Bronwen Maddox
Hello, everyone, and a very warm welcome to Chatham House and our discussion on The Israel-Hamas War and its Fallout. I’m Bronwen Maddox, the Director of Chatham House. I’m delighted to have with me a bunch of people, I cannot think of, really, a better panel to be discussing this with us today. We have Professor Daniel Byman of the School of the Foreign Service in Georgetown, but with a long, distinguished career. He was a professional staff member of the 9/11 Commission, and Joint Staff of the House and Senate Intelligence and has a long career in academia and as an Analyst of Intelligence.
John Jenkins, Sir John Jenkins, who was Ambassador to Libya, Iraq and also, Consul General in Jerusalem and has many, many years of professional experience in working with countries and people of this region. We have Francesca Albanese, United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories. And we have from home team, Dr Sanam Vakil, Director of our Middle East and North Africa Programme, and Professor Yossi Mekelberg, the – one of our Associate Fellows in that programme. Well, thank you all very much, indeed, for joining me and thank you in the audience, as well.
We’re going to talk about this in three parts, really. So, there’s been such an outpouring of commentary, of feeling, of anger, of fear on many sides. One has to divide it up somehow. We’re going to begin with the immediate situation on the ground. We’re going to then talk about the region, how that – this affects the region, and we’re going to close our discussion between ourselves with a discussion of what happens to questions of the Palestinians and their statehood, or lack of. And I’m going to leave plenty of time for questions. I’m sure that you will all have a lot of questions.
Sanam Vakil, I wonder if you could start us off with just talking about where we are now, four/five days into this, what the questions now are about what happens next?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Thank you, Bronwen. It’s a pleasure to be here and I should definitely extend my thanks to everyone who’s taken the time to be with us today. This is an important conversation and one that we’re going to continue to be engaging with. There are people far more expert than me to be commenting on these next steps and the questions ahead, but let me take a stab at what is ahead for Israel, as well as the region, very briefly.
I think that Prime Minister Netanyahu is been mired in days of negotiations at trying to bring together a unity government. That process is taking far too long, but it will be important for maintaining cohesion. Domestically, the question of the hostages, I think, is forefront on everybody’s minds. They’re far too high of a number of individuals out there, their locations not known, and I think how to recover them safely, while also preparing for what looks like a ground invasion, seems to be a really hard operation to execute. So, that’s a space that I’m watching and quite concerned about and I’m not sure you can bring people home and invade simultaneously, but I’ll leave that to others.
It looks like we’re in for a long and brutal number of months. It’s very clear, particularly with Western support behind Israel, and President Biden’s very strong remarks yesterday, personal remarks, that Israel is in for a long and brutal engagement that is going to be directed at the highest echelons of Hamas’s leadership. So, it’s unclear if they will be able to eradicate that leadership. It’s unclear what’s going to come next in that space. Those are important questions to ask.
I think, finally, I would just say, the objective here is also to prevent this war from escalating and opening other fronts to this war. Iran is the patron of Hamas and patron of other groups around the region. Hezbollah has exchanged some back and forth with Israel and there have been, sort of, a cascade of threats using these groups and their potential leverage as deterrents to prevent this war from cascading, but I think that is a real concern, as well. I’ll stop there and let others respond.
Bronwen Maddox
Sanam, thanks very much, indeed, and we’ll come onto some of those questions about escalation. Professor Byman, I wonder if you could take us on from there to address this question of how Israel form its response now to this horrendous assault on it? How does it calculate what to do?
Professor Daniel Byman
So, Israel’s immediate effort, of course, was expelling Palestinian attackers from Israel proper and that largely seems to be done. There’ll obviously…
Bronwen Maddox
And…
Professor Daniel Byman
…be a few…
Bronwen Maddox
…killing them, as well.
Professor Daniel Byman
Yeah, absolutely, just, you know, driving them, killing them and removing them completely. The next step is already beginning, which is a mix of airstrikes and tremendous economic pressure on the Gaza Strip, cutting off services and so on. And given the scale of the killing, I would also stress given the nature of the killing, the beheadings, the atrocities against children, the deliberate atrocities against children, a lot of the things that have received a lot of play in the broader media, this has created a tremendous political dynamic within Israel, so a lot of our previous guides as to what happened before do not apply.
The call up of reservists is quite large-scale, and it suggests a significant ground operation. In the past, ground operations have been extremely difficult in Gaza, they’ve been difficult militarily. They’ve, of course, been incredibly costly for innocents in Gaza itself. So – and this is a real challenge for Israel’s military planning, but Israel cannot go back to the status quo ante. The idea that you simply say, “Okay, as in the past, we try to return to some sort of ceasefire” will not work this time. So, that means degrading Hamas in some significant way, but that’s a very easy statement to say and an exceptionally difficult one to do. Hamas is deeply embedded within society in Gaza in multiple ways. So, simply killing a few leaders, taking over some territory, is going to be very hard. So, this would have to be a prolonged military operation, but even then, there is no guarantee of success because of the political difficulty of what to do about Gaza.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm, okay. So, let me just take you in for a few things there, and Daniel Byman, I should say you’ve said some things there, including babies being beheaded, which I should say have not been verified and the Israeli Government has, itself, said it has not seen evidence of that.
Professor Daniel Byman
And what I meant to say there was beheadings have been verified and killing some babies have been verified, so we can…
Bronwen Maddox
Alright, but we have to be careful about these things, because this is exactly, through language, that is how arguments for certain courses of action can escalate. So, you’ve told us, absolutely plausibly, that Israel faces a very difficult set of decisions. Do you think it ought to move into Gaza and try to get hold of the Hamas leaders, or are the risks, including of killing many, many civilians in this incredibly densely built urban area, too great? How should it make that decision?
Professor Daniel Byman
So, Israel is going to make the decision based on the political will of the Israeli people and what if these are the strategic interests? And, in the past, Israel has done very tough strikes on Gaza when the stakes were lower, when the violence was lower. So, there’s no question in my mind that this is going to be a very aggressive action on the Israeli part.
There is a question of how deep Israel should go into Gaza and how long Israel should stay there, I think part of that will depend on the military difficulty, but it’s also important for governments to respond politically to crises, right? If you go back to various crises in the past that are faced, you know, the US Government, the UK Government and others, tend to simply say, “There are going to be problems which then doing anything might be an analytic response,” but governments need to represent their people to at least some degree.
Now, we want them, of course, to act responsibly. We want them to do what they can to avoid the loss of innocent life. It’s not a licence for governments to kill and kill and kill, but I think we have to recognise this political reality is so different than previous conflicts between Israel and Hamas and that’s going to fundamentally shape things.
Bronwen Maddox
Francesca, is there – how would you interpret this call for responsible retaliation?
Francesca Albanese
I’m confused. I’m confused by the whole framing of the discussion and allow me to say, I mean, we started the overview with the unity government, with the hostages, which is a critical point and so, it should stay there. With Western support – I’m sorry, with other people, other countries, playing behind the scene, and I – and affirmation that frankly, miss the – where are the Palestinians in all this? And it seems that this has started on the 7 October, where we are in the 56th year of an illegal occupation which has resulted into decolonisation of what remained of Palestine, the territory that should be, by international consensus, the state of Palestine. And with Israel blockading Gaza for 16 years, bombing it for six times in six years and establishing colonies in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
So, please, this is the context. Hamas action is brutal. Criminal must be condemned and accounted for, but let’s assume that this is – this doesn’t start with Hamas. And either we start the logic, and we recognise humanity and dignity of all, of both Israelis or Palestinians, or frankly, this discussion is going to repeat the same old record than before, which is frankly, extremely condescending. And I have to say, I’m dismayed to hear right now, in this gathering, someone repeating affir – Professor Byman repeating affirmation that have been claimed back either by – even by the Israeli Army, that there has been beheading of children and rape. Until this information is verified, it shouldn’t be share, because it escalates…
Bronwen Maddox
True.
Francesca Albanese
…the tension on the ground, where people are being slaughtered, frankly.
Bronwen Maddox
Francesca, I challenged him on that, and he corrected what he said. What I’m asking you – and you’ve given us very powerfully, first, the important reminder which Chatham House puts into all our range of work on this, that this is a long, bitter conflict. And we’ve discussed it at length in other places, the Israeli settlements and so on, but I’m asking you now – you talked about what Hamas has done.
Francesca Albanese
Hmmm hmm.
Bronwen Maddox
A “terrorist group,” as UK and others are – have unequivocally labelled it. What do you think Israel is entitled to do now in retaliation?
Francesca Albanese
First of all, let’s discuss what Israel is entitled to do under international law.
Bronwen Maddox
Yes, no, that’s…
Francesca Albanese
Is not entitled…
Bronwen Maddox
…exactly what I’m asking you…
Francesca Albanese
Exactly. It’s not entit…
Bronwen Maddox
…Francesca.
Francesca Albanese
Yes, but is not entitled to maintain an occupation in perpetuity. Is not entitled to maintain a military dictatorship over an entire people, because this is structurally violence and violence generates any – it generates response. All colonial systems have met – oh, have meant oppression and met resistance. So, Israel is entitled, and has a duty, to protect its citizens inside Israel, and Israel is confusing its security with the security of its annexation, and this is the first problem.
And second, Israel has the right to defend itself and its citizens, but there are limits, proportionality, precaution and distinction, which frankly, have all been already violated in the current ferocious attack over Gaza. Gaza was already exhausted and depleted on the 6 October and now, it’s even more closed off because there is nothing that can enter Gaza and nothing that can exit.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm hmm.
Francesca Albanese
It’s leading people to starvation.
Bronwen Maddox
Yossi, if you can join in at this point. This dilemma facing Israel, it wants to retaliate. There’s huge national anger and I’m understating it in using those words. There is a sense of shock. There is a sense of wanting to kill the leaders of Hamas and there is the long experience of trying to do exactly that in Gaza, ending up with a lot of civilian deaths, international condemnation of Israel for that, and even if killing some Hamas leaders not – is extinguishing Hamas, which then revives. How do you think Israel should calculate what to do now?
Professor Yossi Mekelberg
Thanks, Bronwen. Yeah, of course, everything happens in a context. Nothing is out of historical context, of political context, on cultural context. They’re all context there, but something happened on Sunday, and we can’t ignore it. This is the – in Israel terms, probably it’s the biggest disaster, not only from Yom Kippur, but probably bigger than Yom Kippur, because so many civilians were killed.
This is not a licence for Israel to go and do whatever it likes in Gaza, no doubt about it. And I think, actually, what President Biden, as supportive as was his speech, probably one of the most supp0rtive speeches by any American President for many, many years…
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
Professor Yossi Mekelberg
…but he also – it’s come with a caveat. It’s come with a caveat, a) we should say democracies, this was, kind of, a message about domestic about domestic politics in Israel. We are allies as democracies, and the other thing, democracies fight in a different way, because they are not a militia, they are not a terrorist group. A state is not – Israel can’t behave like Hamas, and Israel doesn’t want to behave like Hamas. And he says to ‘adhere,’ and this was one of his final words yesterday, according to the – to law of war, and that’s exactly how it should be. But on the other hand, no-one can expect – and any country in this situation would respond and respond with great force.
But what I think it’s important for us to accept, and I think for Israeli leadership, and an emergency government was just formed, there is a cabinet now and that just was announced an hour ago, is yes, dealing with Hamas, but at the same time, thinking about the future relations with Palestinians. At the end of the day, no-one is going away. Israelis and Palestinians, whether they like it or not, are destined to live together. They can live together the way they live right now, which serves no-one, and I think that the events of the last few days, no-one needs any more illustration of that.
So, they need to think about whatever they do in Gaza, that there is enough leeway, there is enough space to create, that they can actually go back and empower the kind of forces that they can go back. It’s not immediate, it will take a long time, but think about the peace after the war and not create another humanitarian disaster, without taking away how angry everyone writing in Israel. But I think, like, the words ‘revenging’ and ‘avenging’ should probably be removed from our language right now.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm. Well, thank for that and while I was nodding as you were talking, I suspect – and there are going to be a lot of people, even on this call, who wouldn’t be [inaudible – 18:35] of the peace after the war at this exact point.
So, John Jenkins, I wonder if I can turn to you. The British Government has, and indeed, the Labour Opposition, has talked about a proportionate response, but said that “Israel is entitled to respond.” And we’re getting challenges of whether Israel should be entitled to respond in the chat, and those are very fluent and eloquent on social media. How – if you were advising the British Government, as a Diplomat, how would you suggest it talk to Israel about Israel’s course of action now?
Sir John Jenkins
I think Israel is going to do what it’s going to do. I think, as Yossi said, I mean, I’m not Israeli and I’m not Jewish, but I mean, this seems absolutely clear to me that this is the most shocking attack that Israel has suffered for decades, maybe since the October war of 73 and maybe even before that. And so, when you’re thinking about what sort of statements you put out now and what policies you might want to follow in the weeks to come, because this will last weeks, if not months and maybe years, I mean, particularly with the hostages. Gilad Shalit was held for, what, a decade?
Bronwen Maddox
No, five years.
Sir John Jenkins
Well, okay, five years, but a long time. So, this is the…
Bronwen Maddox
A long time, we can agree on that.
Sir John Jenkins
This is – so, you know, this is – it’s – and I think, as Yossi said, you have to look at what comes after this. I mean, you think about where we were a week ago, when we were all still talking about the new Middle East, a Middle East where old barriers seem to be coming down, where old enmities were turning into something else. There was this talk of the new economic corridor from India, up through the Arabian Peninsula and Jordan and into Israel, maybe, but which I’m – going to Haifa historically, the great Mediterranean port of the entire Levant. And now, everything seems to have changed. So, it looks as if there were two Middle Easts, the Middle East of – the new Middle East of some – of everything changing and the old Middle East of these – of conflict, of hate, of conf – of violence, of Islamist irridentism and so forth.
I think the two things exist together and I think there – a lot of people talk about the impact of this on normalisation, the normalisation initiative, such as it was, between Saudi Arabia and Israel. And it’s interesting to look at the reaction of the Gulf States, in particular, to this. I think they’re trying to preserve their equities and I think it came as a shock to them. I think what they want to do is to – and of course, there’s a reason that Saudi Arabia pursued the normalisation initiative through the United States with Israel, was ‘cause they have domestic priorities. This was the same reason they did the deal, which was a temporary deal, but it was a deal, with Iran, earlier in the year. I was Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, as well, by the way.
Bronwen Maddox
Yes, I’m sorry, and there were a long list of things.
Sir John Jenkins
No, it’s alright, it’s alright.
Bronwen Maddox
I left out one of the main ones.
Sir John Jenkins
No, no, my CV’s too long, that’s the trouble. And I think that’s the thing you need to try and preserve when all this – and I think for Israel, as well. You know, it is – I think it is true that there was a feeling in Israel, and this is – I mean, Yossi will know more about this than I do, that Hamas was an issue that could simply be managed in Gaza. You know, if you give them enough – if you give enough work permits, if you allow Muscatery money in and so forth, everything will be stable until it’s not, but you can deal with that later. Well, actually, you can’t, because in the end, for the new Middle East to be born, you probably do need a political settlement of the Palestinian issue. It hasn’t gone away.
And I never quite understood what the Netanyahu Government, what the successive Netanyahu Governments’ position on all this was, because they seemed to think that they could simply ignore it and it would eventually go away or diminish in importance to such an extent that it didn’t matter anymore. It still matters, and I think when you look at this – but that’s another thing. You know, if you look at the Hamas Declaration of Principles, the new Declaration of Principles 2017, which didn’t replace the Charter, but supplemented it, as ultimately, it is the same apolitical document. And this is a document that says, “We will take, eventually take the whole of what is now Israel back,” because this is all Palestinian land, this is all rock. That is not a recipe for any sort of sensible politics.
So, the issue is how do you res – after this conflict is over, whatever the damage it does, how do you resume or reinvent the politics of a settlement? And that’s going to be the real challenge for all of us.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
Sir John Jenkins
Whether it’s a Netanyahu Government that does it, or it’s another government in Israel, and then, there’s the issue of what happens to the Palestinian Authority and who exactly does represent the Palestinians in this age of inter-Palestinian turmoil.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm. Well, look, thank you for that. We still have not grappled with the central point of the next – for the coming week, if you like. And Francesca had raised this question of all the things that she’s saying Israel has done that are against international law, what about the actual obligations of any response? The siege of Gaza, if Israel kills a lot of civilians, what should we – how should we judge that?
We’re going to have to come back to that, because I want to pick up what John has been saying and just go more widely to the region, and Sanam, if you could take us into this question of where this has left the region. We were, and you were, writing very much about the Saudi talks, the status of those talks for normalisation of Israel. Where has this left that?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Thank you, Bronwen. I think this is a segue from John’s point. We have been in a period that has been very much pitched as the new Middle East, de-escalatory Middle East, with dialogue, seen all across the region. And we have been watching a very, sort of, Biden-led effort to fast-track normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. And those talks have been very clearly coming at the expense of Palestinians and the Palestinian process. Abbas has been engaged in that dialogue, but there hasn’t been a very clear or open plan as to how Palestinians would be brought in.
And there have been deep concerns that, similar to the Abraham Accords, which didn’t include the Palestinians, just stopped annexation, if you will, and that was a temporary halt, but that this normalisation process would also throw the Palestinians under the bus. And, you know, this de-escalation moment that we have been living through and has been applauded by Western policymakers, including Jake Sullivan just a few weeks ago, has very clearly been pragmatic, it’s been transactional. It’s about prioritising economic interests and engagement and trying a new kind of diplomacy, but has very clear let the Palestinian issue slide off and slide away. Really because maybe, there are no new ideas, there’s no thinking, there’s no bandwidth, there’s the War in Ukraine. But, you know, through this war and through the brutality, the humanitarian crisis that we’re watching, that we will be witnessing over the – already, actually, I mean, we don’t have to wait too much longer in the future, this is an opportunity to bring the Palestinian issue back to the table and it requires new and creative thinking, not old thinking.
And so, I think this is a MENA moment still, because if leaders are keen to keep this de-escalatory moment alive to prevent the war from cascading, it requires engagement on the Palestinian issue, and that requires the Gulf to work together. It requires countries that have ties with Israel: Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, to work the phones, to work the process, Qatar is involved. And this, if it’s – it’s a now or never moment for the Middle East, and as part of that process, I’ll add this last point. There is an Iran dimension. Iran has been allowed – Iran’s role in the region continues to go unchecked, unhindered. Nobody has re-asserted deterrence on Iran’s strategy, the proxy programme functions, and it’s proving to be effective from Iran’s worldview. So, that also requires new thinking and new engagement.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm. Sanam, thank you very much, and I want to mention two questions or points that have come in online from Michael Klein. One to say, “Why is the Egyptian border to Gaza and the Egyptian desire to limit access and free movement of Palestinians not been a subject of discussion?” And another saying – making the point, the essential point, that “Hamas and Palestinians are not the same. Hamas has, as a stated goal, to “kill all Jews” and the actions were a step in that path. How do those who support Palestinian goals reconcile the Hamas goals – reconcile those with the Hamas goals?”
Francesca, could you – want to respond to what Sanam was taking us into, of whether there is any way that the current circumstances can lead to, again, more regional engagement and indeed, engagement from the US on the Palestinian question?
Francesca Albanese
Thank you. I’m not sure I can really speak to the regional political reality, because this is not where my expertise is. I’m worried, though, because I see an escalation of tension and again, I see regional actors being shaken, but no-one really, at this point in time, these days, as of Saturday, no-one really keen to step out.
We know that from public statements, that Iran has said that it has nothing to do with the attack unleashed on the 7th of September by Hamas. And he – in a way, I say there are – we should be neutral in assessing the influence of various actors in the region, in the sense of it’s – there is – it’s not – I often claim that there is international inertia versus the question of Israel and the occupied Palestinian territory. But, in fact, no-one is inert. So far, there has been, sort of, blanket support to Israel. Of course, now it’s clearly justified, because the suffering and the pain that has been inflicted on Israeli civilians is shocking.
The point is the Palestinians, and again, no – not to justify anything, but the Palestinians have gone through brutal killings, times and times again, because there are 4,200 Palestinians who have been killed in the last 15 years in Gaza, including 1,200 kids. I beg you to bring them to the equation, because someone who’s 16-year-old today, has never stepped foot out of Gaza, but has gone through six wars. Imagine a person surviving a war, how traumatic his or her existence is, and these kids who have gone through six wars. So, this is the reality that is being nurtured through 16 years of blockade. And again, I want to reinforce what has been said before. The Palestinians are not Hamas and Hamas is not the Palestinians.
Also, I mean, I want to recall something that was said by some – by Israeli Politicians, I think it was Smotrich, but he was not the only one, no later than a few months ago. He said – he was criticising the cert – the engagement with the PA, and he was mentioning Hamas as an asset. This in – this is in the public record. So, again, the situa – the status quo was untenable because you cannot keep an entire population oppressed. So, the way forward for me, and this is a critical moment, is legality, legality, legality. We have international law, which is very prescriptive, very clear, on what is the perimeter of – for political actions? And this is the wisdom and the even-handed approach that we need to use in these tragic hours.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, thank you for that. I think we still have hanging there the question, from the beginning, of whether – if Israel goes into Gaza in pursuit of Hamas leaders, kills civilians as a result, but not in – not – that not being its prime goal, or its siege of Gaza leads to people’s death, whether that is legal or not legal. I’m just waiting for people’s clear…
Francesca Albanese
It’s illegal.
Bronwen Maddox
…res…
Francesca Albanese
I can tell you.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah, thank you for that.
Francesca Albanese
The bracket is unlawful, is illegal. That the occupation is unlawful, is illegal. As it’s illegal in Crimea and in Donbas and so, it’s illegal in the occupied Palestinian territory.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, thank you. Daniel, I wonder if you could take us just into this wider regional question. Do you think this will extend to Iran? Does Iran want this to extend to Iran and how is the US going to play this?
Professor Daniel Byman
So, this is one of the biggest questions in the air right now. So, on the negative side, we’ve already seen the Lebanese Hezbollah launch limited attacks on Northern Israel. I would stress the word ‘limited’. This is not Hezbollah remotely near its full capacity. We’ve also seen some attacks, to me, who the actor is, is unknown, emanating from Syria. Iran, of course, is pretty close to Hezbollah and has significant ties to Hamas, helping arm, train and fund Hamas. So, Iran certainly wants the pot stirred. It’s long regarded Israel as the enemy. It sees Israel as actively attacking Iran, with the murder of Iranian Scientists and Military Officers, and it also sees a regional plot against Iraq, with things like the Israel-Saudi normalisation that is being directed against Iran. So, Iran certainly has a lot of incentives to create unrest.
That said, both Iran and Hezbollah have reasons to be cautious. When Hezbollah fought Israel in 2006, Hezbollah did very well militarily, but it also suffered tremendously as an organisation. It lost a lot of its people. Hezbollah also was criticised within Lebanon itself, where many Lebanese were very bitter about the destruction that came with the war. And Israel had made it clear it will have a very destructive response to any major Hezbollah attack. And so, right now, my personal belief is Hezbollah, with Iran’s support, is trying to walk a careful line, it’s showing – to show what it says is solidarity with Hamas. Trying to show that it’s active, but at the same time, signal to Israel that it wants to be careful about escalation.
But all that’s easy to say. When you’re actually using military force, things can easily get out of control, and signalling can be misinterpreted and passion is high, right? As we discussed, Israel is enraged because of the scale of this attack. The current suffering, but likely increased suffering, of innocent Palestinians is going to enrage audiences throughout the Arab world, and as a result, we’re going to see calls for action even when people believe it’s illogical. So, I wouldn’t rule out a greater regional involvement, even though I think there are many reasons to say that it won’t happen.
Bronwen Maddox
So, let me ask you, just directly, two questions that have come in, one from Gustav Kotches, saying, “Do you think it is possible that a disproportionate Israeli response causing excessive human suffering” – ah, that word ‘excessive’ doing a lot of weight in that sentence, “could result in Western support to Israel?” And another one from José Salamanca, saying, “Is there growing support over the Palestinian cause?” He particularly picks out “demonstrations in San Francisco” and the “statement from Harvard students” and “is that likely to change US support?”
Professor Daniel Byman
So, in general, these crises tend to follow certain dynamics, where there is a lot of attention due to attacks on Israel, and I would say, again, given the scale and the nature of these attacks, there’ll be even more sympathy towards Israel. And then, over time, there is the Israeli response, which is widely criticised and creates sympathy on the Palestinian side. I suspect, without knowing, we’ll see a similar dynamic here, where we’ll see support for Israel and then, some countries, like the United States, that are very strong supporters, will be more willing to back Israel as military operations go on. But others that were more lukewarm in their support, start to drop off very quickly, with calls for a ceasefire happening.
Within the United States itself, President Biden is very much trying to position himself and the United States as squarely in Israel’s corner. That was a very strong statement and I think that he’s going to stay with Israel for quite some time, knowing the Israeli response is going to be very tough. Not to delve too much into US politics, but the people who are critical of the Biden administration on this are hardly likely to support a Republican alternative under President Trump, right? It’s not like the alternative political position is saying be gentle to the Palestinians. So, I think Biden feels secure politically knowing that the people who are criticising him are still likely to end up supporting him in the end.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you for that. Yossi, I wonder if you could take us back to the point that Sanam and Francesca were talking about, and threading through this, as I promised, which is whether this brings the question of a deal with Palestinians? It brings, inescapably back to the forefront this question of what is going to happen to arrangements between Palestinians and Israelis? Is it – is – can you see a way forward for that, or is this government and many Israelis just saying, what is the point of talking to these people? Yossi, you’re on mute. Not a subject on which people stay muted for long. So – ah, I wonder if one of my wonderful team can release Yossi from his computer silence.
Yossi – while the team is, kind of, wrestling with that, John, could I turn to you, just on this question? Can you see anything bringing back a way to talk about the future of the Palestinians…
Sir John Jenkins
I don’t know what it is…
Bronwen Maddox
…in Israel?
Sir John Jenkins
…but it’s – I think it’s going to have to happen, and I’ve always thought this. I mean, I – the thing is that the – you know, I never understood, with the Netanyahu Governments, that you have whatever it is, 1.9/2 million Palestinians in Gaza, you’ve got whatever it is, 3.7 or something and 3.5 in the West Bank, more in Jerusalem, what happens to them, where do they all go?
Now, it’s proved, I mean, as Francesca and others have said, that Hamas are not Palestin – are not the Palestinians. Nor, in that – for that matter, are Fatah the Palestinians. I mean, the Palestinians – you know, the Rabat Summit, of course, said, you know, “The PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” That was a fiction then and it’s a fiction now.
You’ve got to find some political mechanism by which, you know, Palestinian aspirations can be politically focused, discussed and resolved. That doesn’t exist at the moment. If the Israelis sweep through Gaza and destroy – I mean, which is what they said – was what Avi Dichter says they want to do, the entire Hamas military and also, political structures there, there will still be Hamas figures in exile. But they will not exist anymore as a coherent entity within Gaza, whatever the implication – the imbrication of Hamas into the population. And it’s interesting to look at polling on Hamas popularity in Gaza. Khalil Shikaki up in Ramallah does a lot of this stuff, and it goes up at times of conflict, then comes down at times of peace.
So, there is this – and I think if you – if – most – if you look at the sort – all the polling that we see from within Pales – in the West Bank and, indeed, in Gaza, it suggests that Palestin – it’s true that they’ve lost faith in the two-state solution, but that’s because they’ve lost faith, partly, in the Palestinian Authority, which they think is corrupt and useless, which it is. And I think – and Hamas are not the answer, ‘cause Hamas do not offer a political horizon. They offer a millenarian horizon and that cannot work.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm hmm.
Sir John Jenkins
How this political – how a construct – how a realistic, credible and authoritative political interlocuter on the Palestinian side emerges, I don’t know. I do think that the other Arab – particularly the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, will, in the future, have a role in this, ‘cause I don’t think the Pale – the Saudis have lost an appetite for normalisation. They always knew that their appetite for normalisation was not as great, or as insistent, as Netanyahu’s appetite for normalisation, which is why they were constantly raising the price of normalisation.
But I think that will remain after all of this. I think you will see, you know, changes in popular opinion as this – as the Israeli assault on Gaza continues. That happens all – it happened in 2006. I mean, in 2006 you could go into Khan el-Khalili in Cairo and you would see the three pictures on the wall. You would see Nasrallah, Khamenei and Assad, the Holy Trinity. You’d see them everywhere, that ended. I mean, you don’t see them anymore and that’s partly because of the Syrian Civil War, and of course, Assad has killed, tortured and exiled millions of his own citizens. So, it shifts, it – when the conflict is over, people will still have to come back to this issue of what happens to the Palestinians?
Dr Sanam Vakil
And we…
Sir John Jenkins
…and that’s – I mean, I don’t know what the answer to that is. I just know there has to be an answer.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm, thank you for that. Sanam, do you agree with that?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Not to sound like an echo chamber, I do agree. I – we don’t know what is going to come next.
Professor Yossi Mekelberg
Yes.
Dr Sanam Vakil
But we need to be helping to cultivate and support Palestinian leadership. Leadership that can come from within, come up, that’s youthful, that empowers younger generation voices and that begins to create a consensus on the way forward. I think the Palestinian leadership has been, at least in the West Bank, stagnant. No elections for over 15 years. Abbas needs – circulation of elites is a really important concept to bring people along and to create buy-in and investment in the current status quo, but in the future.
So, I would think that that’s where we should be placing our interests. I think we should be thinking about anticipating where we – where this conflict is going to go and help to nourish and bring people together to start working in that space, and that should be happening quite urgently and quite now. I’m – I don’t know if Yossi’s…
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm, has Yossi returned…
Dr Sanam Vakil
…audio is working…
Bronwen Maddox
…to us?
Dr Sanam Vakil
…but I think he has a lot to say about this. Great.
Bronwen Maddox
Yossi, have we…
Professor Yossi Mekelberg
I – can you hear me?
Bronwen Maddox
…retrieved you? Excellent, yes, we can.
Professor Yossi Mekelberg
Oh, yeah. Yeah, I just – the computer does what the computer does. You know, one point, and I think it’s very important, because we enter into a period, as Daniel said, that the war which has its own dynamic, and it’s very difficult in these early days. I know for some of us, the last five die – days, like, is eternity, feel like eternity, but it will go – rage on. And I think the role now is to look into the future and to think where do we want to be, all sides, at the end of it?
But I think we don’t have this privilege, you know, of self-indulgence, to think, oh, you know, it’s all done. I think this is exactly the result that we see now that the international community abandon the urgency to deal with looking for creative, innovative solution. For too long, many parts of – you know, whether in the United States or in the European Union, everyone said that we fell into the trap of the status quo, and it was so obvious there was no status quo. The situation was getting worse and worse.
You can’t ignore the, kind of, the conditions on the ground without changing all the time. Call it status quo. Status quo served the Israelis, didn’t serve the Palestinians. At the same time, also, the status quo among the leadership, the PLO leadership, maintained the same people, the same ideas, the same concept and then some point of view, someone will try to bring. Obviously, what happened this week is horrendous and leads to a much worse situation before.
But we need, already, to think now, and I know this is the difficult thing while the war is raging, to look at the day after, and to believe – and then say, instead of looking where the border is going and how much compensation do refugees get, we need to think about the values. We need to think what you are – the end of any peace process and any political engagement, we like everyone to enjoy. So, when we look at the situation in such a small territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, we would like to say everyone enjoy the same political rights. We like to have everyone to enjoy the same human rights. And we tend to say this, anyone enjoy the same civil rights. So – and if we start with the values instead of from the details of where the border exactly, then we come – actually can come up with new ideas.
The second thing, we need the space for new leadership to emerge. We also neglected grassroots. Everyone, you know – people use the term, we don’t want ‘normalisation’. We don’t agree with people talking because it makes it one wor – the situation worse, and we have to move exactly in the opposite direction.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, well, thank you for that. Francesca, and I’m going to stir in even more questions we’ve had, but we’ve been talking a lot about the two-state solution, whether or not it has any future. And let me just read out a few – quite a few remarks that are on this. From Laurence Barnaud-Bettle, “What do you expect to happen in the West Bank repositioning participation?” Let’s see, there is Keith Tracey saying, “Surely the two-state solution is long dead, need true democracy.” There is another one from – and we have a lot of questions, so sorry for my…
Francesca Albanese
That’s okay.
Bronwen Maddox
…pausing. And others asking, “What about the two-state solution?” Francesca, from your perspective and work very much close on the ground in the…
Francesca Albanese
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
…occupied Palestinian territories, what do you make of that?
Francesca Albanese
Yeah, I think that we shouldn’t confuse the two-state solutions, which is probably the only thing on which there is international consensus, other than the treaties that everyone has signed and – or remains, like a dead letter. However, there is consensus on the two-state solution. The problem is confusing Oslo as a way – with the two-state solution.
Oslo has been an attempt – I cannot say – I’m sorry, I cannot force myself to say – to realise the two-state solution, because this is not the case. Oslo has not been unsuccessful. Oslo has been very successful at creating the matrix that is currently in place, where Israel has gained more control, 60% of the West Bank, has further fragmented the territory, separating the West – the Gaza Strip, as he had started to do since the very beginning of the occupation, and this is fully documented, and East Jerusalem.
So, before I get into what a two-state solution could look like, I would say that we should probably question the validity of Oslo if it’s interpreted against the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people, because they are the ones deprived of these fundamental rights, which is an [inaudible – 48:08] obligations for the international community. So, everyone should act for the realisation of this right.
And my question is, how can a two-state solution and how can we think of peace without – I mean, with the current – with a status quo that – I mean, personally, I was clearly not comfortable with the pre-6 – the pre-7 October reality, which is a reality where the right of self-determination continues to be violated by more taking of the land for the colonies.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah, yeah.
Francesca Albanese
There are 300 colonies right now. This possession, first displacement of the occupied population, we talk about – we can criticise the Politician, Pal – the Palestinian leadership as much as we want, and it’s fine as I’m with you. But the point is that this is not an out – like, this has never been envisaged to be like an outer reality or an equal reality to Israel. It’s part of the occupation itself. So, it doesn’t – it plays the role it plays and is not there to protect the Palestinians or its interest. And so, with – yeah, without the possibility to form a political leadership under occupation, without the possibility to enjoy rights, without the possibility to really exist culturally, economically, politically, as a people, I don’t think there is any viable future. So, the – yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, thank you. I guess thank you for that, but you wouldn’t be the first to take that particular view. Yossi, just take us into the politics of Israel now and the trends of the – of that politics. Do you see, given the – this particularly Conservative Government, given that they – that all the political forces pushing – that have been pushing Israel in that way, do you see any Israeli Government being capable of this kind of dialogue and, indeed, concession?
Professor Yossi Mekelberg
I don’t think so, but I think at the same time, what happened at – on Sunday – on Saturday/Sun – was an earthquake in Israeli politics, and the idea that any Prime Minister can actually survive such an earthquake. Prime Minister Golda Meir didn’t survive more than a few months after the Yom Kippur War. Ehud Olmert would’ve gone, probably, after 2006 on something on – compared to what happened this week, much minor. And so, the – for Netanyahu, it’s essential to stay in power, mainly because of his corruption trial, but he positioned himself as Mr Security and security failed completely.
Right now – actually by aiding people like Gantz and Gideon Sa’ar into the government, it does exactly what he’s so much agai – was against, is to prepare them to take over eventually. And it’s hard for me to see how they’re not going to election probably at some point in the near future, how there is no commission – an investigation into the failures of the war. And at the end of the day, the buck will stop with the Prime Minister, also because some of the appointments to keep position that led to this disaster.
Now, looking at it in terms of two-state solution, probably this is not the government that is capable, but sometime – and we saw in the history, after 73, came actually, a few years later, a new government and peace with Egypt, after the first 75 there came Madrid, came Oslo. So, actually, you know, if in time – maybe I’m holding – I’m clutching straws, but I think that sometimes, after major, major failures, also creates, also, the opportunity and for new thinking and this might – just might be the case here, too.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, thank you. I’m just going to read out a few more. One from Fernando Herrero, saying, “Is there any difference between Tories and Labour, under Starmer, under – on this big crisis? What are the possible positions? I haven’t heard proportionate response.” And they have both used that in the past couple of days, but thank you for that question.
There’s quite a lot on – interesting ones on motives here. One from Hugh Jenkins on, “Does the panel have a view of what Hamas is seeking here?” which I think is a very good one. And then, various questions about Egypt, which I want to stir in about what – “where Egypt has positioned itself in this” and whether “Israel is trying to drive the Gazans into Egypt?” And from Michael Ingber, “Can it not be safely said” – this one’s a deeply, I guess, ironic question, “that all Arab countries would be” – or “are ready to sell the Palestinians for their own interests?” Motives of Hamas, of Arab countries in this, of Egypt. I wonder if some of you could take us into this, Sanam, Daniel, John?
Dr Sanam Vakil
Sure. Very quickly, I’ll take Egypt to start. I think Egypt is in a hugely difficult position. It shares the Rafah border crossing, connecting the Strip, Gaza Strip, to the Sinai Peninsula. And under President Sisi, who is very national security orientist – oriented leader, he has taken a very, sort of, strong securitised approach against the Muslim Brotherhood, which is as – almost ideologically aligned with Hamas. Egypt has blocked imports, tried to curb the outflow of tunnels and there’s concern that there will be pressure on the border. Israel struck that border just recently, a few days ago, and there’s, you know – the influx of Palestinians on this closed border crossing is going to add to what is already a humanitarian crisis. And I think that this is where there needs to be a huge amount of attention. Prime Minister Netanyahu said, very clearly, “Gazans need to go,” and what is really unclear is there is nowhere for them to go.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm, absolutely.
Dr Sanam Vakil
And that border crossing is – I hope will be opened, but I think that Egyptians, but also, the broader European community, needs to be involved in that space. There have been really negative backlash to migration crises across Europe, with Italy bearing the brunt of that crisis, and so, this is going to have a cascade that I hope policymakers are thinking about. And the Egyptian political establishment is already fragile. Sisi is meant to have elections in December. The economy is not in a good shape. So, again, there is another, sort of, vicious circle of very difficult decisions that need to be made and again, it’s not clear who’s going to be making them.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you. Daniel, do you want to come in?
Professor Daniel Byman
I do. Let me talk about possible Hamas motivations, and I would stress there’s a lot we don’t know. Hamas has been in a situation where it’s been losing politically in multiple ways. It’s trying to govern Gaza in the face of significant Israeli and international economic isolation and as a result, has not been able to claim legitimacy among the Palestinian people for simply being the best at out-governing its rivals.
It also is losing some of its, what it would call its resistance legitimacy, legitimacy that comes from its use of military force. It’s in – at times, cracked down on anti-Israel groups in Gaza and it’s been criticised, not only by other more militant organisations, but also by fighters within Hamas, who say the organisation is not committed to fighting Israel. And all this concern about loss of legitimacy is happening when Palestinian politics are in turmoil. The Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank, there’s a leadership succession crisis that’s beginning. Mahmoud Abbas is 87-years-old, he’s a chain smoker, and who leads the Palestinian National movement in the future is very much in question.
Add to this the sense among Palestinians that they’re being left behind as regional normalisation occurs, and the last thing I would say is simply a tremendous sense of anger and desire for revenge. And to me, all this is, kind of, combined into a very combustible cocktail.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm, thank you. John?
Sir John Jenkins
I agree with all that and I agree with what Sanam said. I think there’s another issue with Hamas, ‘cause it is striking that they didn’t – I mean, this and, actually, the previous two, I think, occasions, when they’ve wanted to blockade Central Israel, they’ve claimed to be acting on behalf of Al-Aqsa, which is so – there’s an ethnonationalist strain to Hamas and there’s an Islamist strain to Hamas. And they’re clearly emphasising the Islamic umatic aspect of the struggle in an attempt to draw in Muslim states more widely. And it’s interesting, actually, that there has been some response elsewhere, but it’s not been huge. So, we’ll say – I mean, you know, as this plays through, we’ll see what other appeals they make to Islamist and Islamic solidarity.
I think the Egyptian angle, everything that Sanam said is true, but interestingly, what this also does is make Isra – is make Egypt important again. I mean, historically, the earlier question, you know, why is – why the Egyptian controlled the crossing at Rafah, they don’t want Gaza back. They’ve never – and they haven’t wanted Gaza back for the last five decades, and they don’t want it ‘cause they’ve got enough problems of their own in Sinai. They’ve now got 100 and whatever it is, 110 million citizens, instead of the 92 they thought they had three years ago. They’ve got massive economic problems. They can do – they could do with Gaza like a hole in the head.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
Sir John Jenkins
Equally, they were the ones who managed Gaza on behalf of the Arabs in general. It was already – under Mubarak, it was – they did it through EGIS, the external security organisation, with Omar Soliman. That, then, actually became frayed after Mubarak’s fall and it’s not clear who was with Hamas, and I think it probably still is an issue.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm hmm.
Sir John Jenkins
Do you know?
Bronwen Maddox
John, we are actually going to have to…
Sir John Jenkins
Okay, just…
Bronwen Maddox
…bring it…
Sir John Jenkins
…one quick…
Bronwen Maddox
Micro, micro point.
Sir John Jenkins
You know, given that the Egyptians do have all these problems, they can now perhaps exact a price on the Gulf States for acting as their proxies in dealing with Gaza.
Bronwen Maddox
That is a really good point. We’re going to have to draw it to a close. I’m just going to mention a few more questions that have come in which I couldn’t stir in as questions. But from Shafi Aldamer, whether “the rise of a Palestinian death toll would shift public opinion in the West?” A lot of people saying, “Don’t equate Hamas with Palestinians,” and “The Palestinians have been – not got the kind of international attention they want because of the groups within them.” Others asking whether “Professor Mekelberg” would – “really thinks that one million settlers, a number he says will soon be reached, could be moved by an Israeli Government?” Ismail Berkman saying that “International law does not apply in the Gaza Strip,” and others writing in, Batul Arafa, “As a Palestinian refugee,” again, saying, “what recourse, really, does he have to international law?”
Some of these points we’re going to bring back. The biggest lump of questions that I haven’t stirred in is over mediation and what other countries can do. Also, the future of the Palestinian negotiations and the two-state solution and settlements and so on, and role of many other countries. So, I think we are planning other events very soon and we’ll come back to these, but may I just thank my distinguished and passionate panellists and thank you all very much for coming and for sending your questions? I’m so sorry I couldn’t get more than a tiny fraction of them in, but thank you, and see you very soon on this.
Dr Sanam Vakil
Thank you.
