Donald Trump returns to the White House amid a new Gulf region he helped create. Trump’s aloof response to the September 2019 attack on Saudi oilfields and facilities shattered a security doctrine predicated on US protection of energy sources and the interests of long-time partners. The US reaction – or rather, lack thereof – boosted an ongoing self-reliance drive in the Gulf.
The Arab Gulf states have made strides in the intervening years by taking matters into their hands: reconciling intra-Gulf discord, freezing the Yemen conflict, and making overtures to regional neighbours like Iran, Syria, and Turkey.
The six Gulf states are no monolith, but they have been largely moving in the same direction, prioritizing national interest and linking it to attempts at regional peace and prosperity.
Moreover, ending the more than three-year-old rift among the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was one of the final foreign policy acts of the first Trump administration. The reconciliation was pushed and finally sealed in the presence of Jared Kushner at the al-Ula Summit in January 2021.
Both Gulf impulses – assertiveness and de-escalation – are traceable to different sources and moments in recent Gulf history. But the actions of the first Trump administration reinforced these tendencies.
The Gulf states are best served by sustaining and reinforcing their self-reliance and regional reconciliation, despite any temptation or pressure to reverse course by the incoming US administration.
The Gulf’s approach
The Gulf policymaking toolkit has been adaptive, pragmatic, and nimble. It has paid dividends, for example insulating the Gulf from the ongoing skirmishes between Iran and Israel. It has also enabled the Gulf to work with successive US administrations, and it will help the region navigate Trump’s unpredictability and transactionalism.
It is too early to ascertain which of the competing isolationist or neoconservative strands will win Trump over. The Gulf states will try to manage both if they tensely coexist, although the isolationist strand better speaks to Trump’s persona and evolving Gulf policy.
Israel–Palestine
Support for Israel will clearly continue under Trump. The nomination of pro-Israel Elise Stefanik as UN ambassador is one early example.
The Biden administration has long been calling for a ceasefire while it has not been able, or willing, to use its leverage on Israel. The Gulf states welcome the potential change that war-averse Trump can bring to that equation, without high expectations, given the rhetoric has not yet yielded policy results.
The incoming administration is likely to return to the Abraham Accords, brokered under Trump and adopted by Biden’s team, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab nations. Yet this will put Saudi Arabia in a bind.
The Saudis have banked on a clear precondition for normalization: the end of Israeli occupation and establishment of a Palestinian state. They have even gone further in recent months to signal their leadership on the Palestinian cause, launching a Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two State Solution and convening the Extraordinary Arab and Islamic Summit.
It makes sense for the Saudis to sell this global alliance and a revived version of the two-state solution to the Trump administration early on. It would speak to Trump’s ambitions to make history by delivering a seemingly unattainable peace deal.
Other Gulf states would support US moves on this, including the adept Emiratis and mediator Qatar, which seems willing to heed America’s request to reduce Hamas presence in Doha.
Breathing life into the two-state solution will require much heavy lifting, especially with an intransigent Israeli administration. Trump’s maverick character, however, could unlock uncharted possibilities.
Iran
In his first term, Trump aimed to isolate Iran from its neighbours and build a regional coalition of Arabs and Israelis against Tehran. To this end, the US pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, applied maximum pressure on the country and killed Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.
This US approach floundered after its lacklustre reaction to the Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia in 2019 under Trump and the Houthi attacks on Abu Dhabi in 2022 during the Biden administration. A region-wide détente with Iran ensued and Trump’s return will not change that. The Gulf states have no desire to return to a combative phase that did not serve their interests.
Though sluggish, the China-brokered Iran–Saudi deal has been steady. The Saudis have pointedly continued a noticeable level of interaction even after Trump’s victory. Less than a week after Trump’s win, the Saudi army chief made a rare visit to Tehran and the two countries’ leaders have spoken, with President Pezeshkian saluting Saudi action on Palestine.
Like the elusive peace project, Gulf diplomacy must proactively lay out its views on Iran and propose a revamped modus operandi that resets red lines and rules of engagement. The security of all regional actors is possible, especially following Israel’s exposure of Iran’s weakened capabilities.
Trump has said he is open to engaging with Iran, but the reality is that this will remain difficult, especially given anti-Iran discourse in the US, Tehran’s destabilizing regional behaviour and nuclear ambitions, and alleged Iranian attempts to assassinate the president-elect.
Trade and energy
Trump’s trade and energy policy could be the most challenging for the Gulf. His promise to drill and pump more American oil while imposing higher tariffs on imports weaponizes the economy. Increased US oil exploration and production will lower prices and jeopardize the oil-driven economies of the Gulf.
It will also threaten their ambitious national visions and even the shift to a post-oil future premised on high oil returns. Indeed there is potential for tension with the new US administration on alternative energy and climate change, especially given the strategic importance of these issues to several Gulf states.