Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy will accelerate China’s push for global leadership

Should a new US administration disengage from forums like the UN, Beijing’s plans to reshape global governance will be boosted. US allies should plan accordingly.

Expert comment Published 14 November 2024 3 minute READ

US President Elect Donald Trump has made no secret of his intention to adopt a hard-line stance on China, from his threatened 60 per cent tariffs on Chinese imports to his lining up of China hawks for his cabinet. This will prove to be a headache for Beijing, in terms of the bilateral relationship with Washington. But a new Trump administration also presents China with a major opportunity to expand its influence.

Trump’s ‘America First’ foreign policy will most likely see the partial or total withdrawal of the US from international organizations and initiatives that have been the cornerstones of its hegemony – creating a vacuum that Beijing will be keen to exploit. China will hope it is granted greater space to establish a global leadership role, and shape an increasingly multipolar world in its own interests.

China’s vision of international order

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s vision is one of international order, not chaos. But that order would eschew norms and alliance systems based on universal values in favour of non-binding partnerships predicated on common interests. In practice, this would grant China significant influence due to the size of its economy, its technological leadership, and its growing military power.

Beijing seeks to realize this vision by reshaping the United Nations (UN), pushing its own international initiatives, and setting the terms and material conditions by which emerging technologies and supply chains are governed. 

China’s global initiatives and the UN

Since 2021, Beijing has unveiled three global initiatives linked to its influence in the UN: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).

The UN Charter is invoked as the ‘core’ of the international system in the GSI Concept Paper – and GCI-linked initiatives promoting ‘dialogue between civilizations’ have been endorsed by the UN General Assembly and UNESCO (from which Trump previously withdrew the US). 

The UN has also become a key instrument through which China has attempted to build up its role as a global mediator, including its promotion of a peace plan for Ukraine alongside Brazil.

Reduced US commitments would help Beijing use the GSI to spread Chinese security norms while also safeguarding Chinese economic interests.

The GDI represents an evolution of the approach to international development pursued via the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has established China’s role as a primary development partner for countries across the Global South. The two initiatives to watch will be the GSI and the GCI.

The GSI presents a framework for international security cooperation in opposition to US military alliances. While China is nowhere close to the US in terms of global military reach, the GSI is tailored to its strengths, with a focus on cooperation in areas including domestic and data security. Reduced US commitments would help Beijing use the GSI to spread Chinese security norms while also safeguarding Chinese economic interests.

China has already proven an attractive security partner for US defence partners. Pakistan, a US Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), is intensifying security cooperation with China to protect Chinese nationals working on BRI projects. Egypt, another MNNA, has rumoured plans to replace its US-produced F-16 fighter jets with Chinese J-20s. 

In contrast, the GCI is designed to provide an alternative to a Western-led values of universal human rights. Instead, it promotes an international system based on distinctive civilizations, each with their own values and political systems whose sovereignty and authority must be respected. 

This framing, already routine in Chinese diplomatic readouts, is inherently attractive to emerging powers dissatisfied with the Washington-led world order. 

A disengaged US administration could well allow Beijing’s ‘civilizational’ values discourse to become the go-to framing of international diplomacy, especially with increased Chinese influence at the UN.

Setting norms on emerging technology

Ultimately China’s strongest influence will continue to stem from trade and technology, especially where it has already established a leading role. 
China’s systematic approach to developing green technology, from energy production to EVs, has already given it dominance of these supply chains. 

As Chinese technology becomes the go-to, so Chinese standards governing their use will likely become the norm.

Its advanced technical capability, combined with its status as a key development and technology partner across the Global South, means the rest of the world will become increasingly dependent on China for green tech supply chains. In turn, as Chinese technology becomes the go-to, so Chinese standards governing their use will likely become the norm.

A Trump administration unwilling to engage in international climate cooperation will leave China as the biggest player – with the technology and goods the rest of the world requires for the green transition. 

The international influence this will grant China should not be underestimated. This year’s Forum on China–Africa Cooperation saw a suite of commitments to increasing cooperation in renewables and green technology. The summit also saw commitments to deepen cooperation on another, potentially paradigm-shifting technology: AI. 

Absent the US…China will be able to set international standards for the use of AI.

China’s keenness to become a leading player in global AI governance presents a similar challenge for an inward-looking US. 

China is keen to share expertise and collaborate with countries in the Global South on direct implementation of AI systems, for example in smart city projects. Absent the US – the only other serious competitor – China will be able to set international standards for the use of AI and establish long-term dependence on Chinese norms and systems.

US absence 

Ultimately the balance of US and Chinese international influence does not depend on US–China bilateral relations but on each country’s relationship with the rest of the world. 

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China’s increasing influence in the UN, coupled with its international initiatives and technological leadership, make it well placed to take advantage of the Trump administration’s likely absence on the world stage, shaping emerging global norms more extensively than it might otherwise have been able to. 

US allies seeking to counter that effect will have few options with a White House which cares little for international leadership. A trade war with China might undermine Trump’s domestic agenda, but the America First agenda abroad is arguably more aligned with multipolarity than a rules-based order. 

The better strategy for US allies would be to plan to adapt to the realities of a world of increasing Chinese influence long-term.

This means developing ties among themselves based on shared security interests and values, with a view not to preserving the US-led order – that ship has sailed – but to safeguarding the norms that matter most to them where they can. 

That requires engagement with countries in the Global South as partners with a stake in the emerging multipolar world order, and, through bilateral and multilateral engagement, to influence the direction in which that order develops.