Tanzania has a proud history of continental and global influence. Restoring Tanzania’s historical credibility after a period of isolationism therefore provides a strong motivation for current reform efforts.
Tanzania’s distinctive post-independence history continues to influence modern-day foreign policy decision-making, largely due to the towering reputation of the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere. During his leadership from 1961–85, Nyerere’s pursuit of ujamaa – a brand of ‘African socialism’ – was underpinned by ambitions for self-reliance and national unity.
Under Nyerere, Tanzania became a leading voice for, and host of, African liberation struggles, supporting exiled movements and political refugees from across southern Africa. Beyond the region, Tanzania influenced Commonwealth members to reject the readmission of apartheid South Africa, and sacrificed a substantial aid commitment to break diplomatic relations with the UK from 1965–68 over the issue of independence for Rhodesia. Engagement with China also progressed rapidly via military cooperation, state visits and technical and financial support – including to build the TAZARA railway from Dar es Salaam to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia in 1970–75 – with Tanzania leading calls for Beijing’s 1971 admission to the UN.
Tanzania’s distinctive post-independence history continues to influence modern-day foreign policy decision-making, largely due to the towering reputation of the country’s first president, Julius Nyerere.
Yet Nyerere always rejected the notion that socialism, non-alignment or liberation diplomacy amounted to an ‘anti-West’ foreign policy. Throughout the 1970s, Tanzania’s core stance of non-alignment began to take on an economic meaning and its sources of aid became more diversified. Financial support from Scandinavian countries rose and tensions with the US and West Germany thawed, even as Tanzania retained military support from the Soviet bloc. Tanzania’s economy deteriorated, however, and was crippled by war with Uganda in 1978–79. Nyerere resisted IMF reforms but stepped down as president in 1985. With Nyerere’s successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, focused on domestic liberalization reforms during the 1990s, Tanzania shifted its foreign policy towards limited regional involvement, mainly in conflict resolution efforts in the Great Lakes region.
However, in 2001, under President Benjamin Mkapa, Tanzania adopted the ‘New Foreign Policy’ strategy, directing that the country’s foreign relations were to be ‘driven in line with economic interests’ through ‘active and sustainable economic diplomacy’, while also retaining core Nyerere-era principles. This new approach was also advanced by Tanzania’s fourth president (2005–15), Jakaya Kikwete. A celebrated foreign minister prior to winning the presidency, Kikwete continued to travel widely and welcomed high-profile state visits to Tanzania – including those by US president Barack Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2013 – that signalled growth in foreign investment and aid commitments.
International withdrawal in the Magufuli era
President Kikwete’s foreign obligations, however, became a target for critics, as high-profile domestic corruption scandals surfaced. His successor, John Magufuli, framed a retreat from the international stage and a rejection of principled foreign policy as part of a broader crackdown on government profligacy, stating that Tanzania had ‘carried the burdens of other peoples’ conflicts for too long’. Magufuli curtailed foreign travel by government officials and visited just eight countries during his presidency, none of which were outside Africa.
At Magufuli’s direction, Tanzania withdrew from multilateral commitments including the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and from accepting non-governmental cases at the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR), which the country hosts in Arusha. His administration also clashed with the IMF and World Bank, denounced the terms of finance agreements with China, and expelled the EU ambassador and country representatives for three UN agencies following perceived criticisms. President Magufuli’s denial of the existence of the COVID-19 virus in 2020 brought global infamy, compounding existing damage to investor relations. In 2017, new laws were introduced that prevented investors from seeking international arbitration and empowered the government to cancel contracts, with Magufuli also announcing a $190 billion fine for Tanzania’s largest gold producer.
Magufuli’s sudden death in March 2021 elevated his former deputy, Samia Suluhu Hassan, to the presidency. President Samia – a Muslim woman from the semi-autonomous Zanzibar archipelago – rose to power without having a significant existing support base in CCM. Within such a dominant and deep-seated ruling party, many external partners feared that this starting point of relative fragility would restrict Samia’s ability to enact policy change. However, Samia has found space to implement a gradual reform agenda, under which foreign policy has reflected the most decisive area of change. In November 2022, she announced plans for an official review of Tanzania’s foreign policy strategy – marking a first refresh of strategy since 2001. The following chapters of this paper explore the most significant considerations for this new approach across both regional and international settings.
