The Israel–Hamas war: what escalation looks like

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Good afternoon. I’m sorry we were on mute. Welcome to Chatham House’s webinar on Israel-Hama – on The Israeli-Hamas War: What Escalation Looks Like. Maybe we’ll also look at prospectives for non-escalation. But we’re at a pivotal moment at the moment. After 17 days of the war, on 7 October this year, 2023, Hamas stormed the wall between the Northern border of Gaza and Israel and massacred over 1,300 Israelis, mainly civilians, some dual nationals. Took into the Strip as hostages at least 2,000 and – sorry, 212 hostages, possibly up to 350. The – many are unaccounted for, missing in action. Israel reacted by imposing a siege on Gaza, not letting in water, not letting in fuel, not letting in food, not letting in medicine. Has – Israel has also asked at least one million citizens of – or inhabitants of Gaza to vacate their homes and move South, and meanwhile – that’s about half the population of Gaza, possibly more. Meanwhile, Israel has – is attacking from the skies like never before.

We’ve got a pac – we’ve got a fantastic panel of three distinguished experts in the area. Steven Farrell, a former Jerusalem Bureau Chief of the London Times and Reuters, got hands-on experience in the area and he’s the Author of “Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement,” a book published by Polity in 2010. Steven has also been embedded with the Israeli Army in Lebanon and has regional expertise, given that he’s covered the entire region. I won’t go into each and every state that he’s been to, nor through every single article he’s written, but we’ll – you’ll have the chance to ask him questions directly.

Bilal Saab is the Director of the Defense and Security Programme of the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C., and he’s Associate Fellow with the Middle East Programme at Chatham House. He’s a former Pentagon Official with oversight responsibilities for security co-operation in the Middle East and has a terrific amount of detail of how CENTCOM works and what is at stake. He has close ties to The Pentagon and can shed light, not only on the region, but also on what the United States is thinking at present.

Hannah Weisfeld is the Chair of Yachad, which in Hebrew, means ‘together’. It’s a British Jewish organisation working towards ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ending the occupation. For the Americans in the audience, or those familiar with the Jewish organisations in the US, Hannah described Yachad as “the British J Street.” Hannah’s been working tirelessly towards a two-state solution and giving a voice to moderate voices that are not often heard. Giving them a platform is key and the key element of her work.

With that in mind, I’d like to kick off the discussion with Steven. Steven, you were in Beirut in March 2022, when Hamas bombed the Park Hotel in Netanya. At the time, that was the worst attack Hamas had ever inflicted on Israel. There are some parallels that one can draw between what – the mindset then and now. The attack on the 7th of October is of a very different magnitude. However, it will be good if you could kindly shed some light on your thinking on these issues. What did Hamas want then and what did Hamas – do Hamas want now? One – why was signi – why was the 27th of March so significant? Just shed some light on the audience of what meeting was held in Beirut at the time.

Steve Farrell

Sure. Thank, you. We’re talking two decades ago. We’re talking the moment at which the Second Intifada was full-on, and at that point, in 2002, there was a Saudi peace plan for the region, to be discussed at the Arab League in Beirut. And I think many of the Journalists in the Middle East were there. It had been floated by the Crown Prince. It had been – Tom Friedman, The New York Times, had been involved in writing about it. There was a sense of possible groundbreaking change happening, as I say, two decades ago. And just as it was about to be discussed by the Arab League in Beirut in 2002, Hamas blew up a hotel in Israel, sent a suicide bomber in to blow up a hotel during a Passover Seder, killed around 30 Israelis, many of them Holocaust survivors. And, of course, it was an attack aimed at the heart of Israel, on a Jewish holiday, causing huge distress and despair and anger and fury, echoes, pre-echoes, if you like, of what we’ve just seen, but it had another target, not just Israel.

That target was – they – Hamas did not want the Saudis or any neighbouring Arab power to be – start to do negotiations with Israel, to sign a peace deal, normalisation, as they call it, and they succeeded in scuppering that deal. And they issued a communique, for the avoidance of any doubt, saying, “This is a message to our Arab brothers in Beirut. We are doing this. We are present in Palestine.” So, effectively, Hamas, all the focus in recent couple of weeks has been, of course, on its attack on Israel, of course, on its relationship with Israel, and on the Palestinian side, on what it claims to be its right of resistance against Israel. Israel, of course, calls it ‘terrorists’. The argument goes on and on, but there are secondary aims and goals and one of these, I believe, was to make sure they tried to stop the wave of normalisation deals that Arab countries were doing with Israel and the Saudis, in particular [pause].

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Sorry, what do you think was the prime concern of this attack on 7 October?

Steve Farrell

I think Hamas sensed weakness in Israel. I think Hamas, many of whom have been in jail in Israel, many of whom speak Hebrew, they have no trouble following the domestic political discourse in Israel, the divisions we’ve seen, and I think they ha – were paying careful attention to the politics. They were clearly paying very careful attention to the security situation on the ground, and I think they sensed a moment of weakness and they wanted to exploit it and they wanted to shock. This was a shock offensive. They – I suspect they weren’t expecting to get as far as they got and they weren’t expecting, maybe, the Israelis’ guard to be as down as it was, but they were certainly intending to shock, and I think they achieved that aim.

And I am – it’s speculation, we’re [inaudible – 09:41], but I am guessing that they wanted to draw Israel into Gaza, where they’d laid booby traps and tunnels and so on and so forth, because they knew probably what Netanyahu would do, or was likely to do. And I’m guessing, again, Hamas calculated that the scenes in Gaza in the weeks succeeding such a massive attack, would be what the world seed and – saw and remembered, alongside their initial shock, which in their eyes, weakened their enemy. I think it was a mixture of those calculations, Saudis, weaken Israel and establish themselves as the power, totally marginalising their more secular moderate opponent, Mahmoud Abbas. I think it’s a mixture.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you very much, Steven. That was loud and clear, putting an end to Israeli normalisation with Saudi Arabia, asserting themselves as the leaders or the representatives of Palestine, given the weakness in the Palestinian Authority, and luring, or setting a trap for Israel in the city that they have built below ground in Gaza. They have a town, a city, they have tunnels, many layers of them, and I would like to turn to Bilal, who’s an expert on the network that Hamas has underground. What this means for Israel as they are planning to go in for a ground offensive, which undoubtedly, will escalate the conflict, both in Gaza and potentially, and likely, in the region? Bilal, what do you think is going to happen when Israel – oh, well, first and foremost, what do you think is the likelihood that Israel will go in with boots on the ground, and what do you think is going to happen when they do so?

Bilal Y. Saab

Thank you, Nomi and thank you, Chatham House. It’s good to be with my colleagues, Steven and Hannah. Why don’t we just address your first question, Nomi? Nobody knows how likely this is, but I think all the signs indicate that this is pretty likely at this point. The mobilisation is pretty credible, you could see it, it’s complete. The political statements by top leadership all suggest that this is now imminent. I find it very hard to believe that they’re now at a stage where they are reconsidering. So, it’s just really a matter of time, it’s not a matter of if, it’s a matter of when. I think it’s just last-minute collection of further intelligence. You can see the intensification of the airstrikes. So, this is what we call preparatory fires, to try to make this ground invasion a little bit less challenging. Even though we’re going to talk about it, it is still going to be incredibly challenging. So, you know, my guess is, and I’ll be shocked if it didn’t happen, my guess is it’s very likely.

Now to the question of okay, so what happens now? Big picture stuff first. The Israeli Government is not doing any favours to the IDF when they say that “We’re going to go and wipe out Hamas. We’re going to go destroy Hamas. We’re going to go annihilate Hamas. You know, if you’re the IDF Chief of Staff and you hear that kind of stuff, the first thought that comes to mind is, what the hell does that mean? How can I translate this into practical, achievable military objectives? The more realistic objective for the IDF is going to be to massively de-grade the military capabilities of Hamas, ideally to disarm it.

Now, I’m not saying that those are easy objectives, but relatively speaking, they are more achievable objectives, and they are doable, but they’re not without risks, they’re not without challenges. Why don’t we just talk about those a little bit?

You mentioned the tunnels, Nomi. Before I get into the tunnels, let me address an inherent tension here in overall strategy. You have to balance between going hard and also, protecting the lives of the hostages, because this is a layer of complexity now, on top of the urban warfare, on top of the subterranean warfare, that the IDF is going to have to deal with, and this tension is incredibly hard to address. If you do go surgical, then you give Hamas the opportunity to fight back, which makes the whole objective even more complicated. If you go heavy force, then, you can hurt Hamas, but you can also hurt the pot – the hostages, potentially.

Now, either way, you still have to deal with the massive tunnels. They’re deep, they’re long, probably some of the more sophisticated tunnels you’ve ever seen. This is your not average tunnel, okay? And this is probably going to be one of the most sophisticated operations the IDF has ever done. So, I would suspect that high on that priority list is a – eminently, a political decision that has to be made by the Israeli Government, which is how much collateral damage are you willing to accept, right? ‘Cause there’s going to be that no matter what. I don’t care how trained you are for that kind of warfare. I don’t know how many specialised units you have, and they do have them, by the way, and they’re very much trained for that. If anybody’s going to pull this off, it’s the IDF, right?

And they have the specialised equipment, but just remember that everything you use above ground doesn’t work below ground. How you breathe, how you navigate, how you shoot, how you communicate, all of those things require special equipment and yes, they have them, but you don’t know what you don’t know until you go in. Everything could go wrong inside those tunnels, and I’m not even talking about Hamas countermeasures. I’m talking about equipment simply malfunctioning.

So, the question that the IDF has to answer is, do you clear first and then, you destroy, or do you destroy and then you clear? And that comes with a host of challenges either way, right? And so, I know it sounds cliché, okay, there is no military solution to this, although we, you know, we’ve seen cases in the past where the Tamil Tigers were defeated militarily, of course, at a very high death toll, right? But the issue here is the day after. Let’s just say you do massively de-grade Hamas, okay? What happens the day after? Israel’s not going to own Gaza, they’re not going to occupy Gaza. This is not the Third Reich, this is not Imperial Japan. We’re not going to turn Gaza into a democracy, and so, Hamas 2.0 is very much a possibility, as long as Iran supplies weapons to Palestinians who are willing to take arms and do battle with the Israelis.

This is the key element of this IDF operation that is totally missing, and this is where you get to the strategic level, which is where the political leadership has to be involved. There’s not a single discussion about what happens the day after, assuming you are perfect with your execution of the operation, which I just told you is going to be incredibly challenging, right? The hostages make this so incredibly challenging. The tunnels make this so incredibly challenging. You could do hit and run operations if you’re Hamas. You have a degree of technical, tactical operational flexibility that you simply do not have above ground. They can go on the offence, they can go on the defence, and so, the collateral damage, in my opinion, Nomi, and I’ll end with this, is going to be the biggest question mark. How much risk are you willing to take and how much – how high is the price that you’re willing to tolerate?

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you, Bilal. You mentioned ‘collateral damage’. There’s also the whole humanitarian situation, which is absolutely appalling, which António Guterres, the Secretary-General of the UN, described as, you know, an – “witnessing a catastrophe.” And only 35 trucks have moved in thus far in 17 days and that’s a drop in the ocean.

Bilal Y. Saab

Yeah.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

I would like to turn – and we’re sticking, still, to Gaza, still to the Southern front, before we go regionally. I’d like to turn to Hannah and ask her. Hannah what do you – you’re working on the endgame. You have been looking at this both in the short-term and the longer-term. How do you envisage getting to a peaceful solution so that Israel and the Palestinians could have two states living side-by-side?

Hannah Weisfeld

Thank you, Nomi, and thank you for having me. I think it’s very hard today to talk about the word ‘peace’. It almost sounds, kind of, stupid in light of the images that we’re seeing from the region, to even mention the word, and you get accused of being foolish or naïve. I think what’s challenging now is that all eyes are focused on the immediacy of what’s going on and the humanitarian crisis, which is extremely severe, and the damage and the catastrophe that, kind of, civilians are facing.

The big question I have is around what does it mean, kind of – what does the day after tomorrow look like? And, you know, I’m pleased that Bilal raised that issue, because really, what this has, unfortunately and very sadly, proven is the international community’s attitude towards this conflict, which for 20 years, has been look the other way in a moment of crisis, try and dampen the flames and then, we can go back to the status quo. What’s very clear is that we cannot go back to October the 6th, that what has happened now is so catastrophic that the idea that we will go back to managing this conflict is, I think, an idea that has – you know, that has now most definitely passed. That moment has gone that we can indefinitely manage away the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

And you can see that because you can see international leaders literally running around like headless chickens trying to stop this from now becoming a much broader regional conflict. And so, I think there’s got to be some thinking now about what does it mean to internationalise this? How do you involve the wider region in the Middle East? What role do the Abraham Accord countries play? And I think that, you know, for a long time, that, you know, the West has been very fixated on, well, we can just get around the conflicts because we’ll create these relationships and Accords between our allies in Israel, and we can just do away with the Palestinian issue that way.

I think, if anything, this has proven that that’s a huge mistake, and so, this question about what happens to this Saudi Arabia-Israeli relationship, that is not – that can no longer be a relationship that does not consider where the Palestinians fit into it. And so, I – you know, I’m very interested in, kind of, focusing minds on the question about how – you know, once the fighting is over and however long that takes, what does the ant – international community do next and how do we make sure that the voices in the region that are moderate are actually elevated and had a – and have an opportunity to flourish?

So, we’ve seen really interesting stuff, for example, in Israel, with mass mobilisation of the Israeli civil society in the run-up to this conflict, that, you know, if you’d asked me three weeks ago to come and speak at Chatham House, it would be about, you know, hundreds of thousands of Israelis on the streets protesting the Israeli Government. And it feels, really, to be honest, quite strange that that conversation has now completely disappeared, but what has come out of that is there’s a really big possibility that there is some new leadership that could be supported and nurtured to take Israel, you know, back from the brink. Because one thing is, I think we can probably be sure of, is that it – there is no chance that Netanyahu will survive this. He has overseen the most catastrophic failure, military, strategic. I would say, in terms of Jewish history and the most catastrophic leadership, you know, that we’ve ever witnessed, and he cannot, long-term survive that.

So, the question will be, who are the leaders that we can now nurture to take this forward once the fighting is over? Who will put at the top of their agenda, you know, the internationalisation of, you know, of this conflict, in a way that can – where a political agreement can be reached. Because we cannot, we cannot be in the situation where we go back to a status quo, which will be much more violent, it will be much more extreme. This risk of Hamas 2.0 I think is very real, that there will be huge, huge radicalisation, much more so than there has been, in the Gaza Strip, and that’s not going to go away. It’s going to get much worse and unless you’re going to remove the Iranian regime which is funding it, it’s almost impossible to rid the Gaza Strip of it, beyond creating conditions where extremism is diminished and you – moderate leaders can flourish.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you very much, Hannah. Just for the sake of the participants, the references I assume that you were making in the demonstrations is that the demonstrations against Netanyahu had also – would’ve been demonstrations against the occupation. So, is, basically, you know, you cannot continue in this way, as long as the occupation goes on, and I think that will be a very interesting debate in Israel on how to move forward swiftly, when, as you say, the fighting is done. And the big question is, when will the fighting be done, and whether other fronts will open up.

I would like to open the floor to a discussion, and I would like to – but very briefly, two minutes each, to – if you would like to comment on the Northern Front in Hezbollah. Steven, you were there, embedded with the Israeli Forces after two soldiers were kidnapped from the border area in 2006, and Israeli Prime Minister at the time, Ehud Olmert, vowed to assassinate Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah and wipe Hezbollah off the map. You were there at the time, you were embedded with the Forces. What military and political lessons were learned from that that are relevant to the discussion we’re having today?

Steve Farrell

Thank you. Well, I was there. I spent most of the time in Northern Israel, in the Galilee, a lot of it looking across the border from high points. And it was – you saw – you know, once the Israeli Military rolled in, they weren’t quite sure what to do then. You know, take the villages, push on, push on, but push on how far? Spend how long trying to get your soldiers back? Do you know the soldiers are dead? All the same questions that, actually, Bilal was mentioning earlier on apply in Gaza, applied back then. What is the endgame? When do you stop? Was it likely they were going to find their soldiers, the captives?

I mean, again, you’ll be hearing uncomfortable echoes of what – yeah, I did go in briefly with the Israeli Military, it was in an armoured car. The – it was striking to me that the Israelis were operating on a terrain very different from the West Bank, against an enemy very different from the West Bank, and you spoke to many Israeli soldiers coming back across the border at dawn and they were saying, “Hezbollah’s different. Hezbollah’s not what we’ve seen in Jenin and Nablus and the occupied West Bank. It’s more like an army.” And the question – and it’s an unknown. The question is, with all the years Hamas has had to watch what Hezbollah – effectively, fighting the Israelis almost to a standstill in South Lebanon, has Hamas reached the same level, more, less? We don’t know, and we may be about to find out.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you, Steven. I think we’ve got Bilal, who’s an expert on Hezbollah’s force, among other things. Hundreds and thousands of missiles they have. Would you like to shed some light on what the – when Hez – if and when Hezbollah are going to be likely to join? We have the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, has mentioned that the more blood is shed in Gaza – I’m putting it into my own words, his – you know, the Muslim street won’t be able to not respond. And we’ve already seen quite a large escalation in the North. Israel’s continuing to evacuate more and more villages and it was actually, the town of Kiryat Shmona, as well, has been evacuated. So, how do you see things panning out, on the assumption that Israel will go in with boots on the ground into Gaza?

Bilal Y. Saab

Nomi, you probably know this, but I’m actually originally from Southern Lebanon, from a little town right at the border, called Yaroun. So, actually, I could see the other side without even goggles. I know the terrain pretty well. As a matter of fact, while we’re speaking right now, it’s probably being bombed and shelled.

Look, neither party wanted a war in 06, but they got one anyway. I understand that deterrence works both ways. They’re both really careful not to get into a confrontation because they understand the capabilities that they have. I mean, Hezbollah today is very different, as Steve said, from the Hezbollah of 06. You got to remember, Hezbollah is the author of what Hamas just did in terms of actually encouraging them to – deep inside Israeli territory and, kind of, like, amounting a Blitzkrieg and sowing, you know, panic and chaos. They are the senior partner. They’re the ones the Israelis they worry about a whole lot more, you know, and it’s not like they don’t have tunnels, either, but they also have precision guided missiles. They have all sorts of training that Hamas doesn’t have. And so, the Israelis have a very healthy respect for Hezbollah’s capabilities.

Now, so far, it’s been within the rules of engagement. Those rules have been developed over many years, since 2000. The calm more or less has helped, but that perimeter of shelling continues to go deeper and deeper. I mean, first, it was 2km and now it’s 8km. Next, it’s going to be 15 and then, just one missile hitting an Israeli barracks and then, boom, it’s – you know, one things leads up to the other and, you know, it’s really difficult to control that kind of escalation. You know, this kind of communication is quite deadly. These are deadly messages. There are actually Hezbollah fighters that are getting killed and Israeli soldiers, not to mention, also, Journalists, collateral damage.

And so, you could see how, despite them not wanting a confrontation, this could easily get out of hand. And the tensions are incredibly high and Hezbollah’s probably going to – not going to be able to deter and Israeli incursion into Gaza. But the very shelling and kinetic activities that they’re exchanging with the Israelis, that in itself, perhaps, is a mode of communication with the Israelis that, “Look, we may not be able to deter that encouragement, but we’re going to try to shape it,” right? “We’re going to try to make you think twice and try to perhaps force you to think about resource allocation,” which is huge. The Israelis don’t want to fight on two wars, right?

And so, if they have to think about the possibility of a Northern Front, that, in itself, is a tactical success for Hezbollah, so I’m very much worried about it. I mean, these are unprecedented times and this is unchartered territory. The attack of Hamas is nothing like we’ve ever seen before. So, I want us to think a little bit outside the box here and not really draw firm comparisons as to what happened in 06. This is an entirely different ballgame. I don’t think Hezbollah’s going to sit and watch its Palestinian partner get demolished and not do anything about it. The Palestinian theatre has always been core for Hezbollah and Iran. They’re not about to watch Hamas get destroyed and not do anything about it. That’s just my opinion, I hope I’m wrong.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

No, I think there’s a consensus about what you are saying in the region, and Netanyahu has warned, loud and clear, that he will wipe out Lebanon if Hezbollah get involved to a large degree. What are your…?

Bilal Y. Saab

Yeah, that guy is not doing any favours to the IDF on both sides, frankly, with Gaza and the Palestinian and the Lebanese theatre. I mean, Hezbollah, again, could also incur a lot of costs on the Israelis, and so, that political bluster is just completely unhelpful to the IDF.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

I see. We’re discussing a potential escalation and there’s – in – and with a potential gloun – ground invasion and a potential front in the North. Things are going to get very, very bloody, and as you say, we’re – this is unchartered territory and weapons have improved, which means they’re more lethal. So, the question is, what will the rest of the Arab world inc – and not only Arab, Iran too, do?

Bilal Y. Saab

Is that still to me, Nomi?

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Yes, it is to you, yes.

Bilal Y. Saab

Oh, there’s a limit to diplomacy. I mean, you saw the Summit, there was no consensus on what they’re going to even put in the language of the communique, right? I mean, they had an opportunity to underscore their concerns about refugees, obviously, and about escalation, but I mean, there’s – this is more of a, we’re going to watch this thing and pray it doesn’t escalate. And Hannah’s absolutely right, this whole conversation about normalisation, yeah, you could forget about that for now. I mean, this is put on hold indefinitely.

The biggest question mark is US diplomacy, right? I know you want to talk about regional, but US, well, that…

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Probably is…

Bilal Y. Saab

…variable is most important. We were not even present in that Summit.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

So, I’d like to ask the last question and I’m opening it to the floor. We’re getting lots of questions and if you can answer just very, very quickly. In what – what does Biden need to do in order to persuade Israel not to go in with boots on the ground? It’s a – the US is the only country that has such leverage over Israel.

Bilal Y. Saab

We do have leverage. It’s a matter of whether we want to exercise it. I don’t think we’re going to exercise it. I haven’t seen any signs, frankly, that we are. We have just promised the Israelis $14 billion, okay, and we have reassured them that we have troops sitting outside the Mediterranean in two aircraft carriers. So, we’re trying to reassure them publicly. Privately, we’re trying to tell them, “Please rein in anything you’re going to do,” okay, and I don’t think we’re going to be able to deter a ground invasion, but we’re just going to continue to tell them to, “Please, please, pay attention to collateral damage. There’s a limit to how much we can support you.” But I just find it incredibly hard, politically speaking, for this administration to put some firm limits on Israeli military activity.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

What about Israeli milit – Israeli activity in the settlements? Clearly, the settlements has been the key issue for many, many years and the US have not done anything to stop the expansion. Do you see that changing?

Bilal Y. Saab

I’m not an expert on the political aspect of that confrontation.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Okay. I’d like to open – I have opened the questions to the audience. I would just like to remind everyone that this is on the record, being recorded and livestreamed. And attendees have been submitting, but for those ones who – those who haven’t yet, you can use the Q&A function box at the bottom of the Zoom feed, and we will gather some questions. There have been a large number of questions on the intelligence failure of the various intelligence bodies. Yeah, so I’ll gather – given time and given that there are many, many participants, I will gather clusters of three questions, and I will leave it to you to decide who’s going to answer which questions.

The first question, and many questions, are about the intelligence failures that are – on the 7th of October. I think, actually, that Hannah may have some insight into that, given that your knowledge of what the government is doing and what it looks like and where their priorities are lying. If the other participants who – would like to – the other panellists, Bilal and Steven, would like to add anything, that is very, very welcome.

The other questions are, “What are the possible politico-military objectives which Hamas had in mind when they launched this attack on October 7th?” I think that was answered in parts, but we can answer – we can elaborate upon what is it – what do you see? I think Steven has already answered that question, but maybe Bilal, if you would like to take that, and let me take a third question. Whoops, oh, sorry, we’re just having a couple of technical issues here. “Why do you think” – maybe this is for you, Bilal, ‘cause you’re in Washington D.C. “Why were not – wasn’t – weren’t the Palestinians taken into account with the normalisation with the Saudis?” We’re no longer in the Trump era. We are in a Biden era. So, we know that the Palestinians have been left behind with Camp David in the 70s, with Egypt 94, with the Jordanians and the Abraham Accords under Trump, but why were they left out now with the Saudi process? Thank you. Who would like…?

Steve Farrell

Should I…?

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

I think Hannah…

Steve Farrell

I…

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

I think Hannah should take the first question. Thank you.

Hannah Weisfeld

So, just on the intelligence failure, I’ve – so, I think, first of all, it is catastrophic, that’s absolutely clear. And for any of you who’ve spent time at the border, which I have, on many occasion, it’s almost impossible to get anywhere near it. It’s very highly militarised. The idea that they’re saying that over 3,000 people crossed it in one morning seems, kind of, inconceivable when you look at it, kind of, from where I’m sitting.

So, I think there’s a couple of things to bear in mind, which is, firstly, without a shadow of a doubt, the Israeli Government has been completely consumed with internal issues. And for many, many months, the Israeli Military Intelligence Services have been warning the Israeli Government that it will – that they will pay a price for that. That that does not come without your Intelligence Services, your Military Forces being distracted and that regional actors will pay attention to the distraction. And that’s clearly what has happened here and that, unfortunately, has been proven very much correct. So, I think that’s one factor.

I think the other factor, and we just touched on it before, is where energy is being diverted. So, for the last year of this government, we’ve had an – you know, the most extreme Israeli Government in Israel’s history. It has – there has been issue-after-issue on the West Bank which has really distracted the Military. And there has been – because of a whole load of internal issues, which is a subject, really, of another conversation, in order to balance the competing agendas of the coalition, which is very loosely held together with people that all have different motivations for being in it, it has allowed the most extreme of settlers to dictate the agenda and dictate the security agenda, up to a point.

And so, what we saw in the week before October the 7th was the Jewish holiday of Sukkot. And very extreme right-wing settlers, who were really agitating in Palestinian towns in the West Bank, and IDF troops that were redeployed from the Southern border to the West Bank to protect those settlers that were effectively going into Palestinian towns to hold Jewish prayer services. And that meant that there was a real lack of, literally, people on the border to defend the border.

So, when Hamas broke through the border and they killed, basically, every soldier in the South, there were no other soldiers, which is why, if you read the accounts of what happened to the people on the – in the communities on the border, what we call the Gaza envelope, but the border communities, some of them waited eight hours to be – to – for the IDF to turn up and to save them. And obviously, many of them were killed in that, kind of, intervening period, and that is because the soldiers were not deployed in the right places.

And I would just say that, on that, I think that one of the things that I – you know, I hope will come out of this is, you know, and it’s certainly a thread that is already being heavily debated inside Israel, is what is the role of defence forces if it’s not to defend your border? That this idea that we use the Military inside Israel to defend mess – people with a messianic agenda in the occupied territories, rather than defending your Southern and your Northern border, I think is something which is going to radically change. And actually, could be, long-term, to the benefit of thinking about a regional peace agreement, which is that if the Israeli public, who by and large, do not actually support the settlement enterprise, but effectively, have been ground down by years of conflict and ignore it, will no longer ignore it and say, “We do not want our soldiers deployed to defend it.” That totally changes the political calculation inside Israel, which means that something can emerge from that.

I just want to add one more brief thing, just about Hezbollah and the Northern border, which is that I don’t think anyone should also underestimate psychologically what it means for Israelis when missiles come over the Northern border. And it is different from rockets that come from the South because of how far they can reach and how – and that they’re better quality. So, when a missile hits Tel Aviv, from Lebanon, that is completely different in terms of the Israeli psyche, from a mi – from a rocket from Gaza and the likelihood of it injuring more people is much higher. And given Netanyahu and his position now as – you know, and hows – and how – and the extent to which the Israeli public dislike him, the need for him to respond heavily is very severe. And so, this idea that that – that you can end up in a war by mistake, I think is quite likely, that a misstep by Hezbollah and, you know, and a heavily – a heavy response by Netanyahu could result in that war really exploding in the North. So, it’s – I think it’s quite a – it’s a very delicate situation there now.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Would Bilal and Steven like to answer the other questions?

Bilal Y. Saab

I’d like to hear from Steve first.

Steve Farrell

Let’s talk about the politico-military question, but I’d like to add two other words into the mix there, religious and populism. To run through a list of what I think Hamas was trying to achieve, the – first of all, power. They want to show that they are the power in the land. When you talk to Hamas leaders, it’s always about, “We are a bigger number in the equation.” That’s the sort of rhetoric you hear. It’s very, very important to them that they be seen to be – that they’re the representative of the Palestinian people, and of course, at a time right now when we’re seeing, right across the world, many Palestinians say, “Do not identify me with Hamas. Do not identify the word ‘Palestinian’ with the word’ Hamas’.” Well, that is precisely what Hamas wants to happen. They want everybody to forget the word ‘Abbas, PLO, Arafat’, everyone else. They just want – who is everybody talking about? Everybody is talking about Hamas. I think that is what Hamas wanted and a – and to a certain extent, it’s what they’ve got.

The – Hannah mentioned a ‘distracted’ Israeli Government. Well, I – and I – just buil – following up on that, what Hamas has given as the overt reason for this is that the – they saw in 2021, right-wing Israeli supporters of the present government and right – far-right partners, marching on the centre of Jerusalem, insisting on marching through Palestinian areas. The Israelis, of course, saying, “We have a perfect right to march through Jerusalem.” Palestinians utterly denying that they should march through that part of Jerusalem. Hamas are presenting themselves, very important ‘cause it’s actually in their logo, Al-Aqsa mosque, the Dome of the Rock, they’re presenting themselves as the guardians of Al-Aqsa. Not Mahmoud Abbas, not the King of Jordan, not the Saudis, “We are the guardians of Al-Aqsa,” and I think we shouldn’t forget that. It’s core to their identity.

And then, rattling through a couple of others, deflection. Hamas is an international pariah. It hasn’t delivered on services. I mean, it – for many reasons, there’s a huge blockade on Gaza, nothing can get in and out, but it won elections in 2006 and it was still squeezed out, still marginalised. It hasn’t delivered, for whoever you blame, and I think this is a deflection, to a certain extent, back to its basics, back to what Hamas does. When the bombs and the bullets start flying, the moderates and the negotiators don’t have space in which to work. And I think they were – I don’t think you can underestimate the grisly, appalling, but incredibly powerful, you know, but – optics of what happened. For Israelis horrifying, for the world horrifying, appalling. But don’t underestimate Palestinian refugees sitting in Gaza. The power of watching Hamas film the grandchildren of refugees running through the farmlands of lands that their grandparents and great grandparents left. Incredibly powerful, Hamas playing to its base. Whatever you think of it, that’s what it was doing, I think.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you, Steven. We have a lot of questions, so maybe, Bilal, you can weave your answer in one – into one of the other questions. There’s a specific question about “Turkey’s role. Given that they have some of the Hamas leaders living there, they have a relationship with Hamas, and they’ve offer – also offered themselves as mediators,” “Qatar” too. And “If the war expands, how do we prevent other countries from joining? What about Iran, how do we work with Iran?” Those are three of the questions and ‘the risks,’ specifically, someone asked – posted about Syria, “What is the likelihood that Syria will get involved?” Bilal, I think you’re probably best placed to take those questions.

Bilal Y. Saab

Well, I certainly don’t want to prevent the Turks and the Qataris from getting involved, because they do play a role that’s actually pretty significant as far as mediation and prisoner swaps. I mean, they played an important role regarding the release of those two American hostages.

On the Iran issue, well, this is what we’re trying to do, right? This is what the United States is trying to do, to deter the Iranians from opening another front. That, of course, begs a huge question, which is, are we actually willing to go to war again in the Middle East? And this is a huge question for the United States and the Biden administration is going to have to go to Congress. It’s going to have to have a national conversation about the use of force, once again, in the Middle East. We cannot just be dragged into this kind of war with Iran. It has to be methodical, it has to be strategic, and we have to think about an exit strategy. We can’t just be reactive to something like this, and so it’s a huge question mark.

Deterrence is fine, but deterrence fails every now and then, perhaps actually more often than not. And so, we have to ask ourselves the question, if deterrence does fail, and you’re already seeing attacks from multiple fronts, whether it’s from Yemen, from Syria, from Iraq, you name it. I mean, that axis that we’ve been talking about, that proxy network that we’ve been talking about for years, we’re finally seeing it live in action, right? It’s not theoretical anymore. So, if we accept a level of risk of these, you know, limited attacks and those attacks, all of a sudden, start to escalate, and you know, American Soldiers and American troops in the region die, are we willing to go to war in the Middle East again? I don’t have the answer to that, but that’s precisely what we’re trying to do is to prevent this from turning into a regional war.

This is why communication, very honest and brutally transparent communication with the Israelis, is critical, right? We do have hostages as well as Americans and we certainly have concerns about Israel upholding international law. And so, for all these reasons, we have to be tied to the hip with the Israelis, but as I said before, there are limits to how much the Israelis are going to respect American wishes [pause]. You’re muted, Nomi.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Do you think that the US will condition their military aid to Israel on some improvement of the humanitarian situation in Gaza?

Bilal Y. Saab

Well, listen, now you’re asking me as just a, you know, an individual, not an Analyst, I sure hope so, personally speaking. I just find it very hard, politically speaking, that they would condition such a – I just – well, I think it would just come unconditionally. We’ll continue the private diplomacy, but if those promises are not kept on the part of the Israelis, I don’t think we’re going to withdraw, reduce on anything like that.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Do you feel the same way towards the settlements?

Bilal Y. Saab

I just don’t know. I mean, once again, I’m not really an expert on the settlements issue.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Right. We have a few more questions that – about the role of Russia and “How does this affect the Russia-Ukraine war?” “China.” Would anybody like to answer those questions, maybe Steven?

Steve Farrell

Well, there’s an awful lot of plates spinning in the air now and certainly, in terms of global media attention, it focused for a very long time on Ukraine. And I imagine the Ukrainians are getting nervous about will the willingness of the world remain to be with them and what happens in the American domestic political arena there? So, I think there’s so many imponderables and variables there, and it’s honestly anybody’s guess.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you. We have a question from one of the participants about – we’ve discussed the Qatari and the Turkish mediation role, given that they have ties with Hamas. But someone is specifically asking about how we view the role or “how you view the role of China and France?” Those are specific questions that I’m reading from the audience. Anybody like to take those?

Bilal Y. Saab

I’ll take a very quick stab at it. France has a channel of communication, I’m not sure how to qualify it, but it does exist, with Hezbollah and also, with the Israelis. And so, they can play a role in terms of trying to de-escalate this thing, but there’s certainly limits to French diplomacy.

The – what was the other country that you mentioned? Sorry, China.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

China. China, given they mediated for those – you know, between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a very significant deal. They’re certainly stepping in where the US is stepping out in the Middle East, and…

Bilal Y. Saab

Yeah.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

…they certainly have offered themselves as mediators, also, between Israel and Palestine, which – sorry, between…

Bilal Y. Saab

Yeah.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

…Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas.

Bilal Y. Saab

Yeah, well, I mean, you’re already also seeing, which is quite fascinating, the deployment of naval ships to the region. But I suspect that this is more, frankly, to protect their own energy interest, not really to play a significant diplomatic role in this. I think the Chinese pretty much understand their own limitations when it comes to that. And even on the historic groundbreaking agreement between the Iranians and the Saudis, frankly, the Chinese were invited to it, more than anything else. It’s not like they were – you know, played a significant role in making it happen. The two powers needed some, kind of, a great power cover for that and it was more signalling to watch them than anything else on the part of the Saudis.

The Chinese have every interest in keeping this as stable as possible and not escalating, simply because, and I don’t need to remind anybody on this panel or anybody watching this, they have a huge stake in this because of the significant energy interests that they have. I mean, they import more than anybody from that part of the world. So, stability is a core interest of the Chinese. They will try to speak to as many, you know, stakeholders as possible and do have – they do have those channels, right? They don’t really have a dog in this fight, in the sense there’s no bias, frankly, in Chinese diplomacy, other than the bias for the Chinese energy interest, right? They have a very different position from us. We have a bias, obviously. We are not an honest broker. They can play that role, but there are limits to it, obviously. It’s not fully developed.

Chinese devel – Chinese diplomacy is still, like, a very embryonic stage at this point. They don’t understand the Middle East as much. Well, they’ve qualified that, I don’t think we understand the Middle East as much as we do. But relatively speaking, they’re, sort of like, the new kids on the block, they’re understanding the dynamics and the complexities of it, but they’re laser focused on one thing and one thing only, free flow of commerce, energy security.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you very much, Bilal. “What about the role of Egypt?” we have a question here. I mean, Egypt has had a peace agreement with Israel since 1978/79 and, you know, the – this Camp David agreement. Very important strategic partner for Israel and they’re under tremendous strain at the moment. Israel is putting pressure on them to open the Ga – the Rafah Crossing, not just in order to take Gazan refugees in. They’re adamant that they won’t; King Abdullah in Jordan also adamant that they won’t take any refugees. What does that do to Egypt’s and Jordan’s relationship with Israel?

Bilal Y. Saab

Probably Hannah’s best placed to answer that.

Hannah Weisfeld

And so, just one thing on the refugee front, which I think is really crucially important, which is that there is no – in my mind, there is no way you will get either Jordan or Egypt agreeing to take large numbers of refugees. So, there has been discussion about there being small windows for injured people to access hospitals in Cairo, but no surrounding Arab country is going to agree to a scenario where millions of refugees may cross the border and a) destabilise internally, but b) never be allowed to return. Because that is a – it will be a stain in terms of, kind of, how that is perceived in the broader Arab world, that it would be considered to be a Nakba Two in, kind of, Palestinian discourse, that was enabled by either Jordan or Egypt. So, you’re going to have a real clamping down on those borders, that you’re not going to see mass refugee camps that are – that spring up in the Sinai, because it just politically will not work for the Egyptians.

I think that where the Egyptians have been previously extremely important is in de-escalation, which is that it’s not – the Egyptians do not want a war on their border in which they are dragged into, where Hamas is destabilising the – you know, and the Muslim Brotherhood is destabilising Egypt. So, I do think there is a role to play for Egypt in the medium-term, you know, when we are in a de-escalation phase, which I don’t think is – it will be soon, but I – but it will not involve refugees. There’s no chance that that complicitly can wash with the Egyptian public or – you know, and certainly not with the Jordanian public. And I would just add that with Jordanians, that given the number of Jor – of residents in Jordan that area actually Palestinian – of Palestinian heritage to start with, it is – it will be considered an internal security threat to bring in more Palestinian refugees. And so, there is no chance of that happening, I think, at all.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Let’s just state the facts that more than half the population in Jordan is Palestinian. So…

Hannah Weisfeld

Yeah.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

…indeed, any influx. I think we would like to move towards the last batch of questions, given the time, and “How do we get to de-escalating the conflict?” That would be – we’ve discussed escalation at great length, and “How will this effect the global price of oil?” there is a question, and “What do” – and “How do we fight in – likely increased radicalisation in the Middle East, Europe, Asia and Africa?” I think I’d like all of – three of you to answer and I’m not – okay, let’s start with you, Bilal.

Bilal Y. Saab

Okay, nothing…

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

And I was just…

Bilal Y. Saab

…earth shattering.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

…about to [inaudible – 54:09]…

Bilal Y. Saab

Two…

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

…then Steven, then it’s Hannah.

Bilal Y. Saab

Okay, but nothing overshadowing. I’m going to mention the two traditional mechanisms to get to de-escalation and I’m going to say how limited both are and frankly, some of ‘em risky. But diplomacy, as simple as that, getting really serious about containing this fight with American leadership, with international leadership, regional leadership. But I think we’ve all now talked about, you know, how disappointing, unimpressive it’s been thus far, given the differences of opinion, the concerns and frankly, the lack of involvement on the part of the key players.

The second mechanism being deterrence. Deterrence is a double-edged sword, right? It could work just fine in terms of de-escalating, but it could blow up catastrophically. So, there’s the military instruments, then you get diplomatic instrument. The military instrument is very risky, diplomatic right now is fairly limited. I hope that a combination of the two will lead us to some kind of de-escalation.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you. That’s very, very helpful. Steven, de-escalation and if you’d like to hit – take a hit at the other questions, too.

Steve Farrell

Well, I think what the moderate Palestinians, Mahmoud Abbas, has been saying for years, is, “If you don’t deal with us, you will end up dealing with the extremists, because our people, after decades, have no statehood, no freedom, no nothing, no sur” – and that’s what they want. And you can’t buy it off with aid and you can’t crush an idea of independence with a tank or an F16. The – and of course, Israelis see the conflict as entirely existential, as well. Hamas is – does not believe in the existence of the State of Israel, it’s in its charter. So, passions are running very, very high and I’d be – who knows what Palestinian leaders of Hamas or others will even be left alive in Gaza if this goes on much longer. But I’d be very interested to hear – to see and to hear about where do we think the Israeli political chessboard is going to shake down once – if the passions subside?

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you, Steven. We have three minutes left and I’d just like Hannah to wrap up on how – you know, you are – you did touch upon the issue of de-escalation before. We know about your work. What other elements can you throw into the fold?

Hannah Weisfeld

So, I think one of the issues is going to be, you know, and Steven’s just mentioned this, is the Palestinian Authority and where they come into the mix. What’s really hard now is that given the level of violence that’s been unleashed on Gaza and the impact it’s having on Gazans, obviously, many of whom has family in the West Bank, the PA is also coming under heavy pressure now. And there’s been – people will have probably seen that there’s been protests in cities all over the West Bank against the PA and primarily, against Abbas, who is seen to have created this, kind of, catastrophic set of circumstances in which this thing has happened. And so, the PA’s got absolutely no legitimacy at all. It already had no legitimacy ‘cause it seemed to be corrupt and non-representative. We haven’t had elections for 17 years, I think.

And so, I – well, I think one of the questions, in terms of medium-term de-escalation, is what is on the table to create an alternative moderate power that Israelis trust that are seen to be viable amongst the Palestinian – within the Palestinian street, because now, there is nobody? You know, the – if you speak to any Israeli, even Israelis who are moderate, they absolutely, 100%, are of the opinion, with a very, very small minority of people, that Hamas have got to go. That there is no room for bringing Hamas into any kind of discussion.

And so, the great irony of this whole thing is that many of the border communities that, you know, that were impacted by the Hamas inva – well, invasion I guess you’d call it, on October the 7th, are full of left-wing peace activists who are doing a lot of cross-border work. So, a lot of the people that were killed, people that were kidnapped, the people that are involved day-to-day in working with Palestinians as much as they can, which is limited over the border, that are very active in the peace movement in Israel, and if you speak to them now they will say, “I used to think that Hamas should be brought into an agreement. Now, that is not something I could ever, kind of, consider.”

And so, I think one of the questions for the international community is, what can – what pressure can be brought to bear so the PA brings back some results for the Palestinian people? Because nobody has brought anything to the Palestinian people. You know, we’ve seen in the last ten years, and in – particularly in the last year, the biggest growth in settlements in the West Bank. You know, I think this year alone, more settlements have been built in the West Bank in a six-month period than they were in a ten-year prior period. That there’s been massive escalation of an Israeli presence, a lot of violence on the West Bank. And unless the PA can be given some legitimacy and be seen to be delivering for the Palestinian people, it’s going to be very hard to build an alternative reality, I think, for anybody. Because the Israelis won’t – you know, will not trust any partner and the Palestinians don’t feel that the moderates have delivered anything for them.

So, I, you know, I think in terms of international diplomacy, there are – you know, one of the things that I would be interested to see is what pressure can be brought to bear, I think primarily by the Americans, but by other actors, on the Israeli Government. To give something to the PA that will build them as a more legitimate, I guess, authority in the eyes of the Palestinian people that have given some – got something and achieved something for the Palestinians. Because otherwise, what will happen is, you know, Hamas will be seen to be victorious. You know, the only people who have brought something back for the people of Palestine is Hamas, right now, you know, and the Gaz – people of Gaza are paying a very heavy price for that. But at lea – if they can’t win with diplomacy, they can win with military might. And so, at the moment, Hamas is wi – you know, Hamas are winning with military might and nobody is winning with diplomacy.

So, I, you know, I think all efforts will need to be focused on rebuilding that moderate voice, coming from elsewhere within the Palestinian leadership. And I think likewise, you know, there has been some interesting figures that have been given a, kind of, new political birth on the Israeli side. So, people like Yair Golan, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff for the IDF and became an MK in the previous Knesset for Meretz, which is one of the most moderate left-leaning parties, you – people like him, who have, basically, literally put back on their military uniform and got in a car and driven to the South of Israel and rescued Israeli civilians, now, on a very public platform in Israel, are saying that “We cannot manage this conflict.” That “This will only end with a political resolution.” There is an opening there now, I think, in Israel, for people like him, who’ve proved that they are on the side of the Israeli public when it comes to their security.

So, I think that the more we can elevate those voices, the more we can give them deliverables to bring back to people on both sides, that the more likely success there is on moving this conflict away from the extremists to the moderates.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

I think we have a consensus, we need to wrap up, that there’s no military solution to this and we’re hoping that an escalation won’t spread into the entire region, with knock-on dreadful ramifications globally. We need to strengthen the moderates’ voices. We need to give – not just strengthen the Palestinian authority but give them – give the Palestinians something there that they can prove to Hamas and others that they have gotten something. Improve the relationship with the neighbours and try to contain Hezbollah from the daily escalation.

On that note, I would like to thank the three panellists for their comments and all the participants who asked questions. I tried to cluster them together. I may not have gotten to all of them, but I’d like to thank you very much.

Bilal Y. Saab

Thank you, Nomi.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you.

Hannah Weisfeld

Thanks very much.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you.

Steve Farrell

Thank you.

Nomi Bar-Yaacov

Thank you very much.