On Sunday, Aliaksandr Lukashenka ‘won’ his seventh term in office in a rigged election, extending his 30-year reign by another five years. Still ‘only’ 70, this makes him one of the longest-serving heads of state in the world.
The election campaign was, of course, sterile and uneventful. But Lukashenka’s occasional reference to ‘generational change in the coming years’ bears consideration. These remarks might have been dismissed as mere rhetoric were it not for earlier signals suggesting that a transition of power could soon dominate Belarusian politics.
Over the last three years, Lukashenka has reconfigured the country’s political system to secure his future. That includes creating an additional new role for himself: chairman of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, a position from which he plans to wield power after stepping down as president.
Constitutional guarantees of immunity for former presidents have already been introduced.
Speculation about Lukashenka’s health has long circulated, particularly among his opponents. But his physical infirmity is becoming increasingly apparent. Lukashenka’s physical appearance has changed. He has occasional problems with using stairs and has required a car to cover short distances.
A Pandora’s box?
Debates may continue over the timing and nature of a power transition, as well as Lukashenka’s true intentions, but changes are already underway. The implications are difficult to predict, but they are likely to create challenges for Belarusian political actors across the spectrum and for the West – if not for the Kremlin.
While the regime speaks of a future transition, Lukashenka and his propaganda machine continue to insist on his indispensability – a claim that may well be true for the regime. However, the pool of potential successors is not as small as it might seem. It includes Lukashenka’s sons, technocrats, and members of the security apparatus – some of whom could receive Kremlin support.
But these individuals are so different from each other that it is unclear whether any of them could maintain control without him. So far, none have been granted the political autonomy that would indicate they are being groomed for leadership. The disintegration of the regime without its founder is therefore a plausible scenario.
But the prospects for Belarus’s democratic movement in this ‘managed succession’ scenario are also uncertain.
Despite state repression, a significant share of society uses independent media as their primary news source every day, with numbers peaking during crises – that should provide a boost to democratic forces in the country. However, that media will not alone be sufficient to affect the transition.
At least 200,000 people have left Belarus since the 2020 election, and a significant share of them constitute the most active part of society opposing the regime. Meanwhile, ongoing oppression makes it difficult for those who remain to organize an effective opposition.
Russia is ready…
In that respect, it seems that the Kremlin is poised to be the primary beneficiary of Lukashenka’s departure. Belarus–West relations are at a consistent low, while Russia wields immense economic and military influence within the country.
Lukashenka has always been a vassal of the Kremlin, but he served Russia on his own terms. He receives generous financial support from Moscow for following its foreign policy, but he still maintains complete control over the Belarusian political system.
Under Lukashenka, Belarusian sovereignty is slowly eroding, but that process could accelerate if his successor fails to manage relations with the Kremlin effectively.
If a new Belarusian leader did attempt to reset relations with the West, the Kremlin would likely intensify efforts to assert control, even while prosecuting its war in Ukraine.
The Kremlin’s objectives in Belarus are similar to its goals in Ukraine, (although it seeks to achieve them through different methods): deeper economic integration, more military installations, and greater use of Belarus as a tool against the West.
…the West is not
Although many factors influencing the power transition remain unknown – not least the timing and method of Lukashenka’s departure – the West lacks leverage in the process.
Its influence over Lukashenka and potential successors is minimal. Even seemingly straightforward objectives, like securing the release of political prisoners, appear unattainable.
Economic ties have been largely severed, but Belarus’s economy has adapted surprisingly well – though likely not indefinitely. In 2024, it grew by 3.9 per cent thanks to Russian energy subsidies and increased Russian demand for Belarusian goods.
