The Chinese foreign minister’s press conference showed Beijing is still reticent about its role as a global leader

Beijing still intends to oppose Washington by presenting itself as a source of stability and a champion of the Global South. But it remains unclear how it will transform words into action.

Expert comment Published 11 March 2025 4 minute READ

During China’s National People’s Congress session last week, the press conference by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi attracted considerable attention. Wang, a member of the all-powerful ruling politburo of the CCP, is now the most senior official to speak to international media at the event. (A traditional annual news conference by China’s premier was discontinued last year).

Wang’s speech naturally intrigued China-watchers: how would he address US President Donald Trump’s unconventional approach, whether to Washington’s alliances, the country’s position on brokering peace in Ukraine, or China’s next move on the South China Sea?  

Wang did not offer any great surprises or memorable soundbites. Instead, his 90-minute session was peppered with symbolism and rhetoric which non-native speakers might find hard to interpret. The use of metaphors and figurative language was always common in party political blueprints but the veteran foreign minister is a heavy user of that style of communication.  

However, three terms stood out, repeated throughout the 90 minutes pre-scripted press conference namely: ‘stability’, ‘Global South’ and ‘neighbour’. At their core, all three are part of China’s effort to present itself as a responsible and stable global power, offering a stark contrast to what Beijing views as a decaying, chaotic and hypocritical US.

Stability

In his comments Wang continued to depict the US as the root cause of all regional and global flashpoints. 

Wang…reprimanded the US for its deployment of medium range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region.

In particular, he openly criticized the US’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which China believes is designed to undermine its global influence and in the process will destroy regional stability. 

He also reprimanded the US for its deployment of medium range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the Philippines.

Clearly President Trump’s frequent praise for Chinese President Xi Jinping has not altered senior Chinese officials’ core belief: that the US is pursuing a China containment strategy with the intention of suppressing its influence. Far from acknowledging Trump’s personal praise for Xi, Wang accused Washington of being ‘two-faced’, damaging trust between the countries in the process.

Global South

Wang also stressed the importance of ‘Global South’ countries to China’s foreign policy. He used the term 24 times in the press conference, stressing the need for these countries to be better represented in international forums.

China hopes to… fill the vacuum with its own leadership, supported by a network of supportive Global South countries with similar pragmatic outlooks.

Beijing sees a real opportunity in a role as champion of Global South perspectives, which often align more with Beijing than Washington: many Global South countries have taken a neutral stance toward the war in Ukraine, and offered strong support to Palestinians throughout the war in Gaza. Many see the US-led West as hypocritical in its policy on the conflicts – and in its dealings with the Global South.

Large parts of the West still struggle to comprehend what Beijing naturally understands: that most Global South countries champion pragmatism over ideology in their foreign policies.  

China hopes to build on that understanding and capitalize on Trump’s evident interest in withdrawing the US from its traditional role in global institutions. Beijing clearly has the opportunity to fill the vacuum with its own leadership, supported by a network of supportive Global South countries with similar pragmatic outlooks.

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Yet, despite Wang’s warm words, he offered no new detail on the three Global initiatives Beijing intends to run parallel with its Belt and Road Initiative as China’s primary advocacy tool in engaging in the Global South: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). Three years after their initial launch, nobody is any the wiser what China will actually do.

Neighbours

Wang also expounded on China’s relations with its major neighbours, most notably India and Japan, the former as a heavyweight Global South nation and the latter as a long-term US ally.

Both New Delhi and Tokyo are part of the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, aimed at curbing China’s maritime ambitions. Both have tentatively begun to soften their tones in talking with Chinese policymakers. But Wang treated the countries very differently. 

China sees an opportunity to work with India and calm border disputes, Wang speaking of ‘a cooperative pas de deux of the dragon and the elephant’. But it still perceives Japan as the US’s most capable enabler in any military conflict over the Taiwan Strait, and Wang cautioned Japan against interference in the region.

China specialists were wondering how Wang would respond to US–Russia rapprochement under Trump – what some have referred to as a ‘reverse Nixon’ strategy that seeks to peel Moscow away from Beijing.

Beijing offered nominal support for improved US–Russia relations, but stressed the importance of all stakeholders having a say on ending the war in Ukraine. China’s ties with Russia go well beyond the war, based on a common resentment towards US hegemony. But Wang’s comments did hint at an uneasiness about the rekindled warmth between the Kremlin and The White House.

Wang did not articulate what China considers the best way to end the war, or if China will participate in peace negotiations. Instead, Beijing continues to stress the importance of respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine without offering clues on how to achieve it.

What remains unclear is how China intends to develop its role on the world stage.

Judging by the foreign minister’s very complex words, it is crystal clear that its rivalry with the US is here to stay. What remains unclear is how China intends to develop its role on the world stage: whether or not it wishes to play a greater role in international peace-making, in Ukraine or Gaza; exactly how it intends to amplify the voices of Global South countries in international forums; and if and how it will use its new initiatives to develop its international engagement to fill the void left by an increasingly inward-looking United States. 

That is, will it move beyond merely portraying itself as a stabilizing force in international affairs, or will it ultimately match its words with deeds and begin to act as a true global leader that does the heavy lifting?