6. Conclusion
For centuries Afghanistan was integral to the Silk Road, which connected Asia and Europe in terms of trade, ideas, religions and culture. In their role as cultural entrepôts, Afghanistan’s cities flourished. The rise of shipping led to the gradual decline in the importance of the Silk Road, and Afghanistan’s position as tangential rather than pivotal to its neighbours was reinforced by its role as a crucial buffer state, separating the Russian and British empires. Railway lines ended at the Afghan border, in part as a means of impeding potential invaders from north or south.
More recently, decades of conflict have reinforced Afghanistan’s status as peripheral. Engagement – each way – has been negative rather than positive. Neighbouring countries’ support for various proxies within Afghanistan has served to further undermine stability. Connectivity with Afghanistan has more often been conceived in terms of public ‘bads’, most notably the opium trade, radical Islamist ideologies and weapons. Meanwhile, progress on many of the long-mooted and potentially positive large-scale infrastructure plans has stalled or been sluggish at best.
Rethinking Afghanistan’s borders as opportunities, rather than threats, is a precondition for enhanced connectivity. Fears that better connections ease the outflow of illicit trade – particularly in the case of opium – are not unfounded as regards some ungoverned spaces. However, better connectivity eases the spread of governance to remote areas, and on balance the impact of enhanced formalized trade on the opium industry would be negative, or at worst, neutral.
Rethinking Afghanistan’s borders as opportunities, rather than threats, is a precondition for enhanced connectivity.
Contrary to widespread perception, as this paper demonstrates, there are numerous – and growing – examples by which engagement between Afghanistan and its neighbours is taking place and is providing mutual benefits. Furthermore, this is occurring in an environment in which the notion of connectivity as a positive force has greater traction within Afghanistan’s neighbourhood than it did even a decade ago.
While a clear shift is under way among Afghanistan’s neighbours towards seeing the benefits of connectivity, two notions remain widespread. The first is a zero-sum mindset, whereby cooperation (for instance, in the form of trade in goods or power) in one direction is seen to come at the expense of cooperation in another field. The second is that cooperation (for instance, cross-border power trading) creates vulnerability for the recipient rather than a mutually beneficial relationship. Yet if Afghanistan is to develop long-term economic sustainability, these notions need to be overcome and the country needs to regain the regional centrality it once enjoyed.
The demonstration effect of cross-border projects is important. This is especially pertinent for small-scale projects, while the CASA-1000 energy transmission lines should serve to expedite other large-scale initiatives. The starting point in regard to cross-border cooperation is extremely low: some Tajik interviewees, for instance, recounted having grown up being literally warned not to look across the border lest they see an Afghan.65 More broadly, among local communities in neighbouring countries connectivity with Afghanistan is frequently feared, with the country being seen as the source of opium as well as of extreme religious ideologies – although the extent of the latter is often exaggerated for domestic political purposes.
In many cases, the initial response towards cross-border engagement is scepticism. However, this attitude appears to change once cross-border projects are in place, creating a more positive sentiment among both officials and local communities. Beyond simple economics, altruism appears to play a role in encouraging cooperation.
Furthermore, people-to-people contacts help to erode a number of stereotypes that have fed into broader narratives regarding Afghanistan – many of which date from the Soviet era and are based on the idea of Russia having ‘saved’ Central Asia from the Afghans. For example, Tajik participants who had been in educational exchanges with Afghanistan expressed surprise at the level of educational facilities available in Afghanistan (which partly reflected higher levels of donor support).66 A legacy of Soviet rule, for Central Asia, and a legacy of conflict for Afghanistan have meant that Afghans are frequently more entrepreneurial than their Central Asian neighbours. Tolo TV’s expansion into Central Asia, for instance, has had a positive impact (especially through Afghan music), contrasting with often more dour Central Asian TV stations. Thus contact – whether physical or virtual – demonstrates that engagement can provide learnings in both directions.
In the case of Tajikistan, geography provides a powerful argument for cross-border engagement. The terrain of the Tajik–Afghan border, and the fact that movement within northeastern Afghanistan is made easier by transiting Tajikistan rather than Afghanistan, makes the specifics of this border somewhat different than Afghanistan’s other borders. Nonetheless, the approaches taken do provide a template for the development of other cross-border initiatives. Where opportunities can be found to bring both economic and philanthropic benefits, there appears to be an altruistic value in cross-border engagement. Many Tajiks interviewed were happy to have contributed to the welfare of neighbouring Afghans.
The relationship between Tajikistan and Afghanistan differs somewhat from Afghanistan’s relationships with its other neighbours. The isolated nature of the Afghan province of Badakhshan has left it out of mainstream Afghanistan: it was the only province not captured by the Taliban in the 1990s. Its road links are poor, and at some times of year non-existent, making travel within the district easier via Tajikistan. This fact alone – and the resultant requirement for NGOs working in the province to travel through Tajikistan – provided an initial cross-border element to assistance in this region. The context of the GBAO also made a cross-border approach more feasible than along more contested borders.
Shared cultural linkages across the Tajik–Afghan border have parallels with each of Afghanistan’s other neighbours, with the exception of China. However, the politics to the north of Afghanistan differs from that with Iran and Pakistan. In the case of Iran and Pakistan, those inhabiting the border regions are viewed with ambivalence, if not outright suspicion. Sistan is one of Iran’s few Sunni-majority provinces. For Tehran, stability in Sistan is desirable in order to ensure that Sunnis do not migrate to other parts of Iran and destabilize Shia-majority provinces. The tribal areas of Pakistan were, until recently, peripheral to the rest of Pakistan and viewed as lawless. In both cases, cross-border cultural linkages are still regarded as a threat rather than an opportunity.
Many of the barriers to better connectivity are relatively simple logistical issues. For instance, it is easier to develop border markets if cars or lorries can drive into the markets, and even easier if they can drive across the border. The need to have passports stamped at the border is a significant deterrent to cross-border interaction: regular traders on both sides of the border will frequently need to renew their passports, which is a burdensome activity. In a similar vein, trade is facilitated by mobile phone coverage. Mobile phones that work on both sides of the border are ideal, but if this is not possible, ease of access to local SIM cards can be an important determinant of success. While these logistical difficulties stem from the securitized nature of the border, enhanced people-to-people ties require some kind of liberalization if they are to be sustainable.
There is a growing sense in South and Central Asia that cross-border energy trading is both feasible and desirable, and Afghanistan is seen as a conduit for several large-scale links. However, the case of Badakhshan – one of Afghanistan’s poorest provinces – suggests that Afghanistan can benefit from domestic energy consumption. The geography of Badakhshan is such that it is more feasible for it to be connected with Tajikistan than with a national Afghan grid. In addition, the Pamir Energy experience suggests that, with a certain approach, Afghanistan can represent a profitable market for electricity exports. This finding not only has implications for the economics of the large-scale energy projects; it also suggests that there is scope for the development of cross-border micro-hydropower initiatives, both in the north and potentially in regions bordering Pakistan.
While Afghanistan’s borderlands may be poor, lack of access to power is a major contributing factor to their poverty. Winter temperatures fall well below zero, meaning that a significant percentage of household income is spent on firewood, or, as is more often the case, women and children are forced to spend hours collecting wood or dung. Access to power frees up time and/or money for more productive uses.
Winter temperatures fall well below zero, meaning that a significant percentage of household income is spent on firewood, or, as is more often the case, women and children are forced to spend hours collecting wood or dung.
Beyond the economic benefits, people’s health and the environment would both benefit from access to electricity. According to WHO, around 54,000 Afghans die annually from the effects of smoke inhalation. By way of comparison, just over 32,000 Afghan civilians died in conflict in the nine years to December 2018. Energy deficiencies have put immense strain on Afghanistan’s heavily depleted forests, with knock-on effects for agricultural production. In some cases, fruit and nut trees, which could otherwise be a source of revenue, have been cut down and used as firewood.
Demonstrating the advantages of cross-border cooperation to local communities at a micro level is likely to create a more conducive environment in which to advance larger-scale cross-border cooperation. Providing Afghans with power may serve to garner broad-based support for cross-border power trading initiatives.
Recommendations
Being culturally aware, expecting initial scepticism and planning a long-term engagement with a particular geography would appear to be obvious rules for successful interventions (whether or not they are cross-border in scope). For external donors, demonstrating that an engagement is planned to be long-term may be challenging; the more local the ownership model, the better. This also applies to the employment of local people.
For cross-border interventions, it is imperative to engage with government – whether central or local. In South and Central Asia there will be concern over the motivation behind any cross-border engagement that can only be overcome with government knowledge and support. Simplicity is key in engagement at all levels. The more complex the approach, the greater will be the assumption that there are hidden motivations.
The more localized the project, the greater the sense of, and potential for, local ownership. Intuitively, large-scale ‘national’ or international projects require local beneficiaries. For instance, if communities close to transmission lines do not receive electricity, they will feel less ownership than if they do. Such arguments recur in South Asia: the potential of hydropower in Nepal and of gas in Bangladesh has lain untapped because the existing market is seen to be external. Neither country wishes to provide resources to a neighbour before domestic needs are met. However, the example of Pamir Energy suggests that apparently poor consumers may present a viable market: the provision of power to those without opens up substantial economic opportunities.
Treating local communities as consumers rather than victims may prove empowering. In different contexts, Afghans have demonstrated the ability to pay for healthcare and electricity. If the ‘right’ to access health and power could be entrenched, this could facilitate the enhanced remit of the state in soft-power terms.
Treating local communities as consumers rather than victims may prove empowering. In different contexts, Afghans have demonstrated the ability to pay for healthcare and electricity.
Because of a growing acceptance in South Asia – and fresh acceptance in Central Asia – about the benefits deriving from cross-border power trading, energy can serve as an entry point to other forms of cross-border exchange or management for areas that are currently more politically sensitive, such as water.
It is important not to underestimate the beneficiaries of the status quo, even if the latter appears clearly suboptimal. ‘Mafias’ involved in providing diesel for generators oppose cleaner forms of energy; transport mafias oppose seamless trade across borders; smugglers oppose (generally) better connectivity as it allows for better governance. Such groups may be politically influential in preserving the status quo.
Regardless of their success, forums for cross-border people-to-people contacts such as markets remain vulnerable to overarching political or security concerns, whether genuine or exaggerated. Until markets are guaranteed to open at particular times, it is difficult to build genuine cross-border reliance, since market closures will mean that certain products will have to be procured from alternative sources. Furthermore, reliance can be interpreted as vulnerability, which is not without justification, given that markets have been closed and cross-border electricity exports shut off. Time is a necessary precondition for trust, but one that cannot be expedited.
Energy trading
The provision of power can have a significant transformative effect beyond what may have been initially envisaged. Increased educational opportunities and healthcare advances can be achieved. Meanwhile, in cold regions the time or money freed from gathering or buying firewood can significantly increase economic well-being, with further beneficial impacts on the environment for instance. The absence of power can also help to explain why some communities are poor. Thus, there may be a greater ability to pay – in particular with some targeted subsidization of the poorest communities – than might have been expected.
The provision of electricity can have a significant impact on Afghanistan. More Afghans die from smoke inhalation than from conflict. The need for firewood has a negative environmental impact and consumes time or money in poor communities. The provision of light extends family time and enables children to study. Whether on- or off-grid, the benefits of providing power are likely to vastly outweigh the costs.
Border markets
The construction of hard infrastructure is necessary but not in itself sufficient to facilitate seamless connectivity. ‘Soft infrastructure’ – whether human capital or legal frameworks – needs to be developed in parallel. Administrative burdens can also work to limit the impact of connectivity initiatives.
Many of the impediments to cross-border connectivity are logistical: a requirement to have passports stamped at the border (in countries in which new passports are difficult to obtain) is a clearly identifiable barrier to both traders and consumers; the need to offload and reload goods onto different vehicles adds to the cost of their transport. While there may be (real or exaggerated) security concerns that justify the status quo, innovative thinking (such as allowing other forms of identification to be used to access border markets) can circumvent the overarching official policy.
While there may be initial hesitation towards greater engagement with Afghanistan, once in place the benefits to both sides can generate enthusiasm. The markets have also provided space – both literal and conceptual – for other cross-border interactions.
Cross-border ecosystems
Shared ecosystems can be highly politically contentious, particularly given concerns regarding water availability, and they can fuel regional tension. Yet environmental degradation fuels conflict internally and hinders agricultural productivity. Efforts to convert this vicious circle into a virtuous one, however challenging, are clearly worthwhile.
In relation to many ecosystems that are shared between Afghanistan and its neighbours, the current evidence base on which decisions can be made is low. This provides scope for a neutral, external arbiter to gather evidence. Alternatively, if capacity on both sides is relatively equal, joint teams could be formed to conduct scientific research. Any shared process can serve as a trust-building measure between people and organizations from different countries working on similar issues.
Progress is not guaranteed, and remains contingent on the domestic politics of the countries involved. Consequently, long-term plans that ignore the agency of each of the countries in question are less effective than more flexible approaches to take advantage of windows of political opportunity.
In some examples, cross-border engagement has benefited from a sense of altruism among Afghanistan’s neighbours. Potential funding available to support continued engagement may provide an additional impetus for two countries to work together.67
Medical tourism
It is somewhat ironic that India and Pakistan, along with Iran, are in competition to attract Afghan patients. However, this competition provides a positive narrative as regards engaging with Afghanistan. Given the paucity of healthcare in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, in an ideal world Iran, Pakistan and India (along with Afghanistan) could engage in dialogue to assess in which fields of healthcare provision they each have comparative advantage.
In some respects, the geography of Badakhshan provides the obvious rationale for cross-border healthcare collaboration. Scattered communities on the Afghan side of the border are at some times of the year cut off from any access to secondary or tertiary healthcare in Afghanistan, yet medical facilities are available over the border.
Improving access to healthcare in Afghanistan should be a priority on its own merits, but also provides a means of enhancing stability in the country.
Improving access to healthcare in Afghanistan should be a priority on its own merits, but also provides a means of enhancing stability in the country. Years of conflict have ruined the country’s healthcare system and prompted most medical professionals to leave. For those in need of healthcare, the costs involved – in terms of both money and time – can push families into poverty, in turn potentially increasing the risk of radicalization.
At the same time, weak governance within Afghanistan is seen as a powerful recruiting message for non-state actors. Extending the remit of governance is paramount for the Afghan state. Yet the provision of public goods is a contested issue in many fields of government. It is not just the provision of security but issues such as education that are regarded as divisive. Healthcare (with very few exceptions, notably the issue of vaccination to prevent the transmission of polio) is one of the least politically contentious fields. Any action by Afghanistan’s neighbours to support healthcare provision for Afghans should be seen in a positive light.
65 Interview with female Tajik professionals with extensive experience of managing cross border projects with Afghanistan, August 2018.
66 This was reflected in particular in the interviews with Tajik members of AKDN cross-borders initiatives such as SPCE.
67 Jensen and Hamro-Drotz (2011), ‘Lessons Learned on Environmental Diplomacy’.