PKK leader Ocalan’s historic call to disarm could go to waste without external guarantors

Without third party mediation between Turkey and Kurdish groups, it may be difficult to overcome the many barriers that have stymied past attempts to bring about peace.

Expert comment Published 7 March 2025 Updated 16 April 2025 4 minute READ

Winthrop M. Rodgers

Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Programme

Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – designated a terrorist organization by Turkey and its Western allies – has called on the group to lay down arms and dissolve. His message was delivered in a 27 February letter from Imrali Prison in Turkey where he remains incarcerated. On 3 March, the PKK announced a ceasefire. 

These events have been greeted with enthusiasm. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan described ‘an opportunity to take a historic step toward tearing down the wall of terror’. 

But there is also trepidation about what this means for Kurds not just in Turkey, but in Iraq and Syria as well. It’s not clear that any new process can bring a lasting end to a 40-year conflict that has claimed more than 40,000 lives. There have been many failures and false starts in the past. 

All peace processes are different and there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Yet a common feature is some kind of institutional guarantor that keeps negotiations moving, provides a platform for dealing with anticipated and unforeseen problems, and ensures adherence by all relevant parties. Without a powerful and mutually trusted actor to fill that role, power imbalances pre-determine outcomes, fundamental issues go unaddressed, and the seeds of future conflict are sown.

Why institutional guarantors could work

Ocalan’s call is an historic opportunity, but at this early stage many uncertainties could complicate what happens next. There are disagreements over the political and practical sequencing of the PKK’s disarmament. 

It’s not clear that any new process can bring a lasting end to a 40-year conflict that has claimed more than 40,000 lives.

There are clashing interpretations of what Turkish and PKK statements mean, sometimes made in good faith and sometimes not. (Already, questions arise over whether the 27 February statement applies to the Syrian Democratic Forces – another Kurdish-dominated military coalition that includes major groups with ideological ties to Ocalan). There is uncertainty about whether the Turkish state will change its treatment of Kurdish politicians and civil groups, who routinely face legal charges that prevent them from carrying out their democratic work.

An institutional guarantor would help to facilitate a process where these questions get answered and disagreements are managed so that they do not escalate into violence or lead the process to break down. 

Instructive examples exist from all over the world, ranging from intensive peacekeeping to active but neutral facilitation. Some involve a global actor like the UN, a powerful state like the US, or a regional bloc like the African Union. Others are led by domestic arrangements like the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. 

There are historical examples where such a mechanism was used in Kurdistan. From 1994 in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, a bitter civil war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) resulted in the deaths of more than 5,000 people. The conflict ended with the Washington Agreement brokered on 17 September 1998 by the Clinton administration.

The so-called ‘Kurdish Opening’…cultural and democratic reforms were not institutionalized and were overtaken by regional events like the Syrian Civil War.

While it did not end the pervasive enmity between the parties, the agreement laid a foundation for them to work together to build the institutions of the post-2005 Kurdistan Regional Government. The Washington Agreement’s legacy has a powerful hold on some political elites: a Peshmerga commander once told me that the only way the KDP and the PUK could find a path forward through their current disagreements was for Madeleine Albright (Clinton’s Secretary of State) to ‘come back from the grave’ and sort them out.

The 2013–15 peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK was also preceded by secret negotiations known as the Oslo talks. Those talks helped to facilitate the early stages of the so-called ‘Kurdish Opening’. However, the Opening’s cultural and democratic reforms were not institutionalized and were overtaken by regional events like the Syrian Civil War that contributed to the collapse of the peace process in 2015.

Barriers in the Turkish–Kurdish case

What works (or does not work) depends on many factors. None of these examples resulted in anything like a perfect outcome. Nevertheless, an institutional guarantor provides essential shape to peace processes, particularly when there is a massive power imbalance between antagonists. 

It is hard to imagine Ankara allowing a global power to intervene in a situation as sensitive as the Kurdish issue, which Turkey sees as essentially domestic.

Kurds make up 20 per cent of the Turkish population, and the Turkish state’s history of suppressing Kurdish identity and denying them legal and political rights is a primary source of the conflict in the first place. Without some way of ensuring these grievances are properly and fairly addressed, the conflict will only morph into some new stage rather than bend towards a just resolution.

It is hard to imagine Ankara allowing a global power to intervene in a situation as sensitive as the Kurdish issue, which Turkey sees as essentially domestic. Turkey’s geopolitical positioning prioritizes its autonomy as an international actor. It is actively involved in world affairs, but strives not to be beholden to any one force. 

For example, it is a member of NATO while having active ties with Russia and often acts as an intermediary. It sits outside the EU, but has links with some Europe-wide institutions like the European Court of Human Rights. (In recent years, the court has taken up cases regarding Turkey’s treatment of its Kurdish population, much to Ankara’s irritation. That includes the court’s ruling that the detention of Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtas, imprisoned since 2016, is illegal).

Forums where discussions could take place include the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Conflict prevention is part of the OSCE’s remit and Turkey is involved in its efforts to address the situation in Ukraine and the South Caucasus. That said, Ankara could easily treat OSCE recommendations and processes as non-binding.

A domestic arrangement could possibly be constructed to serve as an institutional guarantor, but it seems unlikely. The experience of South Africa and elsewhere shows that this type of arrangement requires intensive political commitment to remake the basic social contract of the state.

Kurdish groups certainly are trying to achieve this, with politician Sırrı Süreyya Önder stating the goal of a ‘shared Turkish-Kurdish Republic’. This is clearly not what President Erdogan or other Turkish nationalist politicians have in mind. That would go against the basic ideology of the Turkish state. Moreover, one of Erdogan’s goals in engaging with the PKK is to bolster his own domestic position and secure constitutional changes that will allow him to stay in power beyond 2028.

In the absence of an institutional guarantor, it seems likely that the fundamental imbalance between the Turkish state and the Kurdish population and their political representatives will prove problematic.

The Turkish state does not hold all the cards, but it has the better hand. If it sees that its interests are no longer served by engaging with Kurdish groups, it may simply withdraw from the process  – leading to a resumption of violence. An institutional guarantor would mitigate that risk and would help to ensure that the new opportunity provided by Ocalan’s call does not go to waste.