9/11 and US-Russia relations

James Nixey

Well, ladies and gentlemen, welcome and welcome to this Chatham House members’ event, one of several over this week and next, examining the impact, ramifications and perhaps most significantly for today, I suppose, the lost opportunities from the terror attacks of 9/11. It does seem to me, by way of introduction I suppose, that when the world undergoes significant great upheaval that we optimistically and rightfully talk about opportunities from disaster, coronavirus is a contemporary example, people say “Build Back Better” all the time and I suppose it’s debatable as to whether we do or not, but perhaps that’s debate a hope we’ll have today.

Could we have – should we have invested more, focused more, on establishing a solid and sustainable relationship with Russia? Something I think we can all agree we don’t have now, and something that was maybe lost after this pivotal moment. It is for some, I can see, axiomatic that we should have done. It seems so obvious that we needed and need a better relationship with Russia, but, for me at least, I must say that I would just offer a thought that not only was the United States understandably fixated elsewhere for years after 9/11. But also, that Russia itself had expectations in return for what it was offering, for what it had already offered I suppose, in fact, in terms of the bases and the intelligence sharing, and the nature and the detail of the Kremlin’s expectations strike me as being, kind of, crucial for an understanding of if this was an opportunity we should have, or should not have taken.

So – but that’s more than enough from me, but fortunately, we bring you three outstanding, hugely experienced Russia Analysts, who will have thoughts about this aspect from 20 years ago and how it has affected the present day. Crucially, for me at least, these experts hail from Russia, from the United States and no less importantly from Europe. They are Dr Nadia Arbatova, you’ve seen the bios I think on the opening screen, but to add to it, Nadia is, as you know, Head of the European Political Studies Department, even more the Institute for World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and has been a long-time friend and contributor to Chatham House. Thank you, Nadia, welcome back.

Thomas Graham is not only a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and at Kissinger Associates, but he was also Russia Director at the NSC, the National Security Council, at the time of the 9/11 terror attacks. And bringing up the European rear, no less importantly, we have Nicholas Tenzer, Publisher of Desk Russie, Analyst of Foreign Security Policy Issues, and, for me, really one of France’s very best thinkers on Russia.

So, that’s really pretty much it. Just let me finally add that we are on the record today, and we’re being recorded, so anything you do say, will be taken down and used in evidence against you, ladies and gents, and you’re free to tweet using the #CHEvents. When we come to questions, I’ll go over this in a minute – afterwards, but please use the Q&A function, not the chat function, which is for your – for sharing ideas and for comments, but I’ll go over that again. That’s basically all. The speakers will offer ten minutes of introductory comments each, then I’ll ask them a couple of questions, then we’ll go over to that Q&A I’ve just mentioned. Perhaps we could go in the order in which I introduced you, ladies and gents, which means Nadia, welcome back, Nadia, and over to you. Thank you very much.

Nadia Arbatova

Thank you, James, it’s so nice to see old friends, even in this unnatural format. Let me start with one general remark about the anti-Taliban coalition. There have been many defining moments in the Russia relations with the United States after the collapse of the USSR, but 9/11 stands apart from other events. The scale of the terrorist attacks and the fact that the target was the United States, the strongest world power, suggested that the world will never be the same after this tragedy.

However, looking back, we can safely say that September 11th did not become a gamechanger in the world politics,. It was – rather, it was a catalyst for the trends that existed before this tragic event. With the beginning of anti-Taliban operation, cautious optimism was widespread. Many pointed to positive trends. The emergence of the broad international counterterrorism coalition built in the shortest possible time, and Bush’s foreign policy choice in favour of the United States and its allies, the shift of the United States from unilateralism to multilateral co-operation, the enhancement of the co-operation on external and internal security.

However, two months later, after the Black September, the weakness of the coalition was becoming more and more evident. If there was any ad hoc coalition, the anti-Taliban coalition was quite fragile, and it was not based on a clear common definition of the threat or a common understanding of joint interests and needs of fighting for them. It was primarily based on the US political preferences, which could not provide a long-term foundation for the international anti-terrorist coalition or for its allied strategy.

As for Russia, Russia’s contribution to the anti-Taliban operation was really important, given Russia’s role for the transit of supplies through its air space and ground communications. Aside from this, Russia gave a green light to the US military deployments in Central Asia, in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and Russia was deeply involved in training and advising Northern Alliance on the ground. So, Russian leadership went as far as possible in co-operating with the United States and much further than it could be expected from President Putin, judging by his previous cautious middle of the road policy, based on a bureaucratic consensus.

The majority of Russian public opinion, political parties, mass media, and military bureaucracy was in favour of Russia’s moral support to the United States. But it did not support Russia’s direct involvement in the counterterrorism campaign, primarily because of the deep-seated mistrust of the US policies in the 90s, and out of fear of becoming involved in another quagmire after the big experience in Afghanistan and in Chechnya. Hence, Putin’s co-operative strategy was tolerated, but it was clear that should there be big mishap, or significant US unilateral action, the pressure inside Russia would be enormous for a radical reversal of Putin’s policy. This means that Putin’s personal stakes were very high.

Putin’s decision to side up with the United States may be explained by several reasons, but in my view, the main reason was that Russia’s participation in the anti-Taliban coalition provided Putin with a golden opportunity to perform his main mission, the main – his main foreign policy mission of Russia’s status rebuilding and to achieve this mission, not like Yeltsin on the basis of unilateral concessions to the West, but on equal footing, as an equal partner of the West.

During his visits to Germany and to Brussels, he made many in October. One month after 9/11, he made a lot of good statements, in favour of Russia’s contribution to the counterterrorism co-operation. But I think the most important statement was made by Putin in Brussels when he met Secretary-General Robertson. Putin said in public, “Russia is ready to reconsider NATO and the process of NATO’s enlargement, if Russia is part of this process.” Unfortunately, neither Russia nor its NATO allies were ready for such a breakthrough. They feared the implications of this almost allied relationship for other Western interests, NATO’s expansion, BMD, ABM treaty problems, the post-war settlement in Afghanistan, Russian foreign debt, and so on.

Putin’s support was taken for granted, as we say in Russia, we have a funny saying, instead of thank you, go on, and Putin’s support of the United States wasn’t reciprocated by Washington in none of the three areas of concern: the growing security gap between Russia and NATO, rivalry in the post-Soviet space, and economic issues like debt restructuring. In 2002, the United States withdrew from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The same year, we saw the biggest wave of NATO’s enlargement, and in order to sweeten a need to appeal Russia was offered. The SORT, the Moscow treaty, SORT, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which was never fully functional because the parties failed to agree on counting rules and verification provisions. NATO gave Russia a new body, the NATO-Russia Council, with no guarantees that it wouldn’t be just a new term and a joint council that had not passed the first serious exam in Yugoslav. So, a breakthrough did not happen, and I think that this predetermined the further degradation of the Russia-West relations.

It’s interesting that 20 years ago there were already concerns about the outcome of the anti-Taliban operation. Taliban was defeated, but not eliminated. The new leadership of Afghanistan was not viable, given ethnic frictions, competition for power and distribution of foreign financial aid mismanagement, and the deterioration of the post-conflict Afghanistan could destabilise Pakistan, it was clear, and in the absence of real co-operation between Moscow and Washington, there was a risk of a new rivalry, what we see today. And the US decision to pay off the so-called rogue states, regardless of the direct involvement in terrorist attacks on 9/11 could split the anti-Taliban coalition and polarise the Muslim world. It was clear 20 years ago.

I do not share their gloating over the US hectic withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in my view, no great power would have been able to perform this mission, unless it was ready for collateral damage among the local population and its own massive losses. But I think that the United States lost an opportunity to engage Russia and to integrate with Russia. Thank you.

James Nixey

Excuse me, I can’t unmute, summer break, it’s atrophied me. Nadia, thank you very much indeed. Perhaps, before I turn to Tom, maybe I’ll do the questions immediately one after the other, and maybe I could just ask you a couple of things, and things that struck me in your initial ten minutes, which was, you know, very illuminating, but could I ask you two questions in particular?

The first is, you mentioned how much Putin had invested in the relationship immediately after 9/11. You said about the green light for – on the bases, and it went a long way, and that’s quite well-known about allowing access, but there’s a lot of, sort of, confusion over that and I wonder if you could clear it up, in your view. Because some people say that Putin reluctantly gave access, against the wishes, or some people say he willingly gave access, some people say he didn’t want to, but he realised he couldn’t. What exactly happened? Did he have the power, the gift of granting access to the bases in Central Asia immediately after 9/11, and did he genuinely want to? Was he advised to? Was he told he had no choice but to? So, that’s the first question.

Second question, you mentioned that Putin said that Russia is ready to consider enlargement if Russia is in on the process. Very interesting. Can you tell me exactly what that means, in reality? I mean, in practice, I mean? What does – what would being in on the process look like ideally to Russia? Two questions. That’s okay, over to you.

Nadia Arbatova

Thank you. The first question, yes, I think he could allude dependent on Putin’s decision in the post-Soviet space, and he really wanted this co-operation because he was required as a strong hand, as a President who would reinstate Russia’s prestige in the international affairs on equal footing. And it was an opportunity for him, because even for Russian Democrats it was unexpected that he sided up with the Democratic minority on this issue. Yes, I think he wanted this co-operation. When it failed, well, the situation was reversed and you know all this fuss about American deployment in Central Asia.

As for your second question, it’s very important. I met in Moscow Secretary-General Robertson, and he confirmed this Putin, let’s say, application for NATO’s membership. Some people would say that he was not sincere, that he just wanted. I don’t think so, and in my view, the NATO leadership lost an opportunity to test Russia. Probably, if we had started negotiations on the terms of this would-be membership, Russia could reject this offer. But in this case, it would have been Russia’s own choice, and Russia could not have said that everybody was bypassing Russia in their original strategies, be it European Union, or NATO. And in this case, it would have been very difficult for Russia to be against Ukraine’s or Georgia’s membership. But, you know, I don’t want to expand my time, but it’s a very interesting issue, because after this application in Brussels, Secretary-General Robertson published an article [inaudible – 19:15]. Probably it was written by his Speechwriter, and I was really surprised when I read this article because he used – he resorted to all arguments that our [inaudible – 19:36] always used in the discussions with Westerners, that Russia is too big a country. It is located on the crossroads of different civilisations. Thank you, no. The message was, thank you, no. And I think that it was a really lost opportunity.

James Nixey

Absolutely, thank you very much for clearing that up, Nadia, really appreciate it. We’ll come back to you and have better questions for you than me. Tom, Thomas, please over to you, sir.

Thomas Graham

Thank you very much, James, and it’s a real pleasure to be here with you this morning in New York and afternoon in London. I want to make three brief points following on, I think, with what Nadia has already said about the US-Russian relations. The first, and quite brief one, is it’s important to remember that the US-Russian relationship had begun to improve slightly even before 9/11 with the June Summit in Slovenia when President Bush looked into President Putin’s eyes and got a sense of a soul.

We had begun to work on energy co-operation, we were doing so many things in the area of media, but 9/11 was a serious impulse to improve relations. But, and particularly in the initial weeks after the terrorist attacks, Russia did provide significant intelligence and logistical support to the early phases of the American operation in Afghanistan. And in fact, that led to the very quick overthrow of the Taliban, and we put Al-Qaeda on the run very, very quickly by having achieved what President Biden now says was our main goal in going into Afghanistan.

That said, and this is my second point, the tensions in the relationship were evident from the very beginning, internal contradictions in the way we dealt with terrorism. Take Afghanistan itself, the United States was really focused on dealing with Al-Qaeda, but the Taliban were a secondary concern, and we went after the Taliban because they were harbouring Al-Qaeda, not because we had any particular grievances against the Taliban per se.

For Russia, on the other hand, it always struck me that the real target was the Taliban. A group that it was sponsoring extremist organisations that were creating problems in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, a group that had recognised the Chechen separatists as an independent state. So, while on the surface it looked like we had a shared interest, really what we had was an alignment of different interests that was focused on the Taliban and came centred in Afghanistan at that point.

Now, broadly, it was clear from the very beginning that we had radically different views on what the terrorist threat was. As I said, for the United States, it was Al-Qaeda, that is an alien force that attacked the United States from outside its borders and then did this to undermine the American system.

Now, remember President Bush’s famous question, “Why do they hate us?” And the answer, “Because of our freedoms.” So, we saw this as an assault on the American system of values, the American society, in a major way.

If you look at Russia, the quintessential terrorist threat was the Chechens, a group of separatists who wanted to take a part of Russia away from Russia, a threat to Russia’s territorial integrity, a threat to the state, but the goal of the Chechen rebels was not to destroy Russia as a political entity. And it’s this difference in the way we thought about terrorism and the nature of the challenge, I think, that led to disappointment in the nature of the intelligence co-operation, after the initial phase, we always wanted Russian intelligence on Al-Qaeda. The Russians wanted our intelligence on Chechnya, but quite frankly, neither intelligence service was devoting a great deal of attention to what was a secondary threat from their standpoint, but it also led to the lack of very close political co-operation.

The United States never accepted the Russian position that all the Chechen rebels were terrorists. Indeed, we thought the majority were not terrorists, and believed that they had legitimate grievances against Moscow. We always encouraged the Moscow, the Kremlin, to enter into some sort of negotiations with the Chechens to resolve their differences, and beyond that we were happy to allow representatives of the Chechen rebels to operate inside the United States. We did nothing to cut off funding to Chechen rebels, nor did we close down their websites, despite repeated appeals from Moscow to do just that, to demonstrate that we were indeed partners in dealing with the terrorist threat.

Finally, the co-operation on our counterterrorism suffered when it came into conflict with our geopolitical interests. Just to give you a couple of examples, Georgia. You know, we knew from the very beginning that the Chechen rebels were using Georgia, particularly a [inaudible – 25:25] as a safe haven for their operations inside Chechnya. There was no way the United States was going to allow Russia to use its military force inside Georgia to eliminate that safe haven.

At most, we were prepared to work with the Georgians to try to answer Russian concerns going forward. And, of course, the big stumbling block, where the geopolitical interests differed was Iraq, where the Russians really had grave doubts about what we were doing, had their own interests in Iraq that were – that would be harmed by the American operation against Saddam at that time. So, we had a whole series of contradictions, and these, I think, exploded into view in the fall of 2004 with the terrorist attack on Beslan.

I think the real turning point after 9/11, in President Putin’s thinking about the nature of the terrorist challenge and the possibilities for co-operation with the United States, he clearly saw at that time that America’s talk about counterterrorist co-operation was really nothing more than a smokescreen to advance America’s geopolitical interest, particularly in the former Soviet space, at Russia’s expense. And that was compounded by the Orange Revolution several months later, and while the Orange Revolution doesn’t fit neatly within the idea of counterterrorist co-operation, it did – it was related, at least peripherally, because after all, what was the solution to the terrorist problem, in George Bush’s imagination, it was the freedom agenda,. And what we were pursuing in Ukraine at that time, what did the Orange Revolution reflect, in many ways an advance of the freedom agenda. A country and population choosing to overthrow the result of a rigged election, so that they could have an honest election, defending their own political rights. And then again, Putin sees democracy promotion, the freedom agenda, again, as an US effort to extend its political, geopolitical reach at Russia’s expense.

And this gets to the third and final point, which is the one you raised, James, about whether – if the United States had accepted Russia’s implicit request for a sphere of influence in the former Soviet space, would that have changed everything? I think the fact of the matter is that the United States, and particularly the Bush administration, never gave any thought to recognising a sphere of influence, it ran counter to everything that we were trying to do at that point.

At one level, it ran counter to the geopolitical pluralism that we had been supporting in the former Soviet space, as a way of hedging against the resurrection of a threat of Soviet dimensions emanating from the territory of Eurasia. It ran counter to President Bush’s freedom agenda, where we thought that countries should have the right to determine their own internal structures, their own alliances, and so forth. Ran counter to all the agreements we had signed at the end of the Cold War, that in a sense, codified those types of rights. And finally, it’s something that the administration could not have done because of internal political pressures. There was simply overwhelming support for – supporting Ukraine, even Georgia at that time, and other places in the former Soviet space.

And, finally, even if we had recognised this sphere of influence, it strikes me that, given the nature of the – of politics in many countries of the former Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine and Georgia, there would have been anti-Russian demonstrations, in any event. Efforts by political systems to distance themselves from Moscow, and Moscow most certainly would have seen that as a result not of indigenous factors primarily, but as a consequence of external interference, and whether we had rhetorically said that we recognised a sphere of influence or not, the United States would have been one of the prime suspects behind that type of action. So, I think we had an opportunity to build a better relationship after 9/11 certainly, but there were fundamental differences in our worldview, the way we thought of terrorism, geopolitical interest, that complicated that, and the actual decisions we made only exacerbated the situation. So, let me leave it at that.

James Nixey

Well, no, I’m not going to let you off that easily, Thomas, but thank you very much indeed, that is absolutely fascinating, full of insight and experience, as I predicted earlier. And actually, I really only have the one question for you, which is really, just on your very last point really, right there at the end, which is, ‘cause you said that there were opportunities, and yet at the same time, perhaps surprisingly to me, knowing you as I do, Tom, and then most of what you’ve been saying is actually that the reality was, was that there weren’t because the interests actually differed. So, I’m actually a little bit unclear as to which is it? You know, should – even if there were or there weren’t, I mean, and so, I’m still not clear on if you feel that we, the United States actually, made mistakes and acted, or rather failed to act when it could have done, bearing in mind the fact that you spent eight minutes of your presentation saying that actually, our interests differed? That’s ultimately my question to you, sir.

Thomas Graham

No, no, look, I mean, I think the interests did differ. That doesn’t mean that the relationship needed to deteriorate as rapidly and as significantly as it has over the past 20 years. And after all, we have differences with all sorts of countries and interests and we manage to develop better working relationships than we have with Russia. I think there are things that we could have gone initially in Afghanistan that would have led to more broader co-operation, despite the different interests. And, again, remember, as I said, in Afghanistan, the interests may have differed at a fundamental level, but there was an alignment of interest at that time that allowed for greater co-operation and if we had greater co-operation, it may have had some positive impact on the way we dealt with some of the other challenges that we faced.

To give you an example, early on, the Russians offered us airlift support into Bagram, and Russia is one of the few countries in the world that has strategic airlift capacity, we turned them down flat. Why did we turn them down flat? The argument at that time was that the Afghans would not accept the Russians, because of what had happened in the 1980s, ignoring the fact that of course, the Russians had supported a Northern Alliance, for at least the last ten years, and have worked with the Northern Alliance effectively in ways that helped us deal with the initial threat. So, I think there were specific things we could have done that would have broadened the co-operation, despite the fundamental differences, would have allowed us to manage the differences that we faced later on in a more constructive way, so that we wouldn’t have had the breakdown in relations that we’ve seen over the past several years.

James Nixey

That makes sense. I think it’s a subject to be debated still, but I think that makes absolute sense what you say. Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, can I just beseech the audience, whilst Nicholas Tenzer is speaking for the next ten minutes or so, to send in your questions on the Q&A function, that would make life a lot easier. I can see Bobo Lo is going to be first. But, Nicholas, bienvenue, thank you very much indeed, your debut at Chatham House, if I understand correctly, very glad that you’re here and perhaps over to you.

Nicholas Tenzer

Thank you. Thank you very much. Well, I must say that I beg to disagree with some of the points that were made by the distinguished speakers before me, and I think that basically, we cannot really consider that the fight against terrorism could be the engine to improve the relationship between the two countries, and basically, that anti-terrorism could not be the basis of sustainable good relationships.

If we turn back to what Putin was trying to do, you know, when – by offering support, I mean, military support or bases to the US, I think it was basically three things. One thing, which is quite normal, I would say, which is basically, we have country, Russia, the US and others, were in fight against terror. So, I think it was really a threat to Russia, as it was a threat to the US, to Europe and other countries. So, I think it’s a kind of normal support, but I think there were two other reasons behind.

One was, and I think it wasn’t mentioned, was in a way to whitewash the war crimes, atrocious war crimes, perpetrated by Putin’s Russia in the second Chechnya war. And in fact, I think a lot of attention, a great deal of attention was fed to what Russia was doing at that time, the end of 1999 and 2000 in Chechnya, and then after the 9/11 attacks, I think, basically, people were trying to turn a blind eye, including the US and France and others, to what was done at that time. Because of the solidarity that Russia had shown and was a kind of win also already for Mr Putin, because people in fact tried to improve the relationship for Russia, in spite of the war crimes that are and aimed for criminal crimes, I have to recall.

The third goal of Mr Putin was certainly to advance his own agenda, which was, also it was already said, basically to create the basis of zones of inference of Europe to rebuild the kind of empire, former Soviet empire, and to impose the idea that everything that happens in the post-Soviet space, in that, Russia must have absolutely a say and it cannot let, basically, those countries, having their own alliances, could be the EU or NATO, and to abide by the basic requirement to the Paris Charter of 1990. And I think it was basically what Putin was intending to show to the country, so any attempt, I think, to engage Russia more on these kind of issues, given the positions that were already expressed by Putin, and even more of course later because the nature of the regimes had even deteriorated, I think was a kind of a fool’s game. And already, I think all the basis of Putin’s system were already in place at that time.

I think everyone has read this book, Catherine Belton’s book, Putin’s People, which is certainly the best book probably recently written on Russia that helps to understand the Russian system. I think everything was already in place and of course, the situation deteriorated, not only with Georgia, but also, with the full crackdown on human rights in Russia, before 2008. And with the Yuko stories that happened in 2005 that was a clear sign that Putin want to have a full grip on the Russian economy, etc.

Then, Georgia happened, the war in Georgia, and I think it was not a true reaction, neither from the US nor from Europe, and in fact, Putin has won the war in a way. He was won the war, because 20% of the territory of Georgia was seized, and he won the war in Ukraine in 2014. And I think I will have also to remember another episode, which was a true attempt by the US to re-establish a sustainable relationship with Russia, which was the reset in 2009. And the reset in 2009 has been partly based upon the idea that Russia could help also to fight against terrorism in Afghanistan.

That was one of the very reasons, I remember I was in DC at that time and I spoke with a lot of people, some of them educating the reset, some others not, and it was in that time in [inaudible – 39:01] mind and Mrs Clinton’s mind, it was one of the goal to facilitate the operation in Afghanistan. Of course, it was not the only one reason, and also, as we perfectly know, the reset has failed. It was, in my view, because I was an adversary of this predictable, but I think we have to learn the lessons about this.

And then, there is a second point that I want to emphasise on, which is the fact that when it comes to the fight against terrorism, Russia is hardly credible. Just consider Syria, not only, I mean, the war crimes perpetrated by Russia and in fact, Russia regime has killed more civilians than even ISIS did. But as the former Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian, once put, it was in the 2015, less than ten persons of the strikes by Russia really targeted the ISIS fighters in Syria. 90% of the strikes, or even a little bit more, were basically targeting the opponents to Assad’s regime. And I think that from this point of view, I think the – it’s very difficult to consider even right now the older speeches that says that Russia is a partner in the fight against terrorism.

Of course it could be a change of information and I remember in 2020, Trump’s administration gave some intelligence information on some terrorist plans, terrorist attack, plan of terrorist attack in Russia, and I think, rightly so, of course there must be an assistance between the different countries in fighting against terrorism. And also, I think, when it comes to the next situation in Afghanistan, after what I call the debacle, and I think for me, very misleading position of President Biden with the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, there could be, of course, some discussions also to prevent some possible terrorist attack, and not only in Russia, but also, in Central Asia. And I think there is a true risk, and I think we have certainly to co-operate, and I think that it will also be the interest of the Central Asian countries, and in the interest fort Europe and for the US too, to strengthen their co-operation in this field.

So, basically, your question was, is it possible to have an improvement or sustainable relationship with Russia? And I think that given not the very nature of Russia, but the nature of Putin regime and I think it’s very important to make the distinctions between the two, I think there is absolutely, right now, absolutely, no opportunity, unfortunately.

James Nixey

Nicholas, thank you very much indeed. I’m going to ask you a very brief question, because we’re out of time and we have – we are short of time and I’m told we have a hard stop at six o’clock UK time. But Nicholas, look, I’m very persuaded by your argument, in so many ways, that any attempt to enlarge – to engage, sorry, to engage Putin you said was a fool’s game, your words, I think. And I do understand that, because obviously, your list of the, you know, of the atrocities of – committed by the Russians in Chechnya, you know, that is undeniable of course. But I can’t help but thinking, and maybe I could encourage you to think just for a second, almost as a thought experiment on your part, but in spite of that, being as it was so early on in Vladimir Putin’s tenure, and I can understand now why we would not engage, that makes perfect sense, ‘cause so much has passed us by. There have been so many crimes and misdemeanours, I do understand, but back in 2001, the evidence for that was somewhat more on both sides, with Putin’s suggestions that they might – that Russia might join NATO, via sharing of intelligence that Tom mentioned, etc., etc., there was at least, sort of, evidence on both sides of the equation. So I suppose my point is, should we not at least have tried? And, I mean, maybe you’re just right, maybe it was always this fool’s errand, I do understand that point, but I still can’t help but thinking with this, and for research, that surely it’s better to try, at least back then anyway?

Nicholas Tenzer

Well, James, I understand perfectly your question. I think, but in fact, I think we tried. I think we tried. Maybe not in the intelligence realm, but if we see all the discussions that we had, even before Putin’s era, you know, when it comes to NATO, if we consider the support provided by the EU, provided by the European Reconstruction Bank and Development Bank, when we consider all the separate talks that all the countries, especially European countries, including mine, France, but also Germany, etc., had with Russia at that times, all the bridges that we tried to build in fact, maybe not on the intelligence co-operation, but on cultural relationship, economic considerations, economic markets, etc., I think we really tried and unfortunately, it got nowhere.

James Nixey

Very interesting, in which case, that loops back, I was going to say, Nadia, you’ve got your hand up, and I was going to come back. I was going to loop it back to you one final time because in a way, that goes contrary to your point, I think, that you made, sort of, halfway into your initial ten minutes, that was actually the great distrust of the US because of the 1990s, the [inaudible – 44:41] the wild 1990s. And so, in a way, that’s a contradiction, so you obviously have something to say there, Nadia, and then I’ll try and turn it over to Q&A.

Nicholas Tenzer

Hmmm, yes.

James Nixey

To Nadia, if I may, Nicholas.

Nicholas Tenzer

Sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry.

James Nixey

No, I think Nadia had her hand up, but if you unmute yourself, Nadia. That’s it.

Nadia Arbatova

Can you hear me?

James Nixey

Yeah.

Nadia Arbatova

Yes, I think that we, when we judge the past, or analyse the past events, we proceed from our current experience and current knowledge. Putin one, 2000, 2007, and Putin two, 2012 present are two different Politicians. And partly I agree with Nicholas, because I also think that the power, the great power game is always more important than anti-terrorism co-operation or even the fight with the pandemic. But we have already forgotten about the initial shock after 9/11.

After 9/11, we believed that this would be possible, that is my understanding of the shock of 9/11. We really believed, I think, and about Chechnya, Nicholas mentioned Chechnya, Chechnya, the second war in Chechnya did not appear from the middle of nowhere. It came out of the first war in Chechnya. The first war in Chechnya started in 1994, after the constitutional crisis, James you know this better than I do, and Putin’s clash with the Parliament.

Putin – Yeltsin needed that war, and he persuaded his friend, Clinton, his friend, Helmut Kohl, that he needed this blitzkrieg to reinstate positions of Democrats after the constitutional crisis, and they tacitly blessed that war, the first Chechen war. Russian Democrats were against the first war in Chechnya from the very beginning until the last day. As for the rest, it is different, like with the constitutional crisis, because the general impression was that it was a clash between the Communist Parliament and the Democratic leadership of Russia. So, I think that Putin one, differs from Putin two. Putin one, it doesn’t mean that I’m going to justify his policy in its every aspect, no, but he sincerely believed that Russia could be engaged in co-operation with the West on Russia’s own terms. Control democracy at home, and domination in the post-Soviet space, and good relations with the West, but all three were completely incompatible.

James Nixey

Yes, I think that’s where we all agree. Thank you, Nadia, I appreciate that. Listen, I must turn it over to questions, because we’ve got just, you know, barely 15 minutes for questions. I’ll try and ask two together actually, they’re not especially related, but I want to get as much in as I possibly can.

The first one comes from my old colleague and friend, Bobo Lo, he says – it’s a very Bobo question. He says, “I know a lot of water has passed under the bridge, but how do you assess the prospects of US-Russia and China co-operation on the Eurasian security post-Afghanistan now?” So, it’s a forward-looking question. He doesn’t want to – not big stuff, he says, but more modest steps, such as intelligence sharing, is that realistic or is it too late and we’re all swamped by the animosities that we know all about? So, that’s a question for anybody who wants to take it, and maybe I’ll pick on Tom first for that. But also, just two questions at a time ‘cause I want to ask Lisa [inaudible – 49:09] question for her, please, ‘cause it’s very concrete, very relevant to this. “What were the alternative approaches the US could have taken with Russia to have avoided the current tension?” Thankyou very much. Tom, I’ll go to you first, and I’ll pick on someone else after that.

Thomas Graham

Fine. On Eurasian security after Afghanistan, you know, it’s hard for me to see where you’re going to see a widespread co-operation between Russia, China, on the one hand, and the United States in Central Asia. You know, rather what you’re going to see, I think, is a gradual withdrawal of American interests in that part of the world.

I mean, President Biden has made it quite clear that the focus of his Presidency now is going to be internal, and dealing with the very real problems that the United States had. That’s the reason he gave for leaving Afghanistan to begin with. Now, it’s hard for me to see where there are major overlapping interests between or among the United States, Russia and China in Central Asia at this point. The only possible one that I can think of is, in a sense, counterterrorism concerns about that. But as we’ve seen, I think there’s significant differences in the way we think of the terrorist threat. So, I don’t rule out minimal co-operation to deal with some concrete problems that arise, but a broader co-operation among these three powers to somehow stabilise, regulate the developments in Central Asia, I just don’t think is on the political cards at this point. Unmute.

James Nixey

Sorry about that, Tom. So, Tom, whilst you’re there, the second question being on specific steps the US could have taken?

Thomas Graham

Specific steps the US could have taken back in…

James Nixey

Yeah, yeah.

Thomas Graham

Look, I mean, I argued at the time, and I think it’s still true, that the United States could have taken greater risk in trying to test Russia’s commitment to the co-operation with us on counterterrorism, to see how much more broadly we could have co-operated. I’ve already mentioned the strategic airlift, which I think we should have welcomed at that point, there was a way of doing that. The Russians also offered us just one other, sort of, first aid to our soldiers who were wounded in Afghanistan by evacuating into a Russian base in Tajikistan at that time. We turned the Russians down flat. So, there were a number of places where Russia made suggestions, where we could have tested the bona fides. If it didn’t work out, I think it was easy enough for the United States to regroup. If it had worked out, we would have, I think, moved to a slightly more constructive relationship than the one we have now.

James Nixey

Nicely put, thank you. Nicholas, perhaps I could ask you the question, Bobo’s question, about intelligence sharing over Eurasian security, is there anything that can be done now, or is it all too late with this regime that we currently live with in Russia? Is there anything that can be done effectively? Please unmute yourself, Nicholas. My mistake as well there, we all make it.

Nicholas Tenzer

Okay. Oh, sorry. Well, basically, I think it depends on the scope of the intelligence sharing. I think there could be, I mean, some information, intelligence, I mean, insights, given to Russia. The contrary, of course, is true as well, but full intelligence sharing, as we have between, let’s say, the CIA and MI6, or the French DGSE, I think that’s just impossible, because basically, there is no trust between the people. No, I think one of the main questions that we have is, what the US and Russia are both intending to do to protect the Central Asian countries, that are basically under threat. I think that could be, also, a very good opportunity because Russia cannot do that alone. Also, to give from the US and from the EU more assistance to enhance the co-operation with these kind of countries, also in the field of intelligence.

James Nixey

So, thank you, Nicholas. Nadia, any prospects for now, or is it too far gone?

Nadia Arbatova

I agree with Nicholas that a Central Asia and uncertainty in this space could provide a basis for our interaction, and we should think about new channels of communication. But I would like to say a few works about China, because there was a question, I think that China has already played a very negative role for the US-Russia co-operation. And there isn’t news about 350 strategic missiles with the ten warhead each, deprived the United States of any incentive to continue negotiations with Russia, on control on the new treaty, and I think this is very negative.

James Nixey

Thank you very much indeed. Ooh, hang on, there’s a question just come in this second. Super, great timing, Rob May, happy for Chair to ask. He says, “What would it take for Biden to persuade Putin to form a balancing coalition or an alliance between the US and Russia against a rising China and China’s expansion in Eurasia?” I think it would take a lot. Okay, let’s get back to you, Nadia, and then I’ll go the other way round again. So, Nadia, what would it take for Biden to persuade Putin to form a balancing coalition between the US and against China?

Nadia Arbatova

For the time being, I don’t see any preconditions for this alliance. Something terrible should happen, probably, yes, but for the time being, no. Our relations with the United States and the West at large are very bad. They have never been as bad they are now, and China is viewed as Russia’s ally.

James Nixey

Yeah, I think that’s fair. Tom, are you somebody who thinks we can ally against Russia against China? I don’t think so.

Thomas Graham

Now, look, and I don’t think the question is alliance. We ought to be concerned about the increasing strategic alignment between these two countries, and there are certain things the United States could do, along with our European allies and our East Asian allies, to attenuate those ties. But seeking to more normal relations with Russia, giving them options, both on the political side, geopolitical, and commercial, so that their only option is not China, and China will take advantage of that one dimensional foreign policy. And if we open up the options, I think you have a less tight relationship between China and Russia, and that is certainly to our advantage at this point.

James Nixey

Nicholas, I could see you nodding to everything that Nadia was saying, in particular. I think you doubt that it could be done, or should be done.

Nicholas Tenzer

Yes, well, I think the idea that we can legal distance Russia from China, or China from Russia, I think it’s a fool blunder. Basically, I think because, as it was said by Tom, there is already a, kind of, strategic alliances between the two. There is a, kind of, an assistance in many fields, and also, I think we have to consider, I think, on a relevant point of view, that Putin’s regime right now is the main and immediate threat to Europe. If we consider Belarus, if we consider Georgia, if we consider the disinformation campaign, or Ukraine as well, what happened in Syria, what happened also, it was not mentioned, in Africa, with also the action of the Wagner Group, you know, in Africa, not only in Africa, also in Venezuela, etc., I think that the idea is that there is a long-term threat with China, obviously threat. But the idea is that we cannot consider and we must not consider what’s the primary threat to Europe right now, I think it’s just stupid.

James Nixey

Thank you very much, absolutely, Nicholas. Ladies and gents, it is just three minutes to the hour, so I think we’ll wrap up, especially as I don’t see any further questions, and I’ll say – but first thing I would say, I’m going to give a shoutout to somebody I’ve seen on the attendees list, which is Richard Wright, he was former – he was a former Ambassador, EU Ambassador in Moscow at this time, in the early 2000s, and he’s always, every time I see him, he’s always come to me and said, “You know, there was a moment we blew it. We messed up.” And my actual view of Richard, has always been that actually, I think that Russia slightly blew it, in fact, but it’s for a debate I think that Richard always wanted to have, I hope, and I hope this satisfies you, to some extent.

Having said that though, I think we could debate this for a very long time and I really wish that we could actually sit down and really just – and talk this over a lot more, because there’s a lot more to be said. Listen, I won’t obviously summarise what has been such a fantastic debate. I’d really rather now just thank profusely the three brilliant speakers and say that Russia-related events at Chatham House seem extraordinarily popular among members, that much is clear. Why that is, whether it’s ‘cause of the outstanding speakers, obviously true in today’s case, or just the sheer magnetism of Russia, read into magnetism what you will, I suppose, I don’t know, but I think we, at Chatham House, should probably find out what it is that makes Russia events so popular. So, with that, I’d like to thank Nadia, Tom Graham, and actually Patricia, my colleague Patricia Lewis, in particular, and Emily Harding for this excellent event, and wish you all a good evening, late evening for Nadia, afternoon for Tom, and a good evening to Nicholas. Goodbye, thank you. All the best.

Nadia Arbatova

Thank you.

Nicholas Tenzer

Thank you, James. Thank you.

Nadia Arbatova

Thank you.

James Nixey

Bye.