Niger’s coup and regional security implications

Tim Eaton

Hello, everyone, and welcome to this webinar on “Niger’s Coup and the Regional Security Implications.” My name is Tim Eaton, and I’m a Senior Research Fellow within Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme, and I’m delighted to be chairing this discussion. It is, of course, a very timely one. For those of you who follow Niger, they’ll know that despite the fallout of the July 2023 military coup that deposed President Bazoum, and the imposition of ECOWAS sanctions, the Nigerien junta has consolidated its power.

As a result, the prospects for returning to democratic rule and resolving the security crisis in the Sahel remain grim. The international community’s strong condemnation of the coup, most notably by France and the EU, was met with anger by the military leaders and led to the withdrawal of French counter-insurgency troops from Niger. The military leaders have also subsequently indicated that they will reverse the law on countering human smuggling to Libya. And amid recent mediation efforts to return Niger to constitutional order, an announcement was made by the Niger military junta to withdraw from ECOWAS, or their intention to withdraw, rather, and that in turn, has sparked a major decision in recent days from ECOWAS to lift sanctions upon Niger without preconditions.

The discussion we are going to be having today is part of Chatham House’s cross-border evidence and research trends project known as XCEPT, which looks to understand how transnational conflict dynamics are likely to affect and be affected by developments in Niger. And we’re also looking to understand the regional and international implications of the military leaders reversal of the anti-smuggling legislation. Just to note, XCEPT research has been particularly looking at the transnational movement of people and its relation to conflict. The XCEPT programme is funded by the UK International Development.

So, in the webinar, we’ve got an hour and a fantastic panel, who I’ll introduce shortly, three main points of conversation. Firstly, we want to understand and explore the prospects for Niger to return to constitutional order. Secondly, we’ll be looking at those transnational conflict dynamics in the Sahel more widely. And thirdly, we’re going to look at the regional and international implications of Niger’s reversal of the anti-smuggling legislation. So, with that, I’m really delighted to introduce what is a stellar panel.

I’m joined by Paul Melly, who is a Consulting Fellow within Chatham House’s Africa Programme. Paul’s work focuses on development, politics and business issues in Africa and the Middle East, and he has written extensively on the Sahel and has a deep interest in Francophone Africa and Madagascar. I’m also delighted to welcome Ornella Moderan, who is a Sahel Political and Security Analyst with extensive experience working for a range of organisations, including the Institute for Security Studies, the Danish Refugee Council and Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit. Her work focuses on the political and security dynamics in the Sahel and West Africa.

And last but not least, Peter Tinti, is a Freelance Journalist and a Chatham House XCEPT Researcher. His work focuses on conflict, human rights, security and organised crime. He has written extensively on organised crime in the Sahel, narcotics trafficking in Mali, and migrant smuggling networks in Africa, Asia and Europe. His writing and photography has appeared in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Foreign Policy and Vice, among others.

So, with that brief info – introduction, a quick note about how this session will work. Basically, I’m going to go to the panellists and ask them a couple of questions. Each question they’ll get five minutes to answer, and so, we’ll spend about half an hour in that process, leaving the remaining 25 minutes of the hour for audience Q&A. As we go along, our audience members, feel free to drop messages – drop questions in the Q&A as they occur to you and we’ll collate them and put them to our panellists once we’ve got through the discussion with the chair. I should note that this conversation is on the record and not under the Chatham House Rule.

So, welcome everyone. After that, probably slightly longer than necessary introduction, let’s make a start, and Paul, I wanted to start with you, if I may. I wanted to ask you to, kind of, set the scene for us a little bit and explain to us what you see as the main political developments in Niger leading up to and since the coup in July 2023.

Paul Melly

Thank you very much, Tim, and it’s a pleasure to be with everyone for this interesting discussion today. I think one of the things that we need to remember is the shock when the coup happened. There’ve been, as everyone will know, a series of coups across Francophone Africa over the last three or four years, but it’s fair to say that the coup in Niger on 26th of July last year caused, I think, much more shock, much more worry in – particularly in West African and in Western Government policymaking and government leadership circles.

And there was a tendency, the immediate reaction was to say, but this is extraordinary. After all, Niger is a country with a solid – solid institutions. It’s just had – in 2021, had a democratic election, where power was peacefully passed within the same party, but in an open, multi-party electoral contest, from Mahamadou Issoufou, the previous President, to Mohamed Bazoum, who took office in April 21. And the shock was deepened by the fact that over the last ten or 15 years of security crisis in the Sahel, Niger had positioned itself as one of the most stable and reliable military partners and support partners for the – not only the West African effort, but the wider United Nations effort, the UN peacekeeping in Mali, and as a key security partner of Western Governments, a number of whom had troops in the country.

So, all of those things led to – really provoked deep unease when the coup happened, but actually, I think we need to remember that Niger’s history, recent history, is rather less stable, rather less purely democratic than one likes, comfortingly, to believe. Like most Francophone African countries, it saw a wave of people power protest and peaceful change to democracy at the beginning of the 1990s, with a national conference process where the incumbent military regime, basically, negotiated with political groups, civil society and so on, and a multi-party system was set up. But we shouldn’t forget that in 1996, so only six years after that change, that political system was overthrown in a military coup led by Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara, and he remained in power for three years, and then he – the military – the period of military rule ended in a very – basically, when he was assassinated by other elements of the military.

They then did restore a multi-party political system, but this lasted only for about a decade, and by 2009, the civilian elected President, Mamadou Tandja, who himself had originally come from a military background, started trying to dismantle the democratic constitutional structures and prolong his stay in power, and that provoked another military coup. This time we could say a, “democracy coup,” if you like, but there was very heavy pressure from ECOWAS and the international community on the Soldiers to say, “You only stay in power for one year and then you do – if the coup is then res – was motivated by Tandja’s decomposition of the democratic system, you’ve got to set up a free democratic system very quickly.” And they honoured that agreement, and that’s the thing that tends to shape our perception of Niger, thinking, ah, this is the country where the army are on the side of democracy, but actually, the history is more complicated than that.

And the political context is also complicated because you have two main political traditions in Niger that are particularly strong. A social democratic tradition, incarnated, if you like, by Pre – former President Issoufou and then by President Bazoum, but you also have a slightly more conservative tradition incarnated by the MNSD Party, which was, basically, set up by the military at the beginning of the 1990s. And the current Prime Minister in the Junta’s Government, Lamine Zeine, he’s in fact an MNSD guy and was a Senior Minister in Tandja’s Government for quite a number of years.

So, the whole picture, you have this, sort of, overlap between military and democratic culture, and so, the picture – the political context out of which – not just out of which the coup comes, but in which the event – the military leaders may be thinking about how to move back to a democratic transition, is a rather more multi-layered one. But there are some aspects of Niger that are possibly a bit more stability encouraging, as we look to see whether the country will, in fact, pursue that course of progress back to democratic rule, which is that relations between pastoralist communities in the north and the farming communities in the, sort of, southern more agricultural farming belt, have been rather more better managed.

It’s not that they’re absent, but there is a tradition in Nigerien politics that those pastoralist communities, the northern communities, are much more incorporated into domestic life. And so, the Tuareg rebellions that took place in Niger were essentially resolved through much more peaceful negotiation, in contrast to the whole series of conflicts that – of Mali over many years. There was a rebellion, but it’s a negotiated outcome. So, I think, I won’t go into the ECOWAS discussions with the junta now because that will overlap with other panellists and we can perhaps come back to that. But I think….

Tim Eaton

I want to come back in particular. Thank you, Paul, for setting the scene there as well, where you alluded to, you know, prospects of what will come next. But before we do, Ornella, I’d like to bring you in, and we’ve just heard that some of the structural shifts within Niger. Could you put that in a regional context for us? What implications did the coup have for the wider region, and to what extent would you say it relates to wider regional dynamics?

Ornella Moderan

Thanks a lot, Tim, for your question, and good morning, good afternoon, good evening to everyone, depending on where you are. So, you know, following up on the points that Paul was raising, I think, one key element to remember is that Niger does, like many other countries in the region, in fact, have a long history of military coups. And that this particular one, the one that happened last year, took place in the wider regional context of what some have called “a wave of coups,” that has resumed since 2020.

So, this is, I think, an illustration of the broader, kind of, democratic backsliding trends that we’re seeing in West Africa, which military coups are, sort of, the epitome example of, but which also plays out in many different ways, including in countries that have not undergone coups. You know, things like executive aggrandisements or institutional and judicial capture by the executive, and things like that. So, this, I believe is one of the main regional trends. You could argue that this is actually a global trend that’s also playing out in the Sahel and in Niger, in particular. So, that’s one element.

A second element is that, because of the fact that several coups had already happened in the region before, be it in Mali, in Guinea, in Burkina Faso and even in Chad, the occurrence of a similar event in Niger raised serious concern for regional actors, especially for the ECOWAS as a regional bloc, that this could become a broader trend and that the – this could essentially threaten the basis of regional political stability. So, more than just – well, the impact of the coup itself on the wider region has been – I think, one question we should ask ourselves is the impact that ECOWAS’s reaction to the coup has had on the broader region.

And, you know, this has been an impact, a very strong impact in terms of revealing some of the challenges that ECOWAS, as a regional bloc, is facing in implementing the democratic norms that it’s – it claims to stand for. Some mistakes have been made in terms of, you know, threatening a military intervention that never really came about, or imposing economic and commercial sanctions that hit the Nigerien people extremely hard, but without actually turning into political gains.

So, as you were mentioning in your introductory remarks, ECOWAS has now removed these sanctions, but without having actually obtained any of the demand it had. So, you know, Former President Bazoum, or deposed President Bazoum has not been released. There’s no clear plan for the transition, there’s no clear plan or even talk of elections, really, and the national dialogue has not happened, and so on and so forth. So, clearly, the coup and the ECOWAS reaction to it have contributed to consolidating this existing trend of political disruptions, and also, another important point, it has contributed to creating the conditions for an alliance of so-called coup makers in the region.

So, there used to be already a bit of a rapprochement between Mali and Burkina that were already going through similar processes. But with Niger, which was until then considered one of the last bastions of stability, especially by Western Analysts who maybe were lacking a bit of the finesse in understanding what exactly was happening in the political life domestically, but now, with Niger on that team essentially, came about the L’Alliance des États du Sahel, the Alliance of Sahel States. That was created in September last year, and is in fact, a challenge to ECOWAS and to other regional outfits.

So, these are some of the key elements I could raise at this point. I think, you know, we could say much more – a lot more about the economic impact, as well, but I wouldn’t want to step on the tongue of Peter, as we say in West Africa, so, I will stop it here for now.

Tim Eaton

Thank you, Ornella. Really clear contextualising there of the broader regional situation, and certainly, I think, the economic impacts of these moves are something which we will delve into in some detail, no doubt, as well, in the Q&A. Peter, bringing you in, a very good morning to you. I think, what we might be – just gone 5am for you. So, thank you for joining us and looking awake, must be tough. But I wanted to ask you, particularly with relation to the research that you’ve been doing, really, how regulation of the mobility economy came to play such a big role in Niger’s governance and with relation to its international relationships? And I wanted to ask you specifically what we might make of the declaration that the anti-smuggling legislation was set to be repealed [pause]? We can’t hear you at the moment, Peter, I think.

Peter Tinti

Alright, first one of the session. What an honour to have been the first person to get to unmute their microphone. Well, thank you for your question, and good morning and afternoon and evening to everyone who’s joining us. This question about the mobility economy in Niger and the decision by the new government and the junta to repeal the law that criminalised the migration economy in Northern Niger, I think is a really interesting one. I mean, we know that this decision to pass the law in 2015, which didn’t really get implemented until 2016, had the very practical effect of criminalising this mobility economy, particularly in the city of Agadez, which had featured for quite some time as a real hub of migration activity, what, depending on your proclivities, you might refer to as irregular or illegal migration. Facilitating migration from West Africa, and really much of the ECOWAS community, towards North Africa, particularly via Libya.

And so, the first very practical impact was just the economic impact. Thousands of families in Agadez lost – this had an impact on their livelihoods, both for those who were directly involved in migrant transportation or migrant smuggling, those being Drivers, people who arranged trips, people who were very – directly involved in facilitating these journeys, but also, all of the actors that were indirectly involved. So, Restaurant Owners, people who were running foyers in what were referred to as migrant ghettos, everyone who was, kind of, part of this ancillary mobility economy. And at the time, at the height of this migration boom, you might say, even local authorities, right, were very sanguine about the economic benefits of this industry. So, there was – there’s real material impacts of this income stream disappearing.

Now, we know some of these migration routes merely got displaced, but there – I think it’s fair to say, looking at the raw numbers, there was a reduction in migrants passing through this one area. But even setting aside the quite important political impact – sorry, an economic impact of this decision to criminalise the migrant economy there, it also had the impact of reinforcing some of the narratives that had been longstanding, particularly in Northern Niger, that the Government based in Niamey, down south, was putting the interests of foreign powers and potentially, international partners ahead of those of its own people. So, this law was passed very much with – under heavy pressure from European partners who wanted to stem these flows that were going to North Africa. And then, at least in theory, many of these migrants would’ve been cons – potentially continued on to try to reach Southern Europe via maritime crossings.

So, there was that perception that this was yet another, in a long list of examples of the Government prioritising external interests over those of its citizens. Keep in mind, Northern Niger is also a place where there’s significant mining interests and particularly the uranium mines that had been – that are in Northern Niger, local communities have often said, right, they never saw the benefits of those economies. The material benefits went abroad, went to a small cohort within the country, but also, to France, right? So, that’s the context within which these narratives are forming, are circulating and are gaining increased traction after criminalisation.

The other political impact, I would say, is it also called into question and maybe soured some of the attitudes towards European partners amongst local populations. As the presence of foreign personnel increased in places like Agadez, and more money was poured into programming and NGOs built around this idea of managing migration, or reducing migration flows, there was some development programming that intended to defray the economic costs to the community of criminalisation, the benefits didn’t really seem to make it down to the local population, or at least weren’t perceived to be making it down to the local population. And so, again, these narratives of, there’s foreigners in our country operating in ways that don’t seem to be benefiting us, and that’s taking place again within this milieu of what’s going on elsewhere in the region, anti-French and anti-French military sentiments being – gaining increasing currency in places like Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as Niger. So, it’s not just these economic impacts. There’s also the political and sociopolitical impact.

And then finally, I would say, you know, this takes place within these wider developments of we have a gold rush in Niger that’s has altered some political economies in the North, perceptions of potential, kind of, lawlessness or banditry or increased insecurity among certain communities in the North. Perceptions of some armed foreign actors from throughout the sub-region coming to Niger to participate in these gold economies. So, there’s a lot of security dynamics going on at the very local level.

Now, the reversal of this law that criminalised migration will almost certainly mean that migration will increase and that migrants will start arriving in Agadez again. We’ll probably see a return to, and already are in some ways, the return of the old system and the old political economies. It’s very likely that many of the actors who were previously involved in it will continue their activities. But I think the one thing to keep an eye on is, at least, in its last iteration, there wasn’t particularly high levels of competition or armed competition, or violence for control over any of these routes and economies, at least within Nigerien territory. We just don’t know if that same – if the same exact modalities and the same exact political economies will emerge this time around.

And so, it is worth keeping an eye on to what extent there might be new dynamics that could lead to violent competition or some conflict over control of these migrant smuggling systems. But we do know that this did have an impact and probably likely will have an impact in southern Libya. So, it is worth keeping in mind, to what extent the return of this migration economy could impact conflict dynamics across the Nigerien border in Southern Libya.

Tim Eaton

Thank you, Peter. Some really fascinating points there and also, helpful things to look out for. Just sticking with you briefly, I think you alluded to some of this, but what kind of impact do you anticipate that the withdrawal of French troops and the recalibration of security co-operation with Western powers is likely to have within Niger?

Peter Tinti

Well, being mindful of time and also, that I know Ornella and Paul are probably going to have some comments on this front as we continue, you know, I think one of the obvious implications, right, is that this very much marks the end of a very specific era of French military intervention in the region. It was one thing for them to leave Mali, but that had been, in many ways, a long time coming. Burkina Faso as well, where the presence wasn’t even that robust compared – certainly compared to Mali and Niger. But the – you know, Niger had been this perceived pillar of stability and co-op – and willingness to cooperate with the French on counter-terrorism initiatives in the region. And so, that’s a major disruption to the status quo in the region.

I think additionally, in addition to the French mission, that was called Barkhane, there’s also the – there was also Task Force to Cuba, which had, sort of, been on life support, which was the EU-led special – that was going to consist of special forces operating in the region. And these types of missions, I think, are unlikely to be reinvigorated and to continue in the area as a result of this decision by the Nigerien Government to pivot away from this type of co-operation.

And then, the elephant in the room, of course, is Russia and the extent to which private military actors, such as Wagner Group, may start co-operating or may be invited in by the Nigerien Government. I don’t want to speculate too much there, get too far ahead of ourselves, but those dynamics, you know, Russian influence in the activity of Wagner group in Mali, has played a significant role in the conflict dynamics there. And I think that’s maybe the next – that’s what a lot of people are keeping an eye on, right? What will the relationship between the Nigerien Government and Russia look like going forward?

One final part of – piece of that puzzle is, right, the US is still present and engaging with – in the gov – in the country and engaging with the Nigerien Government, which puts it in a slightly different category, puts Niger in a slightly different category than Burkina Faso and Mali in terms of its posture and its, kind of, working relationship with the US, at least when it comes to military presence and co-operation.

Tim Eaton

Understood. I think that tees up some of the considerations on the regional level. Bringing you back in, Ornella, questions around, what are the drivers of external states engagement with Niger? And how should regional bodies such as ECOWAS and the broader international community seek to shape their engagement with Nigerien authorities? These discussions around the sanctions and things like that seems to be a pretty interesting case in point.

Ornella Moderan

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, your question is actually, like, three questions wrapped in one, if I look at it. But to try and keep it brief, I think, you know, Peter, was just hinting at some of the key drivers that have to do with foreign actors’ interest in security and in migration around Niger. So, I will start with there first. The US, for instance, has made enormous investments in military infrastructure and co-operation in Niger, and is clearly unwilling to let that go. So, that’s one element that we have to keep in mind when we think of, you know, what a global leader is adopting as a posture in this particular context.

There’s the case of France, also, which is – which has historically been the main foreign power in the region, including in Niger due to the colonial history. And France has, in fact with this coup last – as I was saying earlier, a country that had become the last bastion of its military presence in the Central Sahel, left aside the enduring exception of Chad, which in – which is indeed, forcing Paris to rethink yet more – much more fundamentally that it was saying it was doing the rationale and the modalities of its presence in Africa and whether that presence has to be at all. But beyond that, you know, Peter, was just talking about mobility economies, which is also something that’s central for the European Union. Migrations have been so high on the European internal policy agenda for years now and this is definitely an agenda on which Niger used to be a key ally, and that has now gone.

So, these are some of the key drivers, I think, but looking beyond that, I think, you know, there are also a number of economic elements that we should keep in mind. French companies’ interest in the country’s uranium in the north-east often cited, but this really is just the tip of the iceberg. Looking much more broadly, you know, if you start from closer countries to – like, going in concentric circles into a more extended area, one could argue that a country like Benin, which is an immediate neighbour of Niger, has vested interest, as well as China, which also contributed in those investments to make sure that the country’s oil exportation system actually gets to work. And to some extent, you know, countries like Benin and Togo also have interest in ensuring that Niger’s international trade continues to transit through their ports.

Yet a bit further, Morocco, for instance, recently extended a collective offer of co-operation to Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, which suggests that the kingdom has both economic, but also political interest, in using the current upheaval of international relations in the region in order to position itself to consolidate its power, because actually, America does have a very strong soft power, especially economic soft power, in the whole of West Africa and especially in the Sahel. So, this is an opportunity to consolidate that, but also to make some diplomatic gains in a context where, you know, ECOWAS is being challenged and there is an opportunity to create a different type of regional integration there, perhaps. One that Morocco would not be necessarily left out of so much.

And yeah, so, the – there are just all kinds of various interests which, I think, take us back to the fundamental points that, whereas it may look from afar like Niger is an isolated hinterland, poor country with limited security capacity and so on, actually there is a number of factors that suggest that the balance of power might not be so clear, and that in fact, Niger has some very strong arguments to, kind of, push or force foreign actors to come back to a dialogue. And here is where the very, you know, the very sanctions heavy and threat-driven strategy that the ECOWAS has taken from the start has proven ineffective, and not just ineffective, but in fact, counterproductive because it also turned against. It fired back, essentially, by turning a large part of Niger’s population, but more broadly, the regional population in West Africa against the regional bloc.

So, how do we go from there? I think, you know, at this point, it’s probably time and, you know, the recent decision to lift these sanctions is, in a way, an admission of, well, some would say weakness, or you could also say lucidity. Simply that, you know, the balance of power is such that there is a, sort of, status quo that is established and external actors should seek to restore constructive communication channels with Niger’s authorities, whoever they are, at this particular moment and time, and try to build a new agenda with them.

In doing that, though, I think, you know, some lessons should be learned from the mistakes that have been made in neighbouring countries and I’m thinking of Mali in particular, in terms of making sure that this conversation is centred around needs, but not just the needs of the states and the state elite, but the needs of the people. So, trying to have a much more people-centred, needs-based discussion on what areas of engagement and co-operation should be, as opposed to having a very Western-centric conversation about just, you know, how do we counter Russia? Which is something that I have to admit, tends to get on the nerve of West African stakeholders, who feel completely looked over with that type of approach.

Tim Eaton

No. As someone who works on Libya, I’m very familiar with those discussions, as well. They’re certainly frustrating. Got some great questions coming in. I’ll just ask one final question to Paul and then, we’ll get to your – to questions in the Q&A. But Paul, as you noted in your initial remarks, there are questions around what’s going to, kind of, happen next. The junta has announced that it will work towards elections within three years. That seems like quite a generous timeframe to be offered. So, what are your expectations for the governing authorities in the coming year, and to what extent do you think they will be able to address some of these political, economic and security challenges that the country faces?

Paul Melly

[Pause] Thanks, Tim, and I think in terms of the actual timetable, we should treat that with quite a lot of caution. We’ve seen, in the case of Mali, for example, the timetable’s been revised, reduced and increased several times by the junta there, and there’s no reason to expect anything different in Niger. Late last year, the Prime Minister did a public webinar where he announced that they would be setting out a, sort of, proper agenda for how they were going to go back to constitutional democratic rule in January. But a detailed agenda hasn’t really been set out, and his – essentially, the junta’s current sales pitch, if you like, is to say, “Well, we had to seize power because actually Niger was being very badly governed. There was a lot of corruption, and it wasn’t really democratic,” etc., etc. But that’s – obviously, that’s a partial view, it’s their argument, but it isn’t one that actually, necessarily, all of the Nigerien public would accept.

It was quite noticeable towards the end of Issoufou’s presidency, there was a lot of popular frustration with corruption. There was a feeling that although the Government had been democratically elected, it had become complacent, to0 tied to vested interests and so on. Now, although Bazoum had been a Senior Minister in that government, he had distanced himself quite a bit from its legacy once he became President, and he oversaw a quite serious anti-corruption drive. And one of the factors that many people speculate may have provoked the coup, is that Bazoum had announced some months before that prosecutors examining a military procurement scandal, which of course, potentially could set – threaten senior military figures, would be allow – the – these cases wouldn’t just be settled with a, sort of, civil settlement, but there could be criminal prosecutions.

And so – and Bazoum himself was viewed by ordinary Nigerien – who’s quite individually popular, a typical remark was that he was a good President, but could he escape ,as it were, from the legacy of the vested interests that had clustered around his party over the previous two presidential terms? And so, out of that context, I think there’s going to be a, sort of, two – twin track process. If the junta consider dis – accepts, if you like, to continue discussing with ECOWAS, there’ll be a, sort of, diplomatic path, and in December, there were report – reliable reports that Togolese mediators on behalf of ECOWAS had reached a provisional agreement on a transition of 18 month – 15 to 18 months.

So, that process could go on, but I think also, there’s going to be some sort of bargaining going on with Nig – within Niger itself because of the rather complicated party political dynamics that I mentioned earlier, and because a lot of senior figures invest – have – in politics and the military, will have an interest in, essentially some sort of – that when – if and when constitutional order is restored, and I think it probably will be when, eventually just because – although that’s the only way Niger will fully recover, if you like, its access to the full, sort of, panoply of international co-operation and role in the diplomatic system and so on. But there may want to be some, sort of, underlying elite bargain between military and political figures over the basis on which such a restoration of constitutional rule happens.

And people will – in Niger, will be – especially within the elite, they were – they may have noticed what’s happened in Mauritania, where the previous President, who actually gave up at the end of his second term, and there was a democratic election, his successor from the ruling party took over, has now been convicted of corruption and sent to jail. And this has caused deep rifts in the ruling elite, motivated by clan rivalries and things. Now, people – I think, in Niger, there may want to be some, sort of, deal that when – if and when dem – elect – multi-party elected rule, democratic rule comes back, that there’s some, sort of, understanding of the basis on what – on which that happens.

And the final point I think worth making, is that although ECOWAS, as Ornella was saying, has basically, had to recognise reality, the sanctions were counterproductive, they weren’t working, they – in doing so, ECOWAS’s – leaders in ECOWAS are trying to remind people of the benefits of actually being in the bloc. Remember, people – and especially this is important for the poorer, landlocked countries who have free movement, much easier trade and so on, and so, that, also, could be a bit of a factor.

Tim Eaton

Thank you, Paul. Okay, getting to the questions from the audience now. Thank you. Loads of them coming. We’ll get through as many as we can. I’ll group them, as well, to give us the, kind of, best shot of doing that. I guess, to start off with, there are questions from Ian, Edmund and Mark, which really relate to the relative influence of external actors. They ask “the impact of French investments and interests over recent events,” and connected to this, Ornella, that question, which is irksome in a way, I mean, “How should we view the relative influence of other powers, Russia, China, Turkey?” I’d like to offer this question to you first in terms of relative, external interests, if that’s okay, and pick up, perhaps, on any threads that you think are particularly important.

Ornella Moderan

[Pause] Yeah, sure. So, yeah, the question of global interest, essentially, playing out in the region and in Niger in particular, you know, there are definitely a number of foreign powers that have interest in either developing economic and commercial relations, political and diplomatic relations, military co-operation and so on, with the Sahel globe – generally speaking, including with Niger. And that includes some of – well, some non-Western countries. And here I think, you know, a bit of the – I would suggest, actually, just looking at this question in the reverse way. Not from a threatened position of, you know, the Western power who feels they’re being pushed out, but really looking at what is going on in terms of interests and values alignment and so on.

So, I think, you know, there is such a thing as the rise or return of so-called strongman politics. That’s one of the key leading trends in the Sahel and that speaks to the political systems of some foreign autocratic countries. I would think of, you know, places like Turkey, like Russia, and so on. These are also places that have something to offer in terms of military and security co-operation, however limited, or however specific. So, Turkey has been very much invested in, you know, drone provision, and Russia has been very much invested in trying to get more clients for its private military companies and things like that. So, this reminds us of the need to think of co-operation, not just in terms of what do we think our Sahelian partners want or need, but what do they say they want or – and need and how can we really engage in that conversation with them? And many are the countries actually, but clearly, you know, I’m focusing here on a handful that usually raise the most concern from Western partners. I’m conscious of time, so, I’ll just leave it at that.

Tim Eaton

Sure, thank you very much. I appreciate that. If the panellists are able to be as succinct as that, that’d be great. It’ll give us the best chance to get through. I guess, connected to that slightly, Peter, there was a question about the role of the US and one of their bases, Base 201, I believe, and also, the potential need to repay $550 million in US in debt. I wondered just any comment on the US side of this – of the story here? But also there’s a question from Omar about how some of “these shifts that we see might impact the drug industry and drug trafficking moving across the region.”

Peter Tinti

Sure. Well, those are two pretty complex questions. So, by no means low-hanging fruit. Starting with the – I guess I’ll start with the second question. Well, I’ll – apologies to the questioner ‘cause it is a great question regarding the US involvement. In terms of paying back that debt, I don’t really have anything substantive to add on that particular detail. In terms of US engagement in the region, I do think, you know, there’s clearly been a willingness within US policy circles to, kind of, try to hedge on how to respond to the junta. Given that, you know, in theory, the US by law, has a very specific response when it comes to certain types of military and bilateral aid to states that – where there are coups. And they have, sort of – the US Government, sort of – the Biden administration, more or less tread water for as long as it could. And then tried to basically, thread the needle in saying that certain amounts of co-operate – it is a coup, but certain amounts of co-operation can still, or will still be continued.

But in general, I think, a lot of that is a reflection of the assets that the US already has on the ground and doesn’t necessarily want to roll back right away. Notably, the drone base outside of Agadez, but also some other sites where the US has a military footprint. But I do think, kind of, globally, strategy towards the Sahel and West Africa, and this does go into one of the other questions in the chat, at least from the US perspective, is very much pivoting to the – what are often referred to as the littoral states. So, trying to reinforce and provide more support and pivot engagement to states like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and other littoral states where there – Benin, Togo, where there is this perception, right, that the instability that has been incubating in the Sahel is spreading further and further south.

With the question of drug trafficking, I mean, that’s a – you know, we do know that Niger does remain a transit state for drug trafficking in the region. There have been some pretty prominent seizures in recent years of cannabis resin, both cannabis resin cultivated in Morocco, that probably transited through Mali, through Niger, likely for – to go to onward markets in probably Libya, and then elsewhere from there, and also fairly sizable seizures of cocaine in Niger. Where that cocaine entered West Africa, or the African continent, is not as clear. Did it come from Guinea-Bissau or Guinea at the – that part of the Gulf of Guinea, or did it come up through Benin or Nigeria? There’s a lot of debate and handwringing over trying to understand that.

I don’t know that the coup itself has tangible direct obvious impacts on this trade, but I think it is probably – I think we can say with some accuracy, right, that the actors that are involved in this type of trafficking are probably pretty – have proven over the years very adept at being able to continue their activities regardless of some of these disruptions or changes in government that have taken place within the region. It’s often maybe a – there’s a period of, kind of, recalibrating the networks to the – and reformulating alliances according to the new realities on the ground, but the – I think the basic schematics of these drug flows continue, with only small disruptions here and there.

Tim Eaton

Thank you, Peter. I’m conscious of time. So, what I’m going to do is just group a final set of questions from the chat together and then, put it to our panellists, perhaps, to respond to some elements of those and then make some final remarks so that we’re able to finish on time. And I noted in particular that there are a number of questions around the impact of Niger on the broader region and also, then, broader regional dynamics on Niger. So, Ali Inka asks about “movement in constitutional mandates and terms, is this,” kind of, res – you know, “these changing norms within the AU a problem? How could that play out?” Gordon asks about the “impact on the Alliance of Sahelian States.” And perhaps more directly, Mohamed asked very specifically about the “direct impact on Niger’s neighbours of the coup.”

So, if I could just put out that question to you first, Paul, and then any other final remarks in – if you could keep it to two or three minutes. I know that’s a massive range. So, just be as selective as what you want to pick and perhaps leave with us some final thoughts.

Paul Melly

[Pause] Thanks, Tim. I think, yes, a key point, which really will influence both the political evolution and really, the way Niger’s relations fit in that original context, is that West Africa is actually relatively quite integrated, especially at the ordinary human level, and that’s very true of Niger. About half of Niger’s population, for example, are Hausa. The Hausa community are also a very large part of the population of Northern Nigeria. There is a huge dense, constant economic and human movement back and forth across the border between North Central Nigeria and North – and Southern Niger. And which is probably through smuggling, one of the things that sustained the economy over the last few months of sanctions, but also means that there is quite a driving powerful pressure to, if you like, at the social human level, to somehow sort this mess out, if I can put it simply like that.

And the, sort of – also, there’s a final practical point that there’s a natural economic complementarity between the Sahelian economies and what they produce which – and particularly in the case of Niger, that tends to be livestock and then either desert or cold weather crops and the markets for those things in Coastal West Africa. And then in return, Coastal West Africa is a source of manufactured goods and critically, food crop supplies, cereals, maize and so on, and rice for Niger. So, I think those dynamics are going to be very powerful in trying to push the process, shape the agenda going forward.

Tim Eaton

Thank you, Paul. Ornella, over to you. Any of those points that you wanted to come in or any final thoughts you wanted to leave us with?

Ornella Moderan

Yeah, you know, we had a number of questions, as you mentioned, on the regional impacts, and I think we’ve covered some of that already. Maybe one thing I could come back to is, you know, the first question about constitutional mandates and just more broadly, the overall trend of democratic backsliding. I think I started my remarks by that and I could add here by saying that it is true that coups are just one particular – particularly obvious, but one specific type of expression of the broader problem, which is the weakness of democratic systems, and the, kind of, shallowness that they rely on in many West African countries.

So, one of the things that has considerably plagiarised ECOWAS’s stand and credibility in the region is this perceived approach of, you know, double standards. Whereby the organisation has been very critical and very strongly opposed to military coups but has been a lot more lenient towards softer forms of democratic process manipulations, like, you know, having constitutional manipulations by incumbents willing to overstay their welcome and things like that.

One thing we could wonder about, you know, the context in which Niger’s sanctions were released just a few days ago, is whether the ongoing crisis in Senegal, for instance, could have anything to do with that. Like, how uncomfortable is it for the regional bloc to maintain sanctions on Niger while not really saying anything much about Senegal on the other hand? So, these things are definitely interconnected in several ways, and we could have a whole separate webinar on what that means for the region. What that means for Benin, what that means for Togo, what that means for, you know, other countries.

Perhaps just my very last point, if I have to provide just one wrapping, concluding remark, is the centrality of political economy in all this. A lot of the issues come down to this, whether it’s, you know, trafficking networks and so on, whether it’s how power dynamics function within the security sector and within the political elite. This has, I believe, been perhaps a bit of a blind spot in a lot of the political analysis we’ve had in the region for the past few years, and that’s definitely something that the ongoing trend of militarisation is inviting us to revisit, quite substantially.

Tim Eaton

Thank you so much. As a Political Economist, I very much endorse that last remark. Peter, final thought from you.

Peter Tinti

Well, I hesitate to start talking because I think Ornella just did a really nice job of offering that final remark. And I will echo both what she said, as well as what, Paul, said regarding the political economies and the realities of economic integration, both at a, kind of, more global level, but also, on that very interpersonal level. And the ways in which communities that – the ability to cross these borders and engage in economic activity across these borders is incredibly important to so many communities across the region. And that’s in part why I think the sanctions regime kind of lost popularity quite quickly and why the appetite that certain states within ECOWAS had for continuing them may not have lasted as long.

I also think we should note – I mean, we haven’t really talked about the Alliance of Sahelian States, but I do think that strategic decision to form that grouping by Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, did allow them actually to operate with one voice, to put pressure. And also, the announcement that they were leaving – that they want to leave ECOWAS together, these actions on the unified bloc have really, I think, made it clear to a lot of actors within the region, right, that as a bloc, their ability to gain concessions and to negotiate is much stronger than if they were acting independently.

So, of course, we need to think about, as all the panellists have said, the ways in which – you know, there’s an entire geopolitical context to this. We shouldn’t just think about Niger in isolation, Mali in isolation, Burkina Faso in isolation. Let alone, right, the ways in which these developments are also impacting ECOWAS’s posture towards places like Senegal, Guinea, as well. So, I’ll leave it there. Thank you.

Tim Eaton

Thank you so much, Peter, and thank you to all of our panellists. An incredible number of questions in the chat. So, very sorry for those of you that we weren’t able to get to. I think it’s clear that this discussion could go a very long time. I found it fascinating today hearing about the cross-border implications and the transnational, truly transnational dynamics that are at play here politically, economically, militarily, on an interpersonal level, on a state-to-state institutional level. Very, very complex situation.

I will finish off by making one blatant plug, though, for a couple of papers that we do have coming up on our XCEPT project that are exploring some of these interconnections through the lens of human mobility. So, do keep your eyes out for those in the coming months. But with that, I’ll just close and say thank you so much to our panellists and for all of you to joining us. It was a great discussion, and I look forward to future discussions on this topic. It’s clear that we’ve got quite an agenda to get through in the future. So, thank you once again.

Ornella Moderan

Thank you very much.