Ukraine made substantial progress in repairing its ties with the United States in talks this week hosted by Saudi Arabia in Jeddah, with the US agreeing to restore its intelligence sharing and security assistance to Ukraine. (President Donald Trump had paused US assistance after his fraught Oval Office meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on 28 February).
Now, according to a US–Ukraine joint statement following the Jeddah talks, Ukraine has agreed in principle to an interim 30-day ceasefire – subject to ‘acceptance and concurrent implementation by the Russian Federation’.
The question is, will the US, having pressured Ukraine to agree to this ceasefire proposal, now pressure Russia to reciprocate? The outlook here is uncertain and Russia’s incentives are mixed: in recent days it has recaptured territory in its Kursk region (occupied by Ukrainian forces since last August) and continued its slow advance in the Donbas region. Moscow may feel this is no time for a ceasefire. Equally, Russia may demand sanctions relief from the US to agree in principle to a halt in fighting – a promise it could later break.
Ukraine has therefore entered a perilous new phase in which fighting and negotiations take place at the same time. Unless the talks totally collapse, which remains possible, this phase could last some time. Ukraine and its European backers now have to navigate this period in such a way that Ukraine’s interests are not quashed by competing Russian and American pressures.
There is little muscle memory in this regard. The last time talks to end Russia’s invasion took place was late February and March 2022, just days into Russia’s full-scale invasion. Then, Russian negotiators attempted to impose a ‘victor’s peace’. But Ukraine’s forces successfully defended Kyiv and the talks fell apart.
Three years on things are very different. The US is directly involved in the talks, led by a president who apparently desires peace at almost any cost – while Ukrainian and Russian forces are exhausted after three years of high-intensity warfare.
Dealing with the concurrency of fighting and talking
Something commonly seen when fighting and talking occurred concurrently in other wars is an intensification of fighting, often by both sides. The intention is to display their strength and improve their battlefield positions before making concessions along existing frontlines.
In recent days, this has manifested in massive Russian aerial bombardments of Ukrainian cities often far from the frontlines; in Ukraine’s large drone bombardment of Russia; and in Russia’s aforementioned offensives in Kursk.
The challenge for those involved in negotiations, especially mediators, is to maintain the momentum of talks despite this mutual escalation.
Even if the outcome for these negotiations remains deeply uncertain, the maintenance of a viable negotiation track alongside the fighting marks a new phase of the conflict. Much depends on whether the US offers Russia sufficient inducements to pause the fighting – or exerts sufficient pressure.
How this could unfold
There are forthcoming dates that offer Russia highly symbolic moments to end its war in Ukraine. Orthodox Easter falls on 20 April. On 2 May Russia marks the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Red Army capturing the German Reichstag building in the battle for Berlin. 9 May marks ‘Victory in Europe’ day. These anniversaries will be lauded by Russian nationalists regardless of what happens in Ukraine.
President Vladimir Putin could choose to associate these significant dates with his participation in talks, partly to sell the terms of peace to his domestic audience.
Wider celebrations could serve as face-saving measures for the war’s unrealized ambitions: the conflict has seen Russia conquer some land, but at enormous cost in Russian lives and equipment, while the war has fallen well short of its initial goals of abrogating Ukraine’s independence and sovereignty.
The current proposal of a 30-day ceasefire is intended to buy time for more substantive mediated talks involving Russia and Ukraine. The idea of building momentum behind a peace process is the US aspiration, according to Secretary of State Rubio’s comments in Jeddah.
The risk is that Russia manipulates the diplomatic process to serve as a smokescreen for seeking continued results on the battlefield. Russia has demonstrated precisely this strategic cunning before, launching military offensives in the Donetsk region while negotiations were taking place in Belarus for the Minsk II deal signed in 2015. Moscow also continued unwavering military support for Syria’s Assad regime while talks took place to end Syria’s civil war at the UN in 2016.
Zelenskyy’s reticence for entering into direct talks with Russia reflects his acute awareness of these hazards. It also highlights the risks in Trump’s apparent willingness to take Putin’s words at face value around Russia’s desire to talk.
European support for Ukraine is the vital additional component here. The US–Ukraine joint statement after the Jeddah talks stated ‘the Ukrainian delegation reiterated that European partners shall be involved in the peace process’. As reported in the media, UK national security advisor Jonathan Powell worked with French and German officials and US national security advisor Mike Waltz to fashion the current ceasefire proposal.
