Digital technical standards lay out guidelines for the development of digital technologies, to ensure that deployments are interoperable and scalable. In many ways, such standards are as important as the technologies they underpin, and their content often reflects the ideas and values of the engineers behind them. Until recently, the development of digital standards was a niche field reserved for technical experts. But following recent attempts by China to standardize an alternative internet – referred to by its proponents as ‘New IP’ – at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2019, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic are paying increasing attention to this field.
The Chinese New IP proposal raised a red flag among policymakers in the US, EU and UK, as well as in like-minded states, and was ultimately rejected at the ITU. Nonetheless, the momentum and vision behind the proposal endure. Chinese delegates have continued to introduce the building blocks for this alternative networking model in a series of smaller, piecemeal proposals at the ITU and elsewhere. China is also seeking to standardize key emerging technologies – such as AI that includes facial and emotional recognition – which have concerning implications for human rights.
While digital technical standards are significant for a range of policy areas, the standards pertaining to internet governance (such as those around internet infrastructure and national control of cyberspace) and those around emerging technologies (such as AI, the Internet of Things, facial recognition technology and quantum computing) are of special importance to the US, EU and UK. China’s New IP proposals – and the realization that standards development organizations (SDOs) and standards-setting processes can serve as vectors for systematizing digital authoritarianism at the technical level – have raised substantial concerns. The New IP vision of a centralized internet architecture that facilitates government control has rendered country delegations more vigilant towards geopolitical motivations in SDOs.
China’s approach to engagement with international standards bodies stands in stark contrast to the approaches of the US, EU and UK.
Reliance on industry-led standardization with minimal state intervention might have been a sufficient approach to standards development in the past. But the geopolitical realities around proposals such as New IP have contributed to growing recognition of the importance of government participation for enhancing cooperation on digital technical standards. The same factors also underline the utility of civil society involvement in elucidating the potential implications of certain proposals for democracy and human rights. China’s approach to engagement with international standards bodies – in effect, repurposing its own national standards for multilateral processes via strategic, state-dominated initiatives such as New IP – stands in stark contrast to the approaches of the US, EU and UK.
While there has been some coordinated action against China’s proposals at the ITU already – including by the UK, Norway and several EU member states – geopolitics will inescapably play a growing role in multilateral standardization processes. There are signs that the US, EU and UK are strengthening their partnership in light of their mutual interest in safeguarding a free, open and global internet. Indeed, work on standards development offers an opportunity to accelerate a joint technology agenda. The UK has already shown leadership in this arena with the release of the G7 Digital and Technology Ministerial Declaration, in which a detailed annex on collaboration on digital technical standards is of particular note. The annex provides a framework for how G7 countries could commit to enhanced international cooperation with different stakeholder groups to ‘improve information sharing and facilitate coordination’. The declaration’s endorsement of multi-stakeholder and industry-led standards development – and of standards consistent with open, democratic societies – provides a robust framework to guide transatlantic collaboration.
Within the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, where standards are the focus of one of 10 thematic working groups, cooperation on standards may provide the momentum to guide negotiators through difficult conversations. Policymakers in the US, EU and UK can use their diplomatic networks and leverage their convening power to rally the technical community, industry, academia and civil society to address the emerging complexities of standards development. Two opportunities in this area emerged from the Chatham House workshop discussions:
1. Promoting diverse, effective participation in standards development
The US, EU and UK need to ensure greater participation not only from governments, but also from industry, the private sector, academia and civil society, in conversations around standards and the values that underpin them. These stakeholder groups are well positioned to shed light on the geopolitical, technology governance and human rights impacts of digital technical standards.
However, stakeholders in civil society and academia often lack the financial resources and capacity to engage in standards-setting processes. Additionally, non-industry and non-technical stakeholders may face cultural resistance to involvement in these organizations. As standardization processes are technical and complex, the US, EU and UK need to make it easier for such actors to participate by lowering barriers to entry, particularly in multilateral SDOs such as the ITU. Diverse participation requires not only that non-technical actors be represented, but also that they be afforded structured, formal opportunities to engage meaningfully in standards-setting discussions and processes.
The US, EU and UK should cooperate in devising and adopting mechanisms that allow these non-state stakeholders to feed into standards-setting processes effectively. This could include expanding expert participation within country delegations in multilateral standards development processes, thereby enriching the work of existing transatlantic working groups on technical standards with input from civil society and academia. It could also include building capacities among the diplomatic, academic and human rights communities to engage more effectively in standardization processes; or even encouraging collaboration across SDOs and international human rights organizations, such as the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Internet Governance Forum could also serve as a platform for effective, multi-stakeholder conversations about the digital technical standards underlying the internet. Additionally, the recently announced Alliance for the Future of the Internet could provide a model both for building multi-stakeholder capacity and for developing a coherent, common agenda for transatlantic partners. Raising the profile of standards-setting processes among stakeholders through awareness-building and other educational measures is another necessary step in laying the foundations for meaningful, multi-stakeholder participation.
2. Expanding cooperation on standards with and beyond like-minded countries
Digital standard-setting must be global. This requires US, EU and UK policymakers to mobilize international support for technologies and standards that bolster the values of freedom and openness. Digital diplomacy is essential for achieving policy traction within multilateral SDOs, where political allegiance plays a role in rallying votes for or against specific standards.
Such diplomacy could involve joint outreach to the Global South, with an emphasis on multi-stakeholderism, in an effort to influence the leadership and agenda of key SDOs. A particular focus could be the upcoming ITU plenipotentiary in September 2022, at which the ITU’s new secretary-general, deputy secretary-general, and directors for radiocommunications, development and standardization will be elected. Of special relevance in this context is the fact that a US candidate, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, is in the running for the position of ITU secretary-general.
The governance challenges raised by proposals such as New IP, or by emerging technologies such as AI, underline the importance of political coalitions within multilateral SDOs. Cultivating partnerships with developing economies will be key. Brazil, for instance, has been a pioneer in supporting the principle of an open internet, and its involvement in transatlantic standards coalitions could galvanize support from other Latin American countries.
At the same time, reaching out beyond like-minded stakeholders – to countries falling in the ‘grey zone’ when it comes to supporting an open, global internet underpinned by strong human rights principles – is critical. Strategically engaging with emerging economies such as India as well as with other G20 members will be fundamental to the development of international policy coalitions for safe, effective and interoperable digital standards.
The US, EU and UK need to work together to build a strong case for technologies and standards that support free societies. Policymakers and government representatives should cooperate with diverse stakeholders to develop evidence-based arguments that consider challenges inherent to local context, such as the need to improve and expand connectivity and deploy technological updates effectively. Alliances in which industry and civil society act as knowledge partners could assist the US, EU and UK in mobilizing local technical communities across developing countries to support industry-driven standardization, and to raise awareness with local governments about the values at stake.
In cultivating support on these issues, the US, EU and UK may well have to look beyond standards alone. They may need to engage through their respective cooperation agencies to address technology development deficits and support communications infrastructure plans across the Global South. The UK, for instance, has been active in cyber capacity-building across partner countries in the Global South. Efforts of this nature should be broadened and reinforced, alongside parallel efforts to address the digital technical standards that underpin the internet and emerging technologies.
China’s initiatives to revamp telecommunications infrastructure in the Global South have filled a strategic vacuum and facilitated the global entrenchment of the Digital Silk Road. Facing this geopolitical challenge, governments and policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must urgently cooperate with the private sector to offer affordable telecommunications infrastructure that can act as a vector of rights-respecting digital cooperation at the multilateral level.
Digital technical standards – concluding remarks
Digital technical standards are an essential element in the global race for technological dominance, and can be leveraged to enhance competitiveness in international trade. Influence over such standards would better enable the US, EU and UK to compete with countries like China on crucial areas of development in emerging technologies, including in AI, quantum technologies and telecommunications infrastructure.
As standards developed in multilateral standardization bodies such as the ITU and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) have special privileges and protections within the WTO, leading in digital technical standards is the first step in shaping which technologies – and which values – have the capacity and the ‘market edge’ to take precedence globally.
