Building the Sudan of the future: inclusion and capacity development
The transitional government will need to focus on building a more inclusive and equitable system of economic governance that is representative of all sectors of society in Sudan. Disadvantaged populations from conflict zones and other peripheral areas of the country need to be properly included in the reform agenda. Providing greater opportunities for young people within the labour force and ensuring the meaningful participation of women in decision-making will be essential to building enduring and representative institutions.
Peacebuilding as the foundation for sustainable growth
Conflicts in many of Sudan’s peripheral areas have lasted for decades. One of the transitional government’s top priorities is to achieve a comprehensive peace agreement and work towards creating lasting peace in conflict regions, including Darfur, the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) and Eastern Sudan. A peace dividend would allow a reduction in security expenditure and enable growth, boost local populations in largely rural regions – including through the provision of gainful employment – and allow infrastructure development and improved agro-industrial output.
Historical marginalization and ethnic divisions have fed into serious conflicts in many of Sudan’s geographically peripheral areas; these enduring conflicts have caused huge loss of life, mass displacement and a humanitarian crisis. Millions of Sudanese are internally displaced or living as refugees, having suffered aerial bombing, destruction of their villages, occupation of their land by ‘new settlers’, and denial of humanitarian assistance. Eastern Sudan still has some of the country’s lowest development indicators. The perception among communities in conflict-affected and other peripheral areas is that the extent of their suffering under the Bashir regime has never been properly understood or sufficiently acknowledged by those in central Sudan, and any perception that they will continue to be sidelined in decision-making will be a source of anger. The ‘divide and rule’ policies of the previous regime, including encouraging tribalism and arming tribes against each other, has seriously damaged the social fabric and created polarization.
There is an urgent need for a peacebuilding response that addresses centre–periphery relations, security, transitional justice, and issues of returns, compensation and restoration of land and property in a way that brings communities together to promote reconciliation and peaceful coexistence, and that includes IDPs, refugees and other marginalized populations in the new governance structures so that their voices will be heard.
An inclusive peacebuilding process must also extend to other marginalized groups, such as communities affected by the Bashir regime’s dam-building programme, which forced the displacement of tens of thousands of people from the Nile Valley to arid desert locations without proper compensation. Many other Sudanese have lost their lands as a result of arbitrary expropriation of large tracts of territory under the former regime, either for its direct benefit or to lease to foreign investors. Others have lost their jobs in the civil service, the army or other professions, or have been forced to close their businesses as a result of ideological purges and the practice of tamkin (empowering regime loyalists), causing many to move abroad and thereby depriving Sudan of many of its most talented people.
Promoting decentralization and multiple poles of growth
Sudan’s economy is disproportionately based in Khartoum, with the capital estimated to account for up to two-thirds of national GDP,26 widening the gulf between the centre and peripheries. Sudan’s states are highly dependent on transfers from the federal state apparatus in Khartoum, and as such are deeply embedded within networks of political patronage. Many states are not only resource-poor, but have also failed to manage what resources they have efficiently, with the majority of their spending being allocated to salaries. In some areas, multiple taxes on the movement of goods have created particular difficulties for the competitive pricing of livestock and their transport to Sudanese ports.
At the federal level, moreover, the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC) has long been subject to political interference, despite being mandated to increase transparency in state transfers. The long-term aim should be to facilitate multiple poles of growth across Sudan, supported by the review and implementation of fiscal federalism, with the aim of rationalizing expenditure, restructuring transfers to enable greater allocations to less developed and marginalized states, and reducing political nepotism and patronage. This will require reforming the FFAMC with the aim of preserving its autonomy, promoting transparency and applying a rules-based fiscal policy across all states.
Youth, women and future opportunities
The lack of transparency in Sudan’s economic environment has left young people unable to see a route to employment. Many have left the country, or are determined to leave to seek opportunities elsewhere, and some have been drawn into militarized movements. More than half of Sudan’s 40 million population are under the age of 25,27 and there is a clear disconnect between the country’s young population and its very much older leaders. Sudan’s younger generations must have a prominent role in shaping the country’s future, and they have been calling for greater representation, improved education and enhanced employment opportunities.
Women, in particular, suffered under the former regime’s repression, and potentially have most to gain from changes in governance. The transitional authorities should commit to ensuring greater representation for women and young people in the new governance structures and decision-making bodies. The new prime minister’s inclusion of four women in his 18-member cabinet, including Sudan’s first female minister of foreign affairs, has been widely welcomed as a progressive step.28 This needs to be built on.
At the forefront of Sudan’s long-term considerations will be the challenge of the very rapid growth in the country’s labour force, with more than 130,000 young entrants expected annually.29 Sudan currently falls far below the expected benchmark of social spending for an emerging economy. Education was allocated just 2 per cent of the budget under the Bashir regime,30 and the system is failing to provide graduates with the necessary skills for the labour market. Furthermore, a programme of economic diversification will be essential for generating productive and sustainable employment opportunities. There is also a need to promote measures to encourage youth involvement in formal enterprise and entrepreneurship, and to remove barriers to doing business.
The effectiveness of the civil service is also highly reliant on having an appropriately skilled workforce. The instrumentalization of the civil service as a patronage tool has left Sudan with a bloated and inefficient public administration. A professional and sustainable civil service must be representative of all sectors of Sudanese society: the inclusion of women, young people, disadvantaged groups and citizens from the peripheral areas of the country must be prioritized within any reform agenda, along with the development of a culture of service.
26 Figures provided during Sudan Stakeholder Dialogues Roundtable 1, 22–23 January 2019, Oxfordshire, United Kingdom.
27 World Population Review (2019), ‘Sudan Population 2019’, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sudan-population/ (accessed 11 Sept. 2019).
28 Sudan Tribune (2019), ‘FFC, Hamdok reach deal on Sudan’s transitional cabinet’, 5 September 2019, http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article68055 (accessed 5 Sept. 2019).
29 African Development Bank (2019), African Economic Outlook 2019, p. 178.
30 Quartz Africa (2016), ‘Sudan could spend up to 70% of its budget on several war fronts this year’, 12 February 2016, https://qz.com/africa/615938/sudan-could-spend-up-to-70-of-its-budget-on-several-war-fronts-this-year/ (accessed 10 Aug. 2019).