Defence and security in the Eastern Mediterranean: The perspective from Greece

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to Chatham House and to this next members’ meeting. We’re delighted you can join us this afternoon. We’re going to be discussing Defence and Security in the Eastern Mediterranean, a very topical subject for our time today. It’s an issue that is only rarely out of the news, given the quite tense situation, in particular between Turkey and Greece and Cyprus and a number of other countries, all finding themselves contesting space in that area, discoveries of energy resources, along with all sorts of historical territorial disputes. And these issues were, kind of, below the surface, if I can use that term, for a long time, but obviously have now, in recent months, come very much to the surface.

And we’re absolutely delighted, therefore, that we can welcome the Greek Defence Minister, Mr Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos, with us here this afternoon to come and join us and share the perspective from Greece. Members who have joined us today will be aware that we had the Turkish Defence Minister with us last week, Dr Hulusi Akar, sharing some perspective, taking questions from members, and we’re very grateful, Mr Panagiotopoulos, that you would join us today, so that we can discuss this topic with you, as well.

Before I do any more formal introductions, may I remind you, in terms of process here that this meeting is on the record, you’re free to tweet, #CHEvents, and share the thoughts and ideas that you hear discussed today. We very much hope that you will join us as well in Q&A and a discussion with the Minister after his opening remarks. Please use the ‘Q&A’ function at the bottom of your screen. We will not be using the ‘Chat’ for this purpose. The ‘Q&A’ is where we will take the questions and I will give an opportunity to unmute people who are asking questions if we have time, otherwise I will ask questions as well on your behalf.

But with that element out of the way, Mr Panagiotopoulos again, so thank you very much for joining us. You took up your role, as I understand it, in July 2019 as Defence Minister, you’ve been a member of the New Democracy party in Parliament, at least, since 2007, served on the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committee, served as a Shadow Defence Minister, and now has the Defence Minister role at this very important time. We are thrilled that you could join us, look forward to your opening thoughts on your perspective on the challenges to security in the Eastern Mediterranean, and then look forward to discussing the detail with you, through the rest of this meeting, which will run through to the top of the hour, 6:00pm in British Summer Time. Over to you, Mr Panagiotopoulos. Thank you, Minister.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Thank you, Dr Niblett. Ladies and gentlemen, first of all, let me extend my [mobile] thanks to – excuse me, some red lines are flashing and amber, but it shows you that being a Minister of Defence in Greece is a – in these challenging times is a full-time occupation, all day and all night.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

I hope it wasn’t the hotline.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Yeah, it’s a – it was a hotline, but, you know, well, somebody else answered it, so, I guess it’s taken care of.

Well, actually, let me again thank you for extending to me this kind invitation. I’m quite delighted to appear before you and communicate the positions and arguments of Greece toward the very pressing issue of security and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, extremely important, and – in our times. I’m happy to do that, and also, I will be happy to analyse, sort of, the security environment in the Eastern Mediterranean with all those challenges and great – well, potential instability that rises out of a situation, and also emphasise Greece’s initiatives and efforts to promote stability and security in that region.

Please, before I start, let me also extend my deepest condolences for the passing of Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh. You’re all well aware – actually, we in Greece, are fully aware of his Greek connections, but I’m sure it has been a loss for the – Great Britain and the British people as a whole, my deepest condolences for that.

Now, let me begin with a few words that have to do with the bilateral defence co-operation between Greece and the UK. There is a strong and longstanding series, framework, of bilateral relationship between the new countries – between the two countries. We should make sure that the already excellent co-operation between Greece and the United Kingdom continues, despite the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. And there is a certain neutral interest in remaining close partners in security and defence, in order to address the multifaceted security challenges that require a co-ordinated response by us all, thereby our position is that the United Kingdom should remain a strategic partner for the European Union, taking into account the security interests of both parties.

Let me also say that I welcome the renewed interest of the United Kingdom for a more intense and enhanced presence, naval presence, in the Eastern Mediterranean region. I’ve arrived to this conclusion by having talks with my colleague, the Secretary of Defence, and other top officials from the Ministry of Defence of Great Britain. There is also an ongoing discussion, with respect to our great defence project of acquiring four frigates, it’s been a – well, a reason to embark on discussions on the security environment in the Eastern Med, our naval presence there, the potential for defence co-operation between the two countries, and I must say that I welcome the renewed interest of Great Britain for an enhanced naval presence in the region.

Now, the Eastern Med, we all know, is a region of great strategic importance that offers growing prospects and opportunities for stability and growth and prosperity, but also presents a wide spectrum of security challenges, threats and instability to the nations of these areas – of this area and their allies, as well. The failure to co-operate with those challenges would definitely have a negative impact in the stability of the region.

The Eastern Med security environment is characterised by at least three interconnected dynamics, in my opinion. First one is the recent hydrocarbons discoveries off the coast of Israel, Cyprus and Egypt. Second one is the geopolitical competitions and imbalances of power, and also, thirdly, the increased interests in the area demonstrated by external powers.

Now, with respect to the – an assessment on the security situation and geopolitical developments, it’s true that we are facing a very complex and uncertain geopolitical environment, which extends from the Balkans to the Middle East and North Africa. The region has undergone significant geopolitical changes throughout the last decade, and developments there have become increasingly interconnected with great impact especially on Europe.

I would like to stress the fact that the primary source of this growing instability in our region has largely been Turkey’s neo-Ottomans aspirations and aggressive posture. It aims to consolidate its presence and claims in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond, but the way in which those claims are communicated and pursued in my mind attract little sympathy from most or if not all the players in the region, none is very comfortable with those growing aspirations.

And more specifically, Turkey is implementing a policy of constantly increasing contentious claims and illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, in the past few years. It has embraced a revisionist doctrine knows – known as the Blue Homeland, which seeks to give Ankara control over the waters of the Eastern Aegean Sea and the Eastern Med, disregarding every Greek island, and also, Greek sovereign rights. In the wider region, Ankara is again escalating tensions. Everybody is aware of Turkish military forces and assets dispatched to many countries, Northern Iraq, Syria and Libya, as Ankara regards that it has legitimate rights in the broad Eastern Med.

Now, this is an enhanced military presence all over the region for the sake of maintaining peace and stability, and that’s the Turkish position. In our mind, though, it has a certain destabilising element overall, as well. Now, there is a long list of facts that leaves no doubt that Turkey pursues a policy characterised by disrespect of international law and good neighbourly relations. The list includes ongoing tensions caused by the Turkish Libyan maritime zone deal, the null and void agreement on the delimitation on the – of the exclusive economic zone between Libya and Turkey as we view it, and Turkish overflights in the Aegean, and also the seismic research activity within the exclusive economic zone and territorial waters of Cyprus that has created a lot of tension in the Eastern Med overall.

Now, with respect to tensions between our two countries, the latest Ankara provocations in our region were even more confrontational. Last March, Greece became a target of an organised, well-thought attempt to have its land and sea borders violated by mass illegal migration movements. It was our own version of an asymmetrical threat actually borne to fruition and implemented as a series of huge logistic operations to have tens of thousands of illegal migrants transported to our north-eastern border and then having them attempt to break into our country, to be quite clear and blunt on this.

This operation was co-ordinated by Turkey, with a sole purpose to threaten our security and undermine our country’s resilience and social cohesion. Greece, we had to respond immediately and strive to protect our borders, which may I remind you, are also Europe’s borders. We thought that doing whatever it takes to protect our borders, from a mass violation, was our full sovereign right and we took every step, every measure, to ensure our borders were protected.

The assembled migrants have been attempted to forcibly enter Greek territory, despite the fact that we’ve made it very clear that no passage is allowed and no trespassing would be tolerated. As our Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and the leaders of the European Union, that means European Council President, Mr Charles Michel, European Commission President, Madam Ursula von der Leyen, and European Parliament President, Mr David Sassoli, said, upon their visit to our north-eastern border those days back in March 2020, “It was an asymmetrical threat to the borders of the European Union,” that’s how it was characterised by the European Union leaders. They actually made a field tour and saw it for themselves.

We made it very clear back then that the European Union will not be blackmailed by this blatant attempt by Turkey to instrumentalise people and use them as a battering ram, in order to promote this geopolitical agenda. Furthermore, and a bit later during the course of 2020, a series of Turkish NAVTEXs since July for illegal service within the Greek continental shelf, in combination with the high mobility of the Turkish Navy, actually constituted another serious escalation, with the stabilising ramifications to regional peace. There was a research vessel the Oruc Reis sent in the Eastern Med, escorted by warships over the Greek continental shelf from July to November 2020. You understand that we are talking about a severe militarisation of the situation that served to prove that this was not a mere research activity, but an aggressive act, aiming directly at challenging Greece’s sovereign rights in the area.

Now – and there was something beyond that, the extended risk of an accident happening, in danger of happening, when you had large portions of the two countries’ fleets, dozens of Navy vessels, concentrated within a limited area of sea space, and of course, there was a great concern in the Western capitals because of Ankara’s very aggressive and challenging attitude.

Now, we see ourselves as a country that abides with international law, and in fact, we have concluded, Greece has concluded, a number of international agreements for the designation of our exclusive economic zone, most recently with Italy and Egypt. We also agreed with Albania to bring the issue of the limitation of our maritime zones before the International Court of Justice in Hague. In all cases, these agreements are based on international law, including the United Nations Convention on the law of the sea, and have been concluded, in good faith and respectful of sovereignty of all countries involved.

You – we hope that the same spirit will prevail in our exploratory talks with Turkey, of course. We’re trying to do the same with Turkey, reach an understanding, and in that respect, we claim that the sole dispute between our countries is that of delimit fee, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. Unfortunately, Turkey refuses to delimit on the basis of international law, and that is a problem from the outset.

Let me point out that the case of the MoU between Turkey and the Government of National Accord of Libya on the delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas, on the other hand, would claim, as I said, that it’s legally void, as it totally disregards the presence of numerous Greek islands in the area, and nullifies their right to generate maritime zone.

Now, the European Council has clearly stated that the memorandum of the designation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean, infringes upon sovereign rates of third states, does not comply with the law of the sea, and cannot produce any legal consequences for third states. In this way then, European Union leaders in the European Council have made the first step by sending to Ankara a clear message of unity, solidarity and determination. Now, we do believe that Turkey does need to change its behaviour, otherwise Europe, undoubtedly, will have to take more steps and more measures.

Greece generally seeks bridges of peace, good neighbourly relations, and co-operation within – with all its neighbours, including Turkey, of course. Unfortunately, we feel that Turkey, one moment, seeks to build those bridges, and the other moment seeks to burn them down. We have to decide, however, that in good faith, we have to reach some kind of an understanding, starting with the agenda that we have set out and hopefully extending to the full range of our bilateral relations. However, at the same time, our position to all these provocative actions is clear and our red lines have been set. We are determined to continue to exercise our full sovereign rights that stem for – from international treaties and international law, and in no case would we spare the necessary measures and actions to defend our sovereignty.

As I said, Greece and Turkey have resumed their exploratory talks, with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone in the Aegean Sea. It’s too soon, obviously, to draw any conclusion on that, but the fact that the exploratory talks have resumed, I think is a step in the right direction. Many more, however, are needed, in order to reach a tangible result.

Now, if Ankara really wishes to turn a new page in our relations, then it must show in practice that it abides by the same principles as all modern and peaceful states do, and these principles are international legality and the principle of good neighbourliness, and certainly, I do believe that no settlement of a dispute could be achieved through any sort of gunboat diplomacy or a method of escalating tensions and arriving to a certain level of a near military confrontation like the sort we had in the Aegean for three months this past year, basically over the summer and most of the fall.

I would like to make a few more comments on something that has been extensively heard from our Turkish neighbours on the status of certain Greek islands. Turkey claims that certain Greek islands have a demilitarised status and blames Greece for not respecting it. I must say that these claims are baseless, built on misinterpretation of international conventions. Actually, in my mind, one of Greece’s full sovereign rights is the right to defend its territory, and that’s based upon the basic UN chartered principle of each country’s right to defend itself, its right to lawful self-defence.

In that respect, given that we even have allegations of casus belli, reason for war, from the other side, if we extend our national waters beyond our – their current limits, it’s a case – it is a cause for engaging in military action. In that respect, I think Greece has a full sovereign right to take measures, in order to counter that threat, thereby defending its territory, as far as the islands are concerned. Not to mention that certain islands and the fact that they belong to Greek national territory are based on international treaties that should always be invoked by all members, even by countries that have not signed those treaties, and I will be more specific, probably later, if I’m given the time to do so.

With respect to Cyprus, turning the page, I would like to stress that resolving the long-lasting Cyprus issue is a necessity for achieving security, stability and multilateral co-operation in the wider region of the Eastern Med. To this end, Greece has always been and still remains an ardent supporter of the UN Secretary-General’s efforts to facilitate the resumption of negotiations in the framework of his good Officer’s mission and his mandate from the United Nations Security Council.

Greece will participate in the forthcoming informal 5+1 meeting in Geneva, with a constructive spirit. We sincerely hope that this meeting will enable the United Nations Security General to initiate the resumption of negotiations for a mutually acceptable settlement of the Cyprus issue. There is only one basis for such negotiations, and that is the already existing United Nations bodywork, and given that Cyprus is also a European Union member state, the provisions and the application of the United – the European Union are key. I would also like to stress that there is only one basis for a comprehensive Cyprus settlement, the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for a bizonal, bicommunal, federal Cyprus.

As far as multilateral co-operation schemes in the region and Greece’s role in them and let me point out that Greece is a longstanding member of the European Union and NATO, increasingly stands out as stable, credible, and in fact, indispensable partner and ally for the other European Union member states, the United States, and the West in general. Against this volatile situation, Greece promotes partnerships and a fruitful regional co-operation on the basis of international law, extant treaties and legitimacy with our neighbouring countries, acting at the same time as a conduit among countries in the East Med and the Gulf. Many countries share the same beliefs on stability and security in the Eastern Med as we do, and we are happy and willing to engage in multilateral schemes that promote actually peace and stability in the Eastern Med.

Now, through this next multilateral schemes of co-operation that we have established together with other states in the region, we are actively encouraging important synergies and practical co-operation with the United States, with France, with Cyprus, with Israel, with Egypt, with the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. This type of co-operation is strengthening also the different styles among the countries and is supported by solid political will. These are excellent platforms to promote common interests, while highlighting the critical role of Greece as a pillar of stability and as a net security provider in the region, not to mention that these – the participation of these schemes actually enhance the operational capabilities over armed forces, as well as the armed forces of the participating countries and contribute to their interoperability between them, as well as a – to jointly confronting common security challenges.

With respect to European co-operation, I’m drawing to a conclusion, in the European Union framework, we are committed to work towards strengthening the Union’s ability to act as a security provider and to enhance our ability in countering threats and challenges and protect the interests of the European Union and its member states. Regarding the European Union’s defence initiatives, I see the Permanent Structured Co-operation, the so-called PESCO, as a driving force for the efforts to enhance and integrate the European defence and let me point out that my personal view – in my personal view, the goal of achieving and the actual integration of European and in defence would go through enhanced involvement in the European defence industry. I think that is the catalyst in arriving to the, well, lofty ideal of a European defence integration.

To comment on the European Union NATO relations, Greece has always been the frank and staunch supporter of a close European Union NATO co-operation in a spirit of openness, transparency, equality and mutual enforcement, reinforcement actually. The European Union and NATO had made long strides over the last five years, in the framework on the implementation of the Warsaw and Brussels joint declarations. We have achieved unprecedented progress in a pragmatic and realistic way. The two joint declarations have not only reinvigorated our relationship, but also significantly expanded our longstanding partnership within and actually beyond the traditional field of crisis management.

Now, in this regard, we firmly believe that they provide a solid framework for practical, result-oriented and forward-looking co-operation. We should build upon the important acquis, with a view to further deepening our co-operation and developing a genuine organisation to – organisation relationship, for the benefit of a broader transatlantic security and all our citizens. At this point, I believe that Europe needs their – the muscle of NATO’s organisation, in order to achieve its own – actually, to take care of its security concerns and needs, but until it achieves its own strategical economy, I do believe that NATO is indispensable to the European Union.

Finally, let me make a comment on our bilateral relationship with the United States of America. Now, the Greek United States strategic relationship is founded on the traditionally excellent relations of our people, who share common values and principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and respect for international law. That is the main bond that links both countries, and it dates back to two and more centuries, and today, may I add, it is stronger than ever.

It is also a necessity, as a result of the geopolitical developments in the Eastern Med and in the Middle East and our common resolve to work together to promote peace, stability, co-operation and prosperity in the region. Undoubtedly, the upgraded Greece United States Mutual Defense Co-operation Agreement, which was one of the first decisions and top priorities of our government, offers much more flexibility and opportunities to deepen our co-operation. It’s a tool which enhances the United States Greece defence relationship to address the challenges of tomorrow and clearly reflects our will for further deepening and expansion of our co-operation, benefiting both nations and also sending a message to any countries whose actions are in violation of international law. What we’ve done, in the United States through the MDCA, the Mutual Defense Co-operation Agreement, is invest in a framework of common infrastructure in certain strategic locations in Greece, made them accessible to elements of the United States Armed Forces, and encouraged the United States to invest in those infrastructures to our common and mutual benefit.

Now, I think it’s about time I made my closing remarks. Let me say that the Eastern Med is once again the epicentre of a wide spectrum of security challenges and risks. Given the very diverse nature, scale and complexities, in order to avoid the transformation of the Eastern Med to a sea of instability, a co-ordinated co-operation of regional and international allies and partners is required, we want to make it a sea of stability, probably a sea of prosperity, why not? Rather a sea of instability and security challenges are difficult to meet.

Now, we do consider that a stable and secure environment in the region cannot only benefit the countries involved, obviously. The financial implications related to the discover the potential natural reserves will, in turn, upgrade the socioeconomic structure of the communities, and this is an outcome that will further strengthen stability and will create a positive spiral effect.

Actually, I keep reminding my Turkish colleague that it’s in our mutual interests to make sure that both coasts of the Aegean are fully engaged in the benefits of a vibrant tour season than having ourselves deploying our fleets, in order to engage each other off the coasts of the Aegean. Well, we have much more to gain if we make what we must to realise our prospects, with respect to the booming tourist industry on both coasts of the Aegean.

Now, Greece has always countered threats with logic and arguments of effective diplomacy. We do – have demonstrated that we have many powerful allies and partners, yet we are a peaceful country, ready to work together with all our neighbours, of course including Turkey for the end – toward the end of achieving peace and stability and thereby, prosperity in our wider region. Thank you for allowing me this opportunity.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you very much, Minister. Thanks for a very full set of remarks, and you’ve covered – ticked off pretty much most of the key topics that I would hope you would address in your opening thoughts. We’ve got quite a few questions already in the Q&A. Could I encourage those of you who have questions for the Minister to please add them to the list, or you can upvote the questions that are already there, just to indicate your particular interest in them, as you read through them.

If I may just start off with a couple of questions of my own, and in particular come in on the back of I thought your very interesting comments about the strengthening Greece-US relationship that you turned to towards the end of your remarks and your – you mentioned there, the strengthening of the Mutual Defense Agreement, some strengthening of basing and infrastructure agreements, which of course would then have an interesting parallelism, I suppose, to some of the Turkish connectivity with the United States, which has been complicated, obviously, in the past.

But I wanted just to – if you could just say a little bit more about it, but with one angle through there. How important is the US proving for Greece right now, in terms of being a partner on the energy side? ‘Cause we know that one of the issues that’s driven the intensification of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean obviously is the extensive discoveries of gas reserves and their exploitation. The US passed, I think a couple of years ago, the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act, the US Congress, with – you know, to indicate its commitment to support Greece in this area. Do you see the relationship being one that is focused principally on the NATO commitment or is it also drifting over as well into the energy dimension of the relationship, as well? Could you just say a little bit more about that first?

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Well, I would say that the energy dimension is always important, even though one could argue that it’s become less important because of the tendency to rely less and less on oil and natural gas over the years, since other forms of energy are being more put into use. So, you know, this escalating tension that has to do with access to energy resources in the Eastern Med could actually be pointless if those energy resources lose value over time.

On the other side, one would counterargue that this – creating tensions over the potential access to energy resources is just a Greek pretext and not an actual cause for action. It is a pretext of somebody that wants to assert himself over the region as a primary player and seeks just a way to press his claims. Going back to the United States, the United States has been, let’s say, a main player in the – in forming the East Med Act which, well, provides, let’s say, a – an alternative, with respect to the energy roads from East to West.

In that respect, I believe that the US has a certain interest in committing itself to the security, to establishing the security of the – and safeguarding the security of the East Med Act. However, the relationship with Greece on the – on a bilateral basis, I think, goes beyond the energy domain. I think that over time, the United States have – has realised that Greece is a partner it can rely upon, is a – quite a reliable, loyal partner and ally that can be counted as a true frontier state, along the new geopolitical fault lines in the region, more than others, I would say.

So, that increased appreciation of Greece by the United States has evolved into the fruition of the MDCA, the Mutual Defense Co-operation Agreement. It has been in place, for quite a few years, but for the past couple of years, this has been strengthened, enhanced, with added elements in every amendment. There will be another amendment that will be agreed within the – two or three coming months, so we’re looking at an extended and amended MDCA that probably will include more strategic assets and the use by the United States of more facilities or even the enhanced use of the existing facilities. That is the spirit of the amended MDCA.

It certainly has to do with the way the United States use Northern Greece as an emerging energy hub facing toward the Balkan hinterland, I would say, in Central Europe, or even the Black Sea. The United States, however, has made a decision to enhance its strategic footprint in Greece, that goes through the MDCA, that means an investment in common – in building a common infrastructure, and I think that proves the resolve of the United States, that in Greece, and also through the energy hub, as well. I would also mention the United States’ interest in energy projects in South Europe, as well as using Northern Greece as an energy hub.

So, the energy domain is interconnected, but not solely connected to the strateg – growing strategic relationship between the United – with the United States and Greece. I might remind you that President Biden spoke on the phone with our Prime Minister on the day of our celebrating our independence and our 200 years of anniversary from our – achieving our independence that was a very cordial and extended conversation between the two leaders, and President Biden reiterated to our Prime Minister that Greece is viewed by the United States as a very reliable and credible partner in the region.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you for that. You know I’m going to use this opportunity to jump over and see if we can unmute one of our participants, Golfo Alexopoulos, who has I think a relevant question, because, you know, for those who don’t know Greece well, antipathy to the United States has often been assumed to be one of the underlying factors, but also, connected somewhat to a more forward-looking approach to Russia. But Golfo, why don’t you ask your question, please, and thank you for joining the call. I think you can unmute yourself now, Golfo, please. Go ahead.

Golfo Alexopoulos

Yes. Hello.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah, we can hear you.

Golfo Alexopoulos

Yes.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

We hear.

Golfo Alexopoulos

Hello, thank you so much for taking my question. I wanted to ask you about Russia. I’m a Professor of Russian Studies, and I’m really interested in the relationship between Greece and Russia. In particular, could you explain whether you think this relationship is beneficial for Greece, are you concerned at all about Russian disinformation, and what is your assessment of Turkey’s co-operation with Russia? Thank you so much.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Over to you, Minister.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Well, thank you for posing that question, it’s a most interesting question, and I’ll try to answer it as best as I can. First of all, Greece is interested in maintaining a strong bilateral relationship with Russia. Well, that given, it is also quite certain that Greece does belong to the Western camp and does see itself as a loyal and diligent member of NATO and the European Union, as well.

We are more inclined to use the dual track approach, as certain players in Europe view their relationship with Russia. That means try to maintain an existing and fruitful dialogue between the two partners, but also, at the same time, making it very clear that we also value our allegiance to the Western camp and are taking care of the deterrent element, as well. Diplomacy working step-by-step and next to the element of deterrents, which may mean taking care of – ensuring that we have a – let’s say, the ability to have deterrent armed forces.

Now, Greece and Russia share traditional historic ties. Russia was one of the three European powers that had a great role in actually achieving the independence of the Greek state, the one that we celebrated on the 25th of March. So, there’s always been, sort of, a historic link between the two countries, there was also another link that has to do with religion, with Russia being, let’s say, an Orthodox Christian country, and there’s also a certain cultural tie, that’s more subtle between the Greek people and Russia.

On the other side, it’s very clear, and Greece has made itself very clear, that it belongs to the camp of the West, and that means both the European Union and NATO, and as I’ve already said. So, the dual-track approach calls for a cautious approach that keeps the channel of dialogue open. But also makes sure that, on the other side, you know, all types of behaviour that are not – cannot be tolerated or accepted, especially with hybrid operations, that others are more familiar with that save Baltic democracies are meta-countered.

I actually – when I always talk to my Baltic colleagues, I’m also – I’m always making sure to drive the point through that we understand their own version of asymmetrical threats through – say, through a fake news propaganda coming from Russian agents. But in that respect, we – I would like them to sympathise and actually empathise with our type of asymmetrical threats that we’ve faced in the past, which is the extreme pressure in our borders from illegal migration throes that, as I said, might be orchestrated by the Turkish state and actually, has been proven to be the case, on a couple of instances.

So, in a nutshell, yes, we respect Russia. We do believe that calculations of a geopolitical nature in the region must always take Russia into account. It’s unwise not to take Russia into consideration, but on the other side, we are very clear about our adherence to the Western camp.

One more comment on the relationship between Russia and Turkey, it’s actually very interesting. I do believe that, in effect, there is a complete understanding between the two players, and I can arrive to that conclusion by seeing the results in Libya, in Northern Syria, even in the recent conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. So, in my mind, Turkey has prided itself to be a very loyal member of NATO, but I also can see that Turkey has arrived, to a full understanding with Russia, in areas of military conflict where both players have been known to engage.

I see the acquisition of the S-400 missiles as a direct subversive action toward NATO’s internal cohesion, and, you know, that’s the position, the official position of the United States and other players within NATO, not all of them, I’m afraid. However, it speaks for itself, and I’m trying to – I’m having a difficulty trying to understand who is benefiting from who most. I would make the assessment that Russia is benefiting from Turkey’s role more than Turkey is benefiting from Russia’s role, because it’s in Russia’s best interests to keep – to have Turkey remaining within NATO and act as an agent that actually tends to subvert NATO’s internal cohesion, it’d be an ideal situation for Russia.

I’m not sure whether Turkey will stand to benefit from its rapprochement and it’s with Russia, and I’m sure that the litmus test over that lies in the future and has to do with President Erdoğan’s ambitious scheme to create a set of – the – an alternative to the straights and I think that would be against Russia’s interests. We’ve already had some indications on that, and it could probably test Russia-Turkish relations in the future. However, it’s overall a very interesting situation that I determine.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you for that answer, and let me keep going, ‘cause we’ve got a number of good questions here, thank you very much for putting them in. I’m going to ask the question that Euan Grant put in there because I think it connects to this quite well and what you just said about the role of the capacity to – for individual NATO countries to be helpful. His question is, “Can individual NATO countries like Britain actually be effective in working with Tur” – sorry, “working with Greece, to protect Greece against Turkish activities in the Eastern Mediterranean, for example, around some of the oil and gas exploration activities?” Are you finding that NATO members are able to step forward and bilaterally support Greece, even if, from a NATO standpoint, it’s difficult to create a joint position, for the reasons you’ve mentioned?

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

First of all, let me say that I am aware of the fact that NATO has not any type of sanction-imposing mechanism within itself. It’s not built to impose sanctions on member states from – for some type of unacceptable behaviour, so it’s difficult to have this type of alliance punish its members for this and that misdemeanour. However, on the domain of bilateral relations, yes, we’re doing our best, we have intensified our diplomatic efforts on all fronts, in the past couple of years, in order to communicate our arguments to all our partners and allies within NATO and the European Union.

I do believe that, well, as of late, our European partners have come to realise that the overall conduct of Turkey is not toward the end of providing stability and security in the region but is downright destabilising for the region. As I said, the notion that all this, and let’s say bad blood between Greece and Turkey is not a bilateral problem anymore, but it’s a wider problem that involves not only Greece versus Turkey, but Turkey versus a number of players in the region, and whether that be countries of the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Arab world, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, or countries in the – in Southern Europe and beyond.

So, I think that everybody gets to realise that this type of behaviour cannot go on. It’s not only the direct threats toward Greece, it’s the threats toward Cyprus, and it’s a combination of actions, like, say, sending exploratory vessels, escorted by quite a few warships in the Eastern Med or fringes of the Aegean, and – or even the Turko-Libyan memorandum on the limitation of exclusive economic zone between Libya and Turkey that is totally against international law.

Actually, the proof toward that is the fact that it has not been ratified by the Libyan Parliament, which is recognition for its international legitimacy, but that’s another story close – I close the parentheses. I think it’s becoming a problem that is coming out of the closet, and it affects everybody, and it has to do with Turkey’s expansionist and revisionist overall aspirations, which are outright threatening stability in the region.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

I mean, I think one thing we heard quite clearly from Dr Akar, the Turkish Defence Minister, last week was this sense that they have been denied the opportunity to undertake economic exploitation of the Eastern Mediterranean by, in his opinion, a sort of – an impossible, I’ll call it, situation, and actually, I – on that point, I wanted to bring in a question from Dimitris, and you can reply to that, to Dimitris…

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

It is a common…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

…Eudemidis.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Every type – I mean, all the exploratory action has been achieved. The research vessel and the escorting warships have withdrawn, once their job was completed. They extended, you know, the last day of the NAVTEX that had been issued to the last second, and then…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

…they withdrew. Now – and – now, job done, back to the ports of Southern Turkey, and that’s the reason for the withdrawal and not a gesture towards…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

…goodwill. I mean…

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Just let me bring in…

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

…that’s a fact.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

…a couple of questions about the exploration, a couple of good questions, I think, here. One – first of all, let me bring in Dimitris Eudemidis. Dimitris, could you ask your question first and then I’m going to turn to Oded Mya a second after that. Please, Dimitris.

Dimitris Eudemidis

Good evening, Minister. Last week, we heard the Minister of National Defense from Turkey here on Chatham House’s platform, clearly rejecting any opposite views on Turkey’s EEZ expansion claims, which – and all the way to the Libyan waters, disregarding any claims from Cyprus or Crete, etc. What does Greece propose as realistic, practical steps to counter this opinion? Thank you.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Well, first of all, let me say that a few days ago, our Prime Minister visited Libya, along with our Foreign Minister, and engaged on a series of contacts with the Libyan Government. I understand that it’s difficult to – for Libya to abort the agreed memorandum with Turkey right now we speak. However, it’s not – as far as I know, it hasn’t been, let’s say, greeted with unanimous, how should I say it, consensus, a consensus from the Libyan side. Not everybody in Libya agrees with that MoU. There have been quite a few very loud objections, namely the President of the House of Parliament in Libya, who’s very much against it, and actually, the fact it hasn’t been ratified by the Libyan Parliament shows that it’s not unanimously received by the – within Libya itself.

Greece will keep pressing its claims in good faith. I believe that it’s important that the UN does not hastily accept this memorandum, and I’m sure that the Greek diplomacy’s working toward that end. But we also would like to point out the fact that we do want a stable situation in Libya, we’re very much for it, yes. That means eliminating other countries’ military footprint on the country, military presence in the country, so that Libya, well, actually finds its own way towards stability and then, hopefully, prosperity and its own role in – on the Mediterranean domain.

So, Greece will very aggressively continue its diplomatic effort to show all the deficiencies of the MoU, according to international law, and we will keep on underlining the fact that all such attempts should actually meet the standards of international law, and namely the international law of the sea, and I think that’s quite an important element there.

Let me point out that our main concern, our main objection, is that that memorandum ignores and bypasses the existence of large Greek islands, and it’s quite a preposterous legal concoction, if I may put it in this way, that we cannot accept. And the international law of the sea is quite a demand on that. You know, islands have their own territorial waters, their own continental shelves, and so on. It’s an established fact of the law, and we cannot bypass that, especially if we want to appear as proponents of international law, don’t we?

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

I’m keeping an eye on time. We’ve still got a few questions left. We may, if members don’t mind, go two or three minutes over, but no, thank you, Mr Panagiotopoulos, because you’re answering all the questions in great detail. But I think there’s a very good question from Oded Mya, I’m going to bring Oded in, sticking with this issue of the Eastern Mediterranean and energy exploration. Oded, over to you, please.

Oded Mya

Yeah, good evening, and thank you for taking my question. One of Turkey’s qualms was the fact that they were not invited to the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, you know, having one of the longest Mediterranean coastline. I can understand why they were not invited, but my question is, can that be held as a carrot to invite them in, provided they refrain from any illegal drilling or any bilateral border demarcation?

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Well, that’s quite interesting. I would say that in order for somebody to be invited to sit on the table, a very clear precondition for that would be to refrain from any type of new unilateral activity, especially aggressive unilateral activity. Now, unfortunately, that has not been the case with Turkey thus far. I don’t think anybody would have an objection with including Turkey in this multilateral forum, energy forum especially. I mean, nobody has claimed that Turkey has no role to play. However, there has to be a certain degree of decorum in this. There has to – a certain type of behaviour has to prevail, and that behaviour has to be adhering to international law, accepting the concept of good neighbourly relations, and refraining to any type – from any type of unilateral actions, especially those that are outright aggressive and belligerent and hostile to some of the players involved.

Now, if those conditions are met, and this is not an ultimatum that has to rely itself on certain conditions, it’s how all the players view the situation. Of course, nobody would like to have Turkey excluded from this table of dialogue and co-operation. I mean, the end objective of this would be a status of co-operation that leads to stability and prosperity in the region, not a status of inclusion or any type of excluding somebody. But I think in order to do that, one has to behave in a proper and a manner that’s compliant with international law first and foremost.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

As a Defence Minister, let me just ask you quickly Michael Baker’s question. “Do you believe that oil and gas exploration and production offshore Cyprus could become literally, a regional military flashpoint in the near future?”

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Hmmm, well, there’s always a concern, and I would say there’s more a concern in those, let’s say, territories where there – you – French and Italian interests are at stake. So, I understand that France has decided to reinforce its naval presence in the region, and we are in constant contact with them, they’re – I can see an enhanced presence of French Naval Forces in the region, to and from – all the way to Cyprus. So, whenever you have military forces concentrated in limited spaces of sea territory, as I said, as was the case of – in the Southern Aegean this past summer and early fall, there is an increased probability of things happening there, of an escalation that could even reach, well, let’s say, militarist proportions.

So, however, once again, let me say that if everybody refrains from unilateral actions, and if everybody acts according to international law, respecting each other’s sovereign rights, then I think that could be avoided. Let me also point out in that – to that effect that there is an ongoing quadrilateral scheme between France, Cyprus, Greece and Italy that aims at ensuring stability and security in the Eastern Med. It’s no coincidence that these four countries are – have stakes and interests, with respect to hydrocarbon activity and natural gas, potential exploitation of resources off the coast of Cyprus. However, yes, it’s a viable scenario.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Yeah.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

I hope it’s avoided, and I think it will be avoided, if everybody acts in good faith and in accordance with international law.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

As we’re a little over time, I’m just going to let one more question in. I will simply observe Tim Stickings’ question here that maybe it doesn’t always help the diplomacy with Turkey when some of those countries, with strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, also have very difficult public clashes with Ankara on different issues like Syria or the Khartoum crisis. So, Greece can maybe find its diplomacy being that little bit more difficult, but you don’t need to contact on that, I just thought it an interesting observation by Tim Stickings.

I think a last interesting question, because you’ve mentioned the refugee issue so much, let me bring Mehmet Sahid in, please. Mehmet, could you ask your question, please, and this’ll be the last question for the Minister. Mehmet, over to you.

Mehmet Sahid

Thank you. Hello, Mr Minister, I just want to ask, since when we open up the debate on refugees, every state tries to, like, think to what’s their best interest and they approach it with a security agenda, of course. This is also the case for the Europe and for the Greece and for the Turkey, but can you elaborate a possible constructivist more positive solutions, possible solutions and areas, of the Greece on the refugee crisis? Because, as we can hear from your speech, Greece’s position is more or less more at – it’s a position dependent on the security of the Greece, rather than the, like, wellbeing of the refugees. So, does Greece comes up with a solution for Greece and for Europe on refugees? Thank you for your time.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Well, I would say that Greece is already serving as a host to tens of thousands of refugees. We’ve had to deal with a crisis, generating our – in our north-eastern border last March, because we could not accept tens of thousands of other refugees that, according to an explanation, were fleeing for Idlib. However, it was extremely difficult to make it all the way from Idlib to north-eastern border in less than 24 or slightly more than 24 hours, in order to enter our country.

We had to deal with that crisis, and we did it in a very resolute manner. However, we do understand that there has to be a solution to the refugee problem. We do also respect the fact that Gree – Turkey hosts about four million of refugees coming mostly from Syrian territories. We do believe that Turkey has to be helped in managing this problem, and we actually offered to act as intervening agents on behalf of Turkey, toward the European Union, to achieve an understanding in managing the refugee problem. I did that to my counterpart during our first meeting, because we do believe that this problem has to be managed, without blowing out of proportion in a crisis like that crisis we experienced last March.

So, there you have it, Greece has never been negative, has never had a negative stand towards accepting the refugees. There is a number of camps all over the country that have – are hosting, as I said, many of them. Some of them are directed to European countries that have accepted them, others that are entering the country illegally are turned back, but pushbacks are not the norm. I would say they’re – even though the country has adopted a – let’s say a more resolute stance, especially toward traffickers, that are trying to exploit the horrible situation of these people fleeing, I don’t know, battle torn territories.

However, we have to make sure that we defend our borders and maintain security on our borders, and it’s a delicate balance. I know that Greece has been accused of violating human rights of those people. I believe, to a great extent, this has been a result of a fake news propaganda by others because of the fact that Greece took a resolute position and strong position when its borders were attempt – when there was attempt to breach the borders. However, other agents have to step in and co-operate in order to stem all the trafficking networks. Now, I’m talking mainly about co-operation between the Turkish Coastguard and Greek Coastguard.

Whenever there is a co-operation, we can see results happening, and we can see a strong reduction in traffickers trying to smuggle people through the islands or by the sea routes into the country. We are working on enhancing the obstacles on our land borders and so far, that has had the positive effect in stemming the inflows, at least through our land borders. However, the sea is a different situation altogether, and there’s all the room for traffickers to engage in their illegal activities, and actually, you know, it’s at the detriment of those – all those helpless people trying to ensure that a better future lies ahead for them. Nobody likes that, but also, we have to have some semblance of order and especially not threats to our internal cohesion by means of the operations, the mass attempt to break into the country that we saw last March. That we have to avoid.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Thank you, Minister, I know it was a difficult last question to finish on, and I appreciate you taking it. We’ve gone a bit over time. You know, as we have gone over time, one question we got earlier on, it’s totally different, but whenever we see a very prominent painting like we see just behind you, and as we’ve been talking about Eastern Mediterranean and security, one of the questions somebody asked is what is that painting of behind you, behind the – behind where you’re sitting, and we’re wondering if there’s any symbolism in it?

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

Well, actually, no. First of all, let me say that I personally like the painting, so let’s not get into conspiracy theories about symbolism and all that, but it’s actually a painting of the warship Averof. Averof was acquired through the donations of prominent Greeks. It was built in Italy on the eve of the First World War, and that was in the late 20th Century. It was acquired through the – as I said, the good services of affluent Greeks, and it served as our main battleship in the confrontations that took place during the First and Second Balkan Wars, as well as the First World War.

It was a – quite a gamechanger on the Aegean back then, it was much better than all its counterparts. It also – it actually – well, she dominated, let’s say, the Aegean front for many years, and now, actually, it is marooned in the harbour of Piraeus, close to the harbour of Piraeus, and is a museum that is visited by many people. Actually, it’s a symbol of the prominent naval presence from the Hellenic Navy for a number of years, so it’s that dreadnought Averof.

Dr Robin Niblett CMG

Got it.

Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos

And since our main project on – with respect to reinforcing our armed forces, will be the acquisition of four new frigates.