1. Introduction
Cultural similarities are shared across borders in South and Central Asia, but often those borders act as barriers, rather than as the means of connection. Historically, both regions have been associated with homogeneous political units: much of South Asia was incorporated into British India, while the Central Asian republics were subsumed into the Soviet Union. On gaining independence – the former in the 1940s, the latter in the 1990s – the newly sovereign countries within each region each sought to define themselves and forge a sense of national identity. This was often pursued through a series of nation-building projects that frequently served to heighten each country’s sense of difference from its neighbours. So, despite cultural similarities between countries, freedom of movement (of goods, services and people) has become the exception rather than the norm, and border regions are perceived in generally negative terms.
Afghanistan, which has cultural links with countries to its north and its south, sits between Central and South Asia – or, by a more positive framing, forms part of both. For centuries, the country was an entrepôt for goods, people and ideas. During the colonial era, international borders were imposed upon it in order to create a closed buffer between the Russian and British Empires. Numerous railways with different gauges were built running towards Afghanistan’s borders but stopping short of actually crossing them. Connectivity into Afghanistan began to be seen as a threat – a means of facilitating invasion – rather than an opportunity.
After decades of conflict, in the 21st century Afghanistan finds itself peripheral to both South Asia and Central Asia – clear-cut, if poorly integrated regions – as well as its other neighbours, China and Iran. There is a tendency, not without justification, for Afghanistan to be seen as the source of regional instability rather than a potential opportunity as a hub for mutually beneficial connectivity and cooperation. Thus, Afghanistan is blamed as the source of Islamist fundamentalism as well as a vast illicit narcotics economy that harms each of its neighbours and nurtures far-reaching corruption. Even if some elites in neighbouring states currently do benefit from engagement, these issues scarcely serve to encourage positive thinking towards Afghanistan. Furthermore, while there may be an alternative view – that events in, or goods and ideas emanating from, Afghanistan simply exacerbate existing domestic problems1 – that view also fails to provide significant cause for optimism.
The benefits of people-to-people contact in complementing official bilateral relationships are well known. Public diplomacy cannot simply comprise the one-way delivery of messages; instead, it requires sustained engagement and the strengthening of networks. For countries like Afghanistan, this is paramount if its neighbours are to play a positive role in the country’s future. The starting point is, however, low. While conflict in Afghanistan is an undoubted reality, it has also served the domestic interests of Afghanistan’s northern neighbours to emphasize the fragile security of Afghanistan over its economic potential, for instance. In particular, the threat posed by radical Islamism to the Afghan government epitomizes, for their secular regimes, the worst-case scenario.
Normalizing external perceptions of Afghanistan – and of Afghans themselves – is thus a necessary component in encouraging more positive external engagement, which in turn is a precondition for the establishment of a sustainable Afghan state. While political stability is the short-term imperative, in the longer term economic sustainability depends on Afghanistan being reframed as a means of regional connection, or as a pivot, between Central and South Asia. This in turn implies rethinking the status of the border regions through which such connectivity will have to take place.
While political stability is the short-term imperative, in the longer term economic sustainability depends on Afghanistan being reframed as a means of regional connection, or as a pivot, between Central and South Asia.
Afghanistan’s borders were artificially drawn and imposed on it in the late 19th century as Russia and Britain sought to separate themselves with a buffer state. Thus, the Wakhan corridor was added to Afghanistan in the 1890s to ensure that the British and Russian empires were not contiguous – not because of any prior control from Kabul. Afghanistan’s border with China remained unmarked until the 1960s.
On one level, it is the shared ethnicity across its borders, and the porous nature of the frontiers themselves, that give Afghanistan a relatively higher level of integration with certain of its neighbours than is the case for other landlocked countries within the region. However, official people-to-people contacts are stymied by visa requirements and other bureaucratic hurdles, underpinned by real or exaggerated security concerns.
To Afghanistan’s north, despite shared ethnicities, the Central Asian states have tended to deal directly with Uzbek, Turkmen and Tajik strongmen in Afghanistan, rather than explore the possibilities provided by ‘bottom-up’ interactions with Afghan communities. In contrast, Pakistan has at times seen the sharing of Pashtun identity across its border with Afghanistan as a threat rather than an opportunity to develop links based on shared linguistic and cultural traits. In a similar vein – and in addition to the threat posed by narcotics smuggling between the two countries – the shared Sunni faith across the Iran–Afghanistan border represents an extra perceived threat to Tehran.
On some issues, Afghanistan’s neighbours have benefited from its instability. For instance, water is an increasingly contentious issue in each of Afghanistan’s neighbouring states. According to the World Resources Institute,2 of Afghanistan’s neighbours only Tajikistan and China are not faced with an ‘extremely high’ level of water risk. As the upstream riparian state, the destruction of water infrastructure in Afghanistan during decades of conflict has served to benefit its downstream neighbours. Afghan reconstruction – necessary if the agricultural population is to benefit from irrigation – is thus a sensitive issue.
Similarly, although Iran and Pakistan have particular concerns regarding their large Afghan refugee populations, certain groups within both countries have clearly benefited from their presence. For instance, landlords in Peshawar, capital of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, have profited from renting homes to wealthier Afghans. Employers in both countries can ‘take advantage of cheap and effective immigrant labour’.3
For Afghanistan’s economy to be sustainable and secure, it will have to reverse long-standing conceptions and reposition itself as central – and vital – to its neighbours. A great deal of effort has been spent in recent years trying to make Afghanistan pivotal rather than peripheral to its neighbours. Yet the re-emergence of a new Silk Road goes against the dominant view both in Afghanistan and in the region at large.
Iran and China aside, Afghanistan’s other neighbours have been engaged in nation-building projects; Pakistan since the 1940s and the Central Asian Republics since the early 1990s. Self-reliance has at times constituted an integral part of such projects. Rather than being seen as a means of building confidence, cross-border collaboration has often been seen as increasing the vulnerability of one country to the whims of another. In Central Asia, benefit-sharing schemes involving electricity and water were terminated to promote self-sufficiency, even though this resulted in sporadic shortages in the supply of both. Now, however, there are signs that this approach is starting to change across both South and Central Asia. Power trading currently takes place among India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal, while the Central Asian Republics appear similarly to be reverting to the shared systems from which they benefited during the Soviet era.
The successful reinvention of the Silk Road is likely to be based on power – literally involving pylons and pipelines – rather than goods. Three major initiatives at varying stages of development aim to move electricity and gas from Central to South Asia. Construction of the Pakistan section of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (TAP, or TAPI with India) pipeline was due to begin in Pakistan during 2019, with work already ongoing on the Turkmenistan and Afghanistan sections. Given an amelioration of relations between India and Pakistan, the scheme could potentially continue into India. The Central Asia–South Asia 1000 (CASA-1000) and the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan 500 (TAP 500) energy transmission lines are scheduled to begin functioning in 2020 and 2021 respectively. The Turkmenistan–Uzbekistan–Tajikistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan (TUTAP) project is intended for completion in 2022. In addition to providing it with electricity, these projects will secure significant transit fees for Afghanistan. Furthermore, they could serve to enable an integrated market in energy linking South and Central Asia.
Afghanistan has large undeveloped mineral resources, including copper, iron and rare earth elements. In total, these are reputed to be worth some $1 trillion. Improvements in overland connectivity could facilitate the development of these minerals, and Afghanistan could thus benefit from engaging in several regional connectivity initiatives that are already at the development stage. Potential game-changers in this regard include the so-called Lapis Lazuli corridor (which runs west from northern Afghanistan through Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and thence to Europe); the construction of direct road and rail links between Herat and the Iranian port city of Chabahar (which would provide an alternative to Afghanistan’s current reliance on Pakistan for access to the Indian Ocean); and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, within which connectivity through Pakistan, via the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, is a key component. Railway connections to Iran and Central Asia are also in various stages of development.
While progress is being made on many of these long-awaited initiatives, the pace has generally been slow. This, in turn, has hindered the various large-scale mining projects that have been mooted for Afghanistan; these have stalled, since they are contingent on better connectivity and reliable supplies of power. Security concerns, together with other technical and pricing issues, have also contributed to the delays. Until the mining projects are realized in their entirety, they remain symbolic of the difficulties that currently face the country.
Afghanistan has found itself caught in a double bind. Economic development has been obstructed by its neighbours’ uncertainty regarding its political direction, leading them to underinvest in its economy. Yet Afghanistan’s inability to develop its economy, in turn, feeds insecurity. Of late, however, many of its neighbours appear to have recognized that Afghanistan’s security, and hence their own, will benefit from greater connectivity, providing an opportunity for Afghanistan to reposition itself as central to the wider region, rather than a problem to be managed.
Afghanistan has found itself caught in a double bind. Economic development has been obstructed by its neighbours’ uncertainty regarding its political direction, leading them to underinvest in its economy. Yet Afghanistan’s inability to develop its economy, in turn, feeds insecurity.
Notwithstanding the many and diverse challenges hindering the repositioning of Afghanistan at the macro level, this paper documents several ongoing examples of successful and mutually beneficial cross-border collaboration between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Much of Afghanistan’s electricity is imported from Central Asia. Currently the end user of power, Afghanistan should eventually be able to generate revenue from carrying Central Asian power into energy-scarce South Asia. To be sustainable, this will require local ownership within Afghanistan in particular; the expanded provision of energy within Afghanistan is likely to be an important factor enabling it to act as a conduit. In this context, the paper explores the development of off-grid energy trading between Tajikistan and the adjoining Afghan province of Badakhshan, one of the poorest in the country.
A number of border markets have been set up that allow Afghans to trade with their neighbours, or to import and export goods from further afield, taking advantage of price differentials. As with energy, Afghanistan could in time become the link for merchandise trade between Central and South Asia; this would likewise generate domestic revenue. While existing border markets may currently be on a small scale, there is a powerful symbolism in demonstrating that Afghanistan can be a consumer or exporter of licit wares, and in changing the prevailing negative narrative.
The paper outlines efforts to develop a shared approach for Iran and Afghanistan to manage the Helmand river and Sistan lakes, with the desiccation of the latter over the past decade creating a major environmental challenge. Given the sensitivities, politics and history involved in this particular ecosystem, there are implications, in terms of approach, for other shared environmental challenges. Widespread environmental degradation, exacerbated by years of conflict, provides yet another barrier to creating a sustainable Afghan economy.
Also examined is Afghan medical tourism. The destruction of medical facilities within Afghanistan during years of conflict has forced many Afghans to travel abroad for treatment. While the narrative arises frequently that Afghans represent a burden for neighbouring countries, medical tourists provide a source of income for those same countries. This paper also notes the development of specific cross-border medical linkages between Afghanistan and Tajikistan.
These initiatives can serve to enhance prosperity in Afghanistan’s peripheries, and in turn enhance the reach of, and thus help entrench, the Afghan state. Most importantly, the paper assesses the extent to which existing examples of cross-border cooperation provide lessons for replication on other borders, as well as for the larger-scale and long-standing infrastructure initiatives that are vital for Afghanistan’s long-term economic security.
The notion that Afghanistan can be a source of licit benefits for its neighbours is far from mainstream opinion. And yet there are examples where it is exactly that.
The nature of news media means that success stories tend to be far less well publicized than are failures. Across South Asia, this frequently leads to lower expectations and provides excuses for issues such as poor service delivery. In the case of Afghanistan, the tendency is even more pernicious. The notion that Afghanistan can be a source of licit benefits for its neighbours is far from mainstream opinion. And yet, as this paper documents, there are examples where it is exactly that.
The purpose of this paper is to promote a better understanding of the processes involved: the challenges that were faced and the benefits that have accrued. The future sustainability of Afghanistan’s economy will be predicated on the degree to which it is integrated with its neighbours. An autarchic Afghanistan will remain rural and poor, and will be forced to rely on handouts from one or more global powers. The country’s location will need to become an asset rather than a barrier, if this is not to be the case. Once connected, Afghanistan can begin to capitalize on its other potential comparative advantages – its mineral resources and, notably, its people – ensuring that it reaps a demographic dividend from having one of the most youthful populations in the world.
Methodology
Afghanistan’s economic stability is likely to depend on bringing to fruition certain large-scale infrastructure projects, many of which have been in gestation for years. This paper has set out to explore whether ongoing, smaller-scale examples of cross-border engagement can provide lessons or ideas that could facilitate progress on the larger projects. In addition, and more broadly, a stable Afghanistan will call for positive bilateral relations with its neighbours, which are unlikely to develop if it continues to be conceived as a source of public ‘bads’. Thus this paper has set out to document examples where this is not the case, and to suggest means by which they could be replicated.
The project involved mapping out, through desk research, a long list of examples of positive cross-border interaction, before examining a selection of case studies. Fieldwork was conducted in Dushanbe and Khorog in Tajikistan, and in Shighnan district in the Afghan province of Badakhshan.
As part of the fieldwork, interviews were conducted with a wide cross–section of stakeholders, including representatives of the international donor community,4 staff managing various cross-border projects, and Afghans benefiting – directly or indirectly – from such projects. The discussions notably included a group of Afghan women about how cross-border connectivity affected their community-level savings programme, and a visiting delegation from the Badakhshan provincial government that was assessing health and education facilities in Shighnan. The security situation precluded fieldwork in other districts of Badakhshan.
Clearly there are cultural specificities that characterize the Afghan–Tajik border region. In particular, it is pertinent that the Afghan side of the border is better connected to Tajikistan than it is to the rest of Afghanistan. However, some of the approaches used to establish successful initiatives in a region of shared ethnicity and language seem pertinent to Afghanistan’s other border regions.
The paper draws on existing data, much of which – particularly in relation to trade – appear potentially unreliable and not necessarily representative. Nonetheless, although quantification of the benefits may be challenging, interviews in the field suggested that the benefits of cross-border engagement – both in terms of welfare and in improving cross-border perceptions of the neighbouring state – were substantial.
While the assumption that improved connectivity brings net economic benefits holds true, in recent years greater attention has been devoted to the question of where those benefits accrue: whether centres benefit over peripheries, or whether one country benefits over another. These questions certainly apply to Afghanistan, where the lack of governance in peripheral regions has led to a reliance on illicit trade. Of course, illicit trade, too, can benefit from improved connectivity; however, it is generally the case that improved connectivity facilitates better governance, while an economy supported by illicit trade breeds insecurity and prevents political stability. A sustainable Afghan economy would require improved connectivity between Central and South Asia and the development of licit trade to counter trafficking.
1 See Bohr, A. and Price, G. (2015), Regional Implications of Afghanistan’s Transitions: Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/regional-implications-afghanistans-transitions-pakistan-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan (accessed 13 May 2019).
2 World Resources Institute (2013), ‘Water Stress by Country’, https://www.wri.org/resources/charts-graphs/water-stress-country (accessed 13 May 2019).
3 Margesson, R. (2007), Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33851.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
4 Including: USAID (United States Agency for International Development), GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), DFID (UK Department for International Development), EU (European Union), JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation), and IOM (International Organization for Migration).