4. Cross-border Ecosystems
Another casualty of conflict has been Afghanistan’s now degraded environment. Ruined infrastructure and conflict-related risks such as landmines have affected farming practices. Deforestation has been rampant, as people in many rural areas have few alternative sources of energy to wood; moreover, ‘timber mafias’ have taken advantage of the absence of governance institutions to smuggle timber across the border into Pakistan. Indeed, while attacks on hydropower projects are frequently blamed on neighbouring downstream countries, some claim that ‘diesel mafias’ – who smuggle fuel to power generators – are sometimes responsible. This environmental degradation threatens Afghan lives, by making natural disasters such as landslides and avalanches more intense. It also hinders Afghans’ ability to earn licit income from agriculture, not least because of deteriorating soil quality.
Environmental degradation threatens Afghan lives, by making natural disasters such as landslides and avalanches more intense. It also hinders Afghans’ ability to earn licit income from agriculture, not least because of deteriorating soil quality.
Management of Afghanistan’s environment is challenging enough, but a further layer of complexity is added when ecosystems traverse boundaries. Effective management of cross-border ecosystems requires international cooperation if it is to succeed. Given the power, capacity and knowledge asymmetries between Afghanistan and its neighbours, such cooperation is difficult to envisage.
Water scarcity compounds the difficulties in relation to cross-border riverine ecosystems. In countries that are water-scarce, shared rivers are frequently perceived as a zero-sum resource, rather than as potential areas to provide shared benefits. Water is a serious, and possibly growing, source of tension across South and Central Asia. Attempts by upstream countries to construct storage infrastructure are seen to threaten the availability of water to countries downstream.
Upstream Afghanistan has greater water availability than many of its neighbours, but the latter have benefited from the destruction of Afghanistan’s existing water infrastructure. Afghan attempts to build or rebuild water infrastructure have incurred attacks on engineers, which in many cases are attributed by Afghans to downstream countries.
In such a context, the outlook for cooperation over the 2,000-sq km Sistan Basin – the endpoint for several Afghan rivers, including the Helmand (called the Hirmand in Iran) – appears bleak at first sight. These wetlands span southwestern Afghanistan and eastern Iran, and end in the Hamoun lakes, one of the few sources of fresh water in the region. The lakes sustain agriculture in both countries, though the land is more fertile – and the agriculture more productive – in Iran.
The Sistan Basin is a region of immense environmental importance and once sustained numerous animal species: more than 100 species of fish swam in the lakes, while numerous mammals – deer, leopards and otters – relied on them as a source of water. In 1975, when the Iranian portion was designated a Ramsar site,49 around half a million birds – from 150 or so different species, including flamingos and pelicans – fed in the wetlands as they migrated.
Local populations are also reliant on the basin for their livelihoods, notably through fishing and the use of reeds for cooking, for feeding livestock and for the construction of shelter. Local communities were well adapted to their environment, with livelihoods based on hunting, fishing and farming. Until recently, there were more than 1 million domestic livestock in the region, with farmers also growing several types of fruits and vegetables, including barley, maize and wheat, cotton and sugar cane, and grapes and melons.
The lakes have been a source of tension between Afghanistan and Persia/Iran for more than a century,50 and arbitrary borders drawn by outsiders have not helped. Given that the area around Sistan was the only densely populated area lying between Persia and Afghanistan, it was the first to be demarcated.
In the mid-19th century both Afghanistan and Persia sought the allegiance of local rulers. Subsequently, Persia took advantage of instability in Afghanistan and enhanced its presence in the region. However, threatened by an Afghan reaction, in 1868 Persia sought British arbitration (as specified by the 1857 Treaty of Paris, which had ended the Anglo-Persian War).
In 1872, under the so-called Goldsmid Arbitration, Persia was awarded Sistan – an ancient land situated around the lakes, albeit with undefined borders. Land on the right bank of the Helmand river was awarded to Afghanistan. The award, which was held to favour Persia over Afghanistan, also contained a clause stating that ‘no works are to be carried out on either side calculated to interfere with the requisite supply of water for irrigation on both banks of the Helmand’ – although it was not specified what this meant.
The award was flawed, either by design – to maintain British influence – or accident, owing to a lack of information. The landmarks chosen to define the border were often unstable – the edges of lakes that fluctuated in size, or unpredictable rivers.
Culturally, there was little difference between the communities on either side of the river. In 1885, the Helmand river changed course, though both sides continued to accept the old riverbed as the border. However, in 1896 it changed course entirely. Both countries constructed various canals – sometimes for mutual benefit, sometimes not – on their bank of the river. Following a drought in 1901 Persia and Afghanistan traded accusations that the one was carrying out irrigation work to harm the other, and argued over whether the border was marked by the riverbed as it existed in 1872, or the Helmand river as it currently flowed. A severe drought in 1902 led to armed skirmishes, which in turn led to a further British arbitration in 1904, confirming that the old (and dry) riverbed continued to form the border. Finally, the arbitration granted Persia one-third of the flow of the river as it entered Sistan, and made both countries responsible for the supply of water into the existing irrigation network.
Afghan attempts in the 1940s to develop a system of canals for irrigation, as well as a number of major US-backed projects to expand irrigation in Helmand and introduce capital-intensive agriculture to settle nomadic communities, had a significant impact on water availability downstream. A tripartite commission was set up which, in 1951, determined that Afghanistan had to supply Persia (now known as Iran) with a minimum monthly flow. However, Iran rejected the allocation as too low. The dispute flared up again in 1971, when the region was affected by severe drought once again. Iran was awarded a slightly higher water allocation than had been proposed in 1951; however, ratification of the treaty was delayed by political instability in Afghanistan.
In the 1960s Afghanistan demanded credit facilities, assistance and access to Iranian ports in exchange for ensuring that water continued to flow to Iran. Under the Helmand River Treaty of 1973, it was stipulated that 26 cubic metres per second should flow into Iran; it too was not ratified. Political turmoil in both countries soon afterwards left the issue unresolved. In 1998, during a prolonged drought in the region, the Taliban closed the Kajaki dam, reducing the flow downstream. By the time the bilateral relationship had improved in the early 2000s under Presidents Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan and Mohammad Khatami of Iran, the wetlands had been severely damaged by years of drought and were rapidly disappearing.
By 2001 the flow of the Helmand river stood at just 2 per cent of its long-term average; by 2003, 99 per cent of the wetlands had dried up, and by the following year they had largely disappeared.
The periodic occurrence of droughts in the region has meant that at times the lower Hamoun lakes have dried up, although the ensuing damage could be rapidly reversed. The region survived increased use of water for irrigation upstream over the course of centuries, although population growth, coupled with upstream dam construction, has made it more vulnerable to shortages. However, the severe drought that hit the region from 1998 caused significant damage. All of the lakes, including those at higher elevations, started to dry up, with devastating effects both for wildlife and for local populations. By 2001 the flow of the Helmand river stood at just 2 per cent of its long-term average; by 2003 around 99 per cent of the wetlands had dried up, and by the following year they had largely disappeared.
Local animal populations reliant on the bodies of water disappeared; domestic livestock died, and the migratory patterns of birds changed. The region rapidly turned into a dustbowl as vegetation dried up or was collected for fuel. This soil erosion resulted in around 100 towns being submerged by dust. Local populations in Iran migrated – a political concern for largely Shia Iran, since the Sistan basin is situated in one of two Sunni provinces. In turn, the displaced Iranians were replaced by around 300,000 Afghan refugees, fleeing conflict and also facing malnutrition across the border.
Dust storms remain a significant problem: in August 2018 more than 170 people in the Iranian province of Sistan and Baluchestan were hospitalized following one such storm. The remoteness of the region meant that the risks were under-researched. The lack of local knowledge impaired scientists’ ability to forecast the damage, or to reverse it, and has enabled both Iran and Afghanistan to provide their own, differing, explanations of the cause of the environmental disaster. Iran blames what it perceives as a long-term decline in water flow on the construction upstream of various infrastructure items. Two dams in the Afghan province of Helmand – at the Kajaki reservoir and the Boghra diversion, both constructed in the 1950s – have provoked ire in Iran, as has the construction of canals for irrigation purposes.
Afghanistan, in contrast, has an entirely different explanation, blaming the drought on low rainfall and Iran’s own activities. Much of the water infrastructure on the Afghan side fell into disrepair during years of conflict, while Iran has itself diverted water from the river to fill reservoirs to provide drinking water for the city of Zahedan, the provincial capital of Sistan and Baluchestan.
The ongoing Sistan crisis is taking place within a broader context, in which Iran faces a severe nationwide water shortage. Its most famous lake, Lake Urmia, has almost dried up, having once spanned more than 5,000 sq km. While high population growth has clearly caused increased demand, on the supply side explanations for the phenomenon diverge. Some Iranians claim shortages are a result of conspiracies by Iran’s enemies, though others suggest decades of mismanagement and illegal water usage are to blame, at least in part. (The former view reflects a tendency across the region in relation to water – to first blame other countries before taking action to resolve more mundane issues by, for instance, repairing leaking pipes.)
While high population growth has clearly caused increased demand, on the supply side explanations for the phenomenon diverge. Some Iranians claim shortages are a result of conspiracies by Iran’s enemies, though others suggest decades of mismanagement and illegal water usage are to blame, at least in part.
In this context, in the early 2000s51 Iran invited the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to launch a technical dialogue with Afghanistan regarding the basin. UNEP undertook various technical studies, and facilitated two meetings, both in Geneva, with Iranian and Afghan representation, in 2005 and 2006. In parallel, UNEP and UNDP developed a proposal for the restoration, protection and sustainable use of the Sistan Basin.52
The project was intended to allow for the creation of an environmental investment programme, under the Global Environment Facility. However, the dialogue was subsequently put on hold, due in part to the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan and in part to Iran’s own worsening relationship with the international community. The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened to halt cross-border dialogues regarding water, partly because it feared that a lack of capacity on the Afghan side would place it at a disadvantage in any negotiations. Afghan insecurity was further deepened by a widespread belief among Afghans that, in parallel with the relatively positive progress in developing a shared approach towards the Hamoun lakes, Iran was playing a less diplomatic game in undermining Afghanistan’s attempts to develop its own water infrastructure.
Various lessons are nevertheless apparent from this attempted initiative. First, technical papers written by neutral experts provided a starting point for a shared understanding of the nature of the problem. They also alerted both countries to the reality that, while there is no single explanation for the current situation, cooperation would be imperative if the basin were to be brought to life. Elsewhere in South Asia, joint teams of scientists from neighbouring countries have worked together to create a shared understanding of specific problems. In the case of Afghanistan, rightly or wrongly, there are concerns that weaker capacity on the Afghan side makes such collaboration more difficult.
Second, on this particular issue, the technical studies pointed to the fact that the problem was complex and multifaceted; responsibility was shared between the two countries, rather than blame laid squarely on one or the other. Had the latter been the case, the process may well have been curtailed earlier.
Third, while technical or scientific studies provide an entry point to a discussion of politically contentious issues, they remain subject to the vagaries of the domestic political climate. Timing interventions so that the outcomes are realized when the political climate is amenable is a necessary, if almost entirely unpredictable, condition for success.
Since 2014, the Sistan Basin has been revisited as an area of potential cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan. Lessons learned from the earlier engagement have been applied. UNDP shifted focus from the more sensitive cross-border wetlands to focus on Lake Urmia, and developed a strategy combining community participation, the promotion of sustainable agriculture and measures to reduce water consumption. As regards the Hamoun lakes, dialogue is now restricted to contact between experts – among whom there is an acceptance of shared responsibility and of the need to restore the lakes to their former state.
Lessons learned
In cross-border engagement on issues of environmental importance, it appears that evidence from one or other country is less trusted than that provided by a neutral arbiter, or by joint teams of scientists from both countries. However, if evidence is provided by an external agency, it is paramount that both countries accept its findings as neutral. Any shared process also serves as a trust-building measure between communities working on similar issues. As with each example, however, any bilateral process remains vulnerable to the overarching geopolitical environment.
In the case of Afghanistan, a lack of domestic capacity vindicates the use of external agencies. However, ideally this process would in parallel serve to strengthen Afghanistan’s future capacity to engage bilaterally on a more level playing field.
Progress is not guaranteed, and remains contingent on the domestic politics of the two countries. Consequently, long-term plans ignoring the agency of the countries in question are less effective than more flexible approaches to take advantage of windows of political opportunity.
In some examples, cross-border engagement has benefited from a sense of altruism. In this case, while there may have been a desire to protect a shared ecosystem, the potential funding available to support continued engagement appears to have provided an additional impetus for the two countries to work together.53
49 Signed in the Iranian city of Ramsar in 1971, the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat is intended to protect wetlands. As of 2014, there were more than 2,300 Ramsar sites around the world. See The Ramsar Convention (2014), ‘Wetlands of International Importance (Ramsar Sites)’, https://www.ramsar.org/about/wetlands-of-international-
importance-ramsar-sites (accessed 26 Jun. 2019).
50 For a fuller explanation, see Mojtahed-Zadeh, P. (1995), ‘Lake Hamun, a Disaster in the Making’, UNEP Newsletter and Technical Publications, http://www.unep.or.jp/ietc/Publications/techpublications/TechPub-4/lake1-7.asp (accessed 13 Mar. 2019).
51 Jensen, D. and Hamro-Drotz, D. (2011), ‘Lessons Learned on Environmental Diplomacy’, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/lessons-learned-environmental-diplomacy (accessed 14 Mar. 2019).
52 Global Environment Facility (GEF) (2009), ‘Restoration, Protection and Sustainable Use of the Sistan Basin, Project Summary’, https://www.thegef.org/project/restoration-protection-and-sustainable-use-sistan-basin (accessed 14 May 2019).
53 Jensen and Hamro-Drotz (2011), ‘Lessons Learned on Environmental Diplomacy’.