question about the role of the UN. How is it seen from an Israeli point of view? Can the US still play a – the role of a credible broker of peace? And also, if you can, kind of, also look a bit the regional picture in a few words, because as the border with Lebanon is heating up, what do you see where it – which direction this goes? So, Mairav, would you like to start, please?

Mairav Zonszein

I mean, there’s no way I can do that in two minutes, but – or one minute.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

No, no, take more, take more than one minute.

Mairav Zonszein

No, I mean, there’s only three minutes left. I mean, in some – I think I’ve said this several times in different ways, but in – you know, we are at, you know, an inflexion point. It’s one of the worst periods, but it’s also an opportunity, and those are – like, the light at the end of the tunnel is still there. We’re – at some point we’re going to have to cease the fire. I wish it would happen already. At some point we’re going to have to negotiate different deals to assert security. And so, I hope – and that – I mean, with Hezbollah it’s a whole other story, and I – it’s hard to get into here. But I do think that nobody is interested in a serious escalation and that there is room there, as well, for alternatives, and I don’t think that there is a military solution there either. So – and I think the price is way too high.

So, I mean, you asked about the US. I’m not sure – there’s too much there, so I don’t know how to tackle it all. I’ll…

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

One of the question, I think, by John Paul, sorry, is this. You know, “After the way that the United States is handling this crisis, this war, can it still be a credible peace broker?”

Mairav Zonszein

It can be, but it hasn’t been, and it continues to not be. But it could be if it wanted to, but we’re going into an election year, so I don’t expect – if this was Biden’s second term, I would say there’s a lot of options to work with. Currently, I don’t think so, and again, I think, you know, Israel has – I mean, the US has let Israel continue for three months, with very little achievements to show, and it’s trying to make Israel fight a more humane war, which is literally impossible in this situation because of the nature of the Gaza Strip. So, it’s hurting the US, it’s hurting Israel, it’s hurting Gazans. I don’t see the upshot here. I’ll let my other colleagues in.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you. Thabet?

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

Well, I believe that, still, we need the international community, we need the United Nations, we need all, actually, the international bodies. However, unfortunately, the Israeli media did educate over a long time the Israelis that those bodies are not important. It’s rarely that you are hearing in Israel the international law, for example, and these kind of things, and this is the shocking thing right now, when Israel have to now, to be and to try to struggle in the ICJ, okay? It’s really a problem for Israelis. All of a sudden, Israeli Minister that used to do and to say whatever they want, “Second Nakba,” for example, “Throw a bomb – a nuclear bomb in Gaza,” and so forth, all of a sudden now the Legal Advi – Government Legal Advisor asking those people – are – just to erase and to – such statements, okay? So, we should educate Israelis, I think we cannot – and Palestinians, yes. We cannot really progress without the international community, without the international bodies, including the UN.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Nimrod?

Dr Nimrod Goren

On the United Nations, of course, the Israeli perception if – is negative one now, but we need to remember what Nickolay Mladenov, the UN’s Special Co-ordinator, managed to do, not only in terms of preventing previous wars in Gaza, but also, in terms of the credibility he got within the Israeli policy-making system. So, it’s not by definition that any UN Envoy will be disregarded in Jerusalem, of course, this Government is a bit different, but there are examples of effective mediation, and that could be repeated.

In term of US credibility. I think, yes, the US could be a credible mediator. I don’t think we have many of – many other actors who can do that. We see the US now taking the lead on the planning of “the day after.” We see sustained American mediation between Israel and Lebanon with Amos Hochstein doing that. So, there’s no other actors that are stepping in on that. Countries are willing to support the US in that, but are not taking the lead, or are not capable to take the lead, so we have to rely on the US.

And in terms of the regional map, I think it’s important to note how the Saudis and the Emiratis are stepping up their involvement on the Palestinian issue. You know, from The Abraham Accord we said, “Well, these countries are less inclined to be involved,” but the assumption was that whenever there will be an opening for political change in the Palestinian Authority, those countries will have motivation to try and shape it to their needs, and I think this is happening in front of our eyes. Plus, the important role that Egypt is continuing to play, whether it’s in mediation on hostage release, and other issues.

So, those are the key actors. I think there is worry in Israel from the direction Jordan is going. Jordan, who used to be, like, a very moderate and important force, is now taking another approach, and it should be, kind of, brought back into the constructive diplomatic efforts that the international community is trying to lead.

Professor Yossi Mekelberg

Thank you very much, and sadly, we reached the end of the time allocated for us, and Mairav just send her thanks because she had to leave for another meeting. So, this is – thank you for such a thought-provoking conversation. And there are so many issue, I won’t even try to summarise all what has been discussed here, but I think it sets a really a good platform to continue to discuss this kind of issue, from the domestic to the regional, to the international. Thank you, the audience, for so many great question, and I’m – I apologise for not going through all of them. There were nearly 50 of them, so it was impossible. And my special thanks is to Dr Thabet Abu Rass, to Nimrod Goren and to Mairav Zonszein for participating, and follow our future events on this issue and many other at Chatham House. Thank you very much for participating.

Dr Nimrod Goren

Thank you. Thank you, Yossi.

Dr Thabet Abu Rass

Thank you.