Sébastien Maillard
So, good evening. It is my great pleasure and honour to welcome you this evening at Chatham House, on ‘The Future of the UK–EU Relationship,’ our topic tonight. I’d like to welcome our members here in London and also all of you joining us online for this event. Let me remind you before we start that this is a livestream event, so everything that will be said, and I remind this also to our speakers, that is on the record and not under the – our – the famous rule of this house.
We are gathered this evening just the day after the UK–EU Summit, actually quite close to where it happened, at Lancaster House. There’s been weeks and months of intense negotiation, until the very last hour, not only Sunday, but even yesterday morning. This was the first official summit since Brexit and it covered a wide range of issues: defence, energy, migration, youth, agriculture and not least, fisheries. Three documents were issued stating shared principles, engaging both sides to tackle security and making political commitments to further technical negotiations down the road.
I think the aim of our event this evening is both to get a deeper understanding of what has been agreed upon yesterday and also, to get a full grasp of what lies ahead. And to do this, we have an amazing panel that I think many of you will already know. Let me just say that Ped – Ambassador Pedro Serrano, the European Union Ambassador to the United Kingdom, will be joining us in just a while. Professor Anand Menon is here with us. You are the Director of UK in a Changing Europe, that has produced a host of very relevant studies related to our discussion this evening. Thank you for being with us tonight.
Professor Anand Menon
Hmmm hmm.
Sébastien Maillard
Also joining us live from Rome, online, is Dr Natalie Tocci, Director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. Thank you for being with us from Rome. And from Chatham House, my dear colleague, Olivia O’Sullivan, Director of the UK, I would say in a changing world, but in the World Programme.
Olivia O’Sullivan
It’s apt.
Sébastien Maillard
And I am Sébastien Maillard, Associate Fellow of the Europe Programme, chairing this evening’s event. Perhaps I’d like to kick off with you, Anand, because part of yesterday’s summit was about dealing with some of the economic leftovers of the – from past Brexit negotiations. But another part was also moving ahead to new areas of co-operation, especially on defence, with regard to the Russian threat. So, thank you, Ambassador, for joining us.
Would you say that the summit puts the UK–EU relationship on another foot, or that actually, it’s reopening old disputes inherited from the Brexit negotiations?
Professor Anand Menon
Well, I mean, it’s certainly reopened old disputes in the press. It felt like I’d jumped in a time machine this morning, looking at the headlines. I mean, if you’re trying to benchmark the summit, I suppose you’ve got to figure out what you’re benchmarking it against. So, if you’re benchmarking it against our track record in these negotiations, I mean, five years ago, we had a government whose senior members were openly hoping the European Union would collapse. Three years ago, we had a Tory leadership election in which the eventual winner couldn’t figure out if France was a friend or a foe. So, in that sense, you know, it feels very much like the grown-ups are in charge, so it’s quite reassuring.
If you compare it to expectations, what I’d say is what we ended up with yesterday was broader than I’d expected, but thinner. Broader because it covered a load of areas that I hadn’t expected. I hadn’t expected the stuff on energy, particularly. Thinner because I was slightly disappointed by how little is actually agreed. There’s a whole host of…
Sébastien Maillard
Binding, you mean?
Professor Anand Menon
Well, agreed, I mean, negotiated properly. I mean, on quite a lot of the stuff, the EU still has to get mandates and there are difficult talks, particularly about financial contributions, I suspect, to come.
And finally, if you measure it against the scale of the international challenges that we, as Europeans, face, then it’s hard not to be quite disappointed. The Security and Defence pact is full of the, sort of, usual motherhood and apple pie stuff about joint interest, but actually, what we’re going to do about furthering those joint interests, there’s very, very little about.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm. So, it needs to be seen. I would like, actually, to turn to you, Ambassador Serrano, and thank you, again, for joining us, since we’re – have started taking the grasp out of yesterday’s summit. Are you – today, the day after, how much are you satisfied, disappointed, happy of the result of – you have been through this negotiations from the very start, and how do you felt afterwards?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
I think it’s a great moment and a real turning point in the relationship, that strengthens the relationship. It strengthens it in – on security and defence, strengthens it on prosperity and economy. It strengthens it on people – person-to-person, people-to-people contacts. It strengthens it in addressing safety challenges, judicial co-operation, Police co-operation, migration. So, I understand, my friend, Anand, saying he considers it’s ‘thin’. I think if we had to deliver everything that is in these various documents, it would definitely take at least another year to deliver formally, because these are complex issues. But a lot of important parameters have been agreed. There is a commitment to advance on these feelings.
So, I think that for a negotiation that is relatively – that has taken relatively short time, it is a very good outcome and that not much more could be expected. I think all leaders – I see Natalie Tocci, as well, there, I didn’t know. Hi, Natalie. I see that – I think that all our leaders yesterday, Prime Minister Starmer, but also Foreign Secretary David Lammy, in the afternoon the Trade Secretary Reynolds, they were expressing satisfaction. On our side, it was also very clear satisfaction on the side of the two President, President of the European Council, President of the Commission, High Representative, the Commissioner for Trade and relations with the UK. So, the messages were all very positive, being aware that this is a first move and that more has to happen.
But it’s the first summit that we have since Brexit, which in itself, is, I would say, an accomplishment, and it’s a summit that doesn’t just come with nice words. It comes with commitments to advance on a number of issues that were very, very significant in bringing greater security, greater safety and greater prosperity. So, I think, all in all, it’s an important package, a very important step and what we have is a lot of work ahead of us, but good work. And that would be – would bring, certainly, greater prosperity to the UK, to the EU and greater security to us all. I mean, I think – well, I’ll let you – because I could go on speaking, but…
Sébastien Maillard
No, I was…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…I think it’s…
Sébastien Maillard
…actually going to…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
It wouldn’t be fair for the rest, so I’ll stop here and I’m very happy to continue.
Sébastien Maillard
But Ambassador, you’ve mentioned that the negotiations could take a yearlong to…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
I don’t know. I mean, I mentioned…
Sébastien Maillard
Or more.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…a year because…
Sébastien Maillard
There…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…I see that there is so much in the pipeline, that it is going to take some time here.
Sébastien Maillard
And this is a first step, but already, the negotiations…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
Hopefully less, I think maybe…
Sébastien Maillard
…for…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…six months, wonderful.
Sébastien Maillard
The negotiations for this summit were – and it lasted quite a – was quite intensive in the very last run, until the very last minute, even, on Monday morning. Ho – why was it so difficult?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
Well, this is normal in any negotiation that has substance. Where – although, I would say that everything that has been agreed is of mutual interest and benefit. This is not a zero-sum game, this is a win-win, and I think both the UK in all the elements of the negotiation, the various aspects, as well as the European Union, can claim that they have benefits for their citizens. But I – you know, these are, again, complicated negotiations, so it’s very normal that this runs to the last moment. That’s one of the good things about putting a last moment in any negotiation, because you know you have to deliver by a certain time, and most negotiations end up exhausting the time allotted for the negotiations. So, this is, I think, quite traditional diplomat dynamic.
Sébastien Maillard
Oh, well, as you were, too, you were expecting this, kind of, a – this…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
It wasn’t extremely surprising, but of course, I mean, I’m sure it can be improved and – but I think the result was really very good.
Sébastien Maillard
Natalie, let me turn to you. Keir Starmer, when he came to power last summer, he came to power with a promise to reset the UK’s relationship to the EU. Sitting in Rome and having a – from a European perspective, how much – how was this promise welcomed in Brussels and also, in the different 27 member states? How was it understood, appreciated? How much, actually, political attention was given to it and how much the memory of Brexit stood in the way?
Dr Natalie Tocci
I mean, this was a very different debate in EU member states compared to what we’ve seen in the UK. And this has been, in a sense, the story of Brexit since the very beginning, right? I mean, Brexit has, for obvious reasons, been at the centre of the British debate in a way in which it simply has not been in any other member states. So, it’s not surprise that this has been the case even in this and surrounding this summit. And of course, as I think was implicit in Anand’s words, it’s not necessarily a big thing, right? I mean, you know, when you do have a hyper-politicised debate, it tends to take you to pretty nasty places. So, good that it wasn’t politicised, right?
Now, I think that – so, I mean, I think that the broad point is that we’re talking about two very different political contexts in the UK and in any other member state. The second point, from an EU vantage point, to say, is that I think what this summit and its agreement puts right is something that was always considered a low-hanging fruit in Brexit that had never really been materialised, i.e., the security and defence piece, right? So, if there is one issue on which all member states – you know, if you had asked them back in 2016/17/18, you know, ‘What is the one thing that we really need to’ – you know, ‘that can really be a win-win?’ they would’ve probably all said security and defence, yeah?
Because this was obviously the area in which the UK can add a lot, and obviously, there’s an understanding on the EU side that the EU also can add a lot to the UK’s security. And given the, sort of, much repeated slogan of the UK leaving Europe and U – leaving the EU, but not leaving Europe, in a sense, this was the obvious way in which this had to materialise, and it never did, right? So, I think to me, the security and defence bit is the most important part of the agreement and perhaps we can talk a little bit more about that later.
Now, what there wasn’t on – in terms of willingness, on the side of member states, and I mean, Pedro can speak more to this, certainly, than I can, but certainly, I think as far as the institutions, as well is concerned, was a willingness to reopen the entire package and especially the economic piece of it. Yes, there was willingness to reopen and rethink and fix bits and bobs, especially those bits and bobs where, I mean, coming back to the win-win, it was understood that there could’ve been a win-win on both sides, right?
So, whereas on some of the economic issues it was probably seen as, you know, that it would’ve been a rather unbalanced, in a sense, negotiation – as I said, there wasn’t willingness to reopen the entire lot on the EU side. On fishery, on youth mobility, on phytosanitary, you know, on these issues – either because they related to the interests of individual member states, fishing France, phytosanitary Ireland, youth mobility pretty much everyone. So, either because they connected to certain interests of certain member states and therefore, there was a willing, and that is necessary, right? Because unless there is an interest on the side of one or several member states, then there isn’t the scope for that win-win. And so, I think, you know, in a sense, the topics defined themselves on the basis of where it was that actually, a mutually beneficial negotiation and eventually agreement, could be reached.
Now, on this last point that I’ll mention, you know, on this, kind of – you know, Anand’s pessimism and Pedro’s, kind of, optimism in the reading of it, I tend to – I must say I tend more on Pedro’s side on this. Because I mean, essentially, yes, Anand’s absolutely right, it is thin on the details. I mean, I see this a little bit as, you know, the table of contents of a book. Now, the book itself still has to be fully drafted, yeah, but at least we now know what the book will talk about. And indeed, you know, it remains to be seen how long it will take to actually draft the entire manuscript, but the door has been opened, and it is that open door that I think really makes this a turning point.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm. So, we have a table of chapters, and the book have to be written. Olivia, let me turn now to the UK debate on this, because you’ve seen the headlines in the British press this morning, you’ve heard the opposition’s reaction. They’re against the so-called ‘Betrayal of Brexit.’ How much does that reflect the expectations in today’s British society about the kind of relationship it wants toward the EU, I mean, about – I’m talking about the corporate firms, trade unions, universities. What were they expecting out of yesterday’s summit?
Olivia O’Sullivan
I think it’s a good question, because we should be careful to separate public opinion from media reaction and even from some of our, kind of, habits of thinking and mind on the EU–UK relationship, right? So, I don’t think – I probably don’t need to tell anyone here that if you look at surveys now, you do find that we’re ticking up into over 50% of British people saying that, you know, either that Brexit was handled badly or, potentially, that Brexit was not the right choice at the time. This is not the same thing as people saying they want to rejoin in massive numbers. And when you ask people about the particular areas of collaboration that the agreement yesterday covered, particularly defence and security, support is pretty high, even among leave voters in some polls.
Which probably is a reflection of public opinion in other areas, particularly around Trump, right, who is – the UK public is generally worried about. Tends to see at least – you know, in fairly significant numbers, as a threat and a concern. So, the public are reacting in the same way a lot of policymakers and decisionmakers are reacting. You know, suddenly – not suddenly, but in a context where we now have a very volatile and unpredictable security partner, in a context where we’re worried about Russia’s actions in our immediate neighbourhood, we’re not so concerned about some of these distinctions anymore.
And I think you see that a bit reflected in public polls, but also maybe more importantly, the UK public elected this government, which in its manifesto, said it would seek a security pact with the EU, an SPS deal. And actually a few things that didn’t – weren’t so prominent, or didn’t make as much progress yesterday, including mobility of artists and mutual recognition of qualifications. And they got over 400 seats on that manifesto. So, there’s a pretty strong mandate for what happened yesterday.
The media reaction, yeah, you’re right, there were some pretty bombastic headlines and some pretty alarming metaphors from some figures in the opposition, right? I mean, but there’s also, I think, some of the more obviously pro-EU or pro-remain papers framing this as disappointing or unambitious. There’s a section of the media who will always probably – or a section of the commentariat where anything short of rejoin is going to be disappointing, which is maybe Keir Starmer’s eternal curse, that he’s always slightly between two stools of public opinion.
But I think the broader thing here is we have this, kind of, habit in the media of framing everything in terms of the UK–EU and actually, in the, sort of, political commentary, as either a victory or a concession. Either – you know, everything is zero-sum, and we have some kind of relationship on many of these issues. So, I think it is going to be a long few years if we continue to always think of things in this way, not least because the issue for the last government, in many ways, was less actually about public opinion on some of these things. It was about the Parliamentary opinion and Parliamentary arithmetic. They couldn’t get deals through because they had such a shaky majority, and they couldn’t unite different wings of the Conservative Party on the type of Brexit they wanted.
There was quite limited evidence that it was the public that cared a – had fine grained, deeply held opinions, about things like regulatory alignment in certain areas, right? Which isn’t to say the public didn’t hold – don’t hold strong views on bigger issues like sovereignty and immigration and won’t shift or change their mind. But we sometimes react to this as if being, you know, being a rule taker and not a rule maker, was important to a particular part of the Tory Party, and we’re actually in a really different place now, because Keir Starmer has this massive majority. So, it’s – we should be listening a bit more to what are the public actually saying now, which I think is quite nuanced.
Sébastien Maillard
Yeah, ‘cause knowing that the government has this massive majority, as you…
Olivia O’Sullivan
Hmmm.
Sébastien Maillard
…rightly recall and knowing that it was in the Labour manifesto, why do you think it had been always so cautious in recalling its red lines all the time and actually, well, for some it didn’t go…?
Olivia O’Sullivan
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
It could have been a bit more assertive on what it wanted?
Olivia O’Sullivan
Yeah. Well, those red lines were also in that manifesto, right?
Sébastien Maillard
True.
Olivia O’Sullivan
Or – and were also part of the…
Sébastien Maillard
True, yeah.
Olivia O’Sullivan
…Labour Party’s offer to people.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm.
Olivia O’Sullivan
And they very carefully triangulate on this issue and, of course, they remain concerned about Reform.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm.
Olivia O’Sullivan
But I think it’s – which is the reincarnated Brexit Party, but…
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm.
Olivia O’Sullivan
…I think they are maybe to – arguably, they are maybe gambling, not gambling, but relying on the idea that actually, the parts of the political spectrum that look like they are re-litigating Brexit and seeking to, kind of, reopen what many people in the public, arguably, were increasingly exhausted by or not interested by, are the ones who all, sort of, pay a political price.
I mean, if you – speaking of manifestos, if you read Reform’s manifesto, there’s actually only, I think – people can correct me if they’re read it, done a closer read, but only one sentence about ‘We’re going to renegotiate the TCA.’ It doesn’t say in a lot of detail, and it majors on a lot of other issues.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm.
Olivia O’Sullivan
So, you know, I think one thing, looking forward from this deal, that I’m slightly concerned about in terms of the politics of it, is, as the other panellists have quite rightly pointed out, the defence and security co-operation is pretty urgent in the current environment. Of course, a summit like this would never have wrapped everything up neatly, but a lot of it is agreements for further talks.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm.
Olivia O’Sullivan
If this looks like we’re, sort of, reopening a very difficult and endless negotiation where, sort of, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, I think that will slightly drain this sense of urgency and that actually, there’s a public support for getting closer to the EU on defence, especially defence spending and defence planning.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm.
Olivia O’Sullivan
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
But – and maybe, also, Anand, you will want to come on this, but is it possible, since we’re going – as Ambassador Serrano said, well, this is just the first step and there’s going to be more negotiations coming on, is it possible to lead a reset policy and then not try to – and prevent a new passionate debate on Europe in the UK? That was a question for you, Olivia, and then – but also, perhaps Anand could also come on this. Can you actually do reset without having a new debate on Europe in the UK?
Olivia O’Sullivan
I mean it – oh, I think it – there’s nothing wrong with a debate on Europe. I think the question is whether you fall into old habits of the way we characterise it, or whether you think forward about what type of relationship should the UK and EU have in the current geopolitical context? And I think there is – you know, on both sides, there are risks. If we do end up with EU member states tying defence and security co-operation to agreements on fisheries and things, I think we can argue that there’s some ways in which those negotiations – there’s some ways in which that hinders co-operation on pretty urgent risks. I think there’s also probably a tendency on – yeah, so I think that’s a concern.
I think it depends what we mean by the ‘reset’, right? There is – if it – any given negotiation on trade is always going to involve being somewhere on this spectrum being complete independent control over regulation or market access, all the way and up to and including being a member of the single market, which this government has ruled out. So, we are always going to be somewhere on that spectrum. There is no world where there isn’t a trade-off on that spectrum that we have to consider.
So, if any agreement in any economic sector or area is framed as either concession or victory on the part of the UK, rather than accepting the reality that our position now means we have to be somewhere on that spectrum, then I think it’s difficult for us to make progress in the conversation. I think we have a bigger discussion about what kind of relationship as a non-member do we want with the EU on some of these issues that are urgent? Then it – then we frame it differently and that’s useful.
Sébastien Maillard
Anand, do you believe the debate today in British society is different from years ago, or do you just see the same kind of words and slogans coming back? Or is it actually – since it’s a changing Europe…
Professor Anand Menon
Hmmm.
Sébastien Maillard
…and if it’s actually now on different terms? And for inst – ‘cause now we’re talking about a ‘dynamic alignment’, we’re talking about even the UK will have to, perhaps, commit itself to some of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. How that – is that really difficult to – for cab – the Starmer Government to make the society accept, or actually, is it now more easier to make it sway in that?
Professor Anand Menon
I mean, it is a different to – actually, I should say first and foremost, that Natalie has now got me counting in my heads how many detailed book proposals I wrote that never led to a book. So – maybe that’s just me. But yeah, the debate is very different now. One of the things that worries me slightly about this government is it’s obviously keen to build on the relationship we have, but equally keen to do it, sort of, rather sotto voce. That is to say there’s no real Parliamentary debate about this sort of stuff. We’ve lost the House of Commons Committee where these things used to be debated. Decisions on alignment and divergence are going to be taken via statutory instrument because of the Product safety [means Regulation] and Metrology Build.
This government wants to move as close to the European Union, but is scared of having the conversation. And we’ve, kind of, been there before, right, in this country, under successive Prime Ministers, that we did European integration without winning the argument. And I, kind of, think at the moment, given what’s happening in the world, whether it’s Ukraine or whatever President Trump is doing, this is an ideal moment to actually go out there and a bit more – be a bit more forceful with the public and say, ‘Look,’ you know, ‘we campaigned for office in a time of peace. We’re governing now in what feels like a time of war. We need to think through some of our important relationships.’
And I just fear that the government is running a bit scared of that and is not willing to have those conversations. And I think, you know, if you want to make these deals and if you want to make these deals stick, because whatever the size of the Labour majority, it is perfectly conceivable there’ll be a different party in power after the next election, you need to win those arguments. And I’m not convinced they’re doing that particularly well at the moment.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm. Natalie, you were speaking from the EU perspective on this relationship and stressing on the fact that there was now this Security and Defence pact, which actually was, I think, the piecemeal of this – of the – of yesterday’s summit. But…
Professor Anand Menon
Hmmm.
Sébastien Maillard
…from a geopolitical point of view, how does that relationship, E – UK-EU relationship make sense in today’s tumultuous world order, or disorder, rather? It’s such a watershed moment for the fate of European integration, so how does that fit in?
Dr Natalie Tocci
So, no, I think this is – in a sense, a story evolved in three steps. One – and one – the first was obviously insufficient. So, you know, the first, indeed, when Brexit happened, back then, in fact, I was working very closely with Pedro. We were working on the global strategy, and as Pedro will remember perfectly well, there was incredible strategic convergence, I would say, between, you know – I mean, the UK was, but obviously still, back then, within the UK, was really bang in the middle on most issues, right? And as such, really able to, sort of, carry the day on the positioning of the EU as a whole on many issues.
And this is essentially why, you know, this, alongside, obviously, the UK’s defence capabilities, once the referendum happened, once Brexit started happening, there was, indeed, the sense of, oh, surely this is, as I said, the low hanging fruit. Well, obviously, it wasn’t that low hanging. Anyway, Mark 2 Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, this, basically, brings the EU and the UK even closer together, particularly in terms of, you know, co-ordinating on military assistance, particularly the sanctions story. So, you see the strategic convergence, in a sense, becoming far more urgent, far more, kind of, tangible, right?
But then you have, and this is really where we are today, a situation which is actually almost – I’m not sure whether to define it as categorically different but coming close to it. Because we know – don’t only, ‘only’, have, you know, a strategic convergence and the threat from Russia, but we have, in the best of circumstances, the US’s indifference and disengagement from European security, and in the worst and possibly far more likely circumstances, the US’s betrayal of Europe. And back to the UK may not be in the EU, but it is in Europe, you have the, kind of, compounded effect of the threat from Russia and the risk or threat, in a sense, of a US betrayal, which, kind of, makes that once upon a time low hanging fruit, it, kind of, makes it suicidal not to pick it, right?
So, I – you know, I don’t think it’s a coincidence, basically, that this is happening now. The substance of it, both the one that doesn’t exist and the one that eventually may exist, possibly would’ve been exactly the same, you know, even several years ago. But the political, or rather the strategic context, is, you know, qualitatively different and obviously far more degraded than it was only a few years ago.
Sébastien Maillard
Ambassador Serrano, to what extent this ‘strategic convergence’ that Natalie is describing, in a way, facilitated the summit? Because when the reset policy was firstly mentioned a year ago, Trump wasn’t back in office yet in – but now, to this – we have this new Atlanticist crisis, as we call it. There’s this Russian threat that is there more than ever. So, how does that really frame the relationship today?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
I mean, I wouldn’t describe things exactly in the words that Natalie has used, but definitely, we have seen, throughout the last years – I mean, if we move to the beginning of the Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, which started in the Year 2000, formally. I mean, you go Saint-Malo 98, okay, 2000, and up to now, there were two main dimensions. There was the operational dimension and there was defence capability dimension. And by the way, all of this was, and despite many misunderstandings throughout the world, very much framed in a way to support the Atlantic Alliance and to support NATO. It was always complementary to NATO, not as a substitute to NATO. So, I want to put that as well, because it’s still relevant for today’s discussion.
I read in one of these nice media news, someone saying, you know, ‘Are we going to rejoin a European army?’ There is no European army, for – please. I hope that – I thought that was, you know, a ghost of the past and only you see it there. But my God, we never tried to make any European army. What the European Union does is develop certain crisis management capability, which, by the way, is useful for aid, as well. It works where NATO is not involved. It’s very much a, if I may call it, and with all due respects and difference, just a Joint Expeditionary Force type of – and many, many differences. But nevertheless, it’s bringing people together, having some structures that help armies and military work together in order to achieve some goals that are determined on a case-by-case basis, by the way and agreed to all – by participants. Definitely member states, but also third states that want to participate in – on operations on a case-by-case basis.
So, that’s one of the things, but what has gained even more importance is the other dimension, defence capability development dimension. There’s – this was there from the outset. We know the ED – the European Defence Agency, I think was created in 2005, I think, formally, but it was in the making from – and – from the beginning of the project. And here, we’ve seen different iterations of the instruments that the European Union has been putting on the ground in order to make it a reality. And I would say that throughout these last years, the need for that, for coming together to develop defence capabilities jointly, has become every day, more acute.
And the geostrategic panorama that Natalie has laid out definitely confirms that today, you know, it’s not a matter of, oh, do you want, or do you not want? That you have a choice. There’s no choice. We have, all of us have to invest heavily on defence. This country has agreed its government to go to 2.5. The EU averages 1.9, but with the different things that – instruments that the Commission is putting together and offering, it go to 3% of GDP invested in defence. And they need to do this together, because doing it together, we save – there’s economies of scale, there’s greater interoperability, there’s – yeah, we just can work better and at better price.
So, I think that’s where we’re moving and I think this is part of what’s on the table now in this SDP that is intere – of interest as well, for the British Government, particularly after the presentation of the latest initiatives of the Commission, which include a facility, the SAFE, Security Action for Europe facility, which would – up to 150 billion…
Sébastien Maillard
This is supposed to be formally adopted tomorrow, I mean, at the…?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
Which has to be formally adopted, indeed, and into which British companies can contribute and can help in development of the defence capability projects, with at least in…
Sébastien Maillard
Can you clarify this point…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
Yes.
Sébastien Maillard
…perhaps more, a bit more, that…?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
Well…
Sébastien Maillard
To what extent…?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…I don’t know what – I haven’t read the latest.
Sébastien Maillard
Okay.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
I haven’t followed the discussion. What I do know from the white paper is that comp – UK companies already in Europe, based in Europe, could participate from day one. And by the way, UK companies based in Europe are the non-EU countries’ companies that participate in most other defence – development – the cap – defence development capability instruments that are already existing. So, by far, the UK, I think there are about 30 projects they’re – in which they’re involved, they’re – but don’t hold me to this. There are different numbers out there. But yes, it’s one of the most – and UK companies based in Europe are amongst the most active in participating in existing instruments. This is a new instrument, and from day one, they can participate, those that are based in Europe.
Now, what we have to see is now, those based in the UK, and this is what the SDP opens the door for, and joint – participating in joint procurement. And the SDP opens the door for joint procurement already, which is also very important and very beneficial for the UK. So, there are a number of things that, through this SDP agreement, you’re already getting in terms of co-operating in development of defence capabilities, which is part of the game.
Beyond that, there’s also the strengthened co-operation in politic – at political level, which before – okay, it’s not that we were in dialogue and co-operating before the SDP was signed. Yes, we were, but now we have a formal framework which encourages…
Sébastien Maillard
Framework, uh-huh.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…these contacts, regular contacts at High Representative Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary level, also amongst officials on a number of issues. And actually, there’s no limit on the number of issues we have to be able to discuss and comment, because we have common interest. We share a security space and we share an ec – system of resilience.
So – and any dimension you take in terms of secure and defence, we have to work together. The SDP opens door for that, very concrete ones in terms of defence capability development. There will be need for more work on this, but I think it’s a very positive step and again, win-win. The EU needs to – UK companies, and UK companies definitely need – also in the UK, needs to work together with EU companies, as well, to develop this defence for Europe that is – and to strengthen it as much as we do need to strengthen it now.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm, yeah, and contribute to it. Just a follow-up on the SDP, on this Security and Defence pact. Anand, do you – is it that thin, or it’s a part of the thing that you find a bit more flesh?
Professor Anand Menon
No, I thought it was quite thin, and I think, you know, the one thing that the UK wanted, which was guaranteed access to some of this funding, isn’t there. If I can just add a slightly heretical thought. I mean, I agree absolutely with what Ambassador Serrano says about capabilities development, but one of the opportunities for working together stems from the fact that when it comes from – to the operational side of stuff, no-one’s thinking about the European Union anymore. No-one’s thinking about the European anymore, partly because the European Union isn’t really designed for the deployment of hard military force at scale. And no-one’s thinking about the European Union anymore because at least a couple of EU member states are, basically, on the wrong side of the conflict we’re talking about.
So, the reason why we’re talking about Coalitions of the Willing, the reason why Keir Starmer has been able to have such a starring role in all these meetings, is because actually, one of the things we have to do is figure out a new institutional format within which to collaborate on the shared military threat that we face. So, it’s not simply an EU story, in other words.
Sébastien Maillard
No, that’s…
Professor Anand Menon
Natalie’s waving.
Sébastien Maillard
…an important point, but we have to, kind of, differentiate what is military operations and the industrial capabilities for defence…
Professor Anand Menon
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
…which are where the EU comes in, its funding.
Professor Anand Menon
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
But Natalie, you wanted to…?
Dr Natalie Tocci
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
You have raised your hand.
Dr Natalie Tocci
Yeah, yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
Go ahead.
Dr Natalie Tocci
Yeah, I mean, it was actually exactly along the lines of what Anand was saying. I mean, I think what really makes this moment so different and therefore, so potentially, you know, mutually beneficial, is precisely the fact that we are, in a sense, on the cusp of, I don’t know whether to define it as a new European security architecture in the making, but it really revolves around, for lack of a better term, the Coalition of the Willing. And the Coalition of the Willing, which is obviously being led by France, Germany, UK, Poland, together with a Nordic Baltic mob, right? Now, that to me, is the core. It doesn’t mean the other member states will not, kind of, you know, tag on, but that really is a core.
Now, the way I see this developing, for reasons that Anand was mentioning, I don’t see this – yeah, the EU is obviously full of, kind of, variable geometries in different shapes and forms. However, if we go back – I mean, there are two methods through which the variable geometry can come about. There is one method, which we can call eurozone method, which actually, we can even call the PESCO method, which is basically something which is born within, right? And as was the story in the case of PESCO, again, you know, sort of, back to the times when I used to see a lot more of Pedro than I do today, there was a debate there between inclusiveness and ambition. And ultimately, inclusiveness won the day and the rest is history, right?
Now, that, to me, essentially, says that the only way for this to be born is for something to be born not á la eurozone, if you see what I mean, but á la Schengen, i.e. something that is born extra, you know, outside of EU treaties, and eventually can be imported within. And this is – and in that something that can be born outside and it can only be born outside, otherwise the level of ambition inevitably collapses, that something is something which includes the UK. And this is why I think it essentially revolves around this dynamic of the Coalition of the Willing.
Now, I think the trick will, basically, be that of figuring out a way, and SAFE can be the way, of ensuring that there’s an EU institutional connection right from the very beginning, right, and therefore, you know, the SAFE connection being part of it. I don’t have very clear ideas, as is obvious from what I’ve said, but I think there’s, basically, something in that space that, you know, that that’s – that those are the pieces of the jigsaw that we somehow need to put together.
Sébastien Maillard
Ambassador Serrano, so how does the EU fit in this?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
Yes, no, I just wanted to…
Sébastien Maillard
Yeah.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
I agree with many things that Natalie has said, although I do think PESCO debate, you know, I had the chance of actually leading that debate and bringing it to fruition, and I do think we found a very nice way to match inclusiveness and at the same time, effectiveness. But I – we can – maybe that’s for another debate.
Sébastien Maillard
Indeed.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
I do agree with Natalie that there will be, and there is already, actually, a space for EU institutionally in the reassurances that will be – and one very evident space that we have is the missions that we already have. We have a training mission. I think this train already 130,000 military from Ukraine and that’s already in place. So, it’s not that we have to invent, and like that, there may be other ideas that can come in and, sort of, plug into a broader effort that may be done through this Coalition of the Willing.
So, I think yes, the flexibility in what is going to be built is going to be the norm. Starting with the fact that we don’t know exactly what are the parameters around which we’re going to have to build this reassurance force. So, I think we cannot – the mass has not been said, as the Latins would – in the Latin church one would say, on this one, and that we will still have to see how the UN’s contributing to this. But I’m sure that institutionally, there will be – and there’s already, because I mentioned one of the missions – we have another mission, by the way, a civilian one, that is helping with particularly border monitoring, but with Police border monitoring. So, I think all these are already pieces in place that will, no doubt, find their way, probably, into this broader construct that is being [inaudible – 45:09]. And…
Sébastien Maillard
Yes.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…again, the fact that we are having this SDP agreement facilitates, as well, work with the UK in bringing that also into the picture. So, I think yeah, all that is…
Sébastien Maillard
This debate on…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…positive.
Sébastien Maillard
This debate on defence, Anand, shows precisely perfectly – ‘cause the words matter. Is it better to speak about a UK–EU relationship or a UK–Europe relationship in that matter?
Professor Anand Menon
I think you talk about a Europe–UK relationship, to be honest, when it comes to this, because I mean, for reasons I’ve just outlined, I don’t – I mean, obviously, the EU has a role and it particularly has a role when there are questions of money and industrial capacity, military industrial capacity. But on the operational side, it has to go broader.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm, hmmm hmm, hmmm, the – and we’ll see, also, what happens in the – with the future of NATO and it’s…
Professor Anand Menon
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
…so-called ‘European pillar’.
Professor Anand Menon
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
So, that’s all the debate there. Just a last question to my panellists, before I turn to the floor and to questions you may also put online. Olivia, we – this deal that was struck yesterday between the EU and UK happened after a deal with the US, with India, trade deals there. How can the EU reset be framed, also, accordingly with other special relationships that the government wants to keep? Can it actually walk on this tightrope extensively, or do they have – will have to show where it’s, really, centre of gravity is, sooner or later?
Professor Anand Menon
Hmmm hmm.
Olivia O’Sullivan
Yeah, I think this question of how to navigate the relationship with the EU and with wider Europe, the US and China, is – whenever we speak to officials, it’s quite central to thinking about national security strategy, future planning. And ob – I mean, obviously and endlessly, Keir Starmer is very clear that he is not going to say out loud that he’s choosing alignments with any particular one, particularly between the US and the EU. But clearly, their strategy is to try to manage those relationships in such a way that one alignment doesn’t necessarily foreclose another. And I think there are, nonetheless, going to be trade-offs coming, but equally, there are some clues about, sort of, where they will probably seek to align on – in different areas. Because it will necessarily be a patchwork of decisions and trade-offs, right?
So, the US, much as they’re very keen to say they got this hattrick of deals, obviously, the US-UK agreement wasn’t a, kind of, binding trade deal, like the – what was agreed with India. It was a, kind of, a pact…
Sébastien Maillard
Wasn’t to the same extent, yeah.
Olivia O’Sullivan
…to get relief from the tariffs, right? So, it’s not binding in the same way. It doesn’t – it’s therefore not a hindrance to closer alignments with the EU. And if you look at the agreement yesterday, I would say that, you know, talking about a deal on food and plant products and talking about closer alignments on emissions trading and carbon border adjustment mechanisms, suggests, in the end, you’re aligning with the EU market on food and plants. And that suggests that any, kind of, deep comprehensive trade deal with the US is pretty unlikely, and it’s pretty unlikely anyway, I think.
But what the US – what is interesting in that US–UK trade deal, if people have read it, it’s about five pages, right, is there is some kind of boiler plate language. It is – there is some kind of boiler plate language about the economic security in China, right, that the UK will work to meet US requirements on security of supply chains on steel, nature of ownership of relevant production facilities. And certainly, I’ve heard different things, curious if other people have heard things, that this is – again, it’s not binding. It’s relatively boiler plate language. There’s been some similar language in the past, but it certainly gives us a clue as to what the US is interested in when it comes to these tariff relief deals or trade deals in terms of alignments against China.
The US strategy of balancing the relationships, I think we are starting to see a pattern of, you know, maybe getting closer to the EU on economic sectors, where that’s possible, where that will reduce barriers on goods. But there’s some areas, like technology, where some of the UK Government see, rightly or wrongly, the US as the engine of technological innovation. They see that as a ticket to geopolitical power as an important part of the UK strategy. We can’t maintain a cutting edge in leading tech on our own, so we need to be partnering with the US.
And retaining some regulatory divergence over tech might be where they’re interested in – might be what they’re interested in doing, but the price of that might be some alignments against China, right? I mean, that is – I think this is still not a very clear picture. I’m curious what others think. Well, it’d be good to open up from questions, get thoughts from people in industry about all three deals, but there are going to be, I think, some trade-offs between those three relationships.
Sébastien Maillard
Yes, and as you mentioned IA and technology, yes, we saw at the summit in February in Paris, where…
Olivia O’Sullivan
Hmmm.
Sébastien Maillard
…the UK sided with the US and not the EU on these conclusions. So, yes, it does – it is an area where it can…
Professor Anand Menon
Hmmm.
Sébastien Maillard
…diverge a bit. I would like to now open the floor for questions. I’m sure there will be many hands raised, because we’ve touched on many issues, and I will start here with the gentleman here and then take some – I’ll take three questions at a time and then ask my panel. So, start here, the gentleman here.
Savak Just
Yes, thank you very much.
Sébastien Maillard
And just wait for the microphone to come so that people online can also hear you.
Savak Just
Yeah.
Sébastien Maillard
Go ahead, and…
Savak Just
Thank you very much. Savak Just, student at King’s College London. The panel alluded to earlier – I want to go back to the conversation about the US. The panel alluded to earlier the fact that UK–EU relations are definitely of great importance now, due to the fact that the US is becoming somewhat more unpredictable, given the current presidency. And I mean, we’ve seen Vice President JD Vance’s quite scathing comments when it comes to the EU and Europe. And my question is – I think we spoke a bit earlier, I think Professor Anand, you mentioned about, kind of, having uncomfortable conversations when it comes to the UK’s relationship with Europe. But do you think that before we do that, we need to have supposedly uncomfortable conversations when it comes to us perhaps moving away from the US in order to facilitate this new relationship with the EU?
Sébastien Maillard
Thank you for this uncomfortable question. It will raise – I will move the microphone now to gentleman over in the front row, here, and then back…
Professor Anand Menon
There.
Sébastien Maillard
…there, and then I’ll move towards here. Would…?
Robert Walter
Thank you very much. Robert Walter, I am a retired Conservative Member of Parliament. When I retired, the party and its leadership and most of the party still believed in the European project, but I now chair the…
Professor Anand Menon
I’m not sure with that.
Robert Walter
I now chair Euro Defence here in the UK. But my question is picking up on what – the bulk of the last part of the conversation, which is everybody seemed to assume, now, that the reset had taken place, the UK was very definitely back in the fold, and we should be moving on from that. My question is, we have this Coalition of the Willing, which includes the European Union, but it needs some kind of mechanism if it’s ever to be effective, to meet the threat, whether it comes from Russia or from elsewhere, and to meet the threat with a United States which may or may not be there. Which means that somehow, NATO has to be Europeanised. Now, in Europeanising NATO, do you believe that the European Union should become a signatory to the Washington Treaty?
Sébastien Maillard
Thank you for this question and I will take a last one, quick one, from the young man here, and then we’ll – I’ll ask the panellists to answer. A microphone is on its way, there. If you could introduce…
Martijn Dilling
Thank you…
Sébastien Maillard
…yourself.
Martijn Dilling
…very much. I’m Martijn Dilling, part of the Chatham House Common Future Conversations and student at the LSE. I have a question for Ambassador Serrano. You were at the EU–UK Youth Dialogue last fall. There was a very bleak picture for whatever would be ahead as youth. Right now, Trump is in the house. Sadly, all the defence spending will be financed with loans, not using the peace dividend that has built over the last few years. What is there still to look forward to for a young person in Europe or in the UK?
Sébastien Maillard
That was quite a broad question for the future, but I’ll ask first Natalie to perhaps answer the question on NATO and also offer the first question, which is linked to it, also, on the relationship with the US and then, perhaps Anand can answer it, too.
Dr Natalie Tocci
Hello. Yeah, I think with the – well, firstly, let me say that I agree that this Coalition of the Willing business, it’s all very well and good, but there comes a point where you can’t simply jump from one summit or meeting to the next and eventually, what happens in between one summit and the next is called institutions. So, at some point, that institutional question will need to be addressed. Now, the snag and the difficulty is that it’s not quite clear how to address it, because as we’ve said, it’s not really EU, but it is with EU. At the same time, it’s not really NATO because it’s – the whole – like, we’re having this conversation because, in a sense, the US is, kind of, checking out. But it is NATO, because I think as we would all agree, I mean, especially on that operational side, this is, kind of – this is something that works, yeah? And hence the whole conversation about Europeanising NATO.
Now, in a sense, it – so, if we had an ironclad guarantee that the United States would, in a gradual co-ordinated, friendly way, you know, perhaps gradually disengage from European security because it has other important things to do in the world, then in a sense, NATO would be precisely the place in which all of this would take place, right? Now, the problem is that we also have to plan, in fact, I hope that we’re even planning for the worst. So, in a sense that the ideal, not ideal, yeah, but the realistically ideal scenario, if you see what I mean, is one of benign US indifference that enables us, in a co-ordinated way, to assume greater security and as I said, NATO’s the place to do it.
But surely, especially if we’re talking about security, we have to plan for the worst case scenario. And the worst case scenario is not that gradual cunay – co-ordinated nice, nice, US disengagement, but it’s something rather quite, you know, quite nasty. And the problem with NATO is that by definition, endemically, in its DNA, simply because the US is sitting around the table, you cannot have the conversation within NATO, ‘What would we do if the US turns against us?’ right? And so, that conversation, the planning for that, kind of, by definition, needs to take place somewhere else.
Now, at the moment, it’s not really taking place anywhere, and I as I said, I find that actually quite disquieting. I mean, it’s really quite worrying, right, a scenario which is not exactly a, kind of, black swan, it’s, kind of, a grey rhino, there isn’t a place to have this conversation. And as I said, it cannot, by definition, take place in NATO, so it has to necessarily take place somewhere else.
Sébastien Maillard
So, we’re just trying to look for the right format. Ambassador Serrano, there was a question from a – but – from a young man for about the issue of youth in the EU. Perhaps you can also address it in the – about this youth mobility experience that’s…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
Sure.
Sébastien Maillard
…framed…?
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
I’d like to comment on the…
Sébastien Maillard
Okay.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…broader issues…
Sébastien Maillard
Okay, and then…
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
…as well, if that’s okay.
Sébastien Maillard
And then the second question, please.
Ambassador Pedro Serrano
And then I’ll – and on the broader question, I have to say that everything that needs to be done, we’re not just doing it because the US Government is going in one direction or the other. It’s because we need to do it as Europe, for ourselves. And maybe that the US present administration is – as Natalie was saying, has also, other priorities, apart from the European one, and that we’ve seen that it becomes more urgent to take care of this – of our own security and defence, but we had to do that anyhow. So, this is – and definitely, one thing that is very important, I think, to point out, nothing of what we want to do in Europe could be seen as anything antagonistic vis-à-vis the US.
On the contrary, I think all of us in Europe want to maintain a very strong relationship with US. The UK wants it. UK has been very clear, ‘I don’t want to choose between the EU and the US,’ but we don’t want the UK to choose between us and the US and we don’t want to choose between – we want to keep a strong relationship with the US. So, the question is, how can we keep that strong relationship? Part of the answer is being a stronger partner, as well. So, even from the US perspective, apart from, you know, all the other challenges that we’re facing, becoming a stronger partner, which means investing more in defence and having a good defence industry and a real military that can work effectively together, is a priority. So, that’s one thing. On – and so, I think that that was my main point.
On EU signatory to Washington Treaty, there are no forces in the EU. We don’t have the European army. I don’t think we can fulfil the obligations of the NATO Treaty, but I guess you set it more as a provocation to see how all this can fit. And again, I say, what we’re trying to do is to support NATO, in a way, and to create a strong European pillar within NATO. And I do believe that the efforts that the European Union is doing is contributing – are contributing in an important way towards the building of that strong European pillar within NATO. So, maybe not signatories, but definitely helping build that strong European pillar.
On youth and, you know, the – what to do. I mean, my God, you have so many things to do and what you have to do is help build a stronger Europe, definitely, a more united and stronger Europe. The EU is not something that has been created and it will just live forever. It’s the cre – it’s a project that needs to be supported and further developed, and its relationship with key partners, including with the UK, is something that needs to be developed every day. And I think we’ve taken, now, a very important step, I think, and we have to continue strengthening that. So, you have quite a lot of work ahead and for that, as you were saying, keeping our youth united, keeping young people from Europe and from the UK, getting together, getting to meet each other, knowing what our cultures are, is vital.
And here again, the agreement that was undersigned yesterday by our principals, goes in that direction. Opens the door to go to youth exchanges, it’s called the Youth Experience Scheme. So, allowing people from the UK to go to Europe for whatever they want, learning and working temporarily, limited time. This is not freedom of movement in any way. It’s visa-related, it would be controlled, and many things have been said in that regard. So – but it is important that youth from each other keep going. It is important, also, the idea to – the possibility of having the UK rejoining Erasmus, with everything that that means in terms of exchanges of students. But not only university students, also vocational colleges, also the Teachers from different schools. So, all this just brings our societies together, keeps them together, because again, it’s you guys, the young guys, that have to ensure that this continues to be so. If you drop the ball, you drop the ball. Thank you.
Sébastien Maillard
Thank you, Ambassador. So, I know many details still have to be put in that experience to see what it’s all about. As time is running, I’d like to ask a last question, which is online, and I like to ask it to Anand, regarding the model we should have for the future of the UK–EU relationship. Because remember Michel Barnier having his steps showing the Swiss model, the Norway model, the Turkey model? It – well, is there one that you now see after this summit and all the book that has to be written in the coming weeks and months or years? What kind of model are we heading to?
Professor Anand Menon
Well, I thought the model and the ‘staircase’ was silly then, I think it’s even more silly now, and there are encouraging signs that the people who run the European Commission now are starting to agree. That there’s a degree of flexibility in the EU’s approach that wasn’t there, and for good reasons. I mean, the EU’s initial reaction to Brexit was very different to where the EU is viewing us from now.
So, greater flexibility on the EU side, I think is to be welcomed because of the shared challenges we face. The model we have is a model of, you know, Brexit is forever. This is a series of negotiations that will go on forever. It’ll go on forever because we’ll – either – both sides will be adjusting to each other, because at no point will the relationship feel right to everyone. We just need to buckle in for the fact that this is a forever negotiation.
Can I just say something very quickly about the question we didn’t answer, which is about…
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm.
Professor Anand Menon
…uncomfortable conversations about the United States? Now, I mean…
Sébastien Maillard
One minute, yeah.
Professor Anand Menon
Yeah, I mean, Keir Starmer has said he doesn’t want to choose, and I have to say that I think to date, the Prime Minister has played an appalling hand very, very well indeed. You know, the hand he was dealt stank, but he has performed that balancing act, getting these trade deals. Whatever you think about them, in pure performative politics terms, it was a real success. And I agree absolutely with Natalie that ultimately, he might be forced to choose if the US tends towards betrayal rather than indifference. And I agree 100% with what Natalie said about the United States. If we are hoping for indifference but fearing betrayal, we can’t use NATO, because if it tends towards the betrayal side of things, NATO is the eyes and ears of the Americans and that might not be where we want to be.
Sébastien Maillard
Hmmm hmm. Thank you very much Anand, thank you Ambassador Serrano, thank you Olivia and thank you Natalie, for this conversation. I understand that now, there’s going to be at least a summit each year, right?
Professor Anand Menon
Yes.
Sébastien Maillard
So, we’ll probably have other opportunities to talk about all these issues, because as we said, the chapters are there, but the book still has to be written. So, we’ll have lots to talk about in the future. Thank you to our members for gathering, thank you for joining us online and thank you Tom Chapell and his team for organising this event. Good evening.
Professor Anand Menon
Thank you [applause].
