The future of the Turkish opposition after Imamoglu’s arrest

The implications will depend on how effectively the opposition can channel the energy unleashed by the arrest into political processes and narratives.

Expert comment Published 2 May 2025 4 minute READ

Galip Dalay

Senior Consulting Fellow, Turkey Initiative, Middle East and North Africa Programme

On 19 March, Istanbul’s mayor Ekrem Imamoglu was taken into custody on charges of corruption and misuse of public office. Two days later, he was arrested. These dates are significant because on 23 March, Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), was scheduled to choose its presidential candidate in a primary for upcoming elections in 2028. Imamoglu was the sole candidate. This context has led a wide spectrum of the public to view the arrest as motivated more by the desire to remove a formidable presidential rival than address corruption.

Since Imamoglu’s arrest, Turkey has experienced nationwide protests, which are gradually ebbing. The opposition has been morally and politically boosted by these events. And the CHP has political momentum now. However, with three years until the election, maintaining this momentum will be an uphill battle.

Much will depend on how effectively the opposition can channel the energy unleashed by the arrest into political processes and narratives, while navigating this new phase of Turkish politics.

Three issues are of paramount importance here: how to address the presidential candidate question; how to ensure that the CHP and its candidate can appeal beyond their traditional social base; and how to avoid identity politics and focus on governance and policy issues.

The candidate

For a long time, the Turkish opposition suffered from not having a viable candidate to electorally challenge President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The former leaders of the CHP, Deniz Baykal and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, lacked charisma and personal appeal – though the opposition received nearly 48 per cent of the vote in the second round of the 2023 presidential election, with Kılıçdaroğlu as joint candidate.

The CHP’s recent dilemma has been how to manage the presence of multiple potential candidates and avoid intra-opposition rivalries emerging. 

However, after the opposition’s victories in local elections in 2019 and 2024, the situation changed. The mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, Ekrem Imamoglu and Mansur Yavas respectively, emerged as popular political figures with nationwide appeal. So too did the the CHP’s current chairman Özgür Özel, not least since the arrest of Imamoglu. Rather than a lack of a viable alternatives, the CHP’s recent dilemma has been how to manage the presence of multiple potential candidates and avoid intra-opposition rivalries emerging. 

That said, Imamoglu has effectively acted as the leader of the opposition, despite not being the chairman of the CHP. Before the arrest, the opposition’s choice of presidential candidate seemed settled in his favour. Indeed, the CHP has declared Imamoglu as its presidential candidate following its internal election, despite his imprisonment.

However, with his arrest and the cancellation of his university certificate – a requirement to be president in Turkey – Imamoglu may be prevented from running. In that event, the question of who will be the CHP’s candidate will be back on the table. And efforts to agree a replacement candidate could lead to intra-opposition competition and even fragmentation if not managed well.

At this stage, CHP leader Özel is the more likely replacement. His political performance since the arrest has been strong. Furthermore, at the party’s emergency congress held on 6 April, he consolidated his power.

In a sense, if Imamoglu is becoming a leader for the opposition’s social base, Özel is emerging as its political leader. Yavas might yet become a candidate, but his chances are slimmer. Nevertheless, given his popularity in opinion polls, his actions could be highly consequential for the opposition’s electoral prospects.

Beyond the base

To succeed in the elections, the CHP and its presidential candidate need to appeal beyond the party’s traditional voting base. For a long time, the CHP’s vote share hovered around 20 to 25 per cent. It struggled to attract votes from social groups such as Kurds and conservatives. For the government, this meant the existence of a boutique opposition incapable of credibly challenging its power.

However, this situation has changed in recent years. The CHP’s former chairman Kılıçdaroğlu led efforts to broaden the party’s social base focusing on outreach toward the Kurds and conservatives.  

Imamoglu and Yavas, who do not come from traditional CHP backgrounds, personified this policy. Yavas could attract nationalists and some conservatives, while Imamoglu could appeal to Kurds and certain segments of urban conservatives. With Imamoglu in jail, the question remains whether the opposition can continue this reaching out process effectively.

The CHP has expected solidarity from the DEM in the face of Imamoglu’s arrest. The DEM expects support on the Kurdish peace process in return.

Probably the most immediate test case will be the CHP’s approach towards the ongoing Kurdish peace process. Both the CHP and pro-Kurdish DEM party are part of Turkey’s opposition bloc. They cooperated in many places, including in Istanbul, during the local elections in 2019 and 2024. The DEM also supported Kılıçdaroğlu during the presidential election in 2023.

The CHP has expected solidarity from the DEM in the face of Imamoglu’s arrest. The DEM expects support on the Kurdish peace process in return, during the dissolution of the Kurdistan Worker Party (PKK ) – which has waged armed insurgency in Turkey since 1984. The CHP’s support will be essential in securing the parliamentary and legal amendments needed to move the process forward.

If either side fails to meet the other’s expectations, it could potentially drive a wedge between them. But it should be in the interest of the entire opposition bloc to support the Kurdish peace process: its success will get rid of one of the structural foundations of Turkey’s democratic regression. The Kurdish issue and its armed manifestation makes it easier for any government that wants to securitize Turkish politics and trample on rights and liberties.  

Avoiding identity politics

The opposition’s final challenge will be to focus on governance and policy issues and avoid identity politics. During the Baykal era before 2010, the CHP was too willing to engage in culture wars, along secular versus conservative identity-cleavages.

Given the demographic make-up of the country, with the majority broadly falling within the conservative and centre-right camp, the winner of this contest was a foregone conclusion. Erdogan’s electoral victories since 2002 testify to this.

Kılıçdaroğlu wisely refrained from engaging in identity politics along the secular–conservative divide. After winning the local elections in Istanbul and Ankara, the crux of the contest has moved to governance issues. This made it easier for the opposition to appeal to a broader segment of society. The promise of better governance, instead of identity politics, remains the opposition’s best bet for the future. 

In a nutshell, the opposition has gained political momentum and an important moral boost. However, the political and electoral implications of Imamoglu’s arrest will depend on how the opposition addresses these three key issues in the coming years. Regardless, Imamoglu’s arrest will have a formative impact on opposition politics for years to come.