Bronwen Maddox
Good evening, everyone. I’m Bronwen Maddox, Director of Chatham House. We’re meeting here to talk about “Israel-Palestine: Is Peace Possible?” And we’re meeting, obviously, on the anniversary of this horrendous day in Israel’s history and really, that hangs over all our discussions. We do a lot in our Middle East Programme, led by Sanam, three along, Sanam Vakil, and we bring together many, many voices and I’m sure we’ve got some of those here today. But in terms of what we try to do at Chatham House, it is very much bringing together voices of people in – never in a definitive conversation, but in conversations that we believe can advance the cause of peace and of order in the world, and that is the spirit in which we are doing this.
Let me introduce my wonderful panel who are here. Nomi Bar-Yaacov, who is one of our Associate Fellows at Chatham House, Amjad Iraqi, also, Dr Sanam Vakil, who is the Head of our Middle East and North Africa Programme, and Julie Norman, who is many, many things I was reaching for, Julie, who is a Teaching Professor at University College London and after many years writing about the region, is writing a book on Gaza. Not your first book, we can say, in summary.
We’re going to try and address things taking them forward, but – from here, but inevitably, we’re grappling at every point with the past. Nomi, maybe I can ask you to start, and we’re dealing, as I said, with this question of, “Is Peace Possible?” And I – hanging over us, as well, is the possible answer no. I remember a piece that a former Ambassador, a British Ambassador to both Israel and Saudi Arabia, said, Tom Phillips, when he left the region, and he wrote a piece saying, “There may never be peace.” And that is what we are trying to improve on. So, Nomi, I just – first, from your perspective, where is Israel, do you think, a year on from this horrendous event, when people try to address that question of, “Is Peace Possible?”
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
And thank you, Bronwen, first of all, for having me and for holding this very important event on the first anniversary of this terrible slaughter. I think Israel today is still deeply, deeply traumatised and it’s not surprising. There’s still 101 hostages held in captivity and it’s very, very hard for Israelis to move forward towards peace until the hostages get back home, all of them. So, Israeli society is divided in many ways, but they’re not divided at all on the question of the need to get the hostages back.
So, the key, really, to moving forward, as we’re talking about, you know, “Is Peace Possible?” First of all, yes, peace is possible, is to get to a ceasefire, first and foremost, in Gaza, get the humanit – get the Gazans back to their homes. Get the Gazans everything that they need in order to rebuild and heal. Get the hostages home and get everything the Israelis need to heal. And you’ve got individual healing and collective healing, and unless there is a plan to move from a ceasefire in Gaza and in Lebanon towards the implementation of one of the two, or there – well, actually, there are two peace plans currently on the table, recent peace plans. One by a Former Israeli Prime Minister and an – and a Palestine Former Foreign Minister and nephew of Yasser Arafat, the Ehud Olmert and Nasser al-Qudwa Peace Plan, which calls for a ceasefire in Gaza, then Lebanon and paves the path to two states, a Palestinian and a Israeli sovereign state, based on the 67 lines.
We can go into the details in the Q&A, if anyone is interested and then, of course, His Royal Highness, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia and his Jordanian counterparts had put forward in response to the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, they put forward a peace plan offering Israel peace. 57 Islamic and Arab states offering Israel normalisation and security in exchange for ensur – for the recognition of Palestinians to realise their right to self-determination and establish a Palestinian state. So, the plans are there. These are just the outlines. I’m giving them briefly.
Bronwen Maddox
So, let me ask you something, ‘cause you’ve taken us more quickly than I expected to one of the few, if you like, positive visions in this. But you said at the beginning, look, Israel is agreed on this question of the hostages. It is a uniquely painful point are these people, many of them believed to – is still to be alive in Gaza. But it seems to me, and I think many others, that Israel is, in fact, not agreed on this, of whether this is so much a priority that the current Israeli Government should move now to a deal, almost any deal, that gets these people out, or whether it should, as this government says it is doing, pursue the leaders of Hamas and hope to get the hostages back in the same way. And that is – that division is bringing tens of thousands of Israelis out on the streets of major cities on Saturday nights.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
So, you’re absolutely right, this current government has very clearly not prioritised the return of the hostages and this government was elected democratically, but today would not be re-elected. The vast majority of the Israeli population, the Israeli people, do not represent the views that the government represents. And there very clearly is tremendous opposition to the way that Israel has – the Israeli Government and Army have been handling the war in the last 12 months in Gaza, as opposed – and there’s a lot of bitterness in Israeli society about the fact that this government did not prioritise the return of the hostages.
And there’s mounting pressure from many sectors of Israeli society to prioritise the return of the hostages. There is a consensus in the Army that Hamas has, basically, his military capabilities have reached a point at which this should not be a priority, and the priority should be the return of the hostages.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you. We’ll come back to some of those points and again, the long distance between what you’ve discussed and the peace plans that you mentioned, that indeed, have been put on the table, we’ll come onto that. Amjad, what is your take on this question, this impossibly ambitious question, if you like, of whether peace is possible?
Amjad Iraqi
Good evening, everyone. I would want to start off by echoing something that Daniel Levy, former Israeli Negotiator and a colleague of ours who spoke on the Chatham podcast that was just released yesterday, I believe, where he actually, kind of, actually said, like, “That’s probably not the right question to be asking right now.” I thi – and this is something that he said and which I fou…
Bronwen Maddox
He said…
Amjad Iraqi
…wholeheartedly…
Bronwen Maddox
…“The conditions are not right to make that…
Amjad Iraqi
Exactly, exactly.
Bronwen Maddox
…question something you can advance, but nonetheless.
Amjad Iraqi
No, but that is exactly it. The problem is that I think a lot of people have taken October 7th and the massacres that happened there and the attack and the breaking out of Gaza as a seismic moment in the conflict to, kind of, almost re-ask questions, as if this rewrites the conflict in some way, and that’s not the case. We should’ve been asking these questions also October 6th, certainly October 8th and any one of the 365 days since October 7th itself, that the conditions are actually still in place. And what we’re seeing here, as arguably unprecedented it is, it’s also manifestation of the dynamics that define this conflict. It’s about power asymmetries. It’s about how violence is enacted and who over – can enact overpowering violence. Who gets to dictate the facts on the ground and where do international actors play a role in entrenching those power dynamics, more so than reversing them?
And so, the fair – the very fact that we’re now in the moments whereby, you know, even as the Israeli Army is, you know, kind of, ‘whittling down’ it’s operations in Gaza, that it’s now going full steam ahead in Lebanon and now there’s even talk about going forward to Iran. That means that the motivations, at least by Israeli leadership, by the government and also, by members of the military brass, to keep prolonging war in some form or another, that that motivation and that rational calculation for that is still there. So, if that’s still the case and that the continuation of conflict is still seen as positive, and the same could be argued about Hamas, for example, and where it’s at now compared to where we were a few months ago in the ceasefire negotiations, if those calculations are still there, then I think we – then we haven’t shifted the conditions yet to make peace possible.
Bronwen Maddox
I just want to extract because you’ve, sort of, embedded it in that last bit, about Hamas. Where are – you think the Palestinian views of Hamas now are and whether Hamas is going to have to be part of any deal?
Amjad Iraqi
So, I think it’s really…
Bronwen Maddox
Let me be specific, deal on a ceasefire and release of the hostages.
Amjad Iraqi
Yeah. So, I think, first of all, we need to, kind of, hold several, kind of, almost contradictory things into one place. You could be a Palestinian, even a Palestinian from Gaza, and you can hate and agree with Hamas at the same time. So, for example, in Gaza, for many years, there was a lot of Gazans who were, basically, despising Hamas for being an authoritarian government and the way it mismanaged everything in the Gaza Strip, even though they understood the conditions of the Israeli siege and blockade. But that – there was a natural, kind of, opposition, somewhat to, you know, to that government. At the same time, you can have that view of Hamas as a faction, but still believe that arms struggle or armed resistance is still part of the liberation movement and Hamas is a flagbearer of that.
And so, it’s hard to – it’s important to keep in mind it’s not always just pro this and anti that. There could be a kaleidoscope of views about whether it’s Hamas or Fatah or Israeli, etc. From that position of where we are now, I think that if we want to get into the ceasefire negotiations, and this is where the divergence, I think, exists between the Israeli side and the Palestinian side, is that for the Israeli side, yes, there might be an overwhelming social consensus around getting the hostages free, but most would still be either supportive, if not indifferent, to the war continuing in Gaza.
For Hamas, its position in the ceasefire talks was that “We want a permanent ceasefire,” and it’s not a Hamas demand, that’s a Palestinian demand, whether – well, and regardless of what you think of Hamas. But as long as that divergence is there and as long as all of the ceasefire conditions are set – allowing Israel to, basically, carve out Gaza very differently, continue to – the bombardments and also, not to mention the facts on the ground in the West Bank, then that’s not the ceasefire agreement that Palestinians are searching for.
Bronwen Maddox
Well, we’ll come onto the West Bank very deliberately later. Sanam, when we put this event up on our website a few weeks ago, we did not have the wider conflict that has now opened, particularly in the North, not in the scale. What is your sense about whether this conflict is getting beyond any one country’s control or the ability of them to talk themselves down from it in the short-term?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Thank you, Bronwen. Yes, certainly, we didn’t have this very dangerous moment a few weeks ago, when we curated this event. But where we are today was always coming over the course of this year. So many times over the past 365 days have we been on the precipice of a wider conflict, I think. This is third or fourth or fifth, it doesn’t matter how many times we have been counting, but we’ve seen perpetual targeting in Lebanon over the past year, strikes going back and forth across the border that have really foreshadowed where we are today. We have seen unprecedented direct strikes between Israel and Iran that bring us to this tragic anniversary, but also, this waiting for how Israel is going to respond.
So, I’m, as a Researcher and Analyst, not surprised we are here, because we have been collectively, those of us who work in this field, warning and advising and, sort of, appealing to the better senses of policymakers that this moment was coming. And so, here we are and what is it going to take to get off this ramp of escalation? You know, that is the big question and it requires us to look at the kaleidoscope of broader regional actors and their objectives and it requires us to also consider whether the military campaign which we have been watching transpiring in Gaza in a very dangerous way for the past year, and of course, has caused much trauma and horrific conditions on the ground, is now being widened and executed in a very similar way, and dangerous way in Lebanon.
And with the Gaza campaign still underway, there were attacks coming from Gaza today, there is still military engagement coming from the Israeli military in Gaza today, I think we should be pausing and questioning where – why we are watching a widening war being executed without any constraints on the Israeli Government. Any, sort of, pushback or questioning as to how these tactics are going to result in new dynamics on the ground. And I think that’s what’s really alarming and concerning, there are no guardrails, there are no guards. We are just sitting here watching a war being executed on multiple fronts. And the last time I checked, in the Middle East, that has had so many wars, six in the past 40 years, by my count and of course, there could be more, depending on how you count them, the military wars have yet to resolve in peace and security for Israel, but for the wider region.
Bronwen Maddox
So, I absolutely, I sort of, agree with that observation that these conflicts have not, on the whole, resulted in more stability, but in some areas, they have begun to debate more widely. But I just want to pick up your point about “no guardrails, no constraints” at all on Israel, as you’re saying. Obviously, you might have in mind the US. Though we’ve had Antony Blinken on this stage not very long ago, saying, “Look, we talk very tough to Israel.” We’ve had Britain beginning to take various steps. We’ve got protests and campuses in the US. But we also have the countries of the region saying – the Saudis saying, “We are not going to reward you, Israel, with an organisation if you – unless you have a ceasefire,” and other countries withholding the support that Israel could have. So, there is not, it seems to me, no constraint on Israel. It is a pressure that Israel chooses not to pay attention to.
Dr Sanam Vakil
I mean, you could put it that way, but I think that ultimately, countries in the region, if we wanted zoom out and take the wider focus, have been trying to incentivise, cajole, restrain, Israel and have the Israeli Government focus on the bigger vision for the new Middle East. And what hasn’t been achieved over this past year is that level of engagement. There has been no discussion of – or no receptiveness to the idea of what comes next. Prime Minister…
Bronwen Maddox
No receptiveness – that was very abstra – you mean by Israel?
Dr Sanam Vakil
By Israel.
Bronwen Maddox
Right, oh, yeah.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Prime Minister Netanyahu spoke at the United Nations just the week before and he didn’t mention the word ‘Palestine’. He didn’t mention the prospect of the pathway to the new Middle East in his pictures that he, you know, put up to show you the bifurcated Middle East. And this is not to say that the region is not bifurcated. It certainly is. This is not to say that the region does not have deep fissures and a significant problem with Iran. It certainly does. But for Arab states and particularly Saudi Arabia, to be supportive of normalisation and what comes next, we now have it in writing, written in the Financial Times by the Saudi Foreign Minister just last week, credible, irrevocable pathway to statehood. And the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has already said it in Arabic on television and it’s drawn in the land – in the sand.
Bronwen Maddox
Alright. Julie, let me come onto you and just this question of a two-state solution. You get countries, not Israel, not many in Palestine, but you get other countries, and Saudi Arabia is one of them, talking about not only a two-state solution, a commitment by Israel to land for Palestinians, but that this being the moment. After decades of wrestling with this and then it not getting the blast of international attention that it did, this being the moment. Do you regard that, still, as a proposition that has credibility?
Julie Norman
Well, thank you, Bronwen, and good evening, everyone. I would agree with much of what’s been said and Sanam said it well, I think, that, you know, part of the grand bargain from the Biden administration from Saudi Arabia was very much linked to this idea that Saudi would normalise relations with Israel, have US backing. But the linchpin to that was a Palestinian state and they became, I think, much more urgent in pushing quite strongly for that, rather than just the lip service. And other states, I think, in the region, can and will have a role to play if or when negotiations do resume.
But I would add some very important caveats to that. First is that in my conversations over the summer with maly – many Palestinians and surveys back this up as well, a lot of cynicism from Palestinians about these statements from the Arab world and from Arab elites in particular. Seeing this as just lip service and not really taking the real measures that will aid Palestinians and really just watching out for their own interests. So, that’s link…
Bronwen Maddox
In the past?
Julie Norman
Now, I would say.
Bronwen Maddox
And now, as well…
Julie Norman
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
…you’re saying.
Julie Norman
And I do think that needs to be grappled with seriously. Related to that, I would say that there is a – I think there will be this role for Arab states, but not to speak for Palestinians, which has happened in the past, as well, and I think that piece needs to be remembered, also. And finally, I think for Arab states, as well as those in the – you know, within Palestinian, it’s this real sense of what’s actually possible right now? And I think everyone on this panel has said this question of, “Is Peace Possible?” is perhaps premature. You know, it’s not only that Netanyahu didn’t say Palestine at the UN, but the Knesset this summer…
Bronwen Maddox
Netanyahu had a picture without Palestine on it, yes.
Julie Norman
Yes, and the Knesset, the Israeli Parliament, passed a bill this summer saying they would not ever establish a Palestinian state. So, again, I think that speaks to the extreme real trauma of Israel right now. It’s – I wouldn’t expect a Palestinian state to be forthcoming in this current context within Israeli politics, but this is the reality that we’re dealing with now. And I guess I’d just say on both sides, I would say there is – and I use that term ‘both sides’ very loosely, recognising the diversity within both communities, but just a real distrust in the peace process at all right now. A distrust in this idea of a two-state solution and what each side would do with that.
And I just underscore that to say, you know, I think if and when negotiations resume, it can’t just snap back to the roadmap. It can’t just snap back to the 20 years ago’s model. It will need to reckon and realise this new reality of just very deep distrust, very deep sense of grievance from both societies that we’re now experiencing.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you for that. So, Nomi, let me come back to you and pick up for a start – I want to ask you several things about Israeli politics at the moment, but just picking up this question of the two-state solution. It’s a phrase that seems so endlessly redolent of the 90s and way back. As Julie said, the Netanyahu Government took through the Knesset this summer a resolution that Israel would not give a state to the Palestinians. Do you think there is any support for that proposition that there should be such a state…
Julie Norman
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
…in Israeli political life at the moment?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
I think there is, and I think that Netanyahu and this government are not going to be there forever and we need to prepare for the day after Netanyahu. And I think it’s absolutely vital to prepare now and to speak to the Israeli people, as opposed to just focusing on how awful Netanyahu has been and how self – how he’s put his own personal self-interests ahead on that of the state. I think that yes, he’s been masterful in staying in power and – but his time will come up. And unless the preparation is done now, both of, you know, the nitty gritty of the plans themselves, but also just speaking to the Israeli population, that is, as I reiterate, deeply traumatised, how is a Palestinian state going to make Israel feel more secure, is for me, the big question that needs to be asked. And I think the question really is, what kind of security guarantees are the 57 Islamic and Arab states prepared to put together with the US and other states in order to ensure that Israelis feel secure? Because if Israelis don’t feel secure alongside a Palestinian state, then there’s not going to be one and then, you will get war forever.
So, when I say – when you asked initially whether peace was possible and a two-state solution – and a – and two states are possible, of course, a lot needs to happen in order to make it possible. But we do need to plan now and there is huge opposition and people demonstrating with T-shirts saying, you know, that “There cannot be a democracy with occupation” and there’s tremendous, tremendous opposition to the occupation, which is stage I towards a state. So, I do see a brighter future if, among other things, the various international actors, including the Arab states, that did, frankly, very little – they put together the – what – to implement the Arab Peace Initiative. They put together, the Saudis, a brilliant peace plan on the table, but then very little was done in order to implement it. To talk to the Israelis about, “Okay, this is what we’re offering and it’s genuine and this is how it’s going to be done.” There were no working groups that sat together.
The – ultimately, it’s going to be – the peace is going to mean – be made by the communities, by the Israeli and Palestinian community. The leaders, unfortunately, in both places, are leading their populations astray.
Bronwen Maddox
That sounds wonderful, but it can’t surely be made by the communities. This is going to depend on leaders who strike deals, including with other countries and international organisations or whatever.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Correct. We also need new international – all the new international organisations and a realignment of the international world order. But in order – but first and foremost, these – the…
Bronwen Maddox
A lot for Chatham House to do, then, I think.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Yeah, well, I – that’s – in this – you know, as I said, we – I don’t want to take up all the time about…
Bronwen Maddox
No.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…what kind of realignment there needs to be. But certainly, the thinking needs to be it’s armies look at how to kill, that’s what they do. Intelligence bodies, you know, provide the intelligence. It’s the people who are going to lead the change and elect a new leader and that’s why it’s so vital to speak to the Palestinian people and the Israeli people in order to ensure that when elections are held and elections will – they will have to hold elections in order for peace to come. And it’s only then when hopefully, more peace-loving communities will be elected and leaders will be elected. And there are plenty leaders out there on both sides, and that – I go back to the Olmert-al-Qudwa plan.
al-Qudwa is the nephew of Yasser Arafat, yeah, Na – yeah, Nasser al-Qudwa. He was Ambassador at the UN when I worked in the UN and foc – you know, many, many, many years, so over 20 years he was Ambassador at the UN. He knows both the international scene and the internal scene intimately. And I – you know, it’s not for me to decide who should be the next leader, but my point is that he has a plan on the table with Ehud Olmert, who used to be Likud and who started the nine – the 2006 war in Lebanon and vowed to assassinate Ya – Hassan Nasrallah then and to eradicate Hezbollah. So, he’s learnt his lesson, so – you know, and he’s learnt that that wasn’t the right approach and he’s very, very bravely and boldly put this plan on the table.
And I think that, coupled with what His Royal Highness the, you know, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, together with his counter – the Iranian counterpart, have put forward, is both you’ve got the Israelis and Palestinians working together for the future and the region working together for the future. And that needs to give us all a lot of hope, and we’re talking post the current leadership.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you for that, and as I said at the beginning, this is – what you’re sketching out is frankly, about as optimistic as one could be at the moment, or in – I don’t mean to characterise you as optimistic, but you are sketching out what could happen. Amjad, how does that compare to, say, where Palestinian leadership are – is at the moment and Palestinian relationships with others, for example Saudi Arabia?
Amjad Iraqi
First of all, I want to respectfully disagree slightly on where Israeli society and politics is at. One of the defining aspects of the Netanyahu era, since 2009, is that Israeli society, if they didn’t know it before, they certainly learned to embrace the occupation and they learned to embrace the one-state reality that has actually been in place not recently, in the past decade, that was actually in place from the moment that Israeli troops set foot in the Jordan Valley and on the coast of Gaza in June 1967. That one-state reality has been 50/60 years in place, and it’s evolved a lot. And it actually used to be much more open in borders before the checkpoints, and Oslo, The Oslo Accords…
Bronwen Maddox
Well, look, I’m not going to get into the 50/60 years.
Amjad Iraqi
Yeah, yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
But anyway, let’s take the…
Amjad Iraqi
But…
Bronwen Maddox
…past few…
Amjad Iraqi
…the reason I’m emphasising…
Bronwen Maddox
…decades…
Amjad Iraqi
So, the reason…
Bronwen Maddox
…but not the whole existence of Israel.
Amjad Iraqi
Yeah, yeah, so the reason…
Bronwen Maddox
Which I’m not going to debate now.
Amjad Iraqi
So, the reason I’m emphasising this is because I think actually, Israeli society, up until October 7th, enjoyed the status quo and they benefitted from the status quo. Now, for Palestinians, seeing this on the other side, there was a lot of optimism, certainly in the 90s, that maybe this was a path to something. But I think Palestinians realised very quickly the way that Oslo, for example, actually enshrined the even vision of statehood as a cage, that what was actually being asked of them was that they accept, kind of, fragments of a historic homeland. That they have some aspects of self-rule, that the elites certainly benefit from that kind of arrangement, the relationship with the Israeli state and that the question of Palestinian security is not even really on the agenda because Israeli security takes precedence.
And in every technical detail of every plan that’s been brought up about the two-state solution, Palestinians have learned that actually, they are still a substandard state. They are still a substandard people to that arrangement. And this is why – and the irony is that the leadership…
Bronwen Maddox
There are lots of reasons, which you’ve caught the flavour of some of why Oslo and the things that followed it failed it, but I – will you forgive me, Amjad?
Amjad Iraqi
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
I just want to try and anchor it in where we are now…
Amjad Iraqi
So, this…
Bronwen Maddox
…one year on from October the 7th.
Amjad Iraqi
So, the reason is because Oslo’s alive and kicking and the Palestinian Authority is very invested in ensur – in trying to achieve statehood, because that is where its politics is now at. It has failed in every other aspect and is now relying on diplomacy and pegging its hopes on being able to achieve a Palestinian state, which is – which it has failed for decades.
Now, the irony is also Hamas, even with its – even with the massacres of October 7th, its political branch has made equivi – has made very clear for years now, including in Palestinian political agreements, signals to the Arab states, that actually, acquiesces to the 1967 borders of the Palestinian states. This was also the terms that it – and in which it participated in several unity agreements. In 2021, when there were supposed to be elections and it agreed to it, and even in recent negotiations over the past year, they actually have agreed to that. The Likud Party, by contrast, for example, has never actually acquiesced to the 1967 borders as a state, no, it’s…
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, so what I’m asking you now is where you think Palestinians leaders are and their views of some of these others arguing for two-state, now finally, after all these years, some, like the Saudis, arguing that now is the time?
Amjad Iraqi
Well, that’s where the leadership is at, but the Palestinian public, I think, is in a very much complicated place. On the one hand…
Bronwen Maddox
And the ‘leadership’ you’re talking both about Fatah…
Amjad Iraqi
Both Fatah and Hamas.
Bronwen Maddox
…the Palestinian Authority and Hamas.
Amjad Iraqi
Yeah, yeah, yeah, I’m laying out that if they have actually agreed to this…
Bronwen Maddox
But that…
Amjad Iraqi
…kind of, two-state model. The public, I think, is in a much more difficult and – relationship with this question of where they’re going and whether statehood actually is a thing that will give them the security and safety that they’re looking for. And that’s a divergence which I think is not always fully addressed sufficiently.
Bronwen Maddox
Julie, may I ask you something? And I said I was going to come back to the West Bank, where with the two particular Ministers, Ben Gvir and Smotrich, who are saying, quite openly, “Look, we are going to” – and they’re leading the cabinet, indeed, in authorising more settlements and more government support of existing illegal outposts, on a big scale, since October 7th and continuing with some of what had happened steadily four years beforehand. How should the world read Israel’s intentions on that, and can we judge Israel by what its current government is doing?
Julie Norman
Yeah, thank you. I think we should be very clear eyed about these policies in the West Bank, and I agree with Nomi that, you know, part of this is just the current coalition, but I also agree with Amjad that this is ongoing and this – much of the Israeli Government is moving in this way. And these policies are playing out very much in real-time. Understandably, eyes have been on Gaza and then, increasingly on the region, but in the West Bank over this last year, massive military incursions, extreme spikes in settler violence, mass arrests, a plummeting economy due to intentional shutting off of different kinds of income streams, expansions of settlements. And I would say all of this has again, fallen slightly under the radar, but is really the deepening of that occupation that Amjad spoke to.
And even if there’s a ceasefire in Gaza, even if we could resolve things in Lebanon, as long as that is still going on and is deepening under this current Israeli Government, there will be resistance until that is addressed and resolved. And I do think this is going in a very dangerous direction and we – this is not me saying it. This is looking at Ben Gvir’s and Smotrich’s own comments about what they are trying to do in terms of squeezing the West Bank and squeezing the Palestinian population that lives there.
Bronwen Maddox
And Sanam, I want to come round to you and just pick up, actually, Nomi’s point about Israeli sense of insecurity now and Israeli comments often saying, “Well, look, our neighbours are trying to kill us, and we came out of Gaza and we got missiles and then we got October the 7th.” What do you think the answer to giving Israel a sense of security would be?
Dr Sanam Vakil
I think that’s the right question to ask. It’s a question that many Israelis woke up to on October 7th, despite the fact that obviously, prior to October 7th, Israel had a security problem with Palestinians, that hadn’t gone away or been resolved. It had been contained or walled off, and of course, we must remember we’ve seen perpetual rounds of conflict between Hamas and Israel over the past few years. And of course, in 2023, there was also significant tension in the West Bank and in fact, many of us were very worried that violence would kick off in the West Bank last year and years prior.
In addition to that, if we look at the regional landscape, Israel has had a access of resistance crisis with groups hostile to Israel, motivated ideologically against Israel, sitting on Israel’s borders. And in conversations I’ve had with Israelis in Israel, we have acknowledged this regional security crisis and so, it all exploded on October 7th, but it wasn’t a surprise to Israelis, whose strategy, the government, has always been known colloquially as “mowing the lawn,” hasn’t addressed their security crisis with Hezbollah, obviously with Hamas and obviously, with Iran.
What does this mean? It means that we are in this point of heightened escalation, with Israel now escalating against Hezbollah, thinking that it can eliminate Hezbollah’s leadership and thereby, significantly degrade Hezbollah and buy Israel long-term time. It means that Israel also is taking that thinking and applying it to Iran. Perhaps thinking that this is an opportunity to strike Iran and put Iran somehow inside the box. And it means, actually, because if you look at…
Bronwen Maddox
Sorry, what do you mean by “inside the box”? I mean, strike Iran…?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Contain Iran in the region. Contain Iran from supporting proxy groups in the region, and perhaps even contain the advancement of Iran’s nuclear programme, but this is a very big and complex conversation. But Israeli leaders, if we look at their statements, have also said that they also have to address the security issue in the West Bank. So, there’s one front that remains open and not fully activated, as well.
Bronwen Maddox
No, I understand what you’re saying and Israel, and Netanyahu in particular, have found it important and convenient for a long time to say “Security, security, Iran security.”
Dr Sanam Vakil
Hmmm hmm.
Bronwen Maddox
But I’m asking you to address the kind of things that Nomi has brought up about what – if Israel is to achieve peace with its neighbours, what would it need? Is it a different regime and a different kind of regime in Iran? Is it a complicated international deal and lots of lots of international people on its borders? Is it, as this government is suggesting, the Netanyahu Government, its own control of lots of land around it? But what do you think would give Israel the security that its government says is its first duty to its people?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Well, I am a realist, Bronwen, however unpopular that position is these days, and I understand Israel’s security dilemma. But I don’t believe that the security of Israel can be achieved through military campaigns and I think that the security of Israel has to be achieved through two diplomatic campaigns. Perhaps that Israel cannot lead fully by itself, but a Palestinian engagement process that involves regional states and the international community is certainly one very clear and obvious avenue to addressing, incrementally over time, its security dilemma.
But the second avenue is the Iran dilemma, which isn’t going to come back regime change, because frankly speaking, I need Western policymakers to publicly acknowledge that they’re not supporting regime change in the Islamic Republic in 2024. So, what is that going to look like? More sanctions, more containment, but perhaps a potential diplomatic long-term negotiation with the Islamic Republic to impose restraint, impose compromise and perhaps address the big elephant in the room, which has been Netanyahu’s biggest issue, is Iran’s nuclear programme. And we’re in a very dangerous moment, because Netanyahu has always said, “The moment Iran goes nuclear, we can’t get rid of the Islamic Republic.” But Netanyahu’s pulling, forcing, pushing, regarding the JCPOA, has led…
Bronwen Maddox
That’s the nuclear deal.
Dr Sanam Vakil
The Iran Nuclear Agreement that doesn’t exist.
Bronwen Maddox
In the unlikely chance that anyone in this room doesn’t know, and online…
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
…doesn’t know what it is, but anyway.
Dr Sanam Vakil
But we are now in unrestrained territory on Iran’s nuclear programme. And the dangerous aspect here is that Iran is now publicly debating, in an alarming way for me, as a Researcher, the value of Iran’s nuclear programme and the potential necessity to accelerate its nuclear programme, to ultimately, give Iran the security that it is so deeply seeking. So, we’re in a bit of Catch 22 moment that requires a pause, a bit of thinking, and I would suggest that for the Israeli Government, as well.
Bronwen Maddox
So, Nomi, I’m just going to come to you finally. Could an American President make this better or worse, or both?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Well, it depends who the American President…
Bronwen Maddox
Absolutely.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…is going…
Bronwen Maddox
Absolutely.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…yeah, to be.
Bronwen Maddox
Absolutely.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
And we have one American President who is extremely unpredictable. I think we all know in this room who that is, and if he wins the elections, then – which is what Netanyahu is trying to do, he’s trying to force him by escalating and not getting the hostages released before, and not…
Bronwen Maddox
Just…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…re…
Bronwen Maddox
…tease that out by saying yes, we all remember Jimmy Carter and the Iranian hostage crisis.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
But why do you think Netanyahu thinks – oh, this is too many things, but…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
No, I think Netanyahu is…
Bronwen Maddox
But why…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…unlikely to…
Bronwen Maddox
…is that calculation…?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…strike a deal with a ceasefire – reach a ceasefire agreement before the US elections because he doesn’t want to hand any victory to Biden-Harris. It’s as simple as that. We don’t need to get into all history and the details. And I think a number of American leaders, including Antony Blinken, have stated as much, in public, so – that they don’t think there’s going to be a ceasefire before the election and that…
Bronwen Maddox
That’s slightly different, but yes, okay.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Not here, not here. Anyway, the – he has the – he has mentioned it on…
Bronwen Maddox
Alright, so he could make it worse, you’re saying?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Well, you know, we, fortunately, only have four weeks before the American – and oh, if he wins the election, I actually think he’s going to try to strike the Saudi deal and extract…
Bronwen Maddox
Interesting.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…some possible words about a forthcoming Palestinian state from Netanyahu. You know, they’ll find some ambiguous language, as ones…
Bronwen Maddox
As opposed to…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…one tends to do and…
Bronwen Maddox
…strike the Iranian nuclear facilities, the thing that’s all over the…?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
I…
Bronwen Maddox
All because Trump…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
I’ve…
Bronwen Maddox
…started talking…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Yes, I saw…
Bronwen Maddox
…to the…?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…what he said today and I – well, I think Israel – you know, I mean, no-one on this panel has mentioned, you know, that Israel has been attacked for a very long time by Hez – by Iran’s long arms, you know, Iran’s…
Bronwen Maddox
And by Hezbollah…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…sub…
Bronwen Maddox
…in particular.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
They’re basically substates. It’s – well, it’s Hezbollah in particular and anyone following Nasrallah’s speeches for the last 32 years, it’s very clear that Nasrallah’s end goal was not just to reach a ceasefire in Gaza, but to eliminate the State of Israel and he was crystal clear about it. And he built an army and to the extent that the Lebanese Army had no power at all. You mentioned the withdrawal from Gaza.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah, no…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
There was also a withdrawal…
Bronwen Maddox
…we’re…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…from Lebanon.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah, no, we’re going to have – just on the Americ – just your last…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
On the American.
Bronwen Maddox
…thought on the American President and then…
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Well, I think if…
Bronwen Maddox
…I’m coming to questions.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…Trump gets in, he’ll try to strike a deal with…
Bronwen Maddox
It seems so.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…Saudi Arabia, the US-Saudi deal, and that’s a triangle, so it also involves Israel.
Bronwen Maddox
Yes.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
And I think that’s what he will…
Bronwen Maddox
Alright.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
…push for and then, anything could happen from there. And I think Harris hasn’t been clear yet on what she’s going to do, and she hasn’t put her Middle East team yet, and I think it’s going to take her time to work this out. And time – taking time is not a good thing at the moment, because the Israelis are very impulsive, generally, work – operate very, very quickly. So, yeah, we’ll – we’re – that’s about the U – that was my thoughts about the US election.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you very much and we might expand on that with the panel later. Let me come to questions now, and I suspect there are a lot and there are a lot online already, which are very good ones. Who would like to start? There’s someone there and I can’t see your face, actually. Ah, yes, sorry, please.
Ian Smales
Sorry, hello. Ian Smales…
Bronwen Maddox
Please could you wait for a microphone which goes to people online and…?
Ian Smales
Ian Smales. I actually work in…
Bronwen Maddox
Would you like to say who you are? Yes.
Ian Smales
I work in Ramallah with the Palestinian Emergency Services.
Member
Name, please?
Bronwen Maddox
Could you say your name again clearly?
Ian Smales
Ian Smales. I work in Ramallah with the Palestinian Emergency Services. Every day, I get reports of settler violence across the West Bank, and I’m well aware – and yesterday it was in Beit Furik near Nablus. And the IDF stopped the ambulances from going into Beit Furik to treat the casualties there. And yet, the diplomatic community, and there’ll probably be quite a few here, do not do nearly enough to condemn what’s going on.
Bronwen Maddox
Ian, will you…
Ian Smales
So, my question…
Bronwen Maddox
…forgive me?
Ian Smales
…is…
Bronwen Maddox
Yes, this doesn’t have, so far, the feeling…
Ian Smales
So, my…
Bronwen Maddox
…of a question.
Ian Smales
…question is, is now the time to declare what is going on in the West Bank with the violent settlers as terrorism, and secondly, would that help? Thank you.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, thank you, and who else can I – so, I’m going to take them in threes at the time. Right in the front here, please, and if you could make them questions and simply one question.
Zaki Chehab
Yeah, my name is Zaki Chehab, I’m Author of book, “Inside Hamas.” I’m a Journalist, as well. Few facts I think which you have missed.
Bronwen Maddox
Ah, please, I’m really sorry.
Zaki Chehab
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
We’ve got…
Zaki Chehab
Anyway…
Bronwen Maddox
…so many questions.
Zaki Chehab
…so…
Bronwen Maddox
Could you stay with a question?
Zaki Chehab
…I mean, in terms of Saudi Arabia, Saudis have invited all Palestinian factions long before the 7th of October to ask them what is their views of a Palestinians – or a solution with Israel? And they all agree. So, the fact that Saudi Arabia have been, for many years, talking to Palestinians long before 7th of October. The second thing, as well, concerning Saudi Arabia and the initiative, which as you mentioned, recently became article by the Foreign Secretary – Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia already have passed these details to Joe Biden in August last year, when Netanyahu asked to visit the White House by…
Bronwen Maddox
Sir…
Zaki Chehab
Yeah?
Bronwen Maddox
…will you excuse me?
Zaki Chehab
I mean…
Bronwen Maddox
You must ask a question.
Zaki Chehab
…this initiative, this initiative about solution and talking about the states…
Bronwen Maddox
Sir, are you…?
Zaki Chehab
…has been offered to Netanyahu long – a month or two before 7th of October last year.
Bronwen Maddox
Alright.
Zaki Chehab
So, I mean, there is something on the table here.
Bronwen Maddox
Alright.
Zaki Chehab
Now…
Bronwen Maddox
I’m going to have to ask you…
Zaki Chehab
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
…to stop there.
Zaki Chehab
So…
Bronwen Maddox
…because people must ask questions…
Zaki Chehab
Yeah, so I mean…
Bronwen Maddox
…and not make points.
Zaki Chehab
I mean, what – the point here is what kind of…
Bronwen Maddox
No.
Zaki Chehab
…solution, if the Prime Minister is refusing these kind of offers, so what do you expect to get as a result of this?
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, thank you, and then, I will take one on the aisle, this aisle up here.
Frank Gelli
[Pause] My name is Frank Gelli. I am a retired Anglican Priest. My question is, because the title of this conference is, “Is Peace Possible?” part of me would say, is it possible? But another part of me says, if we look back 30 years to the Oslo Accords, we saw how the PLO, which have been demonised by the Israeli as much as Hamas is now, made actually, under President Clinton, made a deal with Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres. So, peace was possible. It was an interim agreement. It did not work, partly because Netanyahu torpedoed.
Bronwen Maddox
Yes, sir.
Frank Gelli
But my question to your panel is, do you think it’s possible?
Bronwen Maddox
What – is what possible, after all that?
Frank Gelli
A new type of Oslo Accord.
Bronwen Maddox
Right, thank you. Okay, thank you very much and everyone, I’m sorry for being firm about questions, but we really do need that in the name of discussion, tempting, endlessly tempting as the history is. I’ll come to other people that, but I’m going to take aspects of those three, which is, is it now time to declare the West Bank as terrorism? What about the Saudi initiatives and government rejecting those? And is a new Oslo possible? None of them small. I’m going to go to Julie and Amjad.
Julie Norman
Sure, and great, thank you. So, to Ian’s question about settler violence, yes, I think this absolutely needs to be called out and I think that some in the international community have started to do this with some sanctions on individual settlers, but we haven’t seen a collective labelling. I’m not sure if the label ‘terrorism’ will make that big of a difference one way or another, as much as just raising this to the forefront. And I would just say it’s a bit of a Catch 22 in that even very small-scale, like the individual sanctions, get extreme pushback within Israel on trying to, kind of, balance reining – getting the Israeli Government to rein in some of these movements, some of these individuals in an effective way. And the terrorism label is one that is obviously very contentious, but one that can – that I do think can put pressure on.
But I will just caveat this by saying there is such extreme cynicism of the international community right now among Palestinians and, kind of, these, like, naming sort of things, that even if there’s a court case, even if there’s recognition of Palestinian state, if things on the ground are not changing and just, kind of, a policy that names this but doesn’t change things on the ground, that is what people are looking for and that’s what they are feeling. So, to me, it’s more what’s going to change those tangible things, rather than a particular label we may choose to give or not give it.
Bronwen Maddox
Amjad, any of those.
Amjad Iraqi
So…
Bronwen Maddox
So, including, “Is a new Oslo possible?”
Amjad Iraqi
Yeah, excuse me. Just to touch on the gentleman’s last question. I mean, two quick points. One is that I would want to encourage a bit of a critical thinking about Oslo itself, ‘cause what I’ve mentioned by “Oslo is still alive and kicking” is that the institutions that the Oslo Accords put in place are very, very alive. The Palestinian Authority is an authoritarian government acting as a Police subcontractor to the Israeli occupation in the eyes of most Palestinians. That is a product of Oslo.
The permanent regime, which controls the movement of Palestinians, which did not actually exist, at least certainly not in this form, before Oslo Accords, and that is especially even difficult even now for people in Gaza to get out, that the Israelis control, that is a product of Oslo. The way that even Area C right now, speaking of settler violence, where settlements make up a – settlements and the Army have con – full control, over 60% of the West Bank, and travelling – and that’s in addition to the fact that the Israeli Army can enter Areas A and B, which are ostensibly under Palestinian Authority control, that is a product of Oslo.
So, this is why I think if there is going to be a negotiated settlement, or even some framework of an agreement, which is inevitable in some form or another down the line, but Oslo cannot be model for that. And it’s really critical about this and this comes back again to what we say about power dynamics. There’s a weird twisting, sometimes, of logic regarding how people are brought to the negotiating table. Now, if the equation is that you keep putting the burden on the weaker party and you keep elevating the stronger party, if you’re coming to the negotiating table, the stronger party’s going to dictate the terms. And we might actually see that – if I can get away with facts on the ground, then why would I change course?
And this is, again, one of the key lessons that the Israeli Government, even before Netanyahu, came to a very clear conclusion. In the 1990s, settlements continued. In the 1990s, the entrenchment of the occupation continued, and yes, there were negotiations. I don’t doubt some of the goodwill that was involved in that, but this – these are the conditions which we’re seeing in full force in this current war. It’s not that all sides are blameless and obviously, there’s a lot – there’s ni – needs to be a lot of questions about Hamas, its opposition to the two-state, but also, its own evolution in the same way that the PLO did, as far back at the 80s. Long before Israel even considered negotiations or a Palestinian state.
So, this political evolution is happening on the Palestinian side, including by Hamas, but these are not always taken, especially, unfortunately, by Western governments, where you can, again, disagree with Hamas all you want, but these signals need to be taken very seriously. In the meantime, most of the Israeli political spectrum, like I mentioned, is still very much on board with keeping some form of a status quo, and we’re seeing that in Gaza and the West Bank. And that cuts across whether you’re on the right wing or the centre left, and these are the conditions and the policies that need to respond to drastically shift those calculations.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, which could take us back to the question of, what would it do to give Israel a sense of security? Because Oslo was at least partly that. So, I – we have discussed a lot here and elsewhere how Israel has taken advantage of that over years. Nomi, do you – is there anything you want to come back on that really briefly, and then, I’m coming to another batch and two very good ones online?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
No, I just think Amjad has been speaking about Hamas as a homogenous group, as if there’s no diversity of opinion within – sorry?
Amjad Iraqi
No, there’s definitely a lot of diversity.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
No, no, but you – the way you’ve been speaking. I know you know this, but you haven’t mentioned it here and, you know, and I think it is important.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Not everybody in Hamas was pro-67 borders and cert – meaning two-states and certainly not today. And the stated goal of Yahya Sinwar on the 7th of October, a year ago, was not to esta – you know, to get to two-states. It was to destroy the Israeli state and it’s also what the Iranian leadership was in. So, I just think Hamas is not a homogenous group and whereas there was an opportunity when they won the elections in 2006, after Israel withdrew from Gaza, and Lebanon for that sake, 2000 and 2005 respectively, Hamas was in a different place to where it was today. And the West imposed sa – imposed conditions on it that it couldn’t meet, and then it was thrown into the hands of Iran. And I think that’s very much a product of Western policy and it needs to be recognised that that was a mistake and it should not be repeated.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, thank you. Just come over here. There was one right in the back.
Jennifer
Thank you. My question is about…
Bronwen Maddox
Would you like to say your name?
Jennifer
Yes, yes, my name’s Jennifer and I’m from Christian Aid. My question is about the foreign policy posture of countries with influence. So, the panellists have already talked a little bit about the Gulf States and the US and here in the UK, we often hear the UK Government suggest that they have very little leverage over the peace process between Israel and Palestine. I wanted to ask the panel to what extent they think that is actually true?
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you very much, indeed, for asking that and then, let me pick up two from online. One from Amitav Banerjee, “What explains the relative silence or restraint of Arab states in the region about a conflict that is today one-year-old?” And from Richard Oblath, “There appears more support of the Palestinians on the college campuses in the USA and the streets of London that in the Arab capitals. Why is that?” Again, these are the perspectives of those two writers, but I would very much like your views. Sanan, would you like to pick this up? There’s really two questions on the nature of Arab support or otherwise and one about the degree of British influence.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Sure. Thank you, important questions. So, let’s take the issue of perceived Arab silence. Certainly, there’s been a lot of criticism, depending on where you sit, about the role of various Arab states and why they haven’t been more forthcoming. I think that certainly on October 6th, there were different strategies underway in the region and one thing that it was very clear is that there wasn’t a pan-Arab sentiment or support to prioritise Palestinian self-determination. Arab leaders, be it from the Gulf, to other pockets of the Middle East and North Africa, were focused primarily on their own national interests. And in fact, we should remember the normalisation deals of the Abraham Accords took place in September 2020 and many people mistakenly thought that that meant that nobody cared about the Palestinian issue. And that was a bit of a mistake or a misreading.
And there’s a second dynamic that’s worthwhile mentioning. In addition to normalisation, Arab states have also de-escalated across the region. Gone is that moment of tension and enmity. All countries are practically all getting along diplomatic. Diplomatic exchanges and de-escalation has held despite this difficult year and it continues despite deep adversarial tensions across the region. But Arab states are in a very uncomfortable position right now. The issue of Palestine has resurfaced, has mobilised their populations, in an unprecedented, unexpected way. You can see this even in states where there are no protests, there’s high degree of engagement online, on social media, donations to charities. Young populations are now highly animated and please let’s not forget that in 2011, the Arab world experienced unprecedented protests that were alarming for many authoritarian states in the region.
So, this is a very difficult moment. At the same time, Arab states have tried to lead diplomatic negotiations, tried to put forward normalisation. Ara – the Big Five, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have together divvied up roles and responsibilities. Qatar trying to mediate, the UAE trying to lead on humanitarian aid. This has been a very difficult year for Arab governments and they have come up and come away one year later with no ceasefire agreement.
Bronwen Maddox
So, you would…
Dr Sanam Vakil
And so…
Bronwen Maddox
…really slightly disagree with both those questions there…
Dr Sanam Vakil
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
…are saying that nothing has happened? Okay, so let me…
Dr Sanam Vakil
Absolutely, and briefly on the British Government. I think all governments currently have leverage and all governments certainly have a role to play. I think that this war has played out in our politics here in the UK. There’s been far too much navel gazing, in my opinion, in Europe, the UK and the United States about what we can do. And frankly speaking, the tale of this war and the tale of this year is going to continue to impact our security, but more broadly, regional security. And our geographies are much closer than people would like to think, and so, I do think we have a role and responsibility here.
Bronwen Maddox
So, let me ask you a version of a question that Dina Mufti has asked online and he’d just like all the panel’s views of whether it would “make any difference if the UK recognised a Palestinian state.” Anyone, anyone, all of you.
Amjad Iraqi
Julie?
Julie Norman
I think both things can be true, that it would not change anything immediately on the ground, but at the same time, it does – I mean, I would say even the very tiny steps, what people see as tiny steps the UK Government has already taken, reinstituting UNRWA, pulling back the ICC challenge, putting some small limits on arms, those were felt very strongly in Israel in terms of diplomatic and political signalling. Recognising a Palestinian state would have a very, very strong message in that regard, and I do think, as Amjad said, if or when there are negotiations, that does at least set up some semblance of slightly more symmetry in going into negotiations.
But I would just also give this, also, that there’s a sense of Israel getting further backed into a corner and again, feeling this sense of insecurity when states take these steps. So, what we often hear from the UK Government is, “When is the timing going to be right to do something that we don’t lose any leverage that we currently have with Israel?” And I think that is a very difficult balance to find.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm. Nomi?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
I think it’s very important to recognise that Israel – the Israeli society is traumatised and feels that it’s victimised. It’s very, very hard for the Palestinians, the Lebanese, the – any of the neighbouring Arab states to understand that, but that, I think, lies at the heart of the conflict. It’s a lack of recognition of each other’s narrative, a lack of recognition of an inability to see the other. And I think a recognition of a Palestinian state is a good thing, only if it will be coupled at the same time as a recognition of Israel’s right to exist and for both the Israeli state and the Palestinian state to have security guarantees. Because otherwise, if that’s missing as part of the declaration, it will only shift Israeli society further and further and further to the right. It will be viewed as an act that’s hostile, as opposed to an act that is conciliatory.
And I think it’s aimed as a conciliatory act and in order to make it a conciliatory act, it has to be accompanied by a declaration of how it’s going to make Israel more secure, beyond words. Words are not enough here. Israel suffered a year ago. This is the anniversary of the 7th of October, a horrific attack, and it’s also – it’s suffered daily attacks from Hezbollah after it withdrew from Lebanon and the international didn’t fill in the gap. United Nations Resolution 1701 of 2006, which called for Hezbollah to withdraw north of the Litani River and disarm, wasn’t fulfilled. And I think unless Israel feels that there is also a commitment of the international community to its security, unfortunately, the trend of aggression is going to continue.
Bronwen Maddox
Of Israeli aggression?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
You meant by that?
Nomi Bar-Yaacov
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah. Amjad, we’re going to have no more time. I’m going to say one thing at the end, but as we don’t, would you like to make a point on this just last two points we have been discussing, on both a state of Arab pressure and otherwise, and what the UK, indeed, might do?
Amjad Iraqi
I just want to echo was Sanam was saying. Just there is definitely more that can be done. I think, also, one of the lessons of the past year is that, I think the international community cannot rely on Washington to play its role as a responsible global power. In fact, it’s been an exacerbator, if not one of the belligerents, basically, in this, kind of, Israel-Palestine and regional – and its regional war. And so, I think there needs to be a bit more of a stepping up by the UK, by many European countries, by the Arab states, as well, which know they have the leverage, but unfort – it’s sad to say that there’s a little bit of gaslighting about how much they can actually do and that that needs to be called and put pressure on.
And just again, just on the last point…
Bronwen Maddox
So, just – as my colleagues know, I dislike metaphors, whether they are – in these contexts, whether they are ‘stepping up’ or ‘gaslighting’. What specifically would you like the UK to do?
Amjad Iraqi
I mean, the fact that the UK is at least beginning to consider the curr – the issue of, like, arms – certain arms bands, I think is a question that we would’ve asked in many other conflicts, but for somehow, it was, like, an untouchable issue because it’s Israel. But I think if you can see that there’s a bombardment that you don’t agree with, but you’re still supplying the bombs, no matter how small it is, logic dictates you should probably stop supplying the bombs. And if that – and the Israelis have been very good at being able to, kind of, play on the Europeans and Americans, saying, “If – well, if you don’t keep allowing us to bomb the Palestinians to smithereens, then you’re actually damaging our security.” I don’t see how anything over the past year has actually emboldened or, like – or let’s say enhanced Israeli security in the slightest.
So, I think we need to, kind of, put the money where the mouth – I – sorry for the metaphor again, but this is – but I think if we just did apply certain logics of what we would do in other conflicts, reduce the exceptionalisation of Israel-Palestine and again, come back to the fact that we need to set the conditions in place. And every government has a hand in being able to allow that to happen.
Bronwen Maddox
These are complicated discussions, and I know the particular discussion that the UK is having with the Europeans over whether to sanction particular Ministers, like Ben Gvir and Smotrich, then runs up against principles like can you sanction Ministers, democratically elected Ministers of a democratic country? We are going to have to answer thing – big things like that another time and had we another ten minutes or so, which we don’t, I would’ve picked up a big line of the questions online, they’re great questions, thank you for sending them, about well, what happens if there is no progress on a two-state solution, if you end up with essentially, a one state? If Israel remains in control of all that, where does that take you?” But not only did we not have enough time. I was thinking I could not possibly turn this round in any kind of optimistic way to end.
Anyway, in any case, we are going to have to end there. I do urge you to follow the extensive and many-sided work of our Middle East Programme, conducted by Sanam, with many, many colleagues assisting, to follow that online. Thank you for joining us. Thank you online. Please join me in thanking the panel [applause].
