Bronwen Maddox
Hello, everyone. Very warm welcome, those in the room, those online, thanks for joining us. I’m Bronwen Maddox. I’m Director of Chatham House, and we are, as you know, discussing this afternoon, “The new threat? An imperial America.” This fascinating question that is hanging over the whole world, in essence, of what to make of American foreign policy, how it is choosing to behave in the world, who is choosing those decisions, and indeed, behind that, “Do you have an imperial President?” To use the old Arthur Schlesinger term, and is there a team trying to make that President more imperial in the sense of strengthening executive power?
And all this against the background, as we’ve been discussing a lot at Chatham House, of the rise of China, the emphatic establishment of China as a leading, if not the world’s – the leading tech power, and what that means for America’s comparative position. Well, we’re going to discuss all this. I’m going to give the briefest of introductions, but not zero, to what is an in-house team, but including people you may have only had one or two chances to hear from because they’ve joined us recently.
Laurel Rapp, at the end, is Director of our US and North America Programme from Chatham House and has joined us after nearly 20 years’ experience in the US State Department, in the Senate and in consultancy. Grégoire Roos is Director of our Europe and Russia and Eurasia Programmes at – here at Chatham House, and I got to know him first at the Munich Security Conference, where he was instrumental in putting together the BMW’s Foundation’s polit – policy programme there and has been a policy leader in many contexts. And Dr Yu Jie, who is a Senior Research Fellow here at China – at – sorry, here at Chatham House, working on China. We’ve had a day much talking about China already and more to be continued.
Let’s plunge straight in. Laurel, what is your reaction to this question, this essay question we have, both, are we looking at ‘an imperial America’, and, indeed, is it a ‘new threat’?
Laurel Rapp
So, if you’re thinking about the United States and the Trump administration’s desire to govern countries and regions, I would say no. The Trump administration, as far as I’ve seen, does not have interest in the intricacies of governing, in the political patience required to develop transition strategies, to support local governance structures. That is not what we are seeing here, and in fact, the State Department and the US infrastructure don’t necessarily have the capacity to do that long-term governance work.
If you’re talking about dominance, though, they do, they absolutely do, and dominance with a caveat. I think what we’ve seen from recent strategy documents from The White House, the National Security Strategy in December, the National Defense Strategy that came out this weekend from the recently renamed Secretary of War, there is a desire to dominate Latin America. There is a desire to dominate the Western Hemisphere. We saw those moves quite dramatically in the last months in Venezuela and in Greenland, and I think that is only going to accelerate in the last three years of this presidency, is how can the US use the full tools of national strengths to dominate this region? Through US military might against cartels, using economic coercive measures, like sanctions and tariffs, which used to be economic tools and are now very much political tools, as well. And I think that is the direction of travel we’re going to see on how can the US use the full set of tools in its toolkit to dominate, you know, not just this region. We’ve also seen in parts of Europe and in Asia-Pacific, as well, the administration has said they “seek to limit a single country from dominating the region,” and so what they are seeking to pursue is a balancing of Russia and Europe and China and its neighbours, and will seek to use its sources of dominance to do that there, as well.
Bronwen Maddox
Let me ask you a couple of things about that. I mean, the first, why this emphasis on the Western Hemisphere, which is, as we understand it, a region defined by longitude? Why, in a sense, give up the influence that the US has spent decades building in Europe and swap for a region that – with which it has a – had a fitful relationship?
Laurel Rapp
So, I think there are a couple of drivers here. The first is political. President Trump ran on a campaign of bringing US foreign policy, national security, back home to Americans. And so, some of the biggest challenges Americans are dealing with, in his view, as he defines them, and some of his voters do, come from the southern border. Come in the form of drug cartels and drug trafficking, fentanyl, cocaine, others. That was his justification publicly, and how the Department of Justice has charged Maduro is on cocaine trafficking. So, that is his attempt to be responsive to voters.
He also ran on a very strong anti-immigration stance, and what we’ve seen over the last year, and then the last weeks, with these very, very bracing and tragic images coming out of Minnesota, is a manifestation of Immigrations and Customs Enforcement removing citizen – removing, you know, undocumented immigrants from the United States. This is part of his broader work with Latin American neighbours to crack down on migrant trafficking and migrant flows across the southern border into the US. So, from a campaign perspective, this is the focus on Latin America.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
Laurel Rapp
But you’re absolutely right, in the process he has said Europe is, you know, “not a reliable ally,” not a major – you know, National Defense Strategy, is very clear that Europe is not a – declining economies…
Bronwen Maddox
Oh, yeah, and…
Laurel Rapp
…not…
Bronwen Maddox
…worse, and worse, much worse.
Laurel Rapp
And much, much worse, and so that is not the – and that, you know, Russia will be a threat for Europe, especially on the eastern flank, but that that’s really Europe’s problem to deal with.
Bronwen Maddox
I want to ask you one more thing just to set us up for this conversation, which is whether your reading, particularly of the National Security Strategy, ‘cause we obviously had a whole year of people saying stuff and…
Laurel Rapp
Hmmm hmm.
Bronwen Maddox
…posting on social media but then the National Security Strategy came out, is it your impression from that that the Trump administration sees China really as a parallel world? You go your way, we’ll go ours. Yes, we’ve heard a lot of talk from Trump recently about if they, Russia and China, want to throw missiles, well, they’ll come over Greenland, this is the importance of Greenland. But there was also language in there about essentially a separation, and much more muted language on Taiwan than in previous versions of the National Security Strategy. Is it your sense that the US in this incarnation wants its own zone and is happy for China to go its own way elsewhere?
Laurel Rapp
That was one of the most surprising and redirecting pieces of the National Security Strategy to US foreign policy going back ten years, in fact, one that Trump himself started with a much stronger stance against China. The strategy basically, says – the US really talks in very limited terms about the military challenge China poses to the Indo-Pacific region or to the United States, talks about it as an ‘economic competitor’ but as a country that we could have, the US and China, have a mutually beneficial economic relationship with.
You know, the National Defense Strategy does look at China as a regional threat, as a regional competitor, but at the same time pushes so much of the burden or the forward deployment into the immediate neighbours of China, Japan, South Korea. And so if I were a US ally in the Indo-Pacific reading both of these strategies, I would have major questions about how the US is going to plan to resource this approach, how it is going to defend US allies, if there is a need. Deterrence relies on the trust that your ally is going to come to your defence if needed. And, you know, we saw today and yesterday the, sort of – one of the most senior Trump officials in the Pentagon in South Korea, Elbridge Colby, to essentially reassure the South Koreans in some way that, you know, the US still has their back, but that that strong security defence deterrence message wasn’t there. It was much more muted than you would have seen from a previous Democratic administration or even the first Trump administration.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm, and very striking, incidentally, there’s nothing about democracy. It was about Taiwan of interest for…
Laurel Rapp
That’s right.
Bronwen Maddox
…chips and preservation of sea lanes.
Laurel Rapp
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
Just to continue whether imperial America in this analysis has a idealistic element.
Laurel Rapp
Commercial diplomacy.
Bronwen Maddox
Commercial diplomacy. Grégoire, let’s come onto you with that scene setting and thoughts that Laurel has given us. Europe has been the target of an incredible fusillade of insults. I was re-reading JD Vance’s “Hillbilly Elegy,” and actually very struck again by the moral fervour of this guy who got himself from the sticks to boot camp, to the Marines, to Iraq, and then horrified by the indulgence, as he saw it, of the – his university Teachers that he went to after that, and this sense of how tough you need to be and ought to be. He’s obviously not the only one, such a – but Europe has been pilloried by everyone up to the President for moral failings, for lack of defence spending, for lack of economic growth. How should it respond to this title that we’ve got, are we looking at ‘an imperial America’? Is it ‘a new threat’?
Grégoire Roos
I think what’s fascinating with this obsession with Europe is that whenever I hear President Putin or the US administration, they’re obsessed with Europe. They love to hate it.
Bronwen Maddox
We’re saving you from yourself.
Grégoire Roos
Yeah, exactly, it’s fantastic. I mean, when there’s such an obsession, there must be something about it. I mean, they should just lie down on the sofa, and I’m sure that would be a very interesting session, because it says a lot about how they compare with Europe. So, there must be a, kind of, jealousy somewhere when you’re obsessed with something. If you think something is weak, there’s no reason to be obsessed with it, and…
Bronwen Maddox
It is a quite European psychology deployed.
Grégoire Roos
Well, perhaps, but, you know, everything we can do, if we say “Stand there and listen,” you know, you had the speech of JD Vance, and we were at the Security Conference last year, it was all about Europe. Obviously, one could argue that he spoke to his electorate, and it’s easier to understand the rationale behind. Then there was the speech of Donald Trump at the – which was way more entertaining than the one at Davos, by the way. He was more energetic at the UN in September. It was all about Europe, “I love Europe, but” – and then all the influx of insults started. And then, of course, the speech last week, also about Europe, and I heard Chinese counterparts and Chinese officials say, you know, “Forget about Europe, we matter, as well,” you know.
So, to answer the question, we are seeing a US that in some respect, hasn’t changed so much. I think the way the US has be – and I know I’m in the minority when I say that, but when you look at the behaviour, it’s changed in tone, it’s changed in style, but in terms of messaging, there’s always been a, kind of, contempt from the US. And I’m saying that without contempt back to – on the US, but if you read Barack Obama’s interview in The Atlantic that he gave – granted Jeffrey Goldberg a few weeks before he left office, it was a long interview and it gave us insights into how he sees Europe, pretty much irrelevant. And especially when he commented about the intervention in Libya, he laughed at then Prime Minister Cameron and President Sarkozy. Like, “They, you know, both state that they did so much to liberate Libya, they did nothing, we did most of the job.” So, they talk a lot, but they don’t deliver.
And a few years earlier, you had the speech that we forgotted – we forgot way too quickly of Robert Gates, then Secretary of Defense, in Brussels for that matter, I think it was in 2011, if my memory is correct, saying, “Right” – and with a more aristocratic tone that Europeans like to hear, but he said pretty much the same as what Donald Trump is saying. Like, “You need to pay more because you are free riders.” And I remember back then, you know, there was a, kind of, diplomatic boiling moment, like, is he really saying what we heard him say? Oh, but leave it, it will fade away. It somehow faded away until it got back on the table, but in a more brutal fashion. So, in this regard, you know, in terms of discourse, it hasn’t changed.
However, it’s obvious that in the way that the US is projection – projecting force, and not just power, but force, it’s changed. You know, even at the most tense, when Charles de Gaulle told the US President, you know – he asked the General in charge of the US Forces in France, “You have nuclear weapons on French territory?” “Yes, we do.” “Can you tell me where they are?” “No, I can’t.” “Okay, then you can take the exit.” That’s how everything started. De Gaulle was not against NATO in France. He just wanted to know where nuclear weapons were. But there were never any, kind of, insult between the two, and any time General de Gaulle would host a, kind of, strong speech against the United States, he would always send a copy to the Ambassador of the US in the country where he would deliver the speech. So, there was a lot of respect.
That doesn’t happen anymore, and so that’s how you can hear the British troops mocked at, spat at, British troops in Afghanistan, or for that matter, the part of a sovereign territory, autonomous territory within a sovereign nation, Greenland, for that matter, being, you know, threatened so openly. So, in this regard, yes, it’s changed, but I can’t say that we’ve moved from light to darkness on the 20th of January last year. We would like to, we would love to think that, because it would make us…
Bronwen Maddox
I take your point exactly about much not having changed, and I can think of decades of American military, in particular, making this point about Europe not paying its way in defence. Let’s take that argument as won by Donald Trump, but it seems to me some things have changed. First on Ukraine, America essentially withdrawing its support, literally withdrawing its support, at one point, its co-operation even. Not just saying to Europeans pay more, which by that time they were, but, “We’re going to withhold it unless Ukraine caves on the terms that we’ve set out.” And then, of course, the Greenland wrestling, I’m not going to call it a dance, because it was plenty menacing and still continues to be, but the – pronounce then that “We do not care about international law of sovereignty” and other things. Surely this is different, and this does change the relationship. Let’s take the defence point, one.
Grégoire Roos
On Ukraine, obviously, I mean, this is a – it’s a real turning point in the way they approach, I mean, not just, to be honest, European security, because what’s going – what might happen in Ukraine will matter for US security, I mean, there’s no doubt about it. So, it’s an interesting way of reading and assessing US strategic interests, but the fact is, and I’m sure we’ll get to that point, there’s such a concentration of power in the hands of the US President, and the US President has such an admiration for strong men, that he just doesn’t want Put – I mean, I wonder to the – to what extent he would really like Putin to lose.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
Grégoire Roos
I’m not saying that he would want Russia to win, it’s not what I mean, but, you know, I think it’s easier to humiliate President Zelenskyy than to talk man-to-man with Putin. It’s just…
Bronwen Maddox
And there is history, going back to the impeachment, as we can see. Yu Jie, let me bring you in here. What is China’s response, do you think, to the spectacle that it and the rest of the world are watching?
Dr Yu Jie
Well, indeed, it’s a spectacle, and then the term ‘imperial America’ reminds me, in the heydays of cultural revolution, every time when Beijing referring to United States, it need to be adding the word ‘imperial’. So, I think that’s where we are, but by no way I’m suggesting that China going back to cultural revolution as such, but I’m just saying the way how America behave for now looks very much imperialistic.
How Beijing sees this, I think many in the room would argue that this has offered Beijing a real opportunity to strengthen its national capability and the national power, and however, I think in the event of last week, I’ve argued actually this also potentially serve as a threat for China. Beijing equally feel very anxious in terms about how to manage this very volatile administration, firstly, and secondly, if you look around, and particularly I think it was in Europe, much of what European trying to do with China and much what Europeans have criticised China has not changed, but instead, actually doubled it down. So, that’s one thing.
Now, secondly, we were talking about – earlier about Latin America, we were talking about the Western Hemisphere, and I think the Western Hemisphere and Latin America is one of those areas that Beijing has cultivated in the last two decades or so. I mean, just to give a very sheer numbers in here, Xi Jinping went to Latin America five times, and – in the last 12 years and visited over 14 different countries. Obama, Trump, and then Biden added together, went to Latin America three times, and only three countries have been visited. So, just to show you how much diplomatic emphasis Beijing already placed in Latin America, but then suddenly realised, United States considered as its own backyard. So, that sense of anxiety, and that would actually cause Beijing, I think, more anxious in terms of how to manage this very volatile administration than feel like, oh, wow, it’s all very much the China’s moment, and I don’t think that’s how it reflected in Beijing.
Bronwen Maddox
So, I want to just extend that point…
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Bronwen Maddox
…back to one of my earlier ones.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Bronwen Maddox
Do you think China hopes to establish, essentially, parallel zones, perhaps less connected than in the past, or does it see itself as potentially in conflict with this imperial America?
Dr Yu Jie
Well, certainly, I think they see very much in conflicts. For example, one thing that Chinese foreign policymakers for the last several decades is one thing they’re obsessed by is borders, obsessed by is neighbourhood policy. Now, every single thing not just Trump administration, but also Biden administration, and previously Obama, this sense of pivot to Asia, all pointed towards China’s nearer neighbourhood. So, in a way, Beijing feel that sense of besiegement rather than feel that sense of being very comfortable sitting in the corner of East Asia.
Bronwen Maddox
Really interesting, and really worth remembering. Laurel, let me jump right back to what I was saying in the introduction, and this question of whether it is the presidency that is imperial at the moment as opposed to America? And what I mean by that is whether Trump, or the people round him, are seeking to change the constitutional arrangements of the US to strengthen the Executive. I don’t mean get rid in a absolutist way of every check that the world’s most famous constitution has put on the presidency, but to weaken those constraints quite a lot and strengthen the powers of the presidency. Those who say, “Look, that is really what the MAGA team around Trump are doing and believe in doing,” and Trump is improvising his way through world events on top of that.
Laurel Rapp
That, in my view, is the project here, and this is not something new. We’ve seen in the United States, this goes back to, you know, World War II and Nixon and this through line. You know, growing up in the US, we’re taught thr – you know, balance of power is between the three major institutions, and together they work together to build this national security architecture. And what we saw in the first Trump administration was a lot of those institutions did hold, and there was not so much of an erosion of the role of the courts, right? That was – the courts and the Congress were the two co-equal checks on the presidency in the first Trump administration and really thwarted and frustrated a lot of the efforts of that first administration. And so, the second project was to both have greater – a more pliant Executive, right? And so that’s Executive Branch, who is working in the Executive Branch, and so we’ve seen this by more like-minded Cabinet Officers, as well as the national security bureaucracy, which has been, kind of, pared down to those who may be more willing to not just – to not challenge, but implement the President’s vision. But the role of Congress, many members of Congress have abrogated their – some of their authority to the presidency. When Trump talks about…
Bronwen Maddox
And why? Fear, political advancement, they believe in it? We had both Mike Pence and John Kerry on the stage in the autumn in successive weeks saying, “Look, the institutions will hold good,” but they were most nervous in talking about Congress.
Laurel Rapp
Hmmm, it’s a moment of concern about retaliation, of being primaried to the right. And so, when you have Republicans who are worried about their seats, members of Congress who come up every two years, Trump and Elon Musk and Steve Bannon have all said, “We will fund your opponents,” and they have a relatively good track record of winning those races, and so that is a real risk going into the per – to the midterms this year. You know, Congress used to have authority over tariffs. Congress used to be the ones that would appropriate funds if you wanted to buy a territory like Greenland, right? None of these really have factored in, and so, these questions now before the Supreme Court on tariffs aren’t, “Did the President have the authority to do it instead of Congress?” It’s, “Are they constitutionally legal?” So, a lot of the challenge has moved to the courts, but even those are not necessarily holding.
I will mention where I do see the checks still exist. They’re more limited. So, one is public attitudes, right? President Trump is very attuned to polling and to electoral outcomes, and so, that will become even more vivid as we move into the November midterms. He is seeing fracturing in the MAGA base, I think that is particularly somewhere to look. How popular are his policies within MAGA circles? They are, sort of, I won’t call them cratering, but they are softening there, and there is fracturing we’re seeing. Then there is markets, right? Trump is very responsive to markets and to, sort of, the ups and downs, and he will correct when he sees challenges there. And then, finally, I’ll put the rest of the world, right? He has been pretty immune to pressure from other countries and actors, but what we did see the last week on Greenland, we saw a step back. We saw a step back because other leaders stood up and said, “This is a red line that you cannot cross,” and so…
Bronwen Maddox
And the markets fell. Grégoire and I had a…
Laurel Rapp
And the markets fell.
Bronwen Maddox
…disagreement on our very good podcast…
Laurel Rapp
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
…last week, which – do listen, about whether it was exactly European leaders standing up that made him…
Laurel Rapp
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
…step back or not, but point taken. I want quickly to ask Grégoire and Yu Jie one thing, before we go to questions, and I’m sure there’ll be a lot, and there’s actually three – at least three brilliant ones already online. And, that is, to take the Mark Carney rebuff to all this, the 14-minute speech at Davos that earned him that week’s accolades and many plaudits, apart from the US President, who was piqued by it. And he said, “Look, how we have to respond is not then to look to” America “for values,” he didn’t mention America, “but to get together and try and do the alliances we can.”
And it’s a big challenge to us, we, as part of what we explore and argue in our Global Governance and Security Centre, and indeed what I was talking about in my Director’s lecture a very long two weeks ago, and the question is, is that realistic? Is that a reasonable game plan for other countries now, or is that wishful thinking, that really the power is with the US, China, and other countries just have to put up with it? Grégoire, what do you think?
Grégoire Roos
Well, I think we first need to define ‘middle powers’. I mean, I heard some, including Canadians, saying, “We should invite India.” If I were Indian, I don’t know whether I would consider myself a middle power or…
Bronwen Maddox
I’m going to say middle powers for this conversation is everyone who isn’t a superpower. So, it’s all but two countries in the world.
Grégoire Roos
Right, can be – one could argue otherwise, but…
Bronwen Maddox
One could…
Grégoire Roos
But…
Bronwen Maddox
…but there – just for the purposes of this conversation. If you were another country, never mind what size power…
Grégoire Roos
Well, I think…
Bronwen Maddox
…how would you respond?
Grégoire Roos
I think – I mean, obviously, positively, because you don’t want to be, to quote President Macron, you don’t want to be ‘bullied’, and I think that’s something everyone, whether a small middle power, a big middle power, would agree on – agree with. But secondly, I think we should agree with what, kind of, so-called values we all adhere to. Each time we hear values, one wonders, you know, whose values? I mean, that’s the first point, and the second point is, I know it’s very fashionable to say that Mark Carney held a fantastic speech. I think he did, although if you read the speeches of any Politician 30 years ago, it was at that level, but we’ve been so used to having political mediocrity that now anything that is slightly above the level is brilliant.
Laurel Rapp
Better speechwriters now.
Grégoire Roos
Possibly yes, but honestly, as a European, I felt a bit shameful, because he actually acknowledged, very brilliantly, and I’ll get to your point, because that’s why I’m saying this, that actually most of America’s allies had known for years, so lived in a lie, that the US had no problem trampling international law. But just because we enjoyed the benefits, we just stayed silent.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
Grégoire Roos
How can you expect others in the world to follow you when you acknowledged in the pub – publicly that you lied? And on top of that, you are weak. I mean, if someone who is a liar and weak comes to you, offering you to enter into some kind of partnership, would you really say yes?
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm.
Grégoire Roos
So, I think we need a, kind of, moment of self-assertion, you know, we need to build self-confidence but also assess the mistakes of the past not just 20 years, but 40 years. And then, yes, of course, but there have been proposals. I mean, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, former SG of NATO, adv – has been advocating for years for an alliance of liberal democracies around the world, and of course, that would bring – well, we – one could even wonder what a liberal democracy is, but that’s another podcast or another panel. But I mean, it’s not new, Mark Carney did not introduce an idea, he just brought it back at the right time. But I don’t know, I’m curious, I mean, technically you could say it’s just the G7 minus the US, the G6, and then we’ll grow the group.
Bronwen Maddox
Hmmm, anyway, it’s really interesting. I – like you, I was queasy, if I can put it that way, at Mark Carney’s use of the – was this account from the Václav Havel…
Laurel Rapp
Hmmm.
Grégoire Roos
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
…story of the Shopkeeper who never believed the sign in his window saying, “Workers of the world unite,” and whether that was really the best way to go into that speech. Anyway, we could extend it, but we won’t. Yu Jie, how has China approached this, do you think? Ju – is it just going to scoop up all these alliances that – are countries now unable to put their faith in the US?
Dr Yu Jie
Not necessarily. I think what China would prefer is they would pre – it would prefer to have a world which – that is largely multipolar. Multipolar, that is not largely dominated by either China or by United States, but every single middle size power would prefer to have something to say, and which has largely reflected on China’s so-called – all this global initiatives, but also with China’s support towards United Nations. As that’s another indicator that it much prefer to have this multipolar system.
I think largely there’s also from not just China, but a larger part of the developing world, felt in the post-Second World War international order, largely built by the G7s, by – led by the United States, and they never really had a chance to voices their concern, voices their preferences. And hence they would much prefer a world that is largely built on multipolar, but whether within this this multipolarity and each country would agree with each other, have that shared value, I have a very serious doubt about it. So, we’re probably going to just led into a world that – very much without leader, so a leaderless world in essence, less about the G2, but more of leaderless world.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay. On that encouraging note, let’s go to questions, if you could bring the lights up. There are two brilliant ones, which I’m going to come to early about tech power. Let me – who have we got? Lots and lots. So, let me start right over there by the door, so I think you were first up.
Houman
Hello.
Bronwen Maddox
If you could say your name, please.
Houman
Should I stand? Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
As you are most comfortable.
Houman
Okay. So, my name is Houman. Thank you for an amazing speech, all of you. I’m a PhD Researcher on financial crime. I focus on Russia, China and Iran. If Washington pursues grand bargains with Moscow, will Europe be left to enforce sanction alone, and can it be – credibly do so while Russian oil continues flowing through Azerbaijan, an EU energy partner? Thank you.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you very much, and I’m going to take one more here on the aisle.
Laurel Rapp
Yeah, the US…
Bronwen Maddox
In the suit, yes, you. Could you wait for the microphone, please?
Laurel Rapp
Of course.
Bronwen Maddox
And…
Valery Morozov
My name is Valery Morozov, and I’d like to ask my first question, but – regarding China. On 18th of January, 15 top Army Officers and Commanders of China, Chinese Army, were arrested, along with hi – their relatives. What do you think about it?
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, great. Let’s take those two. Yu Jie, do you want to start with the second one?
Dr Yu Jie
The 18th of January. Okay, 18th of January, I mean, there’s very scant details publicly available on what exactly happened within the People’s Liberation Army, or with the downfall of this second-in-command within the PLA. But really judging from the public available information, what we have seen so far is that seems to be a very strong disagreement between the command – the second-in-command, and vis-à-vis the President himself. So, I think that’s also part of explanation why this person has been taken down. And also, this link back to the corruption, the rampant corruption issues within the PLA in the last decades or so. So, I mean, this is something that’s long coming, and what we have received on the 18th of January, or three days before, it was a – it was just a matter of a climax as where it is.
Bronwen Maddox
Thanks very mu…
Valery Morozov
And what is – what are the disagreements, disagreements to topple 15 Commanders? There should be disagreements, and nobody says, what are the disagreements?
Dr Yu Jie
No-one know. I think the key thing in here is that for any China watchers or for any tealeaf readers on Chinese politics, if anyone say, “Oh, we would know something,” that’s a total lie. I think for any objective China watcher in here, we’re just standing there and try to work out what’s going on, and the answer is, we don’t know anything, except the official resources being released, and we can only read what has not been written.
Bronwen Maddox
Do either of the two of you want to take on this question about Moscow –bargains with Moscow?
Grégoire Roos
Well, Laurel is happy to leave me the question.
Laurel Rapp
No, no…
Grégoire Roos
So, I’ll answer it.
Laurel Rapp
…I’ll take a slice too.
Grégoire Roos
So, two points and not – the first one is not meant to escape your question. I don’t see that happen because President Trump has showed since the 22 point of November that he is not so keen to let the Russia have it its own way when Europe – the Europeans, including the UK and NATO, stand united. It’s a long way we’ve walked since November, and we’re much stronger than we were. A lot of credit to Sir Keir Stammer and President Macron for making the Coalition of the Willing something meaningful, so I don’t see that happen. Second, also because the Congress is not in favour. There still are Republicans who are staunchly anti-Russian, some very influential amongst the President’s circles, so I don’t see that happen, but again, one needs to be cautious, so I don’t make – predict what will happen.
The truth is, if that were to happen, I don’t see Europe, meaning the UK, the EU, Switzerland, Norway, keep imposing sanctions. It won’t work out. It might mean the end of NATO as we have known it. I don’t know, I could not describe it at this stage, but it won’t be sustainable. And by the way, we keep buying oil and gas, indeed, it comes from India, it comes from Azerbaijan, but we have not phased out 100%, neither for uranium, for that matter, and a few other imports from Russia, so it – we’re not at zero today.
Laurel Rapp
Thanks for the very good question. Just two quick points from me. So, the first is that the sanctions that have been in place and that the US administration has not really unravelled, might grow. President Trump has just said he’s willing to back the Senator Graham bill that looks at a large set of sectoral sanctions against Russia, including secondary sanctions against those who trade hard – hydrocarbons with Russia. So, to me, this is all about building leverage, building negotiating power, and you’re asking a very good question about, you know, “Would this be sustainable?” I think the short answer of it is absolutely not, that there could be smaller pieces that Europe keeps to sustain and even build upon, but in terms of the, sort of, economic reach of the US sanctions packages, that’s – even those have not really changed Putin’s behaviour measurably, and so a reduced package will not be able to do that either.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, let me take some more. Let me take here on the aisle.
Niamh
Oh, me?
Bronwen Maddox
Yes, you, but you need a microphone, which is coming.
Niamh
Hi, I’m Niamh. I’m not from any organisation, I’m just a student, but I wanted to ask, especially in the light of the Mark Carney speech at Davos, could it be argued that the West, like, the nebulous idea of the West and Europe in general and former US allies, are, kind of, just waking up to a reality that the rest of the world that’s been considered on the imperial periphery has been awake to for a very long time, you know, in the Middle East and South America? That America has long acted as an empire, for example, with South America, constant coups and interventionist action, and that what was once implicit imperialism is now just simply becoming explicit. And that here in the West, in Europe, we’re just no longer being tacit beneficiaries of US imperialism anymore. We’re actually being affected by it when we thought that that would only really affect people in the so-called third world.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you very much indeed, and let me go right to that aisle, as well.
Dr Andrew Payne
[Pause] Thank you. My name’s Andrew Payne. I’m a Research Director here at Chatham House. Two very quick points. One for Laurel. You articulated very well how much of what Trump is doing in the Western Hemisphere is what he said he would do, but the critique at the time during the 2024 campaign was that Trump was an isolationist, not an imperialist. So, I’m curious whether there is any credence to the claim that America First really is just what Trump says it is. And Grégoire, under what conditions do you think the EU would use its bazooka?
Bronwen Maddox
Okay, let’s go with those. The first one, whether the West and Europe are – previously beneficiaries of what the US did are just waking up to the fact it has always been an empire doing what it wants, and then America First, real or not on the bazooka. Who wants to start?
Laurel Rapp
So, I’ll take the question on America First. So, I do think a lot of how this second administration is shaping its doctrine is seeking to then explain Trump’s incremental moves on how it’s using military force in the Middle East against Iran, in the Horn of Africa, against cartels, how it’s seeking to use economic leverage and sanctions, right? So, to try to package everything that we’re seeing in a framework that explains the worldview. And so, that is essentially what the national security documents are that have come out and how subsequent speeches the administration has given explains it as. And, you know, he has – he maintains a high degree of flexibility with this strategy to say, “This is America First here,” right? And as we saw, you know, this very dramatic moment right after the US brought Maduro to a jail cell in Brooklyn, Pete Hegseth, the Secretary of War, got up and said, “This is America first,” right? “This is defending the US homeland.”
So, it is this attempt to package, you know, US adventures in many parts of the world as directly benefitting Americans. I think this is starting to really falter because there’s less of an explanation of how is Greenland, territorial control of Greenland, a direct benefit to the American people? That we haven’t – there was not a very compelling case the President – or even tried to make on that front. He said, “We just need to control it for psychological reasons. We need it for national security for Russia and China.” But there wasn’t the how does this benefit Americans on an everyday basis? How is this America First?
When you look at Iran and some of the moves he has threatened to make in the last weeks and months, similar. There’s not been that tieback into how is this move well beyond the US, you know, immediate Western Hemisphere, new Monroe Doctrine area, how is that benefiting Americans? And so, I think he is not isolational – not an isolationist, but he has not yet been able to fully explain how America First actually helps drive the activities he is engaged in in the world, and it seems to be more about, you know, can the military do this thing? Can the US project power confidently and assertively? Can this be an extension of how he sees his own role, this empowered presidency, that has fewer checks on authority? And that’s a very – that’s an unchecked place to be for US foreign policy.
Bronwen Maddox
Grégoire, do you want to take…
Grégoire Roos
Yeah, on…
Bronwen Maddox
…the bazooka and then this question of whether Europe has benefitted…
Grégoire Roos
Yeah, oh, yeah, great que…
Bronwen Maddox
…from what it is now waking…
Grégoire Roos
Brilliant…
Bronwen Maddox
…up to?
Grégoire Roos
…question that connects with what I said earlier about the speech. On the – so bazooka, the so-called bazooka, the anti-coercion instrument, we’ve seen strong Franco-German alignment, so that’s a scenic one on condition. Without Franco-German alignment, I don’t think this would – this could actually be used if we were to see any kind of territorial grab attempt, if I may say so, attempt to grab, even with fighter jets, or – they would definitely use it. I think the speech of last week and the developments of the past few months have changed something in mindsets of leaders across Europe.
In this country here, although it’s no longer a member of the EU, but all across European countries, and we’ll have the discussion tomorrow, but even amongst the so-called populists, something is irremediably broken. And they could even go on and to the extent that they would close down American bases in Europe. That would be extreme because the Poles would really not want to see that, but the Germans could decide to do that. So, beware if something that they would not use it, they will. It will just take a bit of time to make sure they can, because of course, they’ve never really used it. So, time will – they will still be blamed for, “Oh, that’s the EU, it will take six months,” but it will take most likely less than that. And as we speak, they are actually working on speeding up the implementation.
On that point, it’s a brilliant question. I, you know, I can’t speak in my own name because I’m a Researcher here, so we are, if not neutral, at least honest.
Bronwen Maddox
No, no, I mean, that’s exactly the name you can speak in, is your own…
Grégoire Roos
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
…name. There’s no house view, but you can say exactly…
Grégoire Roos
Well, I…
Bronwen Maddox
…what you like.
Grégoire Roos
…definitely th – I mean, I would say, I – in a way, yes and no. In a way, yes, because we’ve enjoyed our welfare state very generous, at the expense of America’s taxpayers’ money, it’s a fact. We don’t like to hear it, it’s a fact. In this very country, if Donald Trump wanted to, you know, weaken the UK nuclear deterrence, he could, by one tweet, saying, “You will no longer have access to the Trident pool.” It would take time. He might not be able to do it, but just a tweet would be enough, because we know that the UK nuclear deterrence is somehow dependent on the Americans.
Second, of course, we have American culture and, you know, as a French, I could have a special view on that, but we’ll keep that for another panel. And obviously, all the money, investment, we owe a lot to American investment, and even we all will be – I don’t know about us, but some might be pensioneers, and they’re very happy to send their money to the US because it’s more profitable. So, yes, of course, we’ve benefited tremendously from, not to mention, science, education, but on the other hand, I’m not sure we have, because, you know, in terms of strategic interests, everything that could lately somehow hinder our independence was favoured by Washington, irrespective of whether you had a Democratic – a Democrat or a Republican in the White House. And second, they all said – we had discussions at the Munich Security Conference last year, saying, “You need your European defence.” Yes, but buying your equipment, not developing our own industry. You mean creating jobs in the US, not creating jobs here.
So, I’d say, of course, yes, but in the longer term, we’re paying the price, but to be very, very, very politically incorrect and honest, the Americans are right, we should pay. We just forgot that everything has a price.
Member
I think…
Grégoire Roos
You don’t give your data for free, and you don’t get protection for free. Sorry?
Member
We’ve been complicit in what America has been doing in many countries…
Grégoire Roos
Absolutely.
Member
…[inaudible – 47:20].
Grégoire Roos
Yes, no, absolutely.
Member
Just recently toward, I don’t know, countries…
Grégoire Roos
I agree.
Member
…like, Iraq…
Grégoire Roos
100%.
Member
…have said they hate America, ‘cause…
Grégoire Roos
Absolutely.
Member
…it’s important to them.
Grégoire Roos
Yes, you’re right, and I should say that there was torture by the CIA in Poland and Denmark.
Bronwen Maddox
So, there is a long list of things that America…
Grégoire Roos
So, I agree.
Bronwen Maddox
…has done that are both hypocritical or damaging to the world, but it’s not all, and I would just say it can be easy to take the best of America for granted and then make a long list of the worst.
Grégoire Roos
But if I can…
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah, go on, go on, you absolutely can.
Grégoire Roos
One minor thing, because I don’t want to give the impression, there is such a thing as real vision and leadership from America. When President Roosevelt decided to create the UN, it was Roosevelt’s idea, and I don’t know whether you know who was responsible for the veto in the Security Council, Stalin. Stalin asked for a veto that Roosevelt didn’t want. Roosevelt really was a staunch anti-imperialist, he loved Churchill, but he didn’t really like the British Empire, and he really wanted a new kind of world. So, there was such a moment in US history when there was a vision-driven leadership, and I’m confident it can come back.
Bronwen Maddox
And I would say to that that, I mean, the US was instrumental in the dismantling of the British Empire and the securing of independence for many…
Member
So, they could…
Bronwen Maddox
…countries.
Member
…become the new empire, hmmm, happens…
Bronwen Maddox
Were they the empire then over those…?
Member
Might be, sort of, a competitor, they were like, you can’t have two empires.
Bronwen Maddox
Well, you can have competitive empires. I think that’s exactly what we’re discussing.
Laurel Rapp
Can I come in on this, Bronwen?
Bronwen Maddox
There’s a million hands now. You’ve – you can. Does anyone want to come in on this? But I am then going to take two brilliant questions on tech and whether tech is the real empire, which are coming online. Does anyone want to come in on this subject, as I – right, let me take right in the front, and then I’m coming to you behind. Just I want to take several comments on this ‘cause this is interesting, and thank you for the question, ‘cause you sparked a…
Member
Thank you, abs – is this working?
Bronwen Maddox
It is, probably.
Member
Absolutely excellent panel. I do have an international role, but I’m asking you this as a member of the Chatham House, private UK citizen and taxpayer. So, everything about this, ultimately, of a relationship comes down to trust, in a sense, political trust at the highest levels of the special – you know, the Five Eyes agreement, NATO, the special relationship, all this. I don’t want to get into what I’m about to say, ‘cause you could have a debate on this which would last 24 hours, the Chagos Islands. Now, the mainstream media, including Hansard, so it’s not Robin’s…
Bronwen Maddox
That’s not the mainstream media.
Dr Yu Jie
That’s not the mainstream.
Member
Alright, fair enough.
Dr Yu Jie
That’s not eve…
Bronwen Maddox
That’s the thing of record.
Member
Alright, on the record.
Bronwen Maddox
And so, are you – I’m allowing people to make points…
Member
Yeah, my…
Bronwen Maddox
…but make it a brief point, please.
Member
Yeah, okay, no, thank you, Bronwen. My point is this. There is at least the debate that Washington has not been given the full facts of the Chagos agreement. There are particularly two legislative processes at the moment which it sounds as if they were not aware of. It might derail the whole thing. So, if you were a State Department official, you might think, I have been sold a fraction or partial truth by the FCDO to go along with this, now they’ve discovered it, they’re not going along with it. My point is this, if you lose trust, the Washington administration with London, on this, in particular, then you might be tempted to say, “I’m not interested in listening what the UK says in other issues, I’m just going to go ahead with it and be a hegemonomonist,” if there’s such a phrase. It’s just a point.
Bronwen Maddox
That’s putting an awful lot of weight on the Chagos Islands to influence…
Member
Well…
Bronwen Maddox
…the whole relationship and everything.
Member
…I’m ex-Royal Navy, I’ve been there, I think it deserves a lot of weight. Thank you.
Bronwen Maddox
It does deserve a debate. It has been going on for more than a decade…
Member
It’s to do with trust.
Bronwen Maddox
…so, they have had some chance to get the facts. Let me go right in the front. You’ve been very patient.
Member
Thank you very much.
Bronwen Maddox
Just take a few comments, but if they’re comments, can they be brief, please?
Member
Thank you, yes.
Bronwen Maddox
Here, right in the front, and then I’m coming to the gentleman behind. Please.
Ahmed Shahat
Thank you very much for the speakers for these elaborate speeches. I am Ahmed Shahat from Palestine. My question is, the first one is to Grégoire Roos about the role of Europe in the newly established Board of Peace by President Trump, if there is any role or a future role for Europe? The second question is to Laurel.
Laurel Rapp
Hmmm.
Ahmed Shahat
What would be the future of this Board of Peace established by President Trump if the Republicans did not win in the next elections?
Laurel Rapp
Hmmm.
Ahmed Shahat
What would be – I mean, we always think that it’s a – this Board of Peace is a one-man show.
Laurel Rapp
Yeah.
Ahmed Shahat
So, what’s going to happen to it when his term is over?
Laurel Rapp
Hmmm, okay.
Ahmed Shahat
Thank you.
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you, and can I just take this gentleman here? And I will try and get a few more.
Nissar
Thank you very much. My name is Nissar. American imperialism has – is not a new thing. American imperialism has been used by the American administration for a long time, either through the military bases, which are 181 scattered all over the world, or perhaps sanctions against any country that America doesn’t like. So, the third one, now, President Trump is using Board of Peace, which is perhaps beginning of the end of the United Nations, because President Trump is going to use this peace – Board of Peace, some people called it ‘Board of Contention’ because of the three layers and they know no Palestinian on that committee.
Bronwen Maddox
That is a very good…
Nissar
So…
Bronwen Maddox
…point.
Nissar
…my question actually is President Trump is going to who – rule the whole world, now, for instance, he’s got solitary veto on the board.
Bronwen Maddox
Sir, I’d like you to…
Nissar
So…
Bronwen Maddox
…ask a question.
Nissar
The question…
Bronwen Maddox
You’re making a lot of…
Nissar
My question…
Bronwen Maddox
…statements, yeah.
Nissar
…is do you agree this Trump peace – Board of Peace, which has got a long reach aft – beyond Gaza…
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
Nissar
…is the end of the – beginning of the end of United Nations?
Bronwen Maddox
Thank you.
Nissar
That’s my question.
Bronwen Maddox
Good question, thank you. Thank you, and I’m going to take one here. People have been very patient. Let’s just – right here in the corner.
Nissar
Thank you.
Terri Paddock
Hi, my name is Terri Paddock, a member of Chatham House. Is it my imagination or in the Davos speech that Trump made last week at the end, did he pivot to saying, “The real power in the room is the business and tech leaders”? It felt to me like he was saying, “Ignore all other governments but mine, you only have to deal with me.”
Bronwen Maddox
It’s a really good question. I’m going to take it into the next bit with tech. I think he didn’t say that right at the end. He returned to script what – after the improvisation in the middle, but let’s come to that. Can we take the earlier ones about the Board of Peace and Palestine?
Grégoire Roos
Yes.
Bronwen Maddox
Please.
Grégoire Roos
I can take that. I think it’s a brilliant question.
Bronwen Maddox
And Chagos and its…
Grégoire Roos
Technically, you would have a European country because they confuse Belgian and Belarus, so de facto Belgian would be a member of the board, which is great. They’re great allies, but…
Laurel Rapp
Iceland and Greenland, yeah.
Grégoire Roos
Yeah, well…
Laurel Rapp
Yeah.
Grégoire Roos
…small geography, when you’re an empire, everything looks very small. But the Greek Prime Minister came up with a brilliant comment about it, said, “We are willing to join, provided the mandate sticks to Gaza.” And I think it’s a responsible European answer, rather than having the usual…
Laurel Rapp
Hmmm hmm.
Grégoire Roos
…kind of, aristocratic, oh, it’s a thing of this man from the real estate and the Americans, so let them do it. I think it’s unnecessarily patronising. So, a smart strategy would be possibly when you are broke, like many European countries, saying, “Can we waive the one billion fee?” But once apart from that, you would say, “We will definitely, definitely be involved. You can count on us, provided it sticks to Gaza.”
Second, I don’t really think – and I get the concern about the UN, China will likely not join. France and the UK have thus far said they won’t join, so three out of five permanent members of the Security Council won’t join, and let’s be honest, the moment Donald Trump is no longer the President, no-one will care about this Board of Peace.
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah, I…
Grégoire Roos
Although he’s Presid…
Bronwen Maddox
…agree it feels insubstantial at…
Grégoire Roos
Although he’s Chairman for life.
Member
That was my next question.
Bronwen Maddox
…point, and it feels not particularly directed at Palestine and solving that, which is the pity of it, at this point.
Grégoire Roos
But he wants to be Chairman for life.
Bronwen Maddox
Quickly, we’re – I want to get in these tech questions.
Laurel Rapp
So, on the Board of Peace, look, he’s asking the right question, but he’s giving the wrong answer, in my view. The UN has struggled to address major questions of peace and security, especially in the last decade, but even beforehand. And so if there are complementary structures that can reinforce the UN’s ability to do that, with P5 agreement, with the very active Secretary-General role, there should be an effort to look at that and whether that’s a viable way of doing business.
You know, I recently came from the State Department and spent four years trying to, sort of, lead the US effort to reform the Security Council and expand its membership and say, “We need more voices at the table from the Global South, from developing countries.” Because the way the composition of the council is built right now, not only can it not address major questions of peace and security, it also isn’t a representative voice for the future versus the past. Impossible, right? My takeaway was it’s impossible in its current form. And so, if there are new ways of building minilateral coalitions, we should look at them in complement to the UN.
But if the answer to that question is a Chairman for life, a billion dollar buy-in, a selective group of countries who are not, you know, ones that would have a, sort of, vested stake in solving these problems or in a way that brings any framework to the table, any international law framework, that’s going to be a challenge. And I just want to bridge that into one…
Bronwen Maddox
Laurel, forgive me, I’m going to interrupt.
Laurel Rapp
Yeah, yeah, please.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah. No, I just – I want to get in these tech questions, and forgive me, we could go on – I’m really sorry, we could go on a long way, but they – these important questions we haven’t touched on. One from Robert Boris on, “Are we talking about the wrong kind of imperialism? Is it really the power consolidating through technology above nation states?” One from Alexandra Sarov, saying, “Is it – is commercial diplomacy being leveraged by these powerful organisations, not states, most specifically within the US, to co-opt different powers of state?” And we had the one from Terri about was Trump cheering on really the business and tech leaders as the real powers in this? I’m paraphrasing, I think, but thank you for asking it. I would just like your views about whether this is the real battle of our time, the tech giants versus, which can include Chinese ones, but versus the governments. Yu Jie, do you want to…?
Dr Yu Jie
In China’s case, it’s the opposite. It’s actually still the government regulate the tech companies, and the tech companies know in the certain political environment, the only way to survive is getting closer to follow what government tell them to do. So, that’s the case for China, and certainly this may not apply for other liberal democracies, but I think in the countries in Southeast Asia, more likely to apply for the China model. That is to say letting the tech companies working for the functions of the government and changing and shaping certain public opinions. That’s where we are, yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
Grégoire.
Grégoire Roos
Well, I think that’s exactly why the EU wants to stay strong on regulation of big tech, and that’s also the – exactly the reason why the US administration is not happy about it. But it’s interesting what Yu Jie has just said, because when you look at it, although it’s not the same system, I don’t see such a gap between the tech gurus in the Bay Area and the big boys in D.C. There’s – they are vested interests.
Dr Yu Jie
Yeah.
Bronwen Maddox
They’ve seriously aligned at this point…
Grégoire Roos
Very much so.
Bronwen Maddox
…and it wasn’t obvious that they were going to stay aligned.
Grégoire Roos
Yeah, very much. I mean, when Donald Trump hosts breakfast at The White House, all the CEOs of those companies and main shareholders are all going. When you’re so wealthy, you could say, “Oh, well, I could say no,” actually, they can’t say no.
Dr Yu Jie
Hmmm.
Grégoire Roos
There’s a reason.
Bronwen Maddox
But his move on Greenland may have cost the tech giants what they wanted on European regulation. The Europeans are now in office.
Grégoire Roos
One can hope so.
Bronwen Maddox
Yeah.
Dr Yu Jie
That’s the problem with…
Bronwen Maddox
Laurel.
Laurel Rapp
Right now, these are mutually reinforcing imperatives. The US Government and the US tech companies are very much aligned in what they want to do in the world. Deregulation, using the, sort of – this US emerging tech and innovation as a source of US national strength and power around the world, to use it very coercively and selectively and doling out to different countries and actors as prizes, and then taking cuts off the top back into the US Treasury. We’ve seen this in the NVIDIA sales of advanced chips to China.
But the question is going to be when those interests start to diverge, what does that look like? How will President Trump respond to that? Whether that’s diverging politically, where some of these firms decide, actually, as elections approach, maybe it’s better to hedge our bets a bet – a bit. Everyone is all in right now with this current administration. That’s going to change as we see data coming out about how the next President is going to – presidential race is going to shape up. And that is – sort of, when we see, potentially, a more directed US role, stakes in private companies, we’ve seen this with Intel, maybe these tech companies start to say, “You know what? Actually, we’re – this is a little too far for comfort. You’ve – you know, federal government have inched a little too far into our private sector territory.” That’s going to be a real crisis moment, potentially.
Bronwen Maddox
Crisis for?
Laurel Rapp
For both.
Bronwen Maddox
Okay. We will have to leave it on that. I would just say we are – our no house view at Chatham House, we do take pains to say the United States is so much more than the one person behind the desk in the Oval Office. This ought to be a year where voters have a chance to make that point, but that last little debate we had on the tech companies is really going to be a test of that. And I would just say while we’ve had a bit of wrestling over the American imperialism down the decades, it is easy to set aside the good things that the US has done in the technicolour of some of the bad things it is now trying to do.
On that, thank you very much, a really stimulating debate. Thank you very much online. There were some terrific questions on China and Europe and should they get closer together, and would UK have been better off had it been in the European Union? We might pick up those things in future sessions. Everyone, thank you very much, indeed. Thank you to my panel [applause].
