The Libyan Arab Armed Forces

Libyan armed groups should be viewed as networks of actors that traverse the political, economic and security spheres rather than discrete sets of armed actors.

The proliferation of armed groups amid and following Libya’s 2011 civil war received significant attention from analysts. After the downfall of the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, researchers published detailed studies examining the social origins of the diverse range of fighting units that fought against the regime and the challenges of integrating them into the new state security architecture. In contrast, after the governance split of 2014 – when rival legislatures and governments emerged in the east and west of the country – the security space received comparatively little attention.

More recently, research into this area has increased with the publication of a series of in-depth papers assessing the trajectory of the country’s armed groups, their evolution and the nature of their relationship to state authority,1 the communities that they claim to represent, and their models of revenue generation.2 These studies have sought to understand why the ‘state’ – despite direct sponsorship and nominal integration of the majority of these groups under state structures – has been unable to reform the security sector and establish a coherent chain of command for the country’s national military.3 Researchers have explored when and how groups have mobilized, from collective action in the face of unified threats4 to the protection of narrow interests and revenue sources.5

At the heart of this research are two areas of focus: the first relates to the nature of state authority in Libya – or the lack thereof, particularly in light of the civil war – while the second pertains to the role of armed groups within society. This paper examines these challenges through a socio-institutional analysis that views the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), and the state structures it engages with, as networks. The findings show how LAAF leader Khalifa Haftar has forged alliances in the security space as well as the public and private sectors, and demonstrate what this approach may mean for the future of the LAAF.

Map 1. Map of Libya

Situating Libya’s different armed groups within a socio-institutional understanding of the state and society is complicated by the current fragmented security situation and the degree of social embeddedness and fluidity of many of these forces. A better way of conceiving of these groups is to consider them as networks competing against other networks for power in an increasingly divided operating environment rather than units of armed groups formed by discrete sets of actors and interests. Such a framing also helps to compare the structures of armed groups beyond the classical distinctions of regular and irregular forces as well as their interests outside the military realm.6 A socio-institutional understanding of Libyan armed groups as networks can also aid what Wolfram Lacher has dubbed the need to ‘re-socialize’ armed groups.7 An enduring feature of many Libyan armed groups is their social embeddedness within communities, particularly in areas with high social cohesion.

The socio-institutional framework developed by Paul Staniland can be used to distinguish between armed organizations based upon the development of horizontal ties between leaders and vertical ties between leaders and a social base.8 While Staniland’s approach focuses squarely on insurgent actors, it has utility here as a tool to enable an analysis of organizational power and to understand the potential evolution or devolution of armed groups more broadly.

Network analysis of the LAAF

Since asserting leadership over a loose alliance of armed groups in 2014, Khalifa Haftar has built a military alliance that held a strong grip over all aspects of life in eastern Libya, empowered allies to dominate the security landscape in southern Libya and almost succeeded in capturing the capital, Tripoli. The nature of the Haftar-dominated LAAF has, however, been a point of contention. For its Libyan supporters, it is simply ‘the army’: a national state force. For its international supporters the LAAF is, at least, a viable partner. For its detractors, however, it resembles a collection of militias of varying composition. For most analysts, the claim that the LAAF constitutes an army does not hold up to scrutiny. While some of its elements resemble ‘regular’ units, the majority of the LAAF consists of groups that have rallied on a tribal and geographic basis, along with a substantial contingent that have mobilized along ideological (Salafi) lines. Power clearly lies in the hands of Haftar and his close associates, who retain authority and operate outside the formal chain of command, which has led observers to describe the LAAF as a ‘family enterprise’.10

This paper will use the typologies developed by Staniland to assess the LAAF rather than getting caught up in the complexities of adopting labels that make normative assumptions about the LAAF’s relationship to state authority – i.e. focusing on whether it is a ‘state’ or ‘non-state’ actor – or assessments over the application of terms that are used to either connote legitimacy – such as ‘army’ – or used pejoratively – such as ‘militia’.11 A socio-institutional framing helps to identify different types of networks that comprise the LAAF and its supporters, and how they have evolved over time. This shows that the LAAF is a very different organization in different parts of Libya and is, in fact, an unwieldy alliance of forces with contradictory interests and ideological outlooks. It also helps to explain the relative successes and failures of Haftar’s attempts to develop the LAAF as an integrated organization, while providing clues to its potential trajectory.

Badi, E. (2020), Exploring Armed Groups in Libya: Perspectives on SSR in a Hybrid Environment, Research Paper, Geneva: DCAF Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, https://dcaf.ch/exploring-armed-groups-libya-perspectives-ssr-hybrid-environment.

Eaton, T., Alageli, A., Badi, E., Eljarh, M. and Stocker, V. (2020), The Development of Libyan Armed Groups Since 2014: Community Interests and Economic Dynamics, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/03/development-libyan-armed-groups-2014/1-introduction-development-armed-groups-2014.

Al-Shadeedi, H., van Veen, E. and Harchaoui, J. (2020), One thousand and one failings: Security sector stabilisation and development in Libya, Conflict Research Unit Report, The Hague: The Clingendael Institute, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-04/one-thousand-and-one-failings.pdf.

Lacher, W. (2020), Libya’s Fragmentation: Structure and Progress in Violent Conflict, London: I.B. Tauris.

Eaton, T. (2018), Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering, and State Weakness, Research Paper, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2018/04/libyas-war-economy-predation-profiteering-and-state-weakness.

Eaton, T. (2021), ‘The Libyan Arab Armed Forces: A Hybrid Actor?’, War on the Rocks, 27 January 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/the-libyan-arab-armed-forces-a-hybrid-armed-actor.

Lacher (2020), Libya’s Fragmentation, p. 106.

Staniland, P. (2014), Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse, Cornell: Cornell University Press.

Adapted from Staniland (2014), Networks of Rebellion.

Lacher, W. (2020), A Most Irregular Army: The Rise of Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces, SWP Middle East and North Africa Research Division Working Paper No2, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/2020WP02_FG06_lac.pdf.

Eaton (2021), ‘The Libyan Arab Armed Forces: A Hybrid Actor?’

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01 Network analysis of Libyan armed groups

Map 1. Map of Libya

Types of networks and their features9

Figure 1. Types of armed networks

Network analysis of the LAAF