The fall of President Bashar al-Assad is a blow to Iran and Russia – and a boost for Turkey

Events in Syria have upended the balance of power in the region – exposing the weakness of the dictator’s alliances and driving home the failure of Western policy.

Expert comment Published 8 December 2024 3 minute READ

Bronwen Maddox

Director and Chief Executive

The speed of the Syrian opposition’s victory in toppling President Bashar al-Assad has added to the significance of the moment. Even more remarkable is that this revolution, which will reshape the region, was an uprising by Syrians themselves – not one imposed by a foreign government.

Fighters led by Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani’s HTS forces swept aside five decades of rule by the Assad family in just over a week, revealing the weakness at the heart of the regime – and the inability or unwillingness of its patrons, Iran and Russia, to help it survive. The result is clearly a considerable setback for Moscow and Tehran. The most likely winner is Turkey, backer of some of the opposition forces.

But Assad’s fall will add to instability all around. Countries in the region will now scramble to contain the risk that unrest spreads as the balance of power shifts.

Tehran and Moscow’s absence

For Iran, Assad’s fall marks the loss of its ‘land bridge’ to the eastern Mediterranean and a base for its proxies, particularly Hezbollah. Its decision not to send forces to support Assad was one of the most significant moves as the opposition’s takeover unfolded. 

It might have reflected a recognition of the fatal weakness of the Assad regime, unpopular even before the sustained economic crisis. It could also illustrate Tehran’s own weakness: Iran and Hezbollah have suffered significant losses in the conflict with Israel.

Whatever government emerges…is expected – for the moment – to respect the deal that Assad struck granting Russia use of a military base on the Syrian coast.

However, it might signal Iran’s pragmatic recognition that it would gain nothing from an intervention – either in its relations with Arab neighbours or with the incoming Trump administration. That may stir further questions about the fragility of the regime in Tehran – although its resilience and ingenuity should not be underestimated.

For Russia, the fall of Assad is a blow whose significance is hard to calibrate. Whatever government emerges in Damascus is expected – for the moment – to respect the deal that Assad struck granting Russia use of a military base on the Syrian coast. But this important asset is vulnerable, and that risks its influence in the region.

Like Tehran, Moscow decided not to support Assad in his final days. That may reflect weakness or simply distraction over Ukraine. While Russia retains extensive influence in the region, it will have to rebuild those networks.

Ankara’s new challenges

In contrast, Turkey has reason for quiet satisfaction. But the overthrow of Assad will bring huge complexities. Turkey is close to al-Jawlani but does not control his forces; the Syrian National Army is more Ankara’s proxy. Until now Turkey has occupied itself mainly with problems close to its border, particularly the perpetual challenge posed by Kurdish fighters seeking autonomy.

The response of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan is… central to the stability or otherwise of the new Syrian regime. 

Ankara will now have to concern itself with what is happening in Damascus, in Syria’s south. It will recognize, too, that as an Arab country, Syria’s decisions are shaped by its relations with its Arab neighbours.

The response of Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan is therefore central to the stability or otherwise of the new Syrian regime. After years of censuring Assad, they had last year invited Syria back into the Arab League; the Gulf Cooperation Council on 1 December called for the opposition to Assad to back down.

They will now have to pivot to deal with al-Jawlani as well as other forces holding sway over the northeast. The United Arab Emirates, for one, are uncomfortable with the Islamist roots of HTS, although al-Jawlani has taken steps to downplay those in recent days.

For Israel, Assad’s fall marks the sudden exit from the scene of an established opponent. To the extent that it weakens Iran’s strategic depth in the region, it is a boost, and Israel’s government will see it as vindication for its move to assassinate Hezbollah’s leadership. But turmoil and fighting near its border and near the occupied Golan Heights will demand its attention and military presence – and it has little to spare, with a ceasefire in Gaza still lacking.

Much will depend on whether Jawlani seeks to form a government himself or looks for a more conciliatory and inclusive model.

For the West, the departure of a dictator who acted closely with Russia and Iran is hardly a source of regret. But Assad’s downfall also drives home the inability of the West to shape the region as it once hoped. President Barack Obama’s failure to punish Assad for using chemical weapons against his own people in 2013, despite calling it a ‘red line’ the previous year, has hung over Western policy towards Syria ever since.  

For Syria itself, the removal of Assad may bring the relief, even prosperity, for which the crowds celebrating clearly hope. The brutality of his regime and the economic hardship that followed sanctions and its pariah status caused suffering throughout the country. 

Much will depend on whether al-Jawlani seeks to form a government himself or looks for a more conciliatory and inclusive model, as some regional observers hope. But there is a long road from the opposition’s victory to the emergence of a new government, and a stable state that will serve the Syrian people.