The Middle East is waiting with bated breath to see how Iran will avenge Israel’s suspected killing of seven Iranian military officers in a strike on an Iranian diplomatic building in Damascus on 1 April. Tehran has made it clear that it will respond. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has publicly stated that Israel ‘must be punished’, and the United States has communicated to Israel that Iranian retaliation is imminent.
Although Israel and Iran have been involved in a shadow war for several years, Israel’s strike in Damascus was particularly bold and painful. In one swoop, Israel wiped out Iran’s military leadership in Syria as well as a vital link with Hezbollah –General Mohammad Reza Zahedi – Iran’s most important and powerful proxy in the region.
Yet despite the significance of Israel’s attack, Iran faces a dilemma: how to retaliate to save face and preserve a semblance of its deterrent without provoking Israel (and possibly the United States) and sparking a wider conflict from which Tehran stands to lose more than its adversaries.
Because of its aversion to escalation, some have questioned whether Iran would respond with force or even at all. Yet Iran is unlikely to hold fire because the consequences would be considerable. Inaction, or a weak response, especially after such strongly-worded statements from the senior leadership in Tehran, could harm the Iranian regime’s internal political cohesion given that the radical revolutionary guards, who dominate Iranian foreign policy, are calling for a strong response.
Iran’s overall deterrent also would suffer a powerful blow, which could invite more Israeli attacks. So would the image of Iran as the leader of the ‘axis of resistance’, as viewed by its allies in the region.
Response options
Iran could respond indirectly on various fronts, given its resilient, well-armed, and combat-ready network of militias across the region. It could also itself hit clandestine and overt Israeli positions in the region, including in the Golan Heights and in Erbil. It took the latter action in January 2024, when the Iranian revolutionary guards claimed they attacked the spy headquarters of Israel in Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdistan region.
Spectacular terrorism against soft Israeli targets – a tactic Iran has honed and used effectively against US and Israeli targets over decades – including Israeli embassies in Eastern Europe, Asia, or Latin America is another option, too.
However, Iran might be compelled to consider reciprocity in its response, to send as clear a cease-and-desist message as possible to the Israeli leadership and impose a higher cost on Israel. This means it might directly strike Israeli military targets in Israel, possibly using a suite of precision-guided long-range ballistic and cruise missiles, in addition to suicide drones.
Yet even with that choice, Iranian tactics, techniques and procedures would matter a great deal. Assuming accurate Iranian intelligence on Israeli military targets is available, consistent with Iran’s modus operandi and previous operations, a carefully orchestrated set of strikes to minimize Israeli casualties would be the preferred course of action.
That Iran might pass on information via Muscat to Washington on how it might strike should not be ruled out – all in the interest of reducing tensions and avoiding strong Israeli retribution.
Iran is less focused on hurting Israel and more on safeguarding its real and perceived strategic gains in the region. This includes its growing political influence in places like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, and its enhanced ties with the Gulf Arab states, Russia, and China – none of which want to see a large-scale military conflict in the region given its expected severe economic repercussions.
Potential consequences
Assuming cooler Iranian heads prevail and Tehran chooses a limited strike, and in return, Israel refrains from responding forcefully, the implications for regional security are unlikely to be devastating. To be sure, fears of a wider war would prevail, causing increased uncertainty in global energy markets and most probably a spike in oil prices, even if temporarily.