US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had an unenviable task at Thursday’s ASEAN summit, seeking to reassure Indo-Pacific allies and partners that are flustered by unpredictable US policies on tariffs and concerned by Washington’s signals on its regional security commitments. Arriving soon after fresh US tariff announcements, it’s unlikely Rubio was able to quell growing uneasiness about America’s role in the region.
The mood among these Indo-Pacific allies has shifted significantly since the opening months of President Donald Trump’s second administration, which went about as smoothly as it could have.
In January, Foreign Ministers of QUAD countries received front-row seats to the president’s inauguration. In February, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru held a successful summit with Trump, inaugurating a ‘golden age’ of US–Japan ties. In March and May, US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth toured Asia, reaffirming America’s commitment to the region. Japan was for some time expected to be one of the first countries to strike a trade deal with the US.
Despite lingering doubts over Trump’s commitment to their defence, and fear of the president’s desire for a grand bargain with Xi, many Asian allies were convinced that they could deal with President Trump. The thinking was that their strategic importance in US competition with China would grant them more favourable treatment than their NATO counterparts.
This has proven a false hope. To the contrary, precisely because of their integral role in US–China competition, they are now confronted by increasing US demands.
5 per cent again
America’s commitment to its Indo-Pacific allies now comes with higher costs, more demands, and inconsistent conditions.
The administration is driven by a desire to deter China and preserve the balance of power in favour of the US. Washington now therefore judges cooperation with allies and partners on the basis of two questions: is it in America’s national security interest, and will it be enough to deter China? This fixation on Beijing has raised the cost of aligning with the US, placing additional burdens on allies which may run contrary to their own strategic interests or fiscal capacities.
Talks on defence spending best illustrate the increasing scale of US demands. In June it was reported that Washington was asking Indo-Pacific allies to increase spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP (up from an earlier requirement of 3 per cent). Later that month Washington stated it was seeking NATO-like defence spending commitments of 5 per cent of GDP.
Key allies, with the exception of the Philippines, publicly expressed their displeasure. Tokyo cancelled a planned July meeting of US and Japanese defence and foreign ministers. South Korea’s Defence Ministry defended the country’s defence budget. And Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese publicly rejected Washington’s demands. A few days after Albanese’s comment, the Pentagon announced a review of the US’s role in the multi-billion dollar AUKUS submarine deal – hailed as the centrepiece of America’s allied cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
The Trump administration is also explicitly asking allies to step up confrontation with China. Pentagon officials are pushing Japan and Australia to clarify their roles in the event of a war over Taiwan – ironic coming from a country that follows a policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ on the matter. It is also reported that The Pentagon’s AUKUS review may require Australia to pay more for the submarines and guarantee their usage in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. Meanwhile, other reports suggest that the Pentagon is considering a restructure of US Forces in South Korea to focus on China, not North Korea, drawing down troops by 4,500.
Some asks are not new. The Biden administration compelled allies to align with American defence and economic security policies on China. However, tariffs, combined with the imposition of new conditions on American commitment, have injected distrust and uncertainty into decades-old alliances. The linking of questions of political economy with security and defence creates new requirements for keeping alliances intact.
Not so different from NATO
The combination of greater costs, higher demands and more uncertainty puts Asian allies in an uncomfortable spot: all remain heavily reliant on American security guarantees. There are no strategic security alternatives to US alliance, when China is increasingly assertive towards Australia, the Philippines, Japan and South Korea.
They must, therefore, meet some of Trump’s demands by ramping up defence spending, clearly defining regional defence commitments, and aligning with American trade restrictions on China. Some are already taking steps along these lines based on their own strategic assessments and economic imperatives.
But now they must do so with greater urgency and under coercion, with the expectation of possibly receiving even more conditions. They will also have the reasonable fear that in the process of meeting American conditions, allies might face a response from China, without a guarantee of Washington coming to their aid.
Regardless, the cost of a significant reduction in US support would be much higher than charting long-term plans to increase defence spending or buying more American goods. US allies and partners must therefore continue to keep the US military engaged in their countries by addressing Washington’s demands as far as possible.
That means, like NATO countries, Indo-Pacific allies must begin the process of bearing a greater burden for defending their own sovereignty. (Rubio has commended Ishiba’s recent comments calling for Japan to wean itself off American dependence).
