7. Emerging Alliances
Among the greatest shifts in UAE foreign policy over the past decade has been in Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Riyadh, which has transformed from one of quiet mistrust to a close – if nuanced – working relationship.
As is discussed elsewhere in this paper, the UAE had long regarded Saudi Arabia as being among the greatest threats to its national security. ‘[W]hile publicly expressing close ties with Riyadh, the UAE privately regards the Kingdom as its second greatest security threat after Iran,’ US diplomats noted in a 2009 diplomatic cable.98 The cable, later published by WikiLeaks, noted heightening tensions between the more assertive Bani Fatima and Saudi Arabia under the then King Abdullah. MbZ is said to have had a strained relationship with Mohammed bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia’s powerful deputy interior minister and subsequently interior minister. In another cable, US diplomats reported that MbZ had raised the possible repercussions in the event of state collapse in Saudi Arabia with them – a possibility that had been mooted in the context of running battles between Saudi state forces and Al-Qaeda cells in previous years.99
After 2011 the UAE and Saudi Arabia became more closely aligned, initially as a response to the Arab uprisings, and subsequently through the strong relationship between MbZ and Mohammed bin Salman.
After 2011, however, the UAE and Saudi Arabia became more closely aligned, initially as a response to the Arab uprisings, and subsequently through the strong relationship between MbZ and Mohammed bin Salman (commonly referred to as MbS), who since his father’s ascension to the throne in 2015 has become the centre of gravity in Saudi political life, assuming a role similar to MbZ’s own in the UAE. ‘The boss talks to him regularly, and I think he values his counsel,’ said one Emirati official who also made the case that MbZ has been particularly influential when it comes to his Saudi counterpart’s views on the Muslim Brotherhood, which MbS is said to have seen as a potential ally during the early days of his father’s reign.100 In 2018 the inaugural meeting was held of the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council,101 co-chaired by the two crown princes, which builds on an earlier security cooperation pact to deepen administrative ties between the two countries.
Operationally, however, some Saudi officials quietly say that they struggle with their Emirati counterparts, particularly on critical issues such as Yemen.102 And indeed, there has been a clear change in the discourse around MbS and Saudi Arabia since 2018, with talk of the ‘UAE model’ dampened and Emirati officials more willing to express frustration with Riyadh – notably, for example, after the assassination of the Saudi journalist and Washington Post commentator Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul in October 2018. By mid-2019 divergent UAE and Saudi positions in Libya, Sudan and, most importantly, Yemen had become increasingly visible, in the telling of regional officials and Western diplomats. An escalation of violence in southern Yemen, in which UAE-backed secessionists captured the port city of Aden, was regarded by many as a potential breaking point. The UAE subsequently drew down its presence in Yemen in response to criticisms from the internationally recognized Yemeni government and, likely, a desire to concentrate its military resources at home amid rising US–Iran tensions. The relationship between the two crown princes was to still said to be cordial, and it was seen as likely that both sides would make efforts to repair the relationship. Senior Emirati leaders feel that they have ‘no choice’ but to continue to bet on MbS, and thus to support his present role and future reign, considering him the one best able to shift Saudi Arabia towards greater social and economic openness and less religiosity.103
Other key partners for the UAE include Egypt and Jordan. Yet the emirates have apparently met some resistance from the deeply entrenched military-political elite in Egypt, who were not receptive to UAE attempts to help build internal capacity or even disperse Gulf-pledged funds for projects that would help boost the Egyptian economy in the wake of the 2013 coup against the Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi.104 Officials in Amman, for their part, have at times quietly complained to Western counterparts that the Gulf states’ approach to regional political competition – including the UAE’s – is proving dangerously destabilizing, particularly since 2017 in the context of the rift within the GCC.105 Tensions with Amman are also reported to have grown in 2019 since Haya bint al-Hussein, a sister of King Abdullah of Jordan, and wife of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, fled the UAE for London, where she has levelled a series of explosive claims against the Dubai leader.106
Perhaps the reason the UAE is confident in its ability to ruffle the feathers of its allies from time to time is that it can rely on the skills and sure-footedness of its diplomats – especially on the front line – and its strong direct relationships with heads of state rather than government-to-government relations.
Perhaps the reason the UAE is confident in its ability to ruffle the feathers of its allies from time to time is that it can rely on the skills and sure-footedness of its diplomats – especially on the front line – and its strong direct relationships with heads of state rather than government-to-government relations. Emirati diplomats abroad often lead relatively small teams who are deeply embedded in the political systems in which they operate, supported by a similarly skilled team of strategic communications workers. And the willingness of senior UAE figures to engage directly with their counterparts abroad, what one diplomat formerly based in Abu Dhabi referred to as ‘WhatsApp diplomacy’, also plays an important role in sustaining engagement.107
According to one former senior US national security policymaker, in line with comments from other Western diplomats and officials: ‘The UAE is very, very smart about how the US works, and is not scared to act as an operator in its own right in DC.’108 The same official pointed to the role of Yousef al-Otaiba, the UAE’s ambassador in Washington, who is often depicted there – by government officials and lawmakers alike – less as a foreign diplomat and more as a trusted adviser. One analyst who regularly briefs lawmakers and officials in Washington noted: ‘It is not rare for me to talk to people about an issue where the UAE is involved and hear “Well Yousef says …” – he is ubiquitous.’109 Otaiba is said to have been one of the first foreign diplomats in Washington to establish a line of contact with the Trump administration, through the president’s son-in-law and adviser Jared Kushner. (Kushner himself would later be criticized for his relationship with MbS – a relationship that Otaiba helped foster.) Moreover, as a former foreign affairs adviser to MbZ, Otaiba is understood to have a direct line to the crown prince.
This, in the view of one analyst based in the Gulf region, is in keeping with the UAE’s broader approach to the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy – using a select group of smart, capable people who are trusted by MbZ and his inner circle to collect and transmit information:
They want to take the Otaiba model and export it to all most important embassies. It gives you a window into how they want to frame their relationships. They have to be in control at all times.110
And this personality-centric way of working may also explain why Otaiba was able to maintain his position in Washington in 2017 despite the opprobrium directed towards him personally as the Qatar crisis, in which he was seen as having played a key role, deepened. (He has been accused by his detractors of driving anti-Qatar sentiment in Washington, in part by sponsoring think-tanks, events and other activities that promote a UAE world view.)
At times, the UAE has been accused of overstretch, and some of its more activist tendencies have attracted controversy among the UAE’s Western partners when they impact on their own politics. Reported meetings between Russian intermediaries and representatives of then-president-elect Trump brokered by the UAE and Erik Prince, the founder of the private security group Blackwater, were scrutinized as part of the Mueller investigation into alleged Russian influence-gathering efforts.111 MbZ is also reported to have met with Trump shortly after his election in 2016, flying to the US without informing members of the outgoing Obama administration.112 And indeed, MbZ’s Abu Dhabi has been unafraid to take action that is not directly in keeping with international norms, including those agreed on by the UN Security Council (although this of course is no different from the way some Security Council members themselves act). Its support for the rebel Libyan military leader Khalifa Haftar – who is battling rival militias and military units allegedly backed by Qatar – runs counter to the Security Council position on the political process in Libya, and could contravene an increasingly scrutinized Security Council arms embargo.113 The construction of the UAE military base around the Eritrean deep-water port at Assab, and Abu Dhabi’s reputed ties with Eritrea’s military leadership, may also be in breach of Security Council sanctions – as may be the use of Sudanese soldiers, equipped and possibly given additional training by the UAE, in the Yemen war.114 UAE officials concede that they are being forced to deal with mounting international media scrutiny.115
Amid a perceived US drawdown in the region, and mounting scrutiny of the UAE in the Western press, Abu Dhabi is also building its economic and diplomatic relations with other global powers, most notably Russia, China and India. MbZ’s relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin has been a source of intrigue and speculation in Western diplomatic circles since the mid-2010s. Xi Jinping made a state visit to the UAE in 2018 – the first by a Chinese premier in almost three decades – and MbZ made a reciprocal visit to China the following year. MbZ is also understood to have built a strong relationship Narendra Modi since the latter became India’s prime minister in 2014. While economic ties are an important component of all these relationships, Western diplomats and regional observers note that there appears to be a particular commonality between MbZ and Putin, whose model of authoritarianism more closely aligns with the UAE’s own internal workings. However, when pressed on what model the UAE sees as best matching its own aspirations, an official says:
While we are constantly honing our processes, we are also confident in our system. We know that there are other systems that work for other countries, but in our situation we need to deliver for our people in a different way, with different expectations for success as a government. We strive to be a constructive and principled partner in the region and the world, and I think we have slowly built that reputation.116
98 Wikileaks (2009), ‘A Long Hot Summer for UAE-Saudi Relations’, 15 October 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09ABUDHABI981_a.html (accessed 15 May 2020). ‘This is based on historic enmity between the tribes of the Najd and the Maliki Bedouin/merchants of the UAE, as well as deep-seated if rarely articulated anxiety about what might happen if Saudi Arabia came under a more fundamentalist regime than the Sudairi/Abdullah [i.e. the incumbent] reign,’ the author adds.
99 Wikileaks (2009), ‘MBZ Meeting with Senior Advisor on Iraq Jeffrey’, 15 October 2005, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05ABUDHABI4308_a.html (accessed 15 May 2020). ‘One of the reasons the UAE maintains close ties with the Saudi royal family is because “anybody who replaces the Al Saud would be a nightmare,” MbZ said, adding, “we have to help them help themselves.’”
100 Author interview, UAE official, April 2017.
101 Saudi Arabia Ministry of Economy and Planning (2020), ‘The Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council’, https://www.mep.gov.sa/en/Pages/KSA_UAE.aspx (accessed 22 Feb. 2020).
102 Author interview, Saudi official, October 2018.
103 Author interview, two Western officials, May, July 2019.
104 In the telling of two consultants involved in this process, the entrenched elite in Cairo was not pleased with the young Emirati technocrats who were sent to implement new practices that would have eroded patronage networks within the Egyptian civil service, like contract awards to key allies.
105 Author interviews, two Western officials, one regional observer, July 2019.
106 Ibid.
107 Author interview, Western official, March 2019.
108 Author interview, US official, May 2018.
109 Author interview, Western analyst, September 2018.
110 Author interview, Western analyst, July 2018.
111 Gambrell, J. (2019), ‘Powerful Emirati Crown Prince Entangled by Mueller Report’, Associated Press, 19 April 2019, https://apnews.com/bbdc17a88bf54f968495c1212a509a02 (accessed 15 May 2020).
112 Ibid.
113 Reuters (2015), ‘U.N. wants clarification of report UAE broke Libya arms embargo’, 12 November 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-emirates-un/u-n-wants-clarification-of-report-uae-broke-libya-arms-embargo-idUSKCN0T209N20151113 (accessed 15 May 2020).
114 Kirkpatrick, D. (2018), ‘On the Front Line of the Saudi War in Yemen: Child Soldiers From Darfur’, New York Times, 28 December 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/world/africa/saudi-sudan-yemen-child-fighters.html (accessed 15 May 2020).
115 Author interview, UAE official, February 2019.
116 Ibid.