The emergence of a new agreement to end civil conflict in Mozambique is an important development. This paper examines how this deal was achieved and highlights some of the potential risks in the run-up to the October 2019 elections and beyond.
4. Sustainability of Elite Bargains
While many observers have focused on the civil divides between RENAMO and FRELIMO, they have neglected the significance of post-war relationships between RENAMO’s low- and mid-ranked veterans and its leadership. Studies in West Africa show that long after a conflict, military networks remain involved in myriad activities such as election campaigning, illicit trade, private security, mining and criminality.54 In Mozambique, with RENAMO’s rapidly degrading fortunes, Dhlakama has shown that he could still remobilize aging ex-combatants and arm them 20 years after the conflict ended. However, that support had to be earned. When the relationship between Dhlakama and core followers in central Mozambique began to break down in 2012, he moved back to shore up support.55 A Dutch anthropologist who spent several years in this area estimates that some 3,000 RENAMO ex-combatants lived in Maringué district, Sofala province, without any financial support from the party and have been ‘waiting’ for the party to provide them with benefits. Although some observers disagree and think that this estimate is likely more accurate for the whole of the province.56 This demonstrates the local nature of Mozambique’s politics at times and goes someway to explain why RENAMO was unable to return to full-scale conflict, though its structures remained sufficiently intact in central Mozambique to resume targeted violence.
The recent confrontation grew out of a variety of factors, which may also have some bearing on the sustainability of any future elite bargain, including:
- RENAMO’s rejection of electoral laws approved in parliament: During the extended debate on electoral laws in 2012, RENAMO consistently demanded the right to have veto power in the National Elections Commission (CNE). Tensions had risen because of municipal elections in November 2013, which RENAMO boycotted, and preparations for national presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2014.
- RENAMO veteran fighters: In 2011 parliament approved FRELIMO-proposed legislation providing pensions for civil war veterans, although it did not win the support of RENAMO. Despite good intentions, the law raised unfulfilled expectations. The bureaucratic and lengthy process rekindled feelings of discrimination among RENAMO veterans, leading them to mobilize and pressure their leadership to do the same.
- Dhlakama: Afonso Dhlakama was 64 in 2018 at his death. His relative youth meant there had been little discussion of a potential successor, and dissent against him could lead to expulsion. Dhlakama had proved to be an inconsistent and poor negotiator, often holding out for maximum concessions, using boycotts and threats. However, in 2016–18 his tactics and statesmanship improved.
- Guebuza: On several occasions, FRELIMO ‘negotiated’ concessions with RENAMO resulting in financial compensation or electoral legislation amendments.57 During Guebuza’s tenure as president, he was less amenable to granting such concessions. It might also be that Guebuza wanted to extend his term in office by encouraging an armed stand-off with RENAMO in 2013 and early 2014 until coming under internal and regional pressure to reach agreement in 2014.58
- RENAMO’s poor finances and lack of accountability: Losing MPs in the 2009 election and being without local-government representation further damaged RENAMO’s already fragile finances. Leadership secrecy over party finances and patronage has been the norm since 1994. Dhlakama himself has faced allegations of misuse and greed.59 Action by government officials from 2012 against RENAMO’s artisanal mining interests also heightened the sense of vulnerability.
- The younger RENAMO generation: There are several important leaders who are not from the civil war generation. They are now in their thirties and forties, and some of them believe that FRELIMO will never cede power without the use of force.
- Promise of riches: In 2012–13, Mozambique’s politicians, private companies and the press talked up the prospects of Mozambique becoming rich on coal, oil and gas. This encouraged Afonso Dhlakama to act radically and not settle for small cash handouts through an elite bargain. The political dangers of not managing expectations of potential rewards from natural resources seem to be playing out now in Mozambique, following the discovery of world class gas fields and a growing sense of FRELIMO elite capture of these future rents and growing inequality.60
- FRELIMO unity: FRELIMO’s rejection of the decentralization bill of April 2015 undermined President Nyusi’s authority and the trust he had built up with Dhlakama, and showed he lacked a tight grip over the party. This failure resulted in a fresh round of armed violence.
Importance of decentralization
Meaningful decentralization by the government and full demobilization by RENAMO have been the key issues of recent negotiations. In early 2018, President Nyusi and Dhlakama negotiated a framework accord on political decentralization. Following Dhlakama’s death there were fears this might not last, but in May 2018 parliament enacted a series of constitutional amendments to prepare for deepened decentralization. These provide for elected provincial, district and municipal assemblies (with the leading delegate with the party with a simple majority, heading them). Following the work of the commission on decentralization, a constitutional amendment on the issue was passed in the National Assembly in May 2019. In June, the president promulgated the Law of Punctual Review of the Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique.
RENAMO had dropped its insistence of directly appointing governors in the provinces it claimed to dominate and accepted the principle of indirect gubernatorial elections in 2019 – as new provincial governors would be chosen based on the winning provincial party list. So for the first time, provincial governors will be elected, not appointed by the president. Provincial assemblies, that currently play an advisory role are to become provincial executive councils and will have some tax-raising authority. A legislative package for decentralization of powers across 10 provinces was announced by Mozambique’s cabinet in February 2019.61 The proposals impose overlapping mandates on provincially elected governors and state-appointed secretaries and this looks like an arrangement designed to preserve FRELIMO power and disadvantage grass-root representation. Under these new laws, crucial tax-raising powers remain with the Secretariat of State, who is appointed by the president – a request FRELIMO insisted on.62
RENAMO’s comprehensive disarmament is the key government demand.63 The government understands that it needs to offer concessions for reintegrating RENAMO combatants into the FADM and police. In this regard, the MoU on Military Affairs includes security provisions for the placement of RENAMO ex-combatants into senior positions in the army and police force. New symbolic senior posts are being created to absorb some of these former fighters and RENAMO has raised the idea of creating a ‘provincial police force’.64 In February 2019, for example, 11 officers from RENAMO were appointed to leadership positions in the FADM and this followed the appointment in January of three top commanders from RENAMO to key army leadership positions. Another positive step occurred in mid-July when RENAMO delivered a revised list of 10 officers it wanted to see integrated into the police force as part of the DDR process. The government rejected the previous list because it included people who had already served in the armed forces and were now demobilized or retired. Finally, on 28 July 2019, RENAMO commenced DDR of its residual forces in Satunjira. This process will cover 5,221 RENAMO militia currently in the provinces of Sofala, Inhambane, Tete, Niassa and Nampula.65
It will be a challenge to manage new ‘opportunistic’ recruits hoping for jobs and benefits following reports in 2019 that RENAMO is recruiting and training armed men.
It will be a challenge to manage new ‘opportunistic’ recruits hoping for jobs and benefits following reports in 2019 that RENAMO is recruiting and training armed men. However, this action is likely more about preparing for the new deal and sending a message that RENAMO could still act as a spoiler, than any real intent to return to conflict.
International partners will need to make long-term guarantees to DDR efforts in hot spots, particularly parts of central Mozambique and Tete province, and focus on bringing Momade into a process that incentivizes non-violent politics. A basket fund has been established to channel financing for DDR activities and a DDR camp has been constructed in central Mozambique, overseen by Brigadier General Javier Perez Aquino and a group of military experts.66 Too much focus on austerity by international donors and the international financial institutions at this critical moment might back-fire – their engagement needs to be conflict-sensitive and not time dependent.67 Like many other guerrilla groups, RENAMO will only gradually disarm its gunmen and is likely to keep hidden arms caches as an insurance policy. As a response, the best strategy is to build up political confidence and economic opportunity so that gradually this armed wing of RENAMO becomes redundant.
A durable peace settlement will require compromise by FRELIMO and an acceptance that RENAMO has in the short term been able to capitalize on some of the government’s shortcomings. A danger for RENAMO is that its armed militia is mostly middle aged and that it will not be able to rely on them indefinitely to provide armed back up.68 The military wing is also divided, split over the appointment of Momade as president and his efforts to pivot the party core away from Manica and Sofala provinces. There is also uncertainty over Momade’s commitment to historical loyalties from the 1977–92 war. Furthermore, there is concern over the impact caused by Cyclone Ida in key strong-holds in Sofala and Manica, which damaged hidden arms caches.69
54 Themnér, A. (2012), ‘Former Mid-Level Commanders in Big Man Networks’, in Utas, M. (ed), African Conflicts and Informal Power: Big Men and Networks, Zed Books.
55 Wiegink, N. (2015), “‘It Will Be Our Time to Eat”: Former Renamo Combatants and Big-Men Dynamics in Central Mozambique’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 41 (4), pp. 1–17.
56 Wiegink, N. (2013), ‘Why Did the Soldiers Not Go Home? Demobilized Combatants, Family Life, and Witchcraft in Post War Mozambique’, Anthropological Quarterly, 86 (1) pp. 107–132.
57 Vines (2013), ‘Renamo’s Rise and Decline: The Politics of Reintegration in Mozambique’.
58 In 2013, Guebuza also underestimated RENAMO’s capacity to disrupt and did not support FADM efforts including diverting resources towards maritime security. Author interview with ex-FADM official, November 2016.
59 Cahen, M. (2011), ‘The Enemy as Model: Patronage as a Crisis Factor in Constructing Opposition in Mozambique,’ OXPO Working Papers, http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/centres/oxpo/working-papers/wp_10-11/OXPO_10-11f_Cahen.pdf (accessed 6 Jul. 2019).
60 Ross, M. (2012), The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations, Princeton University Press, pp. 149–151.
61 This is to come into effect for cities and provinces with the 2019 elections and for district assemblies in the 2024 elections. Under a RENAMO-government compromise, until 2024, the government will consult with governors regarding district executive appointments.
62 Author interview with government official in Maputo, February 2019.
63 After the May 2018 decentralization reforms, FRELIMO parliamentarians delayed additional action pending progress on RENAMO’s disarmament. In July 2018, the signed MoU on military affairs paved the way for further parliamentary progress on decentralization.
64 The existing force, the Mozambique Republic Police (PRM), would retain responsibility ‘for the most serious crimes’, while other policing matters would pass into the hand of the provincial forces.
65 Author interview with international observer in Gorongosa, 29 July 2019.
66 His previous mission was supervising the disarmament of guerrillas in Colombia for the UN and his efforts are funded by Argentina and the EU.
67 Contact Group members have plans to improve roads, support microfinance and agricultural extension projects. Author interviews with
ex-Contact Group members, London, January 2019.
68 During author interviews in Maputo in March 2016, a number of RENAMO supporters speculated that Afonso Dhlakama’s niece, Ivone Soares might be a possible successor. Several also mentioned the son of RENAMOs first leader, André Matsangaissa, was also being groomed for leadership. In August 2017, senior RENAMO officials signalled that Dhlakama would run for a sixth time as the party’s candidate in the 2019 national elections for the Mozambican presidency but with Dhlakama’s death in 2018 this all changed.
69 Author interviews with RENAMO officials in 2019, including some who claim the cyclones were called by the spirit of Dhlakama to protest at divisions in RENAMO.