This year has seen continued tensions between the Philippines and China, as Beijing uses what some analysts call ‘grey zone coercion’ tactics to establish control in the South China Sea. Collisions and confrontations between Chinese and Philippine ships and aircraft have occurred throughout the year – most recently near Thitu Island. Each side repeatedly accuses the other of dangerous manoeuvres and provocations in disputed areas such as Scarborough Shoal, which both sides claim.
The Philippines has invested significantly in securing its territorial interests, but its waters remain vulnerable – not least as a result of domestic politics. The US–China rivalry is playing out at the very top of government, within the walls of Malacañang Palace in Manila, where the president and vice-president are in open conflict.
Anatomy of a feud
When Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr (BBM) launched his bid for the presidency, he did so alongside Sara Duterte, the daughter of former president Rodrigo Duterte. That united two of the most influential rival political dynasties in the Philippines, running on a ‘Uni-Team’ ticket in a show of harmony for the good of the nation. In 2022 the pair won in a landslide and began their tenure full of promise and optimism.
The cracks began to show in early 2024, following a bitter public exchange of drug use allegations between President Marcos and Rodrigo Duterte. In June that year, Sara Duterte resigned from cabinet, citing disagreements on issues including tensions in the South China Sea. The rift turned into a chasm in November when the vice president revealed that she had instructed assassins to go after President Marcos, his first lady, and the speaker of the house in the event of her own killing.
This led to impeachment proceedings in early 2025. However, due to Duterte’s skilful manoeuvring, the hearing was delayed until mid-term elections in May – which swung heavily in favour of Duterte’s allies and won her a reprieve. Her impeachment articles were dismissed and archived in August of this year. This victory followed a wave of pro-Duterte sentiment in the Philippines following the arrest of her father by the ICC in March. The result left President Marcos with a splintered senate and weakened authority.
Opportunity for Beijing
Over time, the feud between president and vice-president focused increasingly around disagreements on how to manage relations with Beijing – particularly with respect to tensions in the South China Sea. According to some surveys, confrontation with China in the region is one of the most important policy issues for the population – sparking viral messaging by politicians and influencers alike.
President Marcos’s position has been clear since the beginning of his presidency. The president backs partnership with the US, arguing that it makes the Philippines stronger, as Washington provides defence support without infringing on territorial rights.
The president has pursued that policy vigorously, signing a new Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement with the US in January, placing typhon missile launchers on Luzon island (within range of China), and reopening the strategically important Subic Bay to US activity in September for the first time since the early 1990s.
In early November a new task force was established to increase interoperability and coordination, with US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth citing shared ‘concerns about China’s coercion in the South China Sea, particularly recently in Scarborough Shoal’.
In contrast, Vice President Duterte has maintained a conspicuously neutral stance on maritime incidents in the South China Sea. She has heavily criticized US partnership as ‘provoking’ Beijing, and espoused values of friendship and cooperation with China.
Her more conciliatory approach has been returned by Chinese ambassador to the Philippines Huang Xilian who praised the vice president for her ‘support and dedication to the China-Philippine friendship’, indicating that Duterte is viewed by Beijing as the partner who will get their bilateral relationship back on track.
Duterte’s statements reflect the policies of her father. Rodrigo Duterte visited Beijing in 2016, appearing to say it was time to ‘say goodbye’ to the US.
But in the years that followed he failed to build significant economic ties with China, or prevent continued Chinese infringement on Philippine sovereignty in the South China Sea – Chinese ships surrounded Thitu island in 2019 and blocked the resupply of the BRP Sierra Madre with water cannons in 2021.
Now, these diverging approaches at the top of Philippine government present a significant opportunity for China. The vice president’s open split with the president, and her significant popular support, provide an opportunity to turn public opinion against the policy of partnership with the US. That will be further helped by reported Chinese disinformation campaigns, and punishing US tariffs: President Marcos only managed to negotiate a small reduction in US tariff rates during a visit to the White House in July.
Looking beyond the binary
Heading into the final years of his presidency, President Marcos must walk a tightrope. Having dedicated a significant portion of the last four years to strengthening security in the South China Sea, he must now see that policy endures. That will be difficult: the feud with his vice president has stymied his ability to act decisively on security issues for fear of alienating the electorate – a deeply vulnerable position to be in.
His priority should be to take control of public narratives and push security discussions beyond the US–China binary. The US–China debate reliably gains significant attention, but it divides opinion and leaves no room for nuance. It is a powerful tool in the hands of the opposition, but a weakness for the government.
The US is the largest possible security partner for any Philippine government seeking to deter China. But it is certainly not the only one. The Philippines has made significant inroads with other strategic partners including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, India, Canada, France, and the UK.