Introduction
At a joint press conference on 2 April 2019, the foreign ministers of Germany and France, Heiko Maas and Jean-Yves Le Drian, announced that they would launch an ‘alliance for multilateralism’ at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly.1 The ministers had mooted the idea for some months, arguing that an alliance was needed ‘to protect international norms, agreements and institutions when they come under pressure’.2 They have reportedly discussed their proposals with representatives from Argentina, Australia, Canada, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, South Korea and the UK.3
It was not the first call for mid-sized states to assume greater responsibility for sustaining the ‘liberal world order’, broadly defined as the lattice of multilateral institutions, agreements and norms that for decades has underpinned a relatively stable and open international system. In December 2016, on his final foreign trip as vice-president of the United States, Joe Biden met with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Ottawa. With Donald Trump poised to become the next US president and populist sentiments sweeping across Europe, Biden delivered a pointed message to Trudeau: ‘The world’s going to spend a lot of time looking to you, Mr. Prime Minister, as we see more and more challenges to the liberal international order than any time since the end of World War II. You and [German Chancellor] Angela Merkel […]’.4 Prominent international commentators have issued similar appeals. Gideon Rachman, a Financial Times columnist, has proposed a ‘middle-powers alliance’ to ‘preserve a world based around rules and rights, rather than power and force’.5 Two eminent American foreign-policy experts, Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, have also called on US allies to ‘leverage their collective economic and military might to save the liberal world order’.6
The rationale for asking middle powers to perform this role is obvious: challenges to the international order have been mounting in recent times – and not just from a rising China and a resurgent Russia. President Trump has embraced an ‘America First’ approach that repudiates his country’s long-standing role as the leading defender and underwriter of the post-1945 multilateral system. Among other actions, he called the EU a ‘foe’,7 blocked the appointment of judges to the dispute settlement panels of the World Trade Organization (WTO), withdrew from negotiations that ultimately yielded the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, pulled out of the so-called Iranian nuclear accord (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – JCPOA), threatened sanctions against the International Criminal Court, and is reported to have discussed withdrawing from NATO.8 At the same time, China and Russia have been increasingly brazen in their defiance of international rules and norms. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea has become a fait accompli. Hackers and social media accounts connected to the Russian government have reportedly engaged in efforts to disrupt recent democratic elections in the US and Europe. China has dismissed the ruling of an international arbitration court that rejected its sovereignty claim over most of the South China Sea, and has continued building and militarizing islands in contested locations.9 Meanwhile, respect for international humanitarian law is weakening, arms-control regimes are eroding, the multilateral trade system is under threat, and democracy and human rights are receding in many parts of the world.
In the face of such challenges, what can middle powers realistically do? The notion that they can ‘save the liberal world order’ (to quote Daalder and Lindsay) seems fanciful. No system of international institutions and rules can survive for very long without the backing of its most powerful members.10 The challenge, moreover, is not simply to preserve key elements of the existing order, but also to reform institutions that are failing, devise new rules for emerging policy areas, and adapt the multilateral system so that it better reflects the shifting realities of global power, rather than the post-1945 world in which its central institutions took shape. On the other hand, the collective influence of the middle powers should not be underestimated. Taken together, for example, Japan, Germany, the UK, France, Canada, South Korea and Australia account for more than one-fifth of the global economy.11 If these and other countries worked together in a concerted campaign, they might succeed in slowing the erosion of the current order, and perhaps even strengthen and modernize parts of it. It certainly seems worth trying. After all, if the world’s middle powers do not take on this task, who will?
No system of international institutions and rules can survive for very long without the backing of its most powerful members
There are compelling reasons for them to do so. International institutions and rules offer mid-sized countries a measure of protection from the whims of more powerful states. Democratic middle powers should be especially concerned about their prospects in a world where ‘might makes right’ holds sway and where they will be more exposed to threats and coercion from autocratic states. Most importantly, functioning institutions help to buffer the international system from shocks that might otherwise escalate into larger conflicts, creating a more brittle and dangerous world.
To a certain extent, this sort of middle-powers cooperation is already under way. Multilateral efforts have been made, for example, to preserve the JCPOA and the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, and to address issues such as the future of the WTO or human rights abuses in Yemen. To date, however, these initiatives have been fragmented and uncoordinated. A more ambitious and concerted campaign is needed – one that defines core priorities, constructs issue-specific coalitions with clear goals, and demonstrates a level of commitment to match the seriousness of the threat.
Several mid-sized countries seem to be interested in taking further action. In addition to the Franco–German proposal for an ‘alliance for multilateralism’, in early 2019 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed his country’s determination ‘to preserve and continue the free, open, and rules-based international order’.12 Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland has advocated ‘doubling down on an improved rules-based international order’.13 In early 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa May referred to ‘a new, global Britain’ that would energetically defend ‘the rules-based international system on which the stability of our world continues to rely’.14 Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Keshav Gokhale has warned that ‘unilateral tendencies are coming to the fore, be they in rising trade protectionism or in the disregard for established international mechanisms governing the global commons’, and has called for urgent efforts to ‘strengthen multilateralism’.15
The time has come to turn these aspirations into a concerted campaign. Which countries should be involved in such efforts? What role should non-governmental actors play? How should participants determine their priorities and coordinate their efforts? This paper aims to provide answers to these questions.
1 Agence France-Press (2019), ‘France, Germany seek to boost multilateralism’, 2 April 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/
20190402-france-germany-seek-boost-multilateralism (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
2 Maas, H. and Le Drian, J.-Y. (2019), ‘Who, if not us?’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 February 2019, reprinted at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/germany/events/article/who-if-not-us-15-02-19 (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
3 Democracy Without Borders (2019), ‘Alliance for Multilateralism to be launched at the UN in September’, 3 April 2019, https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/7165/alliance-for-multilateralism-to-be-launched-at-the-un-in-september (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
4 Tang, J. (2019), ‘Biden to Canada: The world needs you ‘very, very badly’’, Globe and Mail, 9 December 2016, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/politics-briefing/article33279957 (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
5 Rachman, G. (2018), ‘Mid-sized powers must unite to preserve the world order’, Financial Times, 28 May 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/546ca388-625d-11e8-90c2-9563a0613e56 (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
6 Daalder, I. and Lindsay, J. (2018), ‘The Committee to Save the World Order’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-09-30/committee-save-world-order (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
7 Continguglia, C. (2018), ‘Trump: EU is one of United States’ biggest foes’, Politico, 15 July 2018, https://www.politico.eu/article/donald-trump-putin-russia-europe-one-of-united-states-biggest-foes/ (accessed 16 Apr. 2019); Rogin, J. (2018), ‘Trump is trying to destabilize the European Union’, Washington Post, 28 July 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-is-trying-to-destabilize-the-european-union/2018/06/28/729cb066-7b10-11e8-aeee-4d04c8ac6158_story.html (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
8 Barnes, J. E. and Cooper, H. (2019), ‘Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia’, New York Times, 14 January 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
9 Hayton, B. (2018), ‘Two Years On, South China Sea Ruling Remains a Battleground for the Rules-Based Order’, Chatham House Expert Comment, 11 July 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/two-years-south-china-sea-ruling-remains-battleground-rules-based-order (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
10 Paris, R. (2015), ‘Global Governance and Power Politics: Back to Basics’, Ethics and International Affairs, 29(4): pp. 407–418,
doi: 10.1017/S0892679415000428 (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
11 Based on GDP in current US dollars in 2017. See World Bank (2019), Gross domestic product 2017, https://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
12 Reid, D. (2019), ‘Japanese leader Abe tells Davos audience to rebuild trust in global trade’, CNBC, 23 January 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/japan-prime-minister-shinzo-abe-tells-davos-audience-to-rebuild-trust-in-global-trade.html (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
13 Global Affairs Canada (2018), ‘Address by Minister Freeland when receiving Foreign Policy’s Diplomat of the Year Award’, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/06/address-by-minister-freeland-when-receiving-foreign-policys-diplomat-of-the-year-award.html (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
14 Financial Times (2017), ‘Theresa May: Speech to ‘Congress of Tomorrow’ conference, Philadelphia’, 26 January 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/f7abaf42-e41b-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).
15 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2019), ‘FS’s keynote address to the 1st Disarmament and International Security Affairs Fellowship’, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30910/FSs_Keynote_address_to_the_1st_Disarmament_and_International_Security_Affairs_Fellowship (accessed 16 Apr. 2019).