President Donald Trump’s peace plan for Gaza was devised in close contact with Israel in a way that would just about make it possible for Prime Minister Netanyahu to accept. Hamas did not have a seat at the table and claims that it was only given the plan upon its publication.
To Palestinians, the document will appear unbalanced, emphasizing Israel’s security interests over their demands for a leading role in the period of ‘the day after’ the Gaza war. Indeed, there seems to have been little or no Palestinian voice in the development of the plan.
The larger Arab world may also find itself surprised and perhaps a bit discomfited. They have been invited to contribute personnel and dollars to a plan that does not offer any vision towards addressing the Palestinian right to self-determination – the root cause of 80 years of conflict in the region. There may also be the sense that Israel’s highly controversial conduct in the Gaza war will now be forgotten in the enthusiastic rush to make peace.
That said, the Trump administration has been rather nimble in abandoning the president’s ‘Riviera of the Middle East’ idea. Instead, the new plan offers a vision that is fairly close to planning that occurred under the previous US administration of President Joe Biden.
Positive momentum
The Trump plan has the backing of virtually all major regional governments and the major Islamic states of the world other than Iran. The EU and its members also support it.
In addition to providing political punch, this support endows the initiative with the massive economic muscle required to make the pledge of rapid reconstruction and development of Gaza (and potentially also the West Bank) credible. There even seem to be Arab states willing to contribute armed stabilization forces – a potentially dangerous role that had previously not attracted many takers.
Moreover, the plan is embedded in a larger strategy of bringing peace to the broader region through an ever-denser network of Abraham Accords, seeking to add to the present treaty partners of the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. Chief among the candidates is Saudi Arabia, but Syria and Lebanon – each a target of frequent Israeli armed intervention – are also prospects.
Problem areas
But there are many potential problems, even if Hamas gives in to international pressure to accept the deal.
First of all, a list of 20 principles barely spanning three pages does not represent a comprehensive peace agreement. In fact, there already exist some fairly advanced blueprints offering significant details on many elements of the plan.
But there are some areas where politics will prevent the principles translating into a workable scheme, and other areas where practicalities will present major obstacles.
Practical problems: standing up a peace mission
It ordinarily takes months to develop a mandate and operating procedures for a major international peacekeeping mission. Such an effort must include a definition of the mission’s powers, its structures of authority, accountability mechanisms, human rights safeguards, security arrangements and more. For United Nations missions, established templates are available that can be adapted to a new case with relative ease.
But this mission will not be conducted by the UN or be under UN control, even if it receives a mandate from the UN Security Council. Rather, President Trump will preside over the venture as chairman of a ‘Board of Peace’, supported by international political figures, including Tony Blair. This is a new and unprecedented arrangement. No template applies.
There is also no ready pool of experienced peacekeeping personnel to satisfy the plan’s demand to ‘immediately deploy’ a temporary international stabilization force along with international civil administrators.
Some mainly Arab states appear to have offered military contingents. But deployment in the required numbers will have to occur over some time, and will be a major logistical challenge. Issues of coordination, direction and control of an untested multinational venture of the scale required will also be formidable.
The Israeli Defence Force will patrol Gaza until any mission can take responsibility. This avoids a security vacuum. But it may also taint any international mission as merely the continuation of foreign occupation.
Disarming Hamas
The plan calls for Hamas to accept its own dissolution as both a military force and a civil administration.
In other instances, demobilization, collection of arms and reintegration of fighters would be a multi-year venture. Here, quite rapid action is expected, with no infrastructure specified other than a reference to ‘independent monitors’.
Civilian governance is just as great a challenge. As the collapse of authority in Iraq following the 2003 conflict demonstrated, it is not possible to simply dismiss civilian local officials without serious consequences. Yet more or less all officials in Gaza will be at least nominally affiliated with the Hamas authorities that governed Gaza for years – and perhaps retain a quiet loyalty to that previous regime.
The plan foresees the gradual development and then deployment of a freshly trained, untainted police and security force. Again, building up such a force takes months or years. In the meantime, the international stabilization force would need to provide security for the mission (and for Israel).
It will be difficult for any mission to both restrain and control opposition from within the population, including from remnants of Hamas, while at the same time establishing a trusted policing role.
Absorbing political Hamas?
Even if it is disarmed, Hamas will not simply disappear as a political force. Even after the horrors of the present conflict, it still commands some public support in Gaza. There is as yet no plan to address this very significant spoiling element in Palestine’s political system.
This raises the delicate issue of whether a demilitarized political element of Hamas should or can be absorbed into the umbrella of the Palestinian Liberation Authority (PLO).
In view of the abhorrent events of 7 October, even an unambiguous pledge of non-violence and acceptance of the existence of Israel may not persuade Israel and the Board of Peace that there is a place for Hamas in Palestinian governance.
But as Iraq again teaches, leaving a significant group out in the cold when searching for a political settlement can be highly dangerous. Violence may seem the only option available to those who have no place in the political process.
International governance
Then there is the question of the link between the top-level ‘Board of Peace’ and local governance. The plan seems to foresee a technocratic government or ‘committee,’ composed of Palestinian and international experts. Again, putting such a structure together and making it function in an integrated way in a matter of days or weeks seems scarcely possible.
This is bound to result in frustrating delays that could undermine the new authority’s credibility. Gaza’s civilian infrastructure is totally destroyed. The ability to swiftly restore public services will be a key measure by which civilians judge the Board of Peace.
While the ‘Riviera of the Middle East’ plan is no longer highlighted, the plan gives much emphasis to the project of re-developing Gaza. Billions will be spent, and billions will be made by those involved. The risk of corruption is high.
The plan foresees an international expert panel to oversee a ‘Trump economic development plan’. But a future where profits stream out of Gaza, rather than to Palestinians, is a worrying possibility.
