Afghanistan since 9/11

Dr Gareth Price

Hello and welcome to this Chatham House webinar in our series 20 years after 9/11. This particular webinar is looking at Afghanistan. I’m looking at the event outline, which says that, “As a Western military presence withdraws, the Afghan Government is battling to prevent the Taliban once again taking over the country.” The event outline was written a couple of weeks ago. But the topic of discussion is perhaps even more prescient. We wanted to take a look back at the 20 year intervention in Afghanistan and discuss the question of whether the outcome that has since transpired was inevitable or whether there were specific choices that could have made or different decisions, which could have led to a more positive outcome.

A couple of pieces of housekeeping. This event is being held on the record and is being recorded. If you want to submit questions, please use the Q&A function to do so. Each speaker will speak for around five minutes or so, and then we’ll have plenty of time for a moderated discussion and taking your questions.

We’ve got a terrific panel with us today. Speaking first is Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, an International Development Consultant with over 25 years’ experience working in Afghanistan on development, international interventions, and women’s rights issues, amongst others, including, during the last period of Taliban rule. After Sippi, we have Saad Mohseni, the Chairman and Chief Executive of the MOBY Group, one of Afghanistan’s largest media houses, which encompasses, amongst others, TOLO TV. Saad currently serves on the boards of the International Crisis Group and the Washington DC based International Center for Journalists. Finally, I have my colleague, Research Associate at the Asia-Pacific Programme and the Europe Programme here at Chatham House, Hameed, who has worked with me on Afghanistan issues for many years.

So, without further ado, let me turn to you, Sippi, for your thoughts.

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Thank you, Gareth. Thank you so much for providing the opportunity for speaking on these topics today. Personally, I think we might need a day, maybe a week, to discuss everything fully, but in the time available, let’s see what we can do.

I had the – I’m not sure whether to say, ‘great good fortune’ or ‘misfortune’, to be in Afghanistan before the Taliban, while they took Kabul, after they left Kabul, and now seeing them back again. It’s quite a wild ride, and not a very pleasant one. Unfortunately, also, bizarrely maybe, it reminds me of the fall of the Persian Empire to young Alexander the Great, and perhaps that happened because the Persian Empire underestimated Alexander’s prowess as a General. Maybe we are facing a similar situation today, who knows? Maybe our discussions will turn up some interesting points.

I won’t be discussing everything that I would like to touch on today. I’m sure there’ll be lots of issues related to women, which I’ll be happy to answer questions about. But some of the points that I wanted to raise around my thinking about the, sort of, sudden arrival of the Taliban, involves perhaps underestimating and demonising the Taliban, which is something that happened throughout the past period, 20 years, while they were in hiding.

We saw the debilitating effect of the ‘shock and awe’ once they returned, and this raised many, many questions for me, whether demonising them made them stronger in the long run. The other issues, which I’ve been looking at for the past four or five years, is their power performance and how excellent they are at power performance, something which the government was not really good at responding to. The other issue is, again, looking at the government, their lack of ability to increase public confidence and not having a great PR machine in any of the ministries or from the Presidential Palace. Corruption and cronyism across the government and especially in these last few weeks in the Armed Forces, this will be covered, I’m sure, by my colleagues on the panel, once again, reminds me of the Greeks and the Persians. If we go back to ancient history, the Persians discovered that it was much easier to defeat the Greeks by paying them gold coins than trying to meet them in battle. So I think the Taliban used the ancient strategy quite effectively in the past few weeks.

Another issue, which has always bothered me, and you know, I’ve never had really effective questions about this, and I’ve actually, sort of, tried to ask different think tanks to cover this in Afghanistan, is issues around Muslim identity, and what exactly the Muslim identity in Afghanistan looks like, how Muslim are the Afghans? You know, and questions around those issues. Was there more that could have been done in relation to being Muslim in Afghanistan? Was there a, sort of, strange national algorithm, which hid Muslimists from foreigners? So we thought that we had this – we were dealing with this secular society where, underneath, a lot of, sort of, resentment was fermenting, and how much were we cultural imperialists in our approach to issues such as gender equality? These are all questions which, you know, I’ve been asking myself, over the past few weeks, and yeah, I think, Gareth, you’re going to ask me to stop there.

Dr Gareth Price

No, that’s a great tour of those issues. Lots of questions, which we’ll come back to. But Saad, how would you view that, the past 20 years?

Saad Mohseni

Well, I – you know, I’m in Berlin right now, and I met, obviously, with German officials and they were pretty tough with themselves as to what did we do wrong, this post-mortem has started and it’ll take, probably, a generation to figure out what went wrong. But what I do want to say is, it’s been, in its own ways, a huge success, because it’s actually transformed Afghan society, the international contribution and presence.

If you think about the 1970s, my parents’ generation, which, you know, people always talk about tourists and miniskirts and, sort of, a cosmopolitan city, as in Kabul, the country was – had not progressed that much. Literacy, in those days, was at 8%. Kabul had a population of 300 – 400,000 people. So - and basically, two or three Imams ran the country, and it was just a very small elite, you know, group of individuals, who basically were sophisticated, the rest of the country was very backward.

So, I think that this post-9/11, the political order that, you know, we saw end in mid-August, contributed greatly to the education of Afghans. We have this extraordinary population that’s the youngest, I believe, outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, a median age of 18, 65% of the population is under the age of 22 or 23. And of the younger generation of Afghans, if you say around the 30s, the education rates are pretty high. I mean, they’re, like, at 65, 70%. Now, the average is much lower, but this new generation of Afghans, you know, you can’t put the genie back in the bottle. I mean, these kids are sophisticated, they’re better educated, they’re savvy when it comes to technology and consumption of media, on both sides, by the way. Even the Taliban fighters know how to use Signal and WhatsApp and Facebook. They may consume a different type of content, but they’re pretty tech savvy in their own ways. So, you know, child mortality has dropped, people are living much longer, the life expectancy has moved up, people live in urban centres, or they have an urban experience, even if they live in smaller towns.

So the country has been transformed, and I think the international community, while it licks its wounds, and it’s of course, it’s a tragedy for the 38 million who are going to remain in the country, I still believe it’s been a net positive for the country. Now, once you taste freedom, once you taste freedom of expression, or you know, as a woman you can work or you can go to the school, how bitter will it be if we go back to the mid-1990? That’s going to be the big question, is that, is the Taliban 2.0 different to the earlier version? And we’re getting mixed signals, obviously, and the proof’s in the pudding, we’ll just have to see how, you know, what their new government looks like, who’s in charge, how much will they tolerate? We can only speculate at this juncture. It’s too early to tell.

Our own experience as a media group is mixed. I mean, there are certain things, which are, you know, encouraging and – but then again, we have to be pretty realistic, and not naïve about what we may see in the weeks ahead. Thank you.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, Saad. I think that question of whether or not you can put the genie back in the bottle, as you put it, is definitely something that we’ll look into in the Q&A and I think, yeah, we’ll certainly turn to your question of, “Is the Taliban different?” Hameed, over to you.

Hameed Hakimi

Sure. On the larger question of was it inevitable, what we saw? I believe it wasn’t. Afghanistan could have had a different outcome to the one we’re witnessing today. But just, kind of, reflecting on a couple of the wider points, I think one of the main things that happened with the international invasion, intervention, whatever you call that, you know, is the issue of sources of conflict and how, at the heart of that, was resource allocation and rent seeking. Afghanistan as an entity, at least since 1850s, when we hear this new phrase at the time called ‘the buffer state’, it was coined by the Russian and the British Empires at the time, and it was pretty much underpinned by providing rent to the rulers in the countries there. And that has been a perpetual issue that we can potentially unpack, maybe not fully. So, with the international intervention, albeit the fact that obviously not, out of the trillion plus money that we talk about, a fraction of it has been spent on Afghans, the majority of it has come through one way and gone the other way back to Western capitals.

The international intervention exacerbated the sources of conflict when it came to resource allocation, rent seeking, validation of networks, and bringing back people who were actually unseated by the Taliban in 1996. Yeah, albeit where the joke on the street in Kabul was that this time they were wearing ties and suits, and they shortened their beards, but they were pretty much the same people. So that’s one thing that, you know, definitely the internationals either did not understand or they didn’t care about much. Maybe, I’m more inclined to say they didn’t understand.

There was also something that Sippi talked about a little bit, is the idea of knowledge production. So there was a huge amount of gatekeeping when it came to policymaking internationally, and how much agency was given to real, ordinary Afghan voices beyond potentially a number of people who could potentially speak English and were, kind of, agreeing with the international, wider international agenda.

Now, that’s not entirely true for the whole period, but there’s definitely a prevalence of that. So, knowledge about Afghanistan, what mattered, you know, the kind of, rural-urban divide, some of the things that Saad talked about, you know, all of these things were organic changes that were not always captured by international policymaking.

And then the other one was, obviously, the regional dynamics of conflict. So the tension with Pakistan very soon became a, kind of, a peculiar type of domestic populism, for very weak people to come in and ride high on this wave of anti-Pakistan sentiment, and occupy positions of public and social influence, whether that was through a media channel, or social media, or whatever. But also, what it did do, was it disregarded two things.

One, that Afghanistan never managed to understand why the Pakistani establishment was doing what it was doing. That the India dynamic was never appreciated enough, and everyone was putting it down on the irridentism of the Afghans, to the fact that Afghans haven’t accepted formally the Durand Line, and therefore, the Pakistanis are having a malicious intervention. I think there was quite a bit of confusion there, because obviously, Pakistan’s main concern was not the Durand Line, that’s internationally recognised, as far as they’re concerned, it was the India component and beyond.

And also, internationally, the internationals, I mean, on a number of occasions I’ve spoken to military leaders in Kabul, ISAF and later on Resolute Support, who accepted the role of Pakistan being a problem, but they were never able to find a way of mitigating that. So, that is why today, you know, on the streets of Kabul, you see ordinary women, some who are speaking on social media, saying they’re not even educated, they’re not even after jobs. But they were saying, “Death to Pakistan,” and I think that’s a damning conclusion to – a failure, and I think a rising populism, that both, kind of, fermented this really horrible, kind of, you know, neighbourly relation that has emerged on both sides.

So I think, yeah, the international intervention could have been so much different, and I think understanding the issues better would have been definitely more conducive, but I’m very happy to unpack this even further in the Q&A.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you. We’ve got a broad spectrum of issues. Maybe I’ll start off going back to Sippi. A couple of questions for you, and if others want to contribute, do step in afterwards. The first is something you and Hameed mentioned, which is, you know, rent seeking or corruption. One of the challenges always seemed to be, in Afghanistan, that the individual incentive, if you’re concerned about the future stability of the government, if you think that the government may be overthrown, that provides a powerful incentive to make sure that you and your family and your wider family are okay. It’s, kind of, the perfect atmosphere for corruption. And if the corruption then becomes part of the reason as to why the sustainability of the government is reduced, it’s a problem. Were there specific ways, do you think, in which the problem of corruption could have been mitigated? I also, I note in the Q&A function, for you Sippi, there’s a specific question, if you could elaborate on what you mean by ‘power performance’.

And another issue I’d throw in, in relation to what Hameed said, and maybe we’ll start with you for this as well, Sippi, is about the question of transitional justice. You know, as Hameed said, that unpopular warlords were returning and so forth, and a lot of people, in the early 2000s, talked about the need for some, kind of, transitional justice after decades of conflict in the country. And it seemed to be something that was entirely put to one side because it was too difficult, and because the people that would require the transitional justice, a lot of them were in positions of power. Do you think, with the benefit of hindsight, more could have been done? Or was the thinking at the time that it was too difficult probably the case? Sippi first and then others, please contribute.

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Working backwards, on the issue of transitional justice, at one stage, I was working as an Advisor to the Commander of the UK military in Southern Afghanistan, and of course it was a NATO headquarters, so it was an international, sort of, affair. And I think I had some very eye-opening moments when it became clear that the issue of transitional justice was not just, sort of, too difficult to handle, but it just wasn’t expedient. At times there would be situations where, for example, I or other people would bring in issues around some of the Commanders that, let’s say, US special forces were collaborating with.

Off the top of my head, there was one case when the particular – the man, in particular, was trafficking in young boys for sex. And the response was, “Well, he kills Taliban, so he’s fine, and it’s all good with us.” So, I think that it was just not expedient for – and you know, here we have a, sort of, clash of aims. So the aims of the international military clashed with the aims of the, let’s say, Afghan Government, with the sectors of Afghan Government who might have wanted transitional justice, and then clashed again with the aims of the people. But I think that the aims of the international military were, you know, placed as priority number one, which then created, you know, a sort of, chain of events.

In terms of the corruption and what you were talking about, I think that there we meander off into, sort of, the setting up of sustainable institutions, which is something that the international community failed at miserably, and the loyalty then always would go back to your family and your extended family and so on and so forth, or your ethnicity, or in some cases, your ideological, sort of, alliances. And I remember, you know, when I arrived as a fresh-faced 20-something-year-old in Afghanistan, the first thing I realised was that the human resource sections of NGOs had been taken over by people from one province, one faction of the Mujahideen, one ethnic group, and they only hired their own. So, then, entire NGOs began to belong to specific groups. And so this practice was long established before the Taliban came and went and the international community came back. I think people just weren’t aware that there was this massive mistrust of government institutions, and that it was always easier to fall back on your immediate family and your extended family, and people who were close to you in different ways.

And, I’m sorry, was there a third question?

Dr Gareth Price

Just a very specific question, if you could elaborate on when you were talking about ‘power performance’?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Oh, power performance/ Yes, at some stage, because of my PhD research, I went back and started looking at, you know, sort of, Taliban spectacles, and the more, sort of, visual and visceral ones, like the execution of President Najib or, like, the destruction of the Buddhas. And from there, I started to read, you know, begin to see the Taliban’s actions as a text. And the message comes across very, very, you know, in a very clear way, about the power that they hold, and that, you know, nobody can, sort of, go against this power. And even in recent days, when they put on, you know, American uniforms and put on the clothes of special forces soldiers and stood there in front of the, sort of, face-to-face with the coalition soldiers who were leaving, was a very, very big power message saying, “Look, you know, I am almost, like, wearing the skin of your dead, and I’m standing here, you know, and you can’t do anything about it.” So they’re all about messaging about power, and it runs in all of their activities and performances. Everything is a spectacle, and everything is very cleverly planned.

Dr Gareth Price

Saad, do you have…?

Saad Mohseni

Well, I mean, I think I just want to maybe just pick up on some of the points that Sippi made, in terms of, you know, why, you know, this sudden collapse, and why did the Taliban, who, if you look at any poll, has never had the backing of more than 15%, ten or 15% of the population? I think that the state, even during the Karzai era, but in particular during the last seven years, has been totally disconnected from ordinary Afghans in Afghanistan.

I often mention the story that when I went to see President Ghani and I said to him, “Listen, you know, you ought to watch the news,” and I reminded him that President Karzai, when he missed the particular programme that asked for a CD or a DVD, this was pre-YouTube. To which he said, “I’m too busy, and I get a transcript, and I can speed read it.” I said, “Well, the emotion of that mother crying because her son has been killed in the front – on the frontlines, or he’s not getting fed in the military, or some other person protesting, it’s a lot more powerful than what you would read on a piece of paper.” He, sort of, smiled and I know that that never changed.

And I think, in a lot of ways, the international community has to also bear some responsibility, and like, if you have an election where a candidate, you know, obviously cheats, and it’s documented by people like us, and we break the stories, and then, no matter what we do, the outcome remains the same, the international community were the enablers. They allowed crooks and thieves and thugs rule over this country of ours, and where corruption was endemic. But in a lot of ways, it was the international community that allowed this to happen. And when you’ve mentioned this to our friends in the US, and they would say, “Well, it’s a sovereign state, we can’t interfere.” I mean, it just sounded so ridiculous, saying, “Oh, you give ‘em” – you know, 45% of our GDP came from the international community, three billion of which went into the military. It’s an extraordinary amount of leverage that they could have utilised, which wasn’t.

So, I think it’s a combination of factors. It’s a weak, inept, corrupt government, and of course, what transpired on February the 20th, when the Americans signed their deal with the Taliban, without any real conditions, I think that really helped the Taliban, you know, gain the momentum that we saw, that basically, eventually triggered the collapse of the government in August of this year. But also, I think we cannot underestimate the severance of US-Afghan ties in April, where there was virtually no air support, especially at the beginning, no contractors to help the Afghan air force as well as Afghan military, no logistical help, no help on the planning, deprivation of key software. All of a sudden, the Afghans had the keys to the car, but the cars had no wheels.

So, I think, you know, it’s very difficult to, sort of, draw conclusions right now, but I think you have to look at a whole series of factors, that – and I think the Taliban also got very lucky, in that Ashraf Ghani had alienated so many people in the provinces, whether it was in Badakhshan or in Herat or in the South or in the East, when, you know, a police force or a military needs the support of local communities. And if that support is not there, because they’ve been alienated and offended by people in Kabul, then it’s not – it’s going to be very difficult for you to get food, to get fires, to get volunteers, to have the support of elders.

So there’s a long list of things, and if I had to divide it up, and I think it’s a 50/50 thing, the international and particularly the Americans played their role, but also, the Afghan Government, that contributed to this, and the Taliban were smart. They took full advantage of these weaknesses.

Dr Gareth Price

Yeah, I think that’s an interesting point, and it’s something regarding the military, that is something that people talked about throughout, that why are we constructing a Western type of army in Afghanistan, that if you take out the Medevac or whatever, it doesn’t work, as was proven when the contractors left, as opposed to something more optimal for Afghanistan’s history?

Another issue, that again has been talked about throughout the 20 year occupation, which you alluded to, and we’ll go back to Saad on this, is, as you said, the system of government. It’s a very centralised system of government. It’s a weak system, but it’s a centralised system, and I remember again, in the early years, after the invasion, people suggest – some people suggested a more decentralised system would be better. Can I return to you and ask your opinion? Was the type of government itself sub-optimal for Afghanistan? And maybe we’ll pass that back to Sippi and to Hameed.

Saad Mohseni

Yes, I think it’s an issue that – it’s been a pet hobby of mine to promote this idea of a decentralised system, devolving power to the districts or the provinces. The only way Afghanistan could develop – I mean, if you wanted a, you know, a notebook or a piece of furniture in Faryab, you had to come to Kabul and bribe someone, so that, you know, a requisition for a particular, you know, item for a school, for example, you had to come to the Ministry of Education. So, the whole system was so, so upside down, it was extraordinary.

By the way, this also applied to the military. You know, I spoke to – I gave this talk at the Hoover Institution last – late last year, and I talked about the military, how it wasn’t being, you know, soldiers were not getting fed. I mean, they were getting paid the same as a street sweeper, 11,000 Afghanis all out, yet they were expected to die for that small amount of money. But at the same time, we were neglecting the basic needs of these soldiers: food, pay. And the food, one of the reasons why it didn’t work out well, was because it was a centralised procurement system, corrupt, rather than, sort of, giving the money, the funds, to local Corps Commanders who can buy meat locally. It’s good for the economy. I mean, they were giving contracts out in Kabul and stealing from it.

So, it’s – and this also applies to governance. I mean, why wouldn’t a school education Chief in a small district – why would he care less than some guy sitting in Kabul? Of course he’s going to care more. That’s his community. Why shouldn’t people be responsible for their own affairs? Afghanistan is a complicated country. We have different ethnicities, people have different, you know, sects, from a religious perspective. They have different needs, and they have different ways of managing their affairs, and the sooner we devolve power to the districts and to the provinces, the better for Afghanistan.

Now, my concern is that the Taliban also are in favour of a centralised system. However, they do also have local leaders, for example, in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Governor is a well-known guy. He’s from the province, or in Badakhshan they have, you know, people from the region who are managing affairs, and they will have probably more freedoms enjoyed, you know, by their predecessors under the Ghani Government. But I think it’s one of the key things about Afghanistan, it’s a nation of 38 million people, that you cannot rule it from the centre.

Dr Gareth Price

Sippi, can I turn to you?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

On the topic of decentralisation, I could really speak for three days. It starts from the Constitution. A lot of the powers are centralised into Kabul Government from the Constitution. So, the Taliban have been griping about wanting to change the Constitution, so if they do, this might be one of the issues that comes up. And exactly as Saad said, you know, there is a hugely bureaucratic system for people to go through, even in Kabul. And I’ll give you a quick, you know, practical examples are always easiest.

There was a very long capacity-building project for the Ministry of the Interior, and one part of it was budgeting, and for people to learn how to fill out the forms to ask for things that they needed in their budget. And in the end, they always fell back on foreign visitors, to ask the foreign visitor directly for things like paper for printers, because it was easier. It was much easier than filling out all the paperwork, knowing that it was going to go to the Finance Department in the Ministry, who would then ignore them, because the budget was one thing on paper, but then it was spent in a very ad hoc way, you know, sort of, given away to elite people in the Ministry, who then just walked in and asked for it and didn’t fill out any paperwork.

So, a whole shambolic system, a lot of bureaucracy, a lot of fake paper trails, and finally, yes, the Ministry of Finance, which really had not – has never devolved its systems effectively to the provinces. It’s got the grabbing part, you know, the taxation, take taxes from the provinces. It doesn’t have a part that gives money to the provinces. You know, those systems are not set up effectively.

Dr Gareth Price

Hameed, we bypassed you for the last couple of rounds, but…

Hameed Mansour

That’s okay. Now, I wanted to make a few points about decentralisation, in particular to Afghanistan. I think, with all its advantages, and we know what they are, and some, you know, have been highlighted already by Saad and Sippi, the problem is that the debate on decentralisation of Afghanistan in the last few years, especially after Ashraf Ghani’s micro-managerial style of Presidency, where reportedly, he was even interviewing District Chief Police appointees, I mean, ridiculous kinds of micromanagement instances, it became an issue that was confused with federalism.

And so, when you start talking about the issue of decentralisation in Afghanistan, remember, they’re not talking in English, so the differences are, kind of, washed away, and when you translate these terms. It is often confused with federalism, so there was a particular class of Afghans from non-Pashtun communities who would, for example, go abroad, do PhDs or degrees, and they would do stuff on decentralisation, and then feed back that debate into the ethnicised, kind of, nature of power brokers and power structures in Afghanistan. So, there was a dilution, it was fully diluted, when you were talking to an Afghan, for example, talking about decentralisation, when actually what they were talking about was federalism. And then a lot was lost in translation in all the confusion.

But also, people who were in favour of decentralisation but favoured their structure of the government would also argue that even if you decentralise, there was no guarantee that, for example, in Balkh, if you decentralise, there was no guarantee that Atta Nur would not be the hegemon there. Whether you had a centralised system or a decentralised system, he would be the one running it. I mean, you know, we know – when I was in Kabul in 2000, I think, 16 to 17/18, and I remember, I took an early flight because I was advised to leave early, ‘cause Atta Nur was coming with thousands of people to storm Kabul, asking for decentralisation. And at the end, Ashraf Ghani had to give him a couple of, I think, ministries and some embassies and he was fine.

You know, so, that, kind of, debate was very unhealthy internally in Afghanistan, that ethnicity, debate over ethnic stuff, Ashraf Ghani’s personal style of micromanagement, and the confusion over federalism and decentralisation, meant that it never went anywhere. You did not have a meaningful conversation internally about decentralisation. While all of these other manual issues and corruption issues, petty criminality – I mean, if you wanted your, you know, your – I mean, I spoke to somebody who was in Kabul, he had to go to Laghman, in a place which was, like, under attack by the Taliban those weeks, and he had to get his national ID card stamped at the back, some ridiculous thing he needed to do to get a passport, and then come back to Kabul. So, I mean, of course, decentralisation is needed, and it will be a challenge for the Taliban, but in Afghanistan, in particular in the last years, we have to see through that, kind of, fog of ethnicity, federalism and decentralisation all being together, confused.

Dr Gareth Price

Thanks, Hameed. Just to say, please do keep putting your questions to our panellists in the Q&A function. We’ve got a few questions, but before we turn to those, or, kind of, adapting the question from Tom Chapel, obviously, there’s a lot of questions about what’s happening now. And so, I wonder if maybe, turning to Saad first, in terms of the Taliban Government, it would be great if you had some ideas of what you think it will look like and what it means, and if you don’t want to go out on a limb, what we should be looking for from the announcement of the Taliban Government.

Saad Mohseni

Well, I mean, you know, we obviously are in touch with the – some members of the leadership, directly and indirectly. Obviously there, you know, if you look at the three Deputies, you could argue that there are three factions: Mullah[inaudible – 37:54] and Mullah Yaqoob and the Haqqanis. Ironically, the Haqqanis seem to be the most moderate and the most interested in a relatively open Afghanistan. They understand the importance of engaging with the world. Some of the Kandari groups less so. And I think this tug of war – and I think one of the reasons they have not announced their government, as much as they insist that the group is very much united, I think it’s that they are having internal issues. And I would suspect that the ISI Chief’s visit also had something to do with that, more than anything else. I’m sure there are other reasons for his visit, but obviously, they want to make sure that this, sort of – there are compromises, even if they have to force the Haqqanis to compromise more than the others, I think they will do this.

You know, there’s been a change in their approach. Early on, it was more about bringing in professionals, and they would be sitting on the sidelines, but it’s become apparent that they want to be involved in running things. And even in the 90s, if you recall, and Sippi probably remembers, that they were, sort of, notional heads, but most of the time they were busy fighting or going around, they were not in the ministries, and they actually kept on a let of the technocrats. I’m not sure if they’re going to tolerate a strong Deputy or a strong team underneath, because a lot of them probably think they know more than they knew in the 90s. So I think that’s one interesting development, that their interest in being involved themselves.

The other interesting this is, again it’s mixed, there is no sense of urgency. I mean, if I was – you know, you’ve got this political crisis, of course, but then you have this humanitarian crisis, and an economic crisis that’s going to completely destroy the country. I mean, literally with this, you know, with the fact that we also have a drought. I mean, if assistance doesn’t come in, I mean, 45% of your GDP disappearing overnight, it’s going to be – and it’s going to have an extraordinary impact on the country. And – but to not have the sense of urgency, well, you know, I mean, most of them don’t, is, sort of, scary, as to how – do they actually realise how serious this is?

$100 million here from the Germans and $100 million here from someone else, is not going to help them. And even with the military spending of three billion, a lot of it did, you know, filter down, and helped a lot of families. Public servants, when will they get paid? How will they get paid? What’s going to happen to Teachers, you know, what’s going to happen to everything? I mean, everything’s been subsidised by the international community.

So, anyway, Afghans have gotten used to this, unlike the 1990s, where people, actually, expectations were low. Afghanistan is almost double the size. Their expectations are much higher today. And also, I think in those days, people, you know, had plots of land, they grew things. Nowadays, people are fairly sophisticated, they go to the supermarket. They probably don’t know, so, you know, they haven’t really survived for 20 odd years.

So, you know, I really – I am worried mostly about the economy and this lack of urgency from the Taliban, and I think they may not even fully understand the implications. I mean, for example, if they had been a bit more patient and, you know, the – and of course, you have to blame Ashraf Ghani for this, but if we had a transition process, it could have legitimised almost their government. But nowadays, everything’s up in the air. This is a knot – the sanctions knot, or the freezing of assets knot, is one that you cannot undo that easily, even if they decide tomorrow to recognise these guys. So, I think, you know, we’ve got our work cut out for us, and so does the, you know, the international community, because this is – what happens in Afghanistan doesn’t stay in Afghanistan.

If you get 1.5 to 2 million refugees coming out of the country, according to the UN, in 2021, we’re two countries away from Europe, you know. It’s Iran and Turkey and then it’s the EU. So, I think the world needs to take notice, and I think, you know, it’s right to help the, you know, Translators and others to get out. 100, 120-odd thousand people, maybe another 100,000 people. But the 38 million people remaining in the country should also be a priority.

Dr Gareth Price

Can I pick you up on that? I mean, it’s something that we’ve been mulling over the last few weeks. I mean, just to reiterate what you were saying, you’ve got the brain drain of the Interpreters, Translators and so forth. You’ve got the economic crisis. You’ve got the reduction in foreign aid. You’ve got a drought. You’ve got warnings of food shortages to potential famine and you’ve not – you know, this would – a team of crack Economists would struggle to cope with this, and this isn’t going to work. So what happens?

Saad Mohseni

Well, I don’t know. I mean, my concern – and, of course, I’ve been advocating publicly and privately to engage the Taliban, to attempt to work with them, to not threaten them. To say, “Listen, these are – this is – these are your options. We’d like to work and help you, because we care about the Afghan population.” My concern is that if they find that – find things too difficult dealing with the international community, they’re going to completely clamp up. And they’ll go to the other extreme, because their default mode, for key Taliban guys, as we saw in the 90s, is to, you know, to be the authoritarian types that they are. And I think that if they go down that route, it’s going to be more Khmer Rouge than anything else, because, you know, there’s going to be dissent, like we saw.

We had protests today, we’ve had protests today about Pakistan, and we’ve protests, over the last few days, about women’s rights. You know, Afghans are very different to what they were 20-odd years ago, and for the Taliban, you know, they’re, sort of, it’s a weird thing, because we had our guy arrested today, and we had to – he was released. They have to get used to this idea that Afghanistan’s a lot more open than it used to be, and that people are not the Afghans of the 1990s, post-Civil War. This Afghanistan is vibrant, it’s alive. Just because they didn’t come out and protest in favour of Ashraf Ghani or fight for him, it doesn’t mean they’re going to just sit back and accept everything.

My concern is they’re going to snap, and they will attempt to go back to the way they used to be in the 1990s. And that’s going to be – it’s going to be very – not just bad for Afghanistan, it’s going to be bad for the world, because that’s when you’ll see, you know, massive refugee numbers coming out of Afghanistan. You may see genocide, you may see ethnic cleansing, you may see all sorts of things. So engaging them at this juncture is really important.

Dr Gareth Price

Sippi, can I take you back to that previous question on what you’re looking for from the Taliban Government, and any further thoughts on what it might be and what that all means?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

I think I’m going to, sort of, jump backwards and forwards in time a little bit. Back in the day, you know, I was working in the humanitarian field when the Taliban were in power, and they were extraordinarily good at extracting assistance and channelling it to wherever they wanted. They were very, very good at this, and very good at leveraging and manipulating the people who were there. And talking of leveraging and manipulating, I think one of the blind spots, which again, was one of the factors that might have led us to this point where we’re at, is all the vast menagerie of extremist groups that have been, you know, operating in Afghanistan for the past many years, and there’s a lot of them. And they have brought their families, they are well entrenched, and the previous government knew about them, and the Taliban, you know, they’ve sworn allegiance to Mullah Hibatullah, so they’re there. And these are the, sort of, doom and gloom that the regional neighbours are worried about. And so there’s a lot of leveraging going on behind the scenes, I think, of the Taliban effectively threatening their neighbours with, you know, kind of, letting the dogs out if they don’t get all the things that they want.

So we have got to look closely at, you know, deals under the table being made with the Iranians to receive assistance, deals being made with the Chinese, deals being made with the Pakistanis. I think the Pakistanis are very worried about Tariq [inaudible – 46:58] Taliban Pakistan, you know, being able to operate from Afghan territory into Pakistan. And I think part of the reason for the ISI Chief’s visit was discussing that specific issue, among other things.

The other issue, which, you know, I don’t see discussed in the “Why did Afghanistan fall?” scenario, is the extraordinary 25-year co-operation deal made between Iran and China recently, which means that, basically, the Chinese can get Iranian oil and gas at knockdown prices, which means that the thing in the way of getting that, you know, sort of, bargain basement oil and gas is Afghanistan. So was that the reason why suddenly the Taliban got this push, and everything just collapsed, you know, like a house of cards, and the Chinese get their way? So, do we have to look at deals that the Chinese and the Taliban are making? Is this why they’re sitting so calmly and appear totally unperturbed by what the international community is doing with a few million dollars here or there? And the Chinese, the Iranians, the Russians, the Pakistanis, I don’t think that they’re desperately worried about women’s rights, human rights, or any of those issues. I don’t think that there would be that much conditionality. And I think that there – the main discussion points between those particular neighbours and Afghanistan, will be extremist groups, drugs, and the flow of refugees, and sort of, issues related to those, the sort of, instability that comes with all of that.

And I think, again, going back to the question of, you know, where did we go wrong in Afghanistan? I think many people treated Afghanistan as a vacuum packed entity and ignored the regional dynamics and did not handle Afghanistan and the Afghan Government in the context, in the regional context, which is how it should always have been treated. Because Afghanistan is so sensitive to those relationships.

Dr Gareth Price

No, it’s an interesting point and, I mean, one of the other things I’ve been mulling over, which speaks to your point, Sippi, one of the problems seems to me, regardless of whether they can get Russian and Chinese support, and whether that can make up in some way for that Western support, if the Taliban is moderate, inclusive, to a degree, it clearly opens up the space to be outflanked by more extremist groups. And if it encompasses those extremist groups, as you say, it risks not getting international recognition, both from the West, but also from its neighbours that fear, you know, intervention in their own countries, whether it’s Pakistan or Indian Kashmir or the Central Asian republics and so on. So that’s, you know, a comment.

And then secondly, if you look back at the history of the region over a long time, you’ve seen Islamist insurgencies, of late concentrated in Afghanistan, because that’s been where the conflict is. But at other times, it’s been in Pakistan, and at other times it’s been in Indian Kashmir, and at other times it’s been in Tajikistan or Uzbekistan. And those same angry young men are still there, and now they have a state to look after them.

My, kind of, follow-up question, where this is leading, I guess, is, unless those angry young people who’ve just been fighting with the Taliban have decided the war is over and they’re going to, you know, sit comfortably, there will be conflict somewhere else in the region, it would seem to me, intuitively. And do you agree with that premise and if so, where do think is most at risk? Is it India? Is it Pakistan? Is it…?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Absolutely. No, I totally agree with you, and if you go through the various countries, like, Iran is already worrying about separatists in Balochistan and worrying about the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan. And the Taliban, in fact, brought in entire groups of militant groups – militants from places like Tajikistan, existing militant groups, and sort of, blended them into the Taliban forces, to hold specific areas. So, for instance, Badakhshan was held by this group of Tajik – no, sorry, Badakhshan was the Uighurs. Another province in the North was held by these Tajik militants, a specific Tajik militant group. And so all of these groups, it’s very much like, Afghanistan is now a roulette table in the middle of the region where, you know, if the pieces fall in the wrong place, then they unleash the extremist groups in your direction.

So, it’s a very tense situation, and I think that there’s a lot of negotiation going on with gritted teeth. It’s difficult to say where the next conflict is going to be. Again, you know, difficult to say whether it’s fake news or not, but the comment from one of the Taliban – I don’t know if it was a spokesperson or a leader saying, “We have the right to comment on Kashmir.” You know, it’s all very interesting, and I think that the tension in the region is palpable, as people rush to meet with the Taliban and to try and get agreements about not unleashing the extremists. But then, what are the Taliban going to do with these extremists? Are they going to sit on them? Are they going to just keep them? They will contest the Taliban’s authority. They are very much linked into different factions within the Taliban, factions that Saad was mentioning. And then, you know, Al-Qaeda will be jockeying them along. Al-Qaeda has got very close relations with Haqqani through marriage and through, sort of, dealings and business with each other. Haqqani has been the, sort of, admin, finance and logistic wing of the Taliban on behalf of Al-Qaeda. So it’s a very complex situation in that respect.

Dr Gareth Price

Can I quickly follow-up and get your opinion on something again, we’ve been thinking about? When the Taliban says, “We’re not going to become – allow Afghanistan to become a site for international terrorism,” for the West, we’re thinking about someone like Osama bin Laden sitting there, boasting about disliking the West and being protected by Afghanistan. For the region, the type of militants that are, you know, fighting in Tajikistan at a certain point, let’s say, or heading in and out of Indian Kashmir, or potentially heading into Pakistan. That’s an entirely different set of militants, and it strikes me as really hard, if not impossible, to see how the Taliban could prevent such people, who, as you say, they’ve been working with and are actually part of the movement in recent years, from basing themselves in Afghanistan’s territory. And if they want to go into Sinchang, they will, and I – can you see any way in which the Taliban could say, “We won’t allow it,” or genuinely prevent Afghanistan from becoming a site, which is mutually destabilising?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

This is all about the negotiations and dealmaking among the factions within the Taliban, and I think there is clearly a group of the Taliban who no longer want to be just localised to Afghanistan, who want to work with these groups and to push jihad further into South Asia and Central Asia. And I think that this is – it’s going to be very difficult for the Taliban to control these forces that are, sort of, pulling the chariot in different directions. And, for me, it’s very difficult to predict what the bargaining chips are, unless, you know, the Chinese have something up their sleeve. I really couldn’t say right now. It’s just an interesting situation to watch, but very difficult to predict.

Dr Gareth Price

Hameed, can I turn to you with that same, sort of, question, in particular on the regional implications?

Hameed Hakimi

Yeah, I mean, for me, look, I want to step back a little bit and look at the Taliban predominantly, what they’ve been doing. So, why they’re successful in the first place. a) They understood the idea of framing themselves in a particular way and appropriating symbols, and then using symbols and framing to mobilise. And I think, while the internationals, kind of, you know, argued about gendered quotas and all of that stuff, and development budgets and, you know, never were able to substantiate whether that was actually being implemented, the Taliban were able to look at communities and, you know, localities, especially in rural areas, and understand what mattered to ordinary Afghans in those places. And I think, one of the pieces we wrote, and Chatham House talked about this idea, that, you know, how did – what did we see when we looked at the maps, and what did the Taliban see when they looked at the maps?

You know, so I think the fact that the Taliban provide that inspiration – because all the Islamists across the world, including the Middle East, may have framing and symbols, and they do mobilise, have they shown the, kind of, success that the Taliban can claim? No. Perhaps in modern history they’re quite unique in that, and they know the position that they hold. And therefore, this idea that the Taliban could somehow remain nationally bounded, you know, yes, they’re very happy to say that in their narratives, but they know that they’re internationally inspiring already, beyond cross-border, you know, inspirations happening.

But I think, I also would caution us against seeing the binaries too much, of extremists versus the moderates. And the trouble is that you have all of these countries, including Pakistan, Iran, you know, Central Asia less so, but Bangladesh, Afghanistan. These places have incredibly large, large amounts of youth bulge, who are all jobless. You know, and we have seen in the history, in the last 20 years, in the last 40 years in Afghanistan, including in the Mujahideen period when they were fighting the Soviets, that a lot of young people join these things because they have to survive. And so, if tomorrow you have ungoverned spaces and a vacuum, as a result of what’s happening in Afghanistan, and the only way to survive is to become part of the Taliban, inevitably, a lot of young people will have to do that, because they can’t leave the country, they can’t find work, and they have to feed themselves and their families.

So – but that practical question should never be overlooked, and I think this is why the issue of engagement with the Taliban’s important, and the issue of ensuring that there is some, kind of, interaction through – that the humanitarian catastrophe, that the economic situation, is not so out of control that then essentially, you have volunteers for banditry and for extremist groups. Because, at the end of the day, I think even among the Taliban, you know, and, you know, I’m sure we all have had this experience, you know, not every Taliban fighter is a sophisticated ideologue. You know, they understand the basics of the framing, and that’s it really, you know. Beyond that, it’s all about affiliation and affinity. And so for – and that dynamic there is still there, and it’s really profound, and therefore, I agree that a lot of the Taliban’s success, what Saad was saying earlier, is purely luck, because so many people hated what the government had become before the Taliban, and what it was unleashing on their daily life. So for the Taliban to keep that, you know, and tap into, it’s a resource.

But also, last point, what are we going to see in the Taliban going forward? I think the immediate and medium-term would be Taliban survival and cohesion is more important to them than anything, and I think even this, kind of, over-reading into Taliban visiting the ISI Chief and all of that, I think this is – it can easily get so emotional so quickly. And understandably for Afghans, obviously, but I think, for the Taliban, their cohesion and preserving the various entities to, kind of, have some, kind of, thing together, ‘cause their survival is together, we know that. But also, their destruction and fragmentation will come from within, as opposed to being inflicted from the outside.

I think their internal fissures, as usual with these kinds of groups, is more damaging to them if they don’t fix it, than anything that could be inflicted upon them from the outside. ‘Cause they’re a bit like the populist movement. The more you – you know, you try and inflict on populist leaders anything, they keep making weaponization out of that, and they use it to their advantage.

We saw that in the Taliban’s case. For 20 years they were demonised, 18 years, for example, and the moment they were legitimated, they were able to ride on that, because that’s what gave them credibility, you know, in the minds of a lot of people who saw corrupt – I mean, they really, really ride high on this thing that they’re not corrupt. They have their own narratives and discourse, and I think, going forward, we will see, unfortunately, we will see Taliban brutality, if that means the cohesion is internally challenged. And to what extent, and they also delegitimate these local movements, these local protests, because there’s already some social media whispering that I see that they’re saying some of these women are protesting because they want their faces on camera to claim asylum abroad. I mean, that’s ridiculous. The country is locked, you know. So – but, you know, there would be people who would believe that narrative. So we – the Taliban are sophisticated, and I think their own cohesion will be more important to them, and that’s what we will see in the immediate to medium-term.

Dr Gareth Price

Can I just ask our audience, if you do have any questions, please put them in on the Q&A function. We’ve got a few questions, and we’ve got about 15 minutes left. But one of the questions follows up very much a point that Hameed just made, which is firstly, will international donors be able to ensure humanitarian assistance is properly used? And then, very much on the points you made, will Russian and Chinese assistance and investment be effective or simply enrich the Taliban and perhaps some from the former government, given the speakers’ comments about incompetence in the past? You make the point, Hameed, that the Taliban is seen as not corrupt, but if it’s taking over a system that is corrupt, if money is channelled in in similar way as it was before, except it’s from China as opposed to the West, what do you think are the chances of it being effectively used in a system where previously it wasn’t effectively used?

Hameed Hakimi

I think the definition of corruption is different. What was considered to be, like, proper corruption affecting daily life on a daily basis on Afghans was things like, for example, just as I mentioned earlier, if you wanted your passport to have a stamp on it, or your ID card, you had to go to the province from which you ancestrally originated, even if you lived in a different province, and even if that meant you had to go into a conflict zone. So for Afghans, those instances of corruption, having to bribe officials at the administrative level, those things are things that the Taliban pride themselves that they don’t do. At the wider level, aid, you know, extortion of taxes and things like that, the Taliban’s record is chequered as well. But I think that interaction with the local population hasn’t been there for the last 20 years, in the same way that it has been for the government, from a service delivery point of view.

So I think the Taliban, a) will struggle, just like the previous government did, with capacity. There’s been a huge brain drain. The Taliban, this is part of their challenge, to convert themselves from an insurgency to a governing entity. So they will have difficulty to implement aid, just like the last 20 years showed. So capacity will be an issue. But also, again, the rent-seeking, resource allocation means some people will get upset, some people will get happy. So what do they decide? Who do they give this first to? And ultimately, what would they like from this, kind of, international recognition? Would they like the international community to be shushing about, you know, the human rights issues, that women’s rights debates and things like that? Or would they like to be, again, promoting themselves as the counterterrorism wing of the international community against forces like Daesh and others, that could give them leverage internally, with whatever they get on with, that the internationals don’t monitor or don’t say much about? So I think a lot will have to pan out, but they immediately have two challenges. A) lack of experience of implementing aid projects, and b) within that debate, governance and capacity issues.

Dr Gareth Price

Sippi, Saad, do either of you want to make a comment? Saad.

Saad Mohseni

I just want to point out, it’s a huge mistake to assume that anyone is going to fill the vacuum of the international community, in terms of money, alright? The Chinese, even if they were to spend, and I have my doubts, but even if they were to spend money, it’ll probably be through some form of a loan, and you know, let’s say, even – let’s look at the TAPI Project: Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, in their pipeline, gas pipeline project. It’s a multi, multibillion dollar project, and once it’s completed, Afghanistan will only generate a few hundred million dollars from within transit fees. That’s it, right? What about the $8.5 billion that we’re getting today? Who’s going to fill – who’s going to give us that money? No-one; not the Chinese, definitely not the Russians. The Russians don’t have money. They can spend money on contractors and military and so forth, but they’re not going to have the billions that the Americans were spending, or the Germans and the Japanese and the Brits were spending. But I think, you know, if the Taliban believe that, then they’re a lot more naïve than I had assumed, that the Chinese are going to be able to fill that vacuum.

The Chinese will look at projects, they’ve looked at projects. They’re actually in touch with a couple of people I know, in particular, in relation to an infrastructure project. But how many people will that employ, you know? And when will we – when will the state generate anything from that project? You know, it remains to be seen. And for anything with mining, they need to have infrastructure. We need to have proper roads, we need to have a railway infrastructure, it’s going to take time. So, having the Chinese involved, and they may do it just to provoke the Americans, and this is the concern that we have, is that right now the Americans, whether they like it or not, lost this war and it’s going to – the consequences will be felt in the years ahead.

This has been a major, major defeat for the Americans, for its military, for its Diplomats, and the Americans right now, if they are attempting to lead anything that, sort of, resembles a diplomatic move or a post-Taliban Afghanistan, it’s going to actually be bad for Afghanistan. That’s why we’re – I myself and all of my colleagues are insisting on a, sort of, a UN Security Council type role, a mandated role, where, you know, the Chinese and the Russians and the Iranians and the Pakistanis as well as the GCC and the Central Asians, sit together and basically figure out how they’re going to do this. Because I think without that leverage, if the Chinese and the Russians do their own thing, because they don’t want to in any way help the Americans, I don’t know, salvage their reputation, it’s got to be bad for our country, and it’s going to be bad – and any leverage we have today with the Taliban, in terms of its leadership and their future conduct and their government, which needs to be broad-based, will fail. But, you know, some of the Taliban do accept this, but I think they need to also understand how naïve it would be for them to assume that what the Chinese do will fill that vacuum.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you. The first report I had to write in my first job was, “What is the feasibility of the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India gas pipeline, and that was in 1998. So, Sippi, did you want to add something?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Yeah, I, sort of, broadly agree with what Hameed’s saying. I agree. I mean, you know, the Chinese handling of the Mes Aynak mine should speak volumes about what the Chinese get up to. But at the same time, also, a lot of these projects make their money from the security contracts around the projects. So you create a situation of insecurity, as we saw with the previous government. You know, they would say that a road where US military had to do logistics was unsafe, and they would pay their own relatives to create the insecurity, then they’d get a huge security contract to keep that road safe. So, you know, these things go round in circles. So there are ways of extracting money from people who hope to come and do business in Afghanistan. But again, going back to the Chinese model, if we look at Africa, they bring in all the workers, they bring in Chinese workers to build roads. This is not going to work in a country like Afghanistan. Nobody will accept it. It’s just not feasible or useful for anybody.

On the other hand, thinking about the money that the US and others were spending in Afghanistan, I worked in Afghanistan at a time when the money had dried up. And it’s, for me, very likely that this money would have started drying up very, very fast, had international troops left and the Taliban not come in. This money would have just started disappearing. In 2001, there was a massive drought in Afghanistan, and women and children were suffering and they were dying, but nobody was willing to give money. In fact, you know, I was working for a US NGO at that stage, and we went many times to them to ask for money, lifesaving projects, and they were just not interested. So I think that we live in a very cynical world, where, you know, people make a lot of noise about certain issues, but when it comes to actually footing the bill, they’re quite reluctant. So yeah, I think at the moment it’s anybody’s guess what’s going to happen next, what will and will not work.

Dr Gareth Price

Can I pick you up on, you know, the point that you and Saad and Hameed have been talking about, about the economic crisis? One of the few industries that does seem feasible in Afghanistan is narcotics and opium grows nicely, and more recently, methamphetamine.

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Yeah.

Dr Gareth Price

The Taliban have announced a ban on opium production, which is obviously going to further reduce the economic plight if it’s true. I just wonder what your thoughts are on that? What are the dangers of Afghanistan becoming even more of a narco state, or the ban announcement, is it just for international purposes? What’s your take on that?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

I have a very strange take on this, based on my own strange take on what happened the last time the Taliban were in power. Showing that you have the ability to control something allows you to mess around with prices, and I think, to be honest, that by having the ban the last time around, the Taliban actually managed to push up prices for opium and other products.

The other issue for them at that time was the revenue coming to the Northern Alliance from the trafficking of drugs. So I think that the ban had a lot of side issues going on that weren’t necessarily always obvious. Of course, you know, it looks very good for them to say, “Yes, we’re going to ban narcotics,” and yes, perhaps it is, in part, for the international community, but I would say that they probably have other plans about pricing, about controlling the market. A lot of extremist groups and other groups in the region rely on revenue from narcotics, so, in a way, if you then start controlling this narcotics production and marketing, you are controlling the revenue of all of these different groups. Perhaps this is the, you know, the sort of, bargaining chip that they have with these various extremist groups.

So, it’s an interesting conundrum, and again, you know, it will be interesting to see what’s happening under the table. The exciting stuff is always happening under the table. So, I would say that they’ve probably got some, sort of, idea about controlling prices and manipulating people and using it as a lever to influence other groups and, you know, sort of, slightly shadier parts of regional governments.

Dr Gareth Price

Good, I think we’ve covered quite a lot of the, sort of, regional questions that appear. There is a specific question on Iran and the Taliban. The question says, “There’s a history of an ambivalent relationship in the past.” And can I add my own, sort of, little comment to this, that of late, obviously, Iran has a better relationship with the Taliban than it did historically. But a lot of that has always seemed to me to be seen through the prism of, “My enemy’s enemy is my friend.”

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Yes.

Dr Gareth Price

And so the US is the greater enemy. If the US isn’t there anymore, what does that mean to Iran’s relationship with the Taliban? You touched on it briefly, Sippi. I wondered if you could dig in a little more?

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

I think, broadly, there is the hard-line element in the Iranian camp which says, “This was a victory for people, anti-imperialists, you know, all over the world, that the Taliban were able to get rid of the Americans.” There are moderate elements who are very worried about the treatment of the Shia Hazaras in Afghanistan, who worry about ISIS Khorasan and who worry about the influence of the Taliban, and sort of, meddling with Sunni extremist groups within Iran’s borders. So, it’s a very mixed picture, in terms of how they view the situation.

The other issue is that Iran has had a very good market for its products until, you know, the past 20 years. They’ve had lots of trade, and watching the Taliban now cosy up with the Turks, the Pakistanis and others, I think has the Iranian Government worried about loss of revenue in that direction. So these are some of the broad areas that are being looked at the by Iranians, I think.

Dr Gareth Price

Thank you, Sippi. We’re coming towards the end of our time, but if I could just turn to Saad and then Hameed for a final comment?

Saad Mohseni

Well, I think time is of the essence. I think that the world needs to act and, you know, I understand everyone is obsessed about evacuations, whether it’s the Germans or the Americans or the Brits. It’s the, how do we get our people out? Ironically, despite the scenes at the airport and God knows how many flights, I think most of the Translators are still inside of Afghanistan, US Translators, and I think the same is also the case with the Germans and the Brits. You know, how do we get our allies out, Afghan nationals? And I think that even with US citizens, there’s a few hundred of them still inside Afghanistan. So they’re negotiating these deals, and the Americans have to, you know, set up their operations or their embassy in Doha or somewhere. There’s a lot going on, and it’s crisis management. I don’t think – I think people need to take a step back and figure out, s) how are they going to deal with the Taliban and what leverage they have and who they can work with, both inside of Afghanistan and outside the country. And, you know, they also have to manage, you know, local, you know, constituencies. For example, you know, how do you satisfy a women’s rights organisation that you’re going to deal with the Taliban, for example, or a human rights group in Europe, or whatever?

So, you know, there are lots of things to manage, and it’s going to be difficult, but I think that, you know, everyone needs to actually take a deep breath and understand that by not engaging them this early, you know, it may be very – you know, it’ll cost us, it’ll be very costly us, longer-term. ‘Us’, I meant both Afghans and people outside. And Europe in particular has, you know, has much at stake, in particular with refugees and drugs, and terrorism is another issue. I mean I – to your point earlier, that, you know, the organisations, they rebrand themselves and they have different names, but the idea, compared to 9/11, September 11th in, you know, 2001, the idea is stronger than it’s ever been.

So the war – the Americans lost the war in Afghanistan, and they certainly have lost the war against terror, ‘cause these organisations continue to prosper and they’re strong. You know, I don’t have the exact numbers, but they are saying that we’ve had literally up to 10,000 fighters have come into Afghanistan over the last six months, to participate in the defeat of the Americans. As the Americans are dragging their, you know, themselves out of Afghanistan, every jihadi group is in there trying to kick them while they’re leaving. What’s going to happen to these guys? What’s going to happen to these organisations? And it’s scary and I don’t think it’s going to be that easy for the Taliban to take on these people. I think there’s a real danger of the group fragmenting in the months ahead. And ISIS, I mean, they’ve had so many fighters released, just the last few weeks.

Anyway, I’m sure that you’ll have many, many more Chatham House talks about Afghanistan in the weeks ahead.

Dr Gareth Price

No, I think we’ve concluded that the story isn’t going to go away anytime soon. Hameed, a final comment from you?

Hameed Mansour

Yeah, very quickly, I agree with Saad entirely. I think we all need to take a deep breath, correct. I think we also have to – when I say ‘we’ I mean the Westerners especially, with our analysis and analytical communities in particular, we have to do adopt the ‘do no harm’ approach to Afghans, because one of the things that happened over the last 20 years is our own framings and paradigms rode over what was important to the Afghans and the Afghan issues in particular. So, what is organic in Afghanistan has to be supported, but also step back, have a deeper breath, and also, do not overestimate the strength and the weaknesses of the Taliban. You know, they will – they have the danger of fragmentation, but they also are a reality. They’ve taken over the country, and all the stakeholders involved in trying to defeat them in the last 20 years have lost, unfortunately, or fortunately for the Taliban. So yeah, I think I entirely agree with the sentiments expressed, and I’m sure we’ll have more conversations about this.

Dr Gareth Price

Look, it’s been a fascinating conversation. I’d like to thank all of our panellists for participating, Sippi, Saad and Hameed. You can join me in a virtual round of applause, if you like. And I’m not going to try and sum up the wide-ranging conversation, but in a sentence, what a mess. Thank you all for staying tuned, and I’m sure this won’t be the last webinar we hold on Afghanistan. Thank you.

Saad Mohseni

Thank you.

Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam

Thank you.