Digital technology is evolving faster than ever, offering rich economic and social opportunities but also raising questions about the frameworks and values that should regulate technological innovations. The US, EU and UK share a vision for digital technology governance that is predicated on a free, open and global internet. They prioritize the promotion of the responsible, democratic and inclusive use of emerging technologies, along with the development of policies to strengthen security, prosperity and protection of human rights.
While the US, EU and UK diverge in their approaches to some areas of technology governance – and complete harmonization of rules between the three is unrealistic – cooperation and alliances can nonetheless be strengthened and agreements reached, facilitated by the growing number of platforms and mechanisms relating to digital technology governance.
This paper identifies strategic opportunities for strengthening transatlantic cooperation on digital technology governance. The insights draw on high-level roundtable discussions held under the Chatham House Rule in 2021, at which Chatham House brought together experts from industry, the private sector, government, international organizations, civil society and academia. The paper also draws on interviews with leading stakeholders in this area.
While the UK’s technology market is much smaller than that of the US and EU, the UK has the potential to be an agile and entrepreneurial partner to both on digital technology governance, having led an ambitious digital agenda as chair of the G7 in 2021, and having continued to show thought leadership in several areas. This paper therefore considers the role of the UK, as well as the US and EU, on issues of transatlantic digital governance.
The impetus for cooperation
Several factors favour greater transatlantic cooperation on governance and regulation of the digital space. In the US, the administration of President Joe Biden is showing an appetite to engage with US allies on a range of digital technology issues. The EU has been active in the regulatory space, recently publishing a draft Digital Markets Act (DMA), a draft Digital Services Act (DSA) and a draft regulation on artificial intelligence (AI). The UK is also legislating to promote more responsible digital technology governance, including in relation to both the regulation of online content and principles for ‘safety by design’.
Progress has already been visible as a result of recent cooperation, including in relation to digital taxation at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and among G20 members.
There are also compelling economic incentives for cooperation on digital trade: global e-commerce sales (including both domestic and international transactions) reached $26.7 trillion in 2019, and growth in this market has accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. The US, EU and UK are also increasingly engaged on issues around digital technical standards. Galvanized by geopolitical and human rights concerns, policy actors in the US, EU and UK are pushing for multi-stakeholder engagement in standards-setting processes.
At the same time, divergences in other policy areas have made cooperation difficult. For example, the EU’s application of the precautionary principle in its regulatory outlook, and its tendency to attempt to shape markets, is significantly different to the US approach of generally reacting to excesses rather than seeking to pre-empt them. Differing views on the adequacy of privacy safeguards have also created barriers to data transfer between the two jurisdictions.
US, EU and UK approaches to the regulation of online content also differ. To date, the US has adopted a laissez-faire attitude to ‘Big Tech’, partly due to its constitutional protection of free expression and partly due to its less stringent antitrust laws. Both the EU and the UK have been more proactive, seeking to tackle online harms such as disinformation and hate speech both through regulation (for example, the EU’s draft DSA and the UK’s Online Safety Bill) and through ex ante competition controls on technology companies with ‘gatekeeper’ status (via the EU’s DMA and DSA, and the UK’s new Digital Markets Unit at the Competition and Markets Authority). The US is observing EU and UK efforts in these areas with interest as it ponders its own way to tackle online harms, including through legislation.
Such difficulties notwithstanding, the US, EU and UK all have interests in overcoming their current cooperation challenges. For example, the fact that data-sharing is a crucial part of digital trade, and important for national security and law enforcement, has spurred bilateral negotiations between the US and EU as well as multilateral discussions in the OECD. Meanwhile, on technical standards, the US and EU are keen to prevent the UK from creating a requirement for industry to meet a fourth technical market specification, in addition to the product specifications and systems already existing in Asia, the EU and the US.
Progress on digital technology issues requires leadership at the multilateral level – whether at the UN, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the G7, G20 or OECD. Ambition, thought leadership and resources from the US, EU and UK – acting in alliance and in pursuit of mutual goals – can help to meet this challenge. The US, EU and UK are also keen to foster a multi-stakeholder approach to the development of digital norms and standards, including at international standard-setting bodies and in the UN’s Open-Ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (OEWG).
The need to respond to geopolitical competition and divergent ideological approaches to digital technology is likely to drive further US–EU–UK cooperation, especially as China’s influence as a global technology power grows. China, often informally aligned with Russia, has been pushing a security-focused vision of the internet based on sovereignty and government control of the internet, social media and emerging technology, including at UN meetings on responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and on cybercrime, and at international meetings on technical standards. This contrasts with the vision of the US, EU, UK and like-minded states of an open and global internet, and of an approach to digital technology regulation underpinned by multi-stakeholder dialogue and the international human rights law framework.
In this context China and Russia, as well as the US, EU and UK, are seeking to influence the approaches to technology governance of third states – sometimes known as the ‘digital deciders’ – through capacity-building and infrastructure projects, among other measures. China’s ‘sovereignty and control’ model of technology governance is gaining traction in many countries outside China, including through the Digital Silk Road programme, the technology arm of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The different visions and values involved in these contrasting models of technology governance have significant implications in the countries concerned – politically, economically and in terms of human rights. This raises the strategic stakes for the US, EU and UK, and serves as an impetus for outreach and capacity-building on issues such as cybersecurity and internet governance.
A final catalyst for cooperation is that overdependence on Asia as a producer of technology goods has sparked shared concerns between the US, EU and UK about supply chain resilience – particularly in relation to semiconductors – 5G telecoms technology and data access. These issues, among others, are reflected in the 10 working groups established under the EU-US Trade and Technology Council, which held its inaugural meeting in September 2021.
While there is scope for deeper cooperation in many areas of digital policy, the remainder of this paper focuses on two in particular – digital trade and digital technical standards – in which there is concrete potential to collaborate, and in which policymakers have indicated significant ambitions to do so.
