2. Energy Trading
In contrast to the current levels of economic interaction between the countries of South Asia, a resilient Afghan economy would most likely be predicated on the country’s centrality in the transmission of energy between resource-rich and resource-poor regions. Afghanistan is located geographically between energy-surplus countries in Central Asia (with Iran, additionally, to its west), and energy-deficit countries of South Asia. However, progress on large-scale energy transmission projects such as CASA-1000 (for electricity), or the TAP/TAPI gas pipeline, has been slow thus far, despite the fact that implementation of these megaprojects would benefit each of the participating countries (with Afghanistan benefiting both from increased energy access and from transit fees) and should serve to improve regional trust.
The countries of Central Asia benefited from a relatively sophisticated mechanism of power trading when they were part of the former Soviet Union. This is currently being re-established, after several countries pushed for self-sufficiency in the period immediately following independence in the early 1990s. However, cross-border power trading is a relatively new phenomenon in South Asia. Until recently most countries in that region recorded power deficits, rendering any discussion of power-trading opportunities largely redundant. A surge in production in India, partly driven by increased capacity in renewables, overestimates of projected demand and the rehabilitation of India’s northern power grid, have facilitated bilateral energy trading with Nepal and Bangladesh. A template of sorts has been provided by the example of Bhutan, which has exported much of its hydroelectricity production to India. Power is not traded across the border between India and Pakistan for now; but elsewhere, progress towards a South Asian regional energy market has been relatively rapid.
In the mid-1990s, just 0.01 per cent of the population of Afghanistan had access to electricity. This started to increase from 2001, so that by 2009 45 per cent of the population had access, and by 2014 almost 90 per cent could access some degree of power.
While the large projects provide Afghanistan with the role of a conduit between Central and South Asia, Afghanistan also represents a significant potential market in its own right. Access to electricity was destroyed by decades of conflict. In the mid-1990s, according to the World Bank,5 just 0.01 per cent of the population of Afghanistan had access to electricity. This started to increase from 2001, so that by 2009 45 per cent of the population had access, and by 2014 almost 90 per cent could access some degree of power. However, the number connected to the grid is much less (in 2013–14 just 27.9 per cent,6 estimated to have risen to 32 per cent7 by 2018). Grid supplies are rationed, and electricity consumers remain concentrated in the main cities, the majority in Kabul. Off-grid electricity comes from a variety of sources, including mini-grids, generators and batteries, along with renewable energy from solar and wind installations.
There have been significant moves to improve Afghanistan’s grid. In 2010 the Indian-funded transmission line between Pul-e-Khumri and Kabul was completed. This enables power from Afghanistan’s northern neighbours to be exported into Afghanistan. Most of Afghanistan’s electricity is currently imported either from the Central Asian Republics or from Iran. As Afghanistan’s domestic grid system is improved, the prospects are enhanced for it to benefit from the megaprojects as a consumer.
The main energy source, however, is traditional biomass, which is estimated to account for some 85 per cent of energy production at present. The use of traditional biomass – mainly wood and dung – along with coal for heating, and kerosene (peat oil) for lighting, has negative implications for individuals’ health, the Afghan economy and the environment. The cold winter weather in upland areas means that some households consume as much as 10 tonnes per year, and firewood shortages are commonplace. When demand is high, half a tonne of firewood can cost as much as $100. Put another way, the amount of biomass used to heat Afghanistan is 50 per cent more by weight than the amount of wheat harvested.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), more than 95 per cent of Afghans burn solid fuel for heating purposes.8 Furthermore, WHO holds smoke inhalation responsible for 54,000 Afghan deaths each year.9 (For the purposes of comparison, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan has estimated that just over 32,000 Afghan civilians were killed in conflict between January 2009 and December 2018.)10 Afghans typically use a wood-burning bukhari – a drum-shaped metal stove, or a sandali – a pit of burning coal. Smoke inhalation from these devices can cause bronchitis, cardiovascular disease, lung cancer and pneumonia. They also emit greenhouse gases and frequently cause burns. Women and children – who spend more time in the home – are worst affected, and the majority of deaths occur in children under five. Various initiatives are under way to introduce clean cooking stoves.
Afghan homes without access to electricity rely on kerosene for lighting. Kerosene is Afghanistan’s third largest import, at a cost of almost $600 million in 2016.11 Burning kerosene adds to indoor air pollution and black (pure) carbon emissions, while kerosene poisoning is a risk, particularly for children.
The felling of fruit and nut trees by Afghan farmers in order to harvest their wood for firewood is a practice that is likely to have a serious impact on farmers’ incomes in the future, with potential revenue streams being literally burnt.
The felling of fruit and nut trees by Afghan farmers in order to harvest their wood for firewood is a practice that is likely to have a serious impact on farmers’ incomes in the future, with potential revenue streams being literally burnt. Pistachios, which currently grow wild, are one of Afghanistan’s highest-value crops; however, in Badghis province (to take one example), the area covered by pistachio trees was estimated in 2018 to have fallen to just 28,000 hectares from around 90,000 hectares a few years earlier,12 with most of the trees being cut to provide wood for fuel.
The reliance on wood as a fuel source has also inflicted a great deal of harm on the environment. According to the United Nations Environment Programme,
[T]ree cover in Afghanistan in the 1950s was estimated at ~3.3 million hectares and is currently estimated at less than 1 million hectares. From 2000–2005, the rate of deforestation was ~3%, which equates to an annual removal of ~30,000 hectares of forest. The primary factors causing this loss of forest and woody cover is overgrazing/overbrowsing by goats and unsustainable firewood collection.13
Now, barely more than 1 per cent of the country is forested, as trees are felled both for timber – frequently smuggled into Pakistan – and fuel. (Tree felling was officially banned in 2006, but continues nonetheless, with the profitable industry run by timber ‘mafias’. Timber smuggling provides sources of funding for various armed groups, and, allegedly, for corrupt government officials.)
Some projections suggest that Afghanistan’s forest cover will have disappeared in less than 30 years.14 In 2009, it was estimated that the province of Nangarhar had lost 90 per cent of its forest cover since 1989. Deforestation also harms Afghanistan’s air quality, and, through the resultant erosion of topsoil, affects farmers’ livelihoods and increases the impact of floods. Hundreds of people have been killed annually in recent years as a result of flooding. The ongoing depletion of forest cover places parts of Afghanistan at risk from desertification.
Deforestation also affects Afghanistan’s biodiversity. In other countries that have areas of conflict or that are post-conflict, conservation projects have been implemented that link species protection to local people’s livelihoods (rather than focusing on the protection of certain environments). By developing ecotourism and sustainable forest management, conservation is seen as a means of developing civil society and governance structures. While this may seem overly aspirational in the case of Afghanistan, efforts by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to protect snow leopards in the Wakhan Corridor, in the northeast of the country, have had some successes. Local people have been involved in the project working as rangers to patrol the park, while pens have been constructed so that livestock herders do not need to kill leopards to protect their animals.15
In sum, the provision of alternative energy sources for local populations is a vital factor in protecting Afghanistan’s forests. Afghanistan has significant needs for electricity, whether on- or off-grid, and the benefits from greater energy provision would be substantial and multi-layered. Most electricity is currently imported, and the vast majority of domestic generation on-grid comes from hydropower.
Table 1: Sources of Afghan grid electricity, 2015/16
|
Imports (GWh) |
3,767 |
Domestic generation (GWh) |
1,007 |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Uzbekistan |
1,284 |
Of which hydro |
967 |
|
Turkmenistan |
1,184 |
Thermal |
40 |
|
Iran |
827 |
||
|
Tajikistan |
471 |
Note: As of 2015, Afghanistan had installed hydropower capacity of 254 MW and 312 MW of thermal capacity. The thermal plants are primarily diesel-powered, and hence expensive to operate.
Source: World Bank (2018), Afghanistan Renewable Energy Development Issues and Options.16
Much of Afghanistan’s hydropower infrastructure has been damaged by conflict; and attempts to renovate or build new infrastructure have riled downstream neighbours, which have benefited from increased water supply owing to disrupted upstream water storage. The rest of domestically sourced power comes from fossil fuels from two oil-fired power stations near Kabul (two gas-powered power stations are planned) and renewables.
According to the Ministry of Water and Energy,17 Afghanistan has the potential to produce 222,000 MW of electricity from solar, 68,000 MW from wind, 23,000 MW from water (though some estimates are higher) and 4,000 MW from biomass annually.
A number of off-grid renewable energy projects are being developed across Afghanistan. UNDP alone has implemented several projects across the country providing clean energy to more than 500,000 people.18 For instance, the Kabul suburb of Sang-e-Nawishta is powered by two wind turbines. In total, UNDP has implemented 100 small solar projects, 44 biogas plants and 240 micro-hydropower projects.
Afghanistan has the potential to produce 222,000 MW of electricity from solar, 68,000 MW from wind, 23,000 MW from water and 4,000 MW from biomass annually.
However, potential consumption is much higher than current production. Central Asian power exports to Afghanistan are significant and growing. In 2015/16, Afghanistan imported a total of 3,767 MW of electricity from its Central Asian neighbours and Iran (see table below). Demand for energy in Afghanistan is likely to increase considerably as the country continues to experience a high rate of population growth and growing urbanization – not least because of internal displacements.
The system of power trading operated between the Central Asian Republics during the Soviet period (known as the Central Asia Power System – CAPS) offered a good example of benefit-sharing, with 83 power stations across Central Asia producing 25,000 MW.19 During the winter, Kirghizia (now Kyrgyzstan) and Tajikistan stored water in reservoirs and imported power and fuel from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In the summer months, Kirghizia and Tajikistan provided water for irrigation to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, along with electricity generated by hydropower.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, CAPS gradually disintegrated, with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan eventually pulling out in the late 2000s. The single central management system collapsed, and technical problems, coupled with the desire of the newly independent Central Asian republics to promote a sense of nationalism and self-reliance, led to the rise of autarchic systems.
Rebuilding a similar regional power-trading system that includes Afghanistan – which at present can only play one of two roles, that of downstream consumer, or that of conduit – appears challenging. Yet Afghanistan is becoming a significant consumer of Central Asian power. In part Afghanistan has benefited from its neighbours’ historical experience of CAPS, receiving some of their surplus resulting from the break-up of the system. Some steps are being taken to reintegrate the power systems of Central Asia, and in November 2017 it was announced that the Uzbek and Tajik energy grids were to merge.20 As the tendency shifts away from autarchy and back towards cooperation, it will be imperative that Afghanistan (and the countries of South Asia) become an integral part of the resultant mechanism. There is a risk that cross-border engagement is conceived in zero-sum terms whereby, for instance, energy is exported to Afghanistan at the expense of another country. Building a more multilateral energy grid reduces this risk, and counters the risk that importing power from one country creates a vulnerability to political shifts in the upstream producer.
Uzbekistan is currently the largest provider of electricity to Afghanistan. A 440-km high-voltage transmission line connecting the two countries was completed in 2008, linking Kabul and five Afghan provinces with Uzbekistan. By 2011 the line had a capacity of nearly 300 MW. Uzbek power supplies have been reliable, though there are commercial reasons for this. The collapse of CAPS meant that Uzbekistan had a certain amount of surplus power available to export, while Afghanistan had few alternative suppliers during winter. This enabled Uzbekistan to charge a high rate for power supplies21 – around $0.10 per kilowatt hour (kWh), or roughly double the rate charged by Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
However, in 2018 the cost of Uzbek electricity was lowered to $0.05 per kWh, bringing it in line with its neighbours. Uzbekistan’s state-run power company, Uzbekenergo, has also begun building a 260-km transmission line between Surkhan in Uzbekistan and the Afghan town of Pul-e-Khumri (to connect with the Indian-constructed line running from the latter to Kabul). This will enable a significant expansion of Uzbek power exports, and could potentially be extended to Pakistan. The project may also enable the electrification of the railway connecting Hairatan, in Balkh province and on the border with Uzbekistan, with the provincial capital of Mazar-i-Sharif, reducing transport costs on that route.
Tajikistan’s exports complement those of Uzbekistan. Most of its energy comes from hydropower – the country is home to 4 per cent of potential global hydropower.22 This potential includes the massive Roghun hydropower project, which could generate 3,600 MW. However, it was bitterly opposed by Islam Karimov, the former Uzbek president. The current Uzbek government has not clarified its stance towards Roghun. Peak supply in Tajikistan is reached in summer, although in the winter months Tajikistan experiences energy shortages. Were intra-Central Asian power trade to be revived in the absence of expanded power generation capacity, Tajik and Uzbek exports to Afghanistan could be jeopardized.
Were intra-Central Asian power trade to be revived in the absence of expanded power generation capacity, Tajik and Uzbek exports to Afghanistan could be jeopardized.
Turkmenistan has the world’s sixth largest gas reserves, and has invested heavily in gas-fired power stations, enabling it to export power to Afghanistan as well as Iran. Turkmenistan is connected to Afghanistan by existing transmission lines between Ymamnazar, on its southeastern border, and the Afghan town of Andkhoy (in Faryab province); and between Serhetabat, in the extreme south of Turkmenistan, and Herat, Afghanistan’s third largest city. However, these cables are not able to deliver the 300 MW exports agreed under the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) TUTAP Power Interconnection Framework.23 In 2018 work started on a high-voltage transmission line which would enable Turkmen exports to Afghanistan to increase substantially – and potentially to overtake those of Uzbekistan.
The break-up of CAPS, and the subsequent desire of the Central Asian countries to be self-sufficient, have led energy exports to be seen as providing leverage, while energy imports create vulnerabilities. Given the necessity of energy security for economic stability, there is a need to develop a sense of co-dependency, rather than the current patron-client relationships that exist, to a greater or lesser extent, in each case.24
Large-scale projects also face security threats. For instance, in early 2018 the Taliban attacked the transmission lines connecting Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to Kabul four times within a one-month period.25 While such attacks, and the resultant damage to infrastructure, are routinely claimed by and blamed on the Taliban, some hold that beneficiaries of the status quo – in particular diesel ‘mafias’ selling fuel for small generators – could have been to blame.
Two of the long-awaited megaprojects are gradually coming to fruition, enabled in part by the increased interconnectedness of Afghanistan’s electricity grid. In February 2018 a framework agreement was signed for the TAP Power Interconnection Project. The first phase will use infrastructure constructed as part of the TUTAP Power Interconnection Project, enabling power to be exported from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is due to be completed by 2021. The second phase, scheduled for completion the following year, will transfer power from Turkmenistan into Herat, Kandahar, and through Spin Boldak (all in Afghanistan); and to Chaman and Quetta in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. In total, around 500 km of transmission lines will be constructed, enabling up to 4,000 MW of power to be exported to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This project will help facilitate the TAP project.
These projects will then link into the Central Asia–South Asia power project (CASA-1000) by transferring any surplus power in winter. CASA-1000 is predicated on the fact that Central Asia has a power surplus in summer, when the countries of South Asia have power shortages.
Substantial efforts – both internally and through these large-scale projects – are being directed at connecting Afghanistan’s grid with those in neighbouring countries, so that Afghanistan can act as the conduit between Central and South Asia. At the same time, Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain provides ample scope for the development of off-grid electricity, as do several of the more remote areas bordering Afghanistan, such as Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, officially called the Viloyati Mukhtori Kuhistoni Badakhshan (Kuhistoni Badakhshan Autonomous Region, or VMKB), in southwestern Tajikistan.
Map: Current and planned electricity network
— Source: Chatham House, incorporating information from Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and Infrastructure and Cities for Economic Development (ICED). The boundaries and names on this map do not imply endorsement or acceptance by Chatham House.
Map: Current and planned electricity network
VMKB and the neighbouring Afghan province of Badakhshan have low population density: VMKB comprises 45 per cent of Tajikistan by area, but is home to just 3 per cent of its population – and has mountainous terrain. It also suffers harsh winters, with average night-time temperatures falling below -15°C – sometimes down to -30°C – and high levels of poverty. As of 2013, 51.5 per cent of the population were below the poverty line,26 and in 2009 one in four children suffered from stunting.27
Gorno-Badakhshan is not connected to the main Tajik electricity grid, since the connection between Tajikistan and Afghanistan runs south from Sangtuda, in eastern Tajikistan, to Kunduz. During the Soviet era, homes and businesses in the autonomous region received a large amount of heavily subsidized electricity and fuel, the latter including coal, diesel, oil and gas. Diesel generators produced 70 per cent of electricity during that period. Supplies of subsidized energy ceased after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. During the subsequent five-year civil war in the region, much of the transmission infrastructure was destroyed, so that by the early 2000s only around 13 per cent of households received a reliable energy supply, and even then for only 12 hours per day.
As in Afghanistan, the absence of electricity led to rapid deforestation as people turned to wood to fuel their heating and cooking during winter. Around 70 per cent of the region’s forests were destroyed between 1992 and 2002; respiratory illnesses from smoke inhalation increased in parallel. Some households felt they had no option but to chop down productive assets – fruit and nut trees – to burn as fuel. Lack of power meant that many schools and businesses were forced to close. Those that remained open were heated by low-quality coal, risking respiratory illness. Since 2010, the use of coal in schools in the region has fallen substantially.
In 2002 the government of Tajikistan, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) and the International Finance Corporation formed Tajikistan’s first public-private partnership, Pamir Energy, with the support of the World Bank and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs.28 The company was awarded a 25-year concession, giving it responsibility for the generation, transmission and distribution of all electricity in VMKB.
Since the project was launched, Pamir Energy has developed innovative schemes at each stage of the process and has introduced creative methods to collect payments. In terms of generation, it has renovated 11 micro-hydropower plants, which increased installed capacity from 27 MW to 44 MW. New turbines were installed at the main generating plant, Pamir I, which generates 28 MW and is able to retain water. This enables it to augment river flow by up to 40 per cent during winter, when low river levels can hamper power generation. As regards transmission, 4,300 km of transmission lines have been built or upgraded, and this had reduced line losses from 39 per cent in 2006 to less than 11 per cent by 2018.
There is a disinclination to pay for an unreliable or irregular service. If a reliable service is provided, whether for water or power, consumers become more inclined to pay.
On the distribution side, collection rates are enviable within the region, at around 100 per cent, up from 62 per cent in 2002.29 This is even more impressive given the heavy Soviet-era subsidies, where those with access to electricity paid less than 10 per cent of the cost of production. Meters were outdated and unable to measure production. Consequently, the starting point was that local populations were averse to paying for their electricity consumption; theft was commonplace, and line losses were high. In addition, as in many cases in South Asia, there is a disinclination to pay for an unreliable or irregular service. If a reliable service is provided, whether for water or power, consumers become more inclined to pay.
The process followed by Pamir Energy involved installing new metering systems at each level: generation, transmission, distribution and for consumers. Old meters have been recalibrated and new smart meters installed, so that more than 96 per cent of electricity is individually metered. Pamir Energy staff take monthly readings from the smart meters using electronic devices. These data are transferred to the billing system within five to eight seconds in order to calculate the consumption of each household, and clear, accurate bills are produced. Consumers are informed of their electricity usage and its cost via a text message sent to their mobile phone. The use of smart meters allows the company to regulate supply, and they can also be used to cut the electricity supply to customers in default.
Customer service call centres provide access to customer services, and record reports of any incident affecting infrastructure or supply lines, as well as faults. Pamir Energy has also installed an integrated network of CCTV cameras at important facilities to remotely monitor operations.
As the sales teams started engaging with consumers, their willingness to pay increased and theft began to be seen as a crime. Information was also disseminated through various media to explain the new approach. Consumers are also being encouraged to participate in various energy-saving schemes. The main one is the Customer Support Scheme, which is in force during the winter months (December to February).
Pamir Energy has two separate tariffs: one for domestic residential consumers, and the other for businesses and government. The Customer Support Scheme benefits those residential consumers who consume smaller amounts of electricity during the three winter months (see Figure 1), with the subsidy ranging from $0.0265 out of the full tariff of $0.0275 per kWh for the lowest-user category, up to 190.99 kWh, to $0.0225 per kWh for households using up to 360.99 kWh. Households using 361 kWh or more receive no subsidy. Almost 72 per cent of residential customers receive some level of subsidy under the scheme.
Figure 1: Residential energy consumers receiving energy subsidies over three months in winter 2017/18
— Source: Pamir Energy.
Figure 1: Residential energy consumers receiving energy subsidies over three months in winter 2017/18
Thanks to the metering technology used, electricity theft is no longer a serious problem in the VMKB; it now accounts for 0.6 to 0.8 per cent of connections – around half the rate that occurs in the UK.30 The meters are sealed, and while some customers attempt to open the boxes and illegally procure power, this can be readily detected. Each month, Pamir Energy analyses electricity consumption (both from consumers and from transformer substations) to see if there are any significant variations in consumption, compared to prior periods. This is the most common way to detect electricity theft.
Communications are key to the success of the venture. Pamir Energy’s marketing department issues monthly publications, which explain the charging structure and highlight methods of saving energy, for example by the use of low-energy appliances and by improving insulation. Pamir Energy has been able to generate additional revenue by selling carbon credits abroad. This provided €1.25 million for the 10-year period between 2005 and 2015. Emission reductions were equivalent to 281,336 tonnes of carbon dioxide.
In 2008, Pamir Energy began exporting Tajik power to Afghanistan – over the Panj river that serves as the border. At present there are eight cross-border transmission points, supplying 4 per cent of Afghan Badakhshan’s population. In contrast to their counterparts in Tajikistan, many of the Afghan communities that now benefit from these exports had never received electricity before. By 2016, 96 per cent of households were reported to be receiving uninterrupted supplies of electricity, and by 2018 Pamir Energy provided energy to 208,000 people in Tajikistan and 40,000 people in Afghanistan.
Electricity from Tajikistan is cheaper than the government-supplied electricity in other districts of Badakhshan, which do not benefit from cross-border power facilities. Residents of Shughnan district, for example, pay 3 afghanis (Af) for each kWh of electricity from Tajikistan. According to the members of the local community development council (CDC), a monthly bill for a typical family using electricity for cooking and lighting would be around Af700 ($9, at a conversion rate of $1 = Af79). The commercial rate for buying electricity from Tajikistan is Af7 per kWh. In contrast, residential electricity in the provincial capital of Faizabad costs Af45 per kWh, and provision is limited. In August 2018 residents of Faizabad received electricity between 6pm and 10pm daily; this electricity is supplied by the Afghan government and is generated using diesel. The tariff, at $1 per kWh is one of the highest in the world. The availability of Tajik electricity in the border regions of Badakhshan has made these areas more desirable than the interior of the province.
Pamir Energy, in close cooperation with the government of Tajikistan, recently secured additional financing from the World Bank to provide electricity to the remaining 4 per cent of the population in the most remote areas of VMKB. It will provide off-grid solutions applying a hybrid model of hydro, solar, wind and storage generation for these communities, thereby fully electrifying VMKB.
On the Afghan side of the border, the government of Afghanistan and the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development are negotiating a 30-year agreement similar to that which exists with Tajikistan. This would involve a new subsidiary of the AKDN – Badakhshan Energy – being granted the energy-related assets currently managed by Afghanistan’s national utility company, DABS. The proposed agreement, expected to be signed later in 2019, has three objectives: to increase electricity generation by enhancing capacity; to construct transmission lines to create a regional grid connected to Tajikistan; and to electrify the entire project. Given the scale of the challenge in remote areas, the works will be rolled out in phases.
Pamir Energy has recently begun construction work on the 11 MW Sebzor hydropower project in VMKB, just 18 km from the Afghan border. Existing power generation is sufficient to enable 100 per cent electrification in VMKB, and for around 47 per cent in Afghan Badakhshan (covering more than 468,000 people).31 The Sebzor project will be critical in meeting the likely increase in demand over the medium term.
By 2025 the company hopes to have extended its grid into Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral in northern Pakistan – areas that are currently poorly served in terms of energy provision.
In fuel-scarce communities, the cost of fuel can form a significant proportion of household expenditure, and the self-supply of biomass fuels can occupy much of a family’s time.
While communities in these mountainous cross-border regions may be poor, the economics of energy provision make sense and the provision of electricity can sharply reduce household expenditure. The cost of renovating the power supply in the VMKB was $108 million.32 For 208,000 consumers, this works out at $519 per head. In fuel-scarce communities, the cost of fuel can form a significant proportion of household expenditure, and the self-supply of biomass fuels can occupy much of a family’s time. A typical month’s electricity costs just $15, but the cost of diesel generators and fuel, kerosene or other energy sources can be as much as $98 per month.33 In some villages without power, around four to five hours per day can be spent collecting wood to burn – a task usually carried out by women. Either way, the provision of electricity can substantively improve livelihoods.
Beyond the actual time taken to collect firewood, the provision of electricity also frees up time hitherto occupied by a range of other tasks: cooking over a wood fire, heating water, washing clothes and so forth. As well as facilitating household tasks, the provision of electricity enables IT and mobile phone services to function. Previously, many businesses were forced to shut down during the winter months. With electrification, the number of small enterprises increased from 640 to 2,300.34
Social indicators have also improved as a result of the provision of electricity. Schools can be equipped with computers. Now, every school in the VMKB has at least one computer. For border districts in Afghanistan, the impact has also been significant. For instance, in Shighnan district in Badakhshan, girls now freed from some of their previous domestic tasks have been able to attend English and computing classes along with their male peers. Afghan staff at these training and learning centres insist the provision of reliable electricity has fundamentally transformed lives for young people. The ability to study at night has correlated with a rise in educational achievement.35 Healthcare and medical facilities are able to offer better services when power supplies are reliable – ensuring, for example, that medicines can be kept in chilled conditions. Some donors have provided equipment that would be unusable in the absence of a regular electricity supply. There are specific positive health outcomes given the reduction in smoke pollution. Environmentally, the reduced demand for firewood complements reforestation efforts taking place in the region, which serve to reduce the threat from landslides. The provision of electricity has also changed the general quality of life in the region. Without electricity, families previously used to cook during daytime and sleep as soon as it was dark, but now they can enjoy more family time – and even watch television.
Lessons learned
Culturally sensitive community engagement is necessary to ensure local support for new initiatives. Initially, local populations may be sceptical of the motivations behind projects. The same lesson applies to local governments, which need to have some degree of ownership.
A long-term approach and commitment is clearly preferable to a more transient interest. This allows for a more holistic approach whereby, for instance, energy projects are not seen as standalone but are linked to broader means of delivering economic growth and social improvement.
Simplicity is key, both in explaining the rationale and logistics of a project, and in subsequent engagement through billing and customer support.
The provision of power can have a significant transformative effect beyond what may have been initially envisaged. Increased educational opportunities and healthcare possibilities can be achieved. Meanwhile, in cold regions the time or money freed from gathering or buying firewood can significantly increase economic well-being, with further beneficial impacts on the environment, for instance.
The absence of electric power can – in part at least – explain why some districts are poor. Ability to pay therefore – in particular with some targeted subsidization for the poorest communities – may be higher than might have been expected. Treating development through the prism of consumers – despite apparent lack of ability to pay – may result in more positive developmental outcomes.
As with many non-governmental, cross-border initiatives in South Asia, the cross-border element stemmed from the recognition that capacities in one country could be used to meet the needs of populations living across the border. This is not usually the case in this part of the world, where, in general, the complexity of cross-border operations deters organizations in one country from expanding into another.36
As with trade, there is a difference in interpretation between ‘national’ and ‘local’ trade. Thus, electricity transmission lines running to Kabul have been subject to insurgent attacks as a means of targeting or undermining the Afghan government, even though the Taliban have indicated their support for large-scale infrastructure projects. Other cross-border power-trading mechanisms could be targeted similarly in order to reduce revenues that support the government. However, if local communities are benefiting, then there would appear to be little logic in non-state armed groups targeting electricity supplies.
A growing acceptance in South Asia – and a re-emerging acceptance in Central Asia – of the benefits of cross-border power trading suggest that energy can serve as an entry point to other forms of cross-border exchange or management. This could encompass areas that are currently more politically sensitive – if not downright controversial – such as water or transport.
5 World Bank, International Energy Agency and the Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (2019), ‘Access to electricity (%)’, Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) database, World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.ZS?locations=AF (accessed 13 May 2019).
6 Krishnan, N., Tan, X., Wieser, C., and Yde-Jensen, T. (2018), Afghanistan’s Displaced People: A Socio-Economic Profile, 2013-2014. Key Findings from the 2013-14 Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey, Washington, DC: 2018 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/294921533557045480/pdf/129249-ALCS-2013-14-note-CLEAN-UPDATED.pdf (accessed 28 May 2019).
7 Smart Energy International (2018), ‘ADB co-funds Afghanistan’s $80m energy contracts’, 25 April 2018, https://www.smart-energy.com/industry-sectors/energy-grid-management/afghanistan-adb/ (accessed 28 May 2019).
8 Rehfuess, E. (2006), Fuel for life: household energy and health, Geneva: World Health Organization, https://www.who.int/airpollution/publications/fuelforlife.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
9 Nichols, M. (2011), ‘Winter brings fiery killer into Afghan homes’, Reuters, 13 January 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-winter-deaths-feature/winter-brings-fiery-killer-into-afghan-homes-idUSTRE70C0V220110113 (accessed 26 Jun. 2019).
10 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (2018), Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Annual Report 2018, Kabul: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_annual_report_2018_final_24_feb_2019_1.pdf (accessed 8 Mar. 2019).
11 World Integrated Trade Solution (undated), ‘Afghanistan Trade at a Glance: Most Recent Values’, https://wits.worldbank.org/CountrySnapshot/en/AFG/textview (accessed 13 May 2019).
12 World Food Programme (2017), Badghis Emergency Assessment Report November 2017, Afghanistan Food Security Cluster and World Food Programme, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/badghis20emergency20food20security20assessment20201720
report.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
13 UNEP and NEPA (2008), Afghanistan’s environment 2008.
14 UN News (2012), ‘UN-supported project brings Afghans one step closer to cleaner cooking stoves’, 28 February 2012, https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/02/404992-un-supported-project-brings-afghans-one-step-closer-cleaner-cooking-stoves (accessed 21 May 2019).
15 UNDP Afghanistan (2016), ‘Snow leopards in Wakhan: UNDP talks big cats and conservation on Mitra TV (Video)’, UNDP Press Center, 5 October 2016, http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/presscenter/IntheNews/snowleopard.html (accessed 13 May 2019).
16 World Bank (2018), Afghanistan Renewable Energy Development Issues and Options, Washington, DC.: World Bank Group, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/352991530527393098/pdf/Afghanistan-Renewable-Energy-Development-Issues-
and-Options.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
17 UNDP in Afghanistan (2017), ‘The Power of Nature: How Renewable Energy is Changing Lives in Afghanistan’, 13 September 2017,
http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/presscenter/IntheNews/renewable-energy-in-afghanistan-atn.html (accessed 13 May 2019).
18 Ibid.
19 Tomborg, I. (2012), ‘Energy industry in Central Asia – challenges and prospects’, Russian International Affairs Council, 26 April 2012,
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/energy-industry-in-central-asia-challenges-and-prospects/ (accessed 26 Jun. 2019).
20 Eurasianet (2017), ‘Uzbekistan, Tajikistan Power Grids to Reunite in Boon for the Region’, 8 November 2017, https://eurasianet.org/
uzbekistan-tajikistan-power-grids-to-reunite-in-boon-for-the-region (accessed 13 May 2019).
21 Aminjonov, F. (2016), Afghanistan’s energy security: tracing Central Asian countries’ contribution, Kabul: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Afghanistan Office, https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kabul/12790.pdf (accessed 10 Mar. 2019).
22 Energypedia (undated), ‘Tajikistan Energy Situation’, https://energypedia.info/wiki/Tajikistan_Energy_Situation (accessed 13 May 2019).
23 Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) program (2017), ‘Energy Sector Progress Report and Work Plan (August 2016–
May 2017)’, Senior Officials’ Meeting, 20–21 June 2017, https://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/Energy-Sector-Progress-Report-and-Work-Plan-August-2016%E2%80%93May-2017.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
24 Fieldwork for this project noted that while Afghans in border areas greatly appreciated having an electricity supply from Tajikistan, they were concerned that Afghans were not ‘equal’ in the bilateral arrangements.
25 Synovitz, R. (2018), ‘Taliban Attacks Short-Circuit Kabul Power Plays’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 21 April 2018,
https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-attacks–short-circuit-kabul-power-plays/29173009.html (accessed 10 Mar. 2019).
26 Asian Development Bank (2016), Country Partnership Strategy: Tajikistan 2016–2020, Poverty Analysis (Summary), August 2016, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cps-taj-2016-2020-pa.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
27 World Bank and UNICEF (2012), Situational Analysis, Improving economic outcomes by expanding nutrition programming in Tajikistan, https://www.unicef.org/tajikistan/Tajikistan_Nutrition_Report_Eng.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
28 Asian Development Bank (2014), ‘CAPE Tajikistan, Linked Document 10’, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/
10-Energy-Sector.pdf (accessed 13 Mar. 2019).
29 Ibid.
30 According to the energy price comparison site UKPower.co.uk, electricity theft costs each UK consumer £20 per year, as against an average bill of around £1,100. See UKPower (2018), ‘Energy theft – are you at risk?’, 20 September 2018, https://www.ukpower.co.uk/gas_electricity_news/energy-theft-are-you-at-risk (accessed 26 Jun. 2019).
31 Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) (2017), ‘Pamir Energy Transforming Lives through Hydropower’, https://www.akdn.org/sites/akdn/files/media/publications/2017_06_pamir_energy_-_brief_0.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019).
32 Ibid.
33 Aga Khan Foundation (undated), ‘Pamir Energy Wins 2017 Ashden Award for Increasing Energy Access’, https://www.akf.org.uk/news/pamir-energy-wins-2017-ashden-award/ (accessed 13 May 2019).
34 Jumaev, D. (2016), ‘Case 19, Tajikistan Energy Sector Pamir Private Power Project (PPPP)’, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/documents/2016/PPP/Forum_PPP-SDGs/Presentations/Case_19_Tajikistan__Energy_Sector__Daler_Jumaev.pdf (accessed 13 May 2019); and interview, June 2019.
35 Ibid.
36 For instance, Chatham House has documented examples of organizations providing flood warnings in one country then subsequently extending the warnings to vulnerable communities downstream in lower riparian countries. However, these examples are rare: most organizations operate in just one country.