Can the US retreat from global governance be exploited by other powers?

China and other BRICS nations have a golden opportunity to take control where the US retreats. But a more fragmented and uncertain world looks more likely.

Expert comment Published 18 June 2025 4 minute READ

Dr Samir Puri

Director, Global Governance and Security Centre

The rollercoaster ride of President Donald Trump’s second administration has caused numerous ruptures in world order. The president’s ‘America First’ agenda has dominated global headlines with dramas including ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs; the unprecedent rupture in relations with Canada and with European allies; and by the president’s attempts to insert himself as a peacemaker first between Russia and Ukraine and now in a more ambiguous way between Israel and Iran. 

Yet it is in the US retreat from collective efforts to alleviate international problems where really profound changes to the international order can be seen. 

The latest US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change treaty was to be expected, given President Trump had already done so in his first presidency. But his second presidency has brought many other new manifestations of this US global retreat, including the closing of USAID and the withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO). 

Equally serious was Trump’s signature of an executive order, ‘Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations’. The order – barely recalled now since it was announced a week before Vice President JD Vance’s controversial February speech in Munich – withdrew US support from or participation in several UN agencies and initiatives for their apparent criticism of Israel.

Other major global initiatives where the US plays a leading role, including NATO, the World Bank and IMF, have been undermined by some of President Trump’s foreign policies. There is no sense yet that the US is seeking to withdraw from any of them. But were this to change, the notion of a US global retreat would heighten.

It is doubtful that President Trump uses the term ‘global governance’ – or even knows the term. But the historic importance of the US when it comes to underpinning collective responses to global problems cannot be underestimated. America led the building of the post-1945 world order and sustained it, overseeing its expansion following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, which left the US as undisputed global hegemon.

The ending of one international order does not necessarily beget the sudden arrival of another.

The US retreat from global governance has already been substantial, creating space for a remaking of that order. Given this fact, plus the fraying of nerves among so many US allies and partners though Trump’s tariff policy, the question has to be asked: why aren’t Washington’s rivals making more of this moment?

It seems that the ending of one international order does not necessarily beget the sudden arrival of another in its wake. The vacuums created by the US’s sudden retreat from multilateralism and global governance will not be automatically filled by others. 

Filling the vacuums left by the US

This is clearly China’s moment to win big. Indeed, its ministry of foreign affairs issues a steady stream of propaganda videos portraying the US as a self-interested, bullying, and unreliable superpower whose tariffs policy is undermining the free trading system. 

Chinese President Xi Jinping sought direct gains for China at the US’s expense during his tour of three Southeast Asian countries in April – all hit by US tariffs. And Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted at this year’s Munich Security Conference (just a day after Vance’s speech), that China is committed to both the UN system and its role as a stabilizing international force.

Yet there is no expectation that China would replace the US as the guarantor of global governance. President Xi has a three-part foreign policy concept that expresses China’s aspiration in this regard. 

China seems to prefer banking the gains it makes as the US alienates global audiences and institutions.

But so far, its Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), Global Security Initiative (GSI), and Global Development Initiative (GDI) – each of which could herald a more explicit role for China as a global goods provider – are not yet matched by commensurate action (Though Xi’s initiatives are still new: the GSI was only launched in 2022). 

Rather than seeking quick and dramatic wins, China seems to prefer banking the gains it makes as the US alienates global audiences and institutions, while responding to those destabilizing actions directed against it, notably in the trade war.

There is little sense the BRICS club is loudly seizing the moment either. BRICS’s rapid expansion, and its upcoming summit in Rio on 6-7 July, features an ambitious global governance agenda, including policy themes including action on climate change through the energy transition, global public health, and the governance of emerging technologies.

The diversity of the BRICS countries – and the deep rivalries between some of it members on certain issues – means that it is never likely to formalize into an organization. And BRICS countries cannot take on the full mantle of global governance. But these are unprecedented times, and they do have a golden opportunity to bolster their connections in numerous policy areas, even if the BRICS remains an informal club.

However, it appears that like China, BRICS countries may bide their time to assess the lasting consequences of the  ‘America First’ foreign policy.  

Fragmented responses to global issues

It seems therefore that no single power bloc is able or willing to simply step in and occupy the space where the US retreats. This fact, alongside the heightening of major geopolitical fractures, pitting the US against China, and the Europeans against Russia, makes global-level responses to world problems unlikely. That means we are probably heading toward a world of regional and issue-specific responses to collective problems.

The US represents about 25 per cent of the world economy, so its retreat from global governance removes a great deal of resources and expertise. But other Americans may still find other ways to contribute. The WHO, for instance, still receives substantial funding from the Gates Foundation, regardless of the US government funding withdrawal.

The old order, undergirded by a globally engaged US, is crumbling away quickly. It almost certainly cannot be rebuilt.

The challenge for multilateral institutions will be having to operate across major geopolitical fractures. They will often fail to do so – the UN Security Council being the prime example.

In the long term, groups of states will still come together to solve common problems, even if the US is absent. It is possible some established global institutions and initiatives will not survive this rapid transition in world affairs, or they will re-emerge much modified.

Such is President Trump’s disdain for UN initiatives in particular, his administration has little sense of ceding advantage to others when it withdraws from them. Other states – whether friends or rivals of the US – will often come to a different conclusion.  

The old order, undergirded by a globally engaged US, is crumbling away quickly. It almost certainly cannot be rebuilt. Other countries are waiting to see how things will develop post Trump, and it remains to be seen which countries and groups of countries will be bold enough to seize the fresh opportunities that are opening up.