On October 7 Hamas forces attacked from Gaza leaving 1,200 dead in Israel and kidnapping 251 people, inflicting on Israel its worst national trauma since the country’s inception in 1948. The following month, a study concluded that just under half of Israelis were in a clinical state of depression, and just under a third were showing signs of post-traumatic stress.
As the country approaches the anniversary of the attacks, it is increasingly clear that only with a new government, major reforms and a period of self-examination can Israel hope to turn a national trauma into a national rebirth. Hamas’s attack shook Israelis to the core. But the domestic actions of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government have also impeded Israelis’ ability to regain their bearings.
Attempts before the attacks to weaken democratic institutions such as the Supreme Court – which provoked enormous protest and which the attorney general called a ‘judicial coup’ – are ongoing, though receiving less attention thanks to the war in Gaza.
The propaganda machine
When it comes to reporting of the war, the average Israeli has been frequently fed government propaganda. Donors to Prime Minister Netanyahu were already in control of much of Israeli media. They have extended that control since last year.
In July, Channel 13, Israel’s second-largest TV channel, underwent an abrupt change of management, putting in place a Netanyahu associate, Yulia Shamalov-Berkovich.
Her first move was to cancel the channel’s most watched daily news hour, presented by Raviv Drucker, one of Israel’s top investigative journalists. Drucker’s work has led to a number of criminal charges against Netanyahu. A newsroom revolt led to the channel agreeing to remove Shamalov-Berkovich.
Also in June, i24NEWS started broadcasting in Hebrew, as well as French, English and Arabic, further pursuing its pro-Netanyahu line. Nevertheless, most Israelis realized by the spring of this year that their country was not winning the war. In a state of shock, they are trying to look beyond the current abyss. What they see are three possible paths.
Beware of the ‘new normal’
The most likely is that the status quo, a war of attrition in Gaza and on the northern border with Lebanon, continues. Until a few months ago this would have been seen as inconceivable. Now, it is ‘the new normal’. Driving this is Netanyahu’s determination to maintain his position as prime minister, his need to see off existing criminal proceedings against him for bribery, fraud and breaches of trust, and to avoid investigations into other alleged wrongdoings.
Another key factor is America. A stronger president than Joe Biden would have shut down the active fronts in Gaza and Lebanon. Now Netanyahu is looking to the possibility of a second Trump administration that would be likely to ease pressure on his government’s conduct in Gaza.
With the ‘normalization’ of the Gaza war will come severe consequences for Israel. It may undergo a process of ‘South Africanization’, with more sanctions, boycotts and divestments from regional, European and like-minded countries. If Kamala Harris wins the US presidency, the US might gradually join this wave.
Already it has started imposing sanctions on extreme right-wing individuals and organizations associated with settlers in the West Bank. The International Criminal Court and International Court of Justice, following their interventions this year, will continue to apply constraints on the government as a whole, and on ‘persons of interest’ including Netanyahu, Yoav Galant, the defence minister, military figures and others.
Risk of all-out war
Another possibility is that the conflict spills over to a fully fledged regional war, leading to unprecedented levels of destruction in Israel, Lebanon and possibly even Iran. For now, the US appears to have prevented the recent exchange of missile attacks between Israel and Hezbollah from escalating into all-out war.
But the risk of a broader regional conflict still exists, and if actualized would be on a scale that even America would struggle to cut short and create a semblance of victory. It would overshadow any other global arena, including Ukraine and the US election. Oil prices would spike, and maritime as well as air movement across the region would be further restricted.
It would create a strategic opportunity for Russia to sink US policies in both the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Galvanized global and local Jihad movements would flock into Lebanon across its porous border with Syria. The US would therefore exert every effort to prevent such a conflict and to curtail it if it does erupt.
Towards a deal?
Perhaps the least likely scenario is a ‘mega-deal’, presided over by the US, by which Israel, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran are forced into a grand bargain, putting an end to the war in Gaza, to the second front in Lebanon and to all other Iranian-led fronts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere. This would pave the way for a US-Saudi-Israeli normalization agreement, and in turn to the revival of Israeli-Palestinian talks.
For there to be any chance of such a ‘mega-deal’, necessary though not sufficient conditions are a change of government in Israel and the removal of Netanyahu. As a general election need not take place before 2026, the path to this outcome is difficult.
So far pressure from the US and other western countries has made little difference, but Netanyahu remains deeply unpopular within Israel. In a July poll 72 per cent of Israelis said he should resign over failures that led to October 7.
The governing coalition is facing increasing criticism on Gaza, Lebanon and its inability to achieve its war aims. The longstanding issue of military conscription of the ultra-Orthodox community might yet topple it, or the looming 2025 budget debate, which will be difficult to reconcile.
In June, Israel’s Supreme Court struck down the ultra-Orthodox’s exemption from military service. The two ultra-Orthodox parties in the coalition could be left with no alternative but to leave the government to stop the recruitment process.
Whatever the make-up of the next government, it must be made to radically shift Israel’s strategic course for the reasons outlined above and to prepare the country for major, historic reforms. The majority of Israelis are keen to turn a page and start this process of national healing and reconstruction.
However, many also believe that the national effort must focus on preparations for an all-out ‘decisive’ war against Hezbollah, Iran and its other regional proxies. The remaking of the country should include the rebuilding of national institutions including, at the very least, the Israeli Defence Force, the police, the Knesset, legislating real separation of powers and a constitution, to prevent any recurrence of an authoritarian coup.