James Nixey
Yeah, I’ve been signalled we can start.
James Sherr
Oh, shall we…?
James Nixey
Good evening, ladies and – you can do that. That’s all – it’s all good. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much for coming at a fairly late-ish hour on a Monday evening, but I think you’re not here for the wine at 7 o’clock, in an hour. I actually think you’re here because we’ve got something really very important to discuss.
Having worked on the Russia and Eurasia Programme here for 22 years now, I suppose I’ve often felt in the past that we were some sort of regional backwater, not central to international affairs, or at least that’s how we were considered. But, of course, in February of last year, whether you predicted the war or not, I think it’s fair to say that our lives did change an awful lot. Our working lives, perhaps our emotional lives as well, looking at my Ukrainian colleagues at the far end here. And of course, like in any think tank, we have to sit down and ask ourselves, what is the most important and the most useful thing we can do to help the debate?
So, we got together, and we discussed it, and credit to Keir – two over, one over – and we did – we – he did come up with the idea that following on from a publication of two or three years ago, which looked at the myths that people – largely people in the West hold about Russia, the misconceptions they hold about Russia, we looked at a, sort of, a similar format, but rather than obviously precisely that, we wanted to talk about options for ending the war. And quite – and actually some quite bad options that you do hear out there. In fact, if you – I suppose if you’ve seen this publication and there’s more on the table, but you may have picked them up already, it looks like there’s a little bit of schizophrenia. It was, kind of, three titles here, “How to End Russia’s War in Ukraine.” “The Dangers of a False Peace” and this bit in the middle about “Safeguarding Europe.”
And actually, it’s credit to my colleague Orysia at the far end, because I do remember – ‘cause I’m always anxious not to take the agency away from the Ukrainians by talking about elsewhere, but it was Orysia who said to me, “Actually, we must say to people that this is about much more than Ukraine.” And whilst I was almost reluctant, but you told me, as a Ukrainian yourself, that we must tell people this is about why the European and global security, when you look at the fact that Russia’s tentacles, tentacles, I suppose, which are all connected to the centre, Moscow Centre, do reach across the globe. So, it really is a question of European and, indeed, global security here.
The other reason, of course for doing this right here, right now, is there’s a certain urgency. This is, yes, I think Day 502 of the war, but at the same time, there are decision making political electoral forks in the road, which are coming up pretty soon. So, we wanted to get this out, obviously before the summer break, but before any decisions get made as a result of electoral choices. But the main thing about the report, I suppose, is to talk about the – not just – not the desirability of a Ukrainian victory and an unambiguous defeat, but the fact that it’s absolutely vital, it’s essential. And I suddenly – I often hear people say they need – Ukraine needs some sort of victory or it would be nice or it would be desirable, it would be ideal. But actually, for the reasons just explained, it is absolutely crucial, obviously for Ukraine’s continued existence as an independent sovereign state, but again, for European security.
James, I’ll pick your pen up for you. There you go.
So, obviously, we have 50% of the Authors of this here report on stage today, if you include myself, and I couldn’t think of a better panel, because I have to say, with all due respect to the other Authors, that these are some of the most crucial chapters. We have, just by way of introduction, a Director, a former Director, a Senior Consulting Fellow on the programme, Academy Fellow, a Deputy Director of programme. So, as a – we’re, sort of, right across the Russia and Eurasia Programme here at Chatham House. But what we’ll do is I will engage these fine ladies and gentlemen in conversation for about half an hour, and then we will have discussion with yourselves and online. I can see some questions have come in already, that seems almost impossible.
Okay. So, that is the way forward, and I will do this in order as you are, sort of, proximate to me. That means you first, James, and James, when this is the – I – you know, yours is the first chapter, with good reason, because it’s all about why we should settle, apparently. You hear it all the time, “We must settle, it’s inevitable. All wars end up at a negotiating table. Better do it now than later.” Half a point or no point at all?
James Sherr
Let me start with a non-point. The – those who are into a considerable degree responsible for my own wellbeing, economic and spiritual, will take it amiss if I do not say that I am also Senior Fellow of the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn. James, thank you very much for doing more than anyone would imagine possible in a short period of time to herd cats and get us to behave in a disciplined way and deliver on time.
Let’s understand – my three points in three minutes from me. Let’s understand what this war is about. This is not a war that is about territory, it’s about Ukraine’s right to be Ukraine. Since 1991, the Russian state that was responsible for, it’s state leadership – we are going back to Yeltsin, we’re even going back to the period of people who sincerely regarded themselves as radical reformers. They believed, most axiomatically, that Russia is entitled to be the arbiter of what Ukraine’s independence means and what it does not. And over 30 years, through different forms of what I have called hard diplomacy and self-coercion, they have pursued this enterprise and continued to fail, and finally, the failure ended in war in 2014. And now a war renewed in particularly extreme and virulent form, and now a war cast as a hybrid war against the West itself. That is point one.
Such wars, whether we call them existential or not, we can quibble about the meaning of this term, in the minds of belligerence, it is existential. Such wars do not end in negotiated compromise. They end in the victory of one belligerent and the defeat of the other, often at horrendous cost. Just to – just ask any 11-year-old to do a calculation between the number of people, even the number of Jews in Europe who had been murdered before 1939, and the devastation produced after the – at the end of the war, a war that began, in part, because certain countries and certain people believed that the survival of their state and nation mattered more than their personal survival. And this has to be understood about the war as well, not simply about aggression, but about the response to aggression.
The wars that have resulted in genuine reconciliation and a sustainable peace, like the Napoleonic Wars, the Second World War, have had a convulsive and radical end, usually regime change. Emmanuel Macron, at a certain point not so long ago, said to President Zelensky after dinner, he said, “I want you to understand. For us, reconciliation with Germany was very difficult. It took 30 years.” Well, someone should have said immediately, “Yes, but it wouldn’t have happened at all had the Nazis and Hitler still remained in power,” this is fundamental.
And my final point, which in a sense, simply restates what I have al – the points I’ve already made, as long as the interests and the object of – and the objectives of the antagonist of the sides are fundamentally antithetical to one another, a compromise settlement will always be a phony compromise, and the war will simply continue by other means. Forgive me for quoting myself what I said, in fact, in a Chatham House paper for another report back in 2015. Putin is determined either to subordinate Ukraine or wreck it. That’s where we are. So, that’s it. I hope that was three minutes.
James Nixey
Thank you, James. You are – that last phrase of yours is well quoted. We took this report last week to Budapest and to Berlin and that ran through the week. I’m going to do a follow up with each of you, if I may, James. So, let me just – let me press you on it…
James Sherr
Yeah.
James Nixey
…a little bit more, just briefly. People – I suppose the reason people give is well-meaning, as are often – as are so many of the fallacies. I don’t want to be too generous about it, but they’re often well-meaning and not ill-intentioned. But I suppose what people say is, they just want to save lives. Yeah, but if it’s going to happen, then let’s do it now, because more Ukrainian lives will be lost otherwise, and it’s been horrific so far, so, get it done now. That’s – I think that’s what they often mean. They mean it from a heart.
James Sherr
As something of a connoisseur of those who have put the most rigorous and determined cases for compromise, and in the – and before that, before there was a war, accommodation with Russia, they really are making other points that sometimes they’re explicit about, but not always. One point is that this deterministic belief, Russia is a great power and cannot be defeated. Edward Luttwak recently said, “Well, Russia couldn’t absorb 20 defeats like Ukraine.” It’s a bit of contradiction in terms, so it can be defeated, if you believe that. So, Russia cannot be defeated, so, just accept it, settle.
Second point, sometimes you hear this very bluntly from the likes of, John Mearsheimer, sometimes you don’t, great powers must accommodate to one another, and if small powers pay the price as they often have in history, well, that’s just tough. And what is clearly going on in these arguments, this isn’t – these are not arguments about how you provide security for Ukraine. They are all arguments about how we establish a modus operandi and a good relationship with Russia.
And final point is the one I’ve already said, who are we to tell the Ukrainians it’s about saving lives when Ukrainians themselves say, “We will risk our own lives personally in order to ensure that the nation and the state are not destroyed”?
James Nixey
Fair enough. Right, I must move on. Keir, the other thing we hear all the time, it’s your chapter, so, it’s come – will come as no surprise to you, is that Russia mustn’t be soundly defeated, that we mustn’t humiliate Russia. People are, as the title of your chapter says, they’re more afraid of a Russian defeat than of a Ukrainian victory. They – so, and that – you know, I suppose as we’ve heard in all the other fallacies, there – it’s superficially attractive, outwardly seductive, but when you delve into it, what do you think?
Keir Giles
I don’t actually find it seductive or attractive at all. It’s one of the ways in which the demands and expectations on the two sides in this conflict are so wildly asymmetric, that nobody is accepting of the idea that Russia should be treated in the way that they see Ukraine being treated now. You see people who are accepting of the idea that Ukraine might be destroyed, or even just subjugated as part of a genocidal war of colonial reconquest, but are deeply, deeply disturbed by the idea that Russia itself might be defeated. It’s two completely views – two completely different views on the problem, depending on which country you’re considering.
And why that is I think depends to a large extent on whether people have accepted and acquiesced in the stories that Russia tells us about itself, because it takes that acceptance to arrive at that duality of view. Acceptance of the idea, for instance, that Russia is a great power, as James was just saying, and therefore it has greater rights than its neighbours. It has the right to, whatever you call it, a sphere of influence, accord on sanitaire, an empire as President Putin would like to see it, and the small powers have to put up with it. But also the rights that Russia has not to suffer the consequences of its own actions, not to be defeated in a war that it started.
But there are other fictions about Russia that you have to believe in order to follow this narrative of Russia not being humiliated. It’s a contradiction between Russia being a mighty unassailable great power that cannot be defeated. But at the same time, they tell us, a country that is immensely brittle and fragile, and so much so that a defeat would actually lead to fragmentation and collapse and the overthrow of the state and Russia’s weapons of mass destruction ending up in the wrong hands. You have to believe both of those things at the same time to subscribe to some of these arguments about why Russia can’t be defeated.
You have to believe other fictions as well if you buy into this humiliation narrative. The whole idea that what we are seeing now is revenge for the 1990s, and the 1990s, in turn, were the West exploiting, rather than aiding Russia in its transition from the Soviet Union, which anybody who knows – who was there at the time knows perfectly well is a reversal of what really happened. And this bizarre idea that if Russia is defeated, it will make it more hostile, more dangerous, more aggressive than a country that has launched an unprovoked war of aggression to reconstitute its empire.
Put all of those things together and even that is not the most critical feature of this mindset that produces this idea. Instead, it is the inability or unwillingness to measure those ideas against what has happened in reality and to learn from the progress of Russia’s war on Ukraine, particularly over the last year and plus, but before that, and look at the reality that’s been exposed by that, as well as considering what has happened repeatedly over history in similar circumstances. Because Russia can and does absorb defeats, particularly when they see them in the context of a much longer term struggle in which this is just a temporary setback. Russia can be defeated, it does reconstitute its strength, it does re-gather its forces, and it comes back for another go. What that means is, the sounder the defeat that is visited on Russia today, the greater the erosion of its military capacity as a result of what Ukraine is doing, the longer it will take Russia before it can have the next attempt and so, the safer Europe will be.
James Nixey
So, it all makes sense, but you know the comeback, we’ve discussed it. The comeback is that in the throes of defeat, a desperate Putin reaches for a nuclear button. So, that’s their obvious comeback, and I suppose they think they’ve got no answer to that because they’re trying to save the world, effectively.
Keir Giles
Yes, it’s wrong, but the good news there is people are less wrong about that than they have been before. I mean, we do see countries and individual political leaders who are adjusting to the realisation that these nuclear threats have been shown time and again to be empty and are becoming more willing to measure them against Russia’s real nuclear posture, the real disposition of its nuclear forces, whether anybody’s actually seen any CBRN units deployed in Ukraine, for example, instead of the nuclear rhetoric they referred so often.
I’m so glad you asked me that question because I brought with me something that we prepared earlier, “Russian Nuclear Intimidation and How it Shapes Western Behaviour” because this report published in March of this year by the Russia and Eurasia Programme here looks in detail at the effect of Russia’s long-term campaign to set up the conversation in exactly the way that you’re describing. To seed through all of its influences and propagandists and agents of influence and useful ideates, this single idea that if you impede or offend Russia, that will lead to uncontrollable escalation, and that will lead to the launching of nuclear weapons. That has been spectacularly successful in constraining Western efforts to support Ukraine.
And it, sort of, belies that the whole premise of the question about nuclear weapons, because nuclear weapons already have been used, just as a tool of influence, rather than a weapon of mass destruction. But the effect that they have had in paralysing the decision processes of Western powers, including, unfortunately, the United States, the biggest donor of military capacity to Ukraine, has been one of Russia’s greatest war winning tools. And that’s the reason why you have a situation where, at this point, it is the UK, which is dragging reluctant partners behind it along with certain of the frontline states. Because having realised precisely what Russia’s nuclear threats are and what they are not, it’s the UK that is moving forward with, for example, main battle tanks, with Storm Shadow long range missiles, with, for example, F-16s, which the UK doesn’t even have. And trying to bring this coalition around to the realisation that actually, supporting Ukraine with one foot on the brake because you are concerned about a more or less mythical Russian nuclear posture, is actually self-defeating in the long run.
James Nixey
Yeah, it does seem to me as if a nuclear question has been the ultimate weapon of self-deterrence. It has just made us self-deter time and again, over the years, over the decades, certainly the last two. Must move on again. Kateryna, thank you. We thought very hard again about the title, and I remember at some point we were going to talk about durable peace, and we were going to talk about a just peace. You’re an International Lawyer. You speak about the necessity for a judicial reckoning, that there cannot actually be any peace if there is not a just peace. Obviously some say, “It could never happen, so why call for it?” Others say, “It will inhibit the search for peace.” What do you say?
Kateryna Busol
I think to the question whether we need judicial remedy for Ukraine, it shouldn’t be a question. The question is how we implement it, because Ukraine as a state, as the civil society, as their organisations of survivors, have been doing that since the beginning of the war. Since 2014, there have been domestic prosecutions. There has been an appeal to the International Criminal Court to proceed with an investigation which was launched only after the full-scale invasion, so it took the international community quite a while. There has been a demand and now we see the increase of the universal jurisdiction proceedings, which are the criminal proceedings in different domestic countries into the atrocity crimes, exactly because they’ve been war crimes, alleged war crimes, crimes against humanity, allegedly genocide, are so atrocious, and their encroachment not only on a particular nation, but on the rule-based order internationally as a whole.
So, these activities have been ongoing. There have been an inherent demand, not only of the government, but as I stress, of the human rights community and of the organisations of survivors. And I think an important argument is also is that if we don’t succeed to ensure holistic justice in Ukraine, by which I mean not only the judgements in criminal proceedings, but reparations to survivors, such as sustainable medical support, sustainable psychological support, good means of housing if their houses were destroyed. We will not be able to actually show the success stories for any other countries internationally, because Ukraine currently has a unique unity of the civil society, of the government and of the survival community who are impressively very active in seeking, in demanding justice amid the ongoing aggression. And while many of the Ukrainians are still as civilians or prisoners of war in unlawful detention in Russia.
And just last week in The Hague, we saw that the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression has been launched again. For the first time since Nuremburg, there has been a push internationally not to leave this core international crime unpunished. And so, also, we have seen an unparallel attempt to create the registry of damage and to also take practical steps there, hopefully not only with freezing, but also with the repurposing of their assets, not only to reconstruct Ukraine, but also to help the survivors. So, Ukraine could be a success story, both for its own citizens in terms of the judicial redress, but also for other countries in terms of how to react to atrocity crimes, which have been perpetrated in many other countries with the world, as well.
James Nixey
So, thank you. That makes sense as well, obviously. So, you said it’s not should we pursue justice, but how do we do it? So, let me push you on that one. What are the mechanisms by which we can prosecute Russia for the crime of aggression? And perhaps allied to that, how can third countries, non-warring countries, be assist in this effort with prosecution of war crimes?
Kateryna Busol
We should distinguish, indeed, the crime of aggression for which, unfortunately, in the current legal infrastructure no court can prosecute Russia, even the International Criminal Court. And because of that, the Civil Society of Ukraine Survivors and the Government of Ukraine have sought the creation of the special tribunal to try the top political and military and propaganda figures of the Russian regime who have launched this war of aggression. Parallel to that – to say that this is not a special procedure, one at a time only for Ukraine, parallel to that, there has been a discussion to reform the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to say that, “Yes, we’re helping the Ukrainian survivors and Ukraine, but we are also making the necessary and overdue changes in the international legal regime regarding aggression so that any future cases of aggression are also prosecuted.” So, this is one stream.
And for that, currently as mentioned, the International Centre for the Prosecution of Aggression has been set up. It has the prosecutors from different countries of the world who will systematise the evidence. And once, hopefully, the tribunal is established, the cases, at least the basis of the cases, will be ready there. And as regards to war crimes, as you mentioned, James, there are three principle avenues to investigate and prosecute them. First, domestically in Ukraine, and this is the principle forum. Ukraine has been, again, exceptional how Investigators, Prosecutors, and Judges have been amid the shelling, training themselves to deal with this totally new category of crimes since 2014.
The second avenue is, as I mentioned, the International Criminal Court. We know that it has already issued two arrest warrants with respect to President Putin and Maria Lvova-Belova, the representative of the President for the rights of the children. And here again, the Prosecutor of the Court has stressed how he prioritises particular crimes, those affecting children. So, it’s again, the – and it might look as the legal remedy, one of the steps towards the legal remedy for Ukraine, but it’s also a signal to other countries as to which crimes would be prioritised.
And the third avenue, which again, the Ukrainian case has catalysed, is these universal jurisdiction proceedings in Germany, in the Netherlands, in other countries. It’s a call that every country cannot stay aside, cannot stay silent when the toughest crimes are being perpetrated and should act domestically.
James Nixey
Thank you very much, Kateryna. I hope we can have a couple of questions on the legal dimension to this. Right, last but not least, Orysia. I know your chapter was on why Ukraine should supposedly be neutral and that would solve everything, but we’re actually not going to talk about that. Of course, we can discuss it in the Q&A if need be, but – well, listen, every boss I’ve ever had here has said, “Don’t tell me what not to do, tell me what to do.” So, it’s a think tanky thing, of course, to produce recommendations. We did 11 of them, if I remember correctly. I wonder, Orysia, as discussed, if you could take us through our key recommendations.
Orysia Lutsevych
Thank you, James, and I think, it’s important to remember there’s been 500 days, almost 500 days…
James Nixey
502.
Orysia Lutsevych
…of this – hundred and two, of this horrible unprovoked invasion. And for many, it was unthinkable that the invasion happened. For many, it was unthinkable that Ukraine perseveres with such a fortitude. I mean, for us, I think it wasn’t, and we clearly understood the nature of the beast on the East of Ukraine, and we clearly understood the resilience of Ukraine itself. And just to say that this very much informs our thinking about how we see this war must end. Some may think this is unthinkable what we propose, to which we would like to invite you for this conversation and argue why. And I think it could be a war that we could win jointly with Ukraine.
And here I emphasise we, because I think the key impediment to victory and to peace is actually a lack of alignment to the outcome of this war. Ukraine, President Zelensky was very clear about what it means to win the war for Ukraine, but we are a bit more fuzzy. The further we move from the conflict, Eastern Europe, all the way to the West and then Washington, what is the ultimate end of this war? And we propose three broad categories to actually safeguard Europe and to safeguard international rule-based order.
One is to allow Ukraine to fight this war to the conclusion. And this is, of course, up to Ukraine, as we said, and Ukrainians are very clear that they do not want to make any territorial concessions after more than 500 days of war, and all the horrific destruction. More than 80% of Ukrainians do not want to negotiate peace in exchange of territory. But that means that we, as allies of Ukraine, must boost up military assistance to Ukraine. If we continue the current level of support, we will actually create exactly what Putin wants, a war of attrition, a protracted conflict.
Up-to-date in our report, to mention that the Author calculates that we roughly committed 0.2% of NATO member states’ GDP, to which Ukraine destroyed more than half of Ukrainian con – of Russian capabilities on the battlefield. That is a pretty good investment, and we call on for actually neutralising Russian battle groups on the territory of Ukraine, because that will be, as Keir said, the best investment in our own security. I mean, some of the numbers are really, I think shameful. France, for example, committed less than 0.05% of its GDP to Ukraine. That is very small numbers. We all criticise Germany, for example, but France has done so much less in terms of what it could provide to support Ukraine’s victory.
That also means ahead of Vilnius Summit, that NATO must improve its own production of munitions, weapons systems and to create more collaborative military industrial complex to actually replenish what has been destroyed in Ukraine and to prepare, possibly, for high intensity warfare. That also means that we are to consider Ukrainian security arrangement seriously. This is something that Ukraine is obviously working hard towards the Vilnius Summit, and we believe that Ukraine has to have clarity on pathway to NATO. Obviously, it’s not going to happen now and the day after tomorrow in Vilnius, but there has to be a rational path, a viable path to Ukraine becoming a member of transatlantic security community. There must be an end of this grey zone or sphere of influence that Russia feels entitled to.
Another big block of recommendations relate to actually overcoming this fear of Russia and fear of instability inside of Russia. Actually, this fear produces stable war. We have to understand that we are self-deterring and we are actually procreating Putin’s ideology by not taking action. And that ideology has been expressing itself from invasion of Georgia to annexation of Crimea and on and on. So, basically, destroying the capability of Russia to attack its neighbours is something that is worth a fight.
And lastly, what Kateryna spoke about, it’s so important that there is accountability for victims, like you said, but also for any future of Russian transformation, because there has to be a collective responsibility of Russian people for the actions of their regime. And also, if there is a judgment on this kind of war where they understand that they’ve committed a fundamentally wrong foreign policy, we have a chance, and I am saying we have a chance. We don’t know if this chance will be ceased both by the Russian people, first of all, for a transformation in Russia that will be much more safe and more accommodating to how we all live together peacefully on the European continent.
James Nixey
Yeah, that’s how it ends, isn’t it? That’s how the report ends, for a better Russia, it’s more at peace with itself and more at peace with its neighbours and the wider world. But, yeah, it’s almost too awful to think about, Orysia, but I’m going to ask you anyway, but what if these recommendations aren’t taken up? What if we commit the nine fallacies, or several of the nine fallacies in this report, what does Europe look like? What does the world look like in that scenario?
Orysia Lutsevych
You know, I was thinking, of course, we describe it quite well, but I will probably sway away from the report and read a poem.
James Nixey
Cool, please.
Orysia Lutsevych
I’ll read the poem by, Victoria Amelina.
James Nixey
Ah, okay.
Orysia Lutsevych
Who I would like to pay a tribute to her because I think we’ll betray a memory of this young Ukrainian Activist Poet and somebody who was very much pushing for truth. And her poem was published in our World Today edition in spring in order to explain why justice is so important for Ukraine. But I think justice is not just important for Ukraine, but it’s important for peace in Europe. And Victoria wrote…
James Nixey
You should just say, “This is the lady who was…
Orysia Lutsevych
Yes.
James Nixey
…killed in the pizzeria in Kramatorsk just a week ago.”
Orysia Lutsevych
Yeah, so, her poem is the following. “I write no poetry. I am a Novelist. It’s just the war’s reality, devouring all punctuation, devouring the plot coherence, devouring coherence, devouring. As if shells hit language, the debris from language may look like poems, but they are not. This is no poetry too. Poetry is in Kharkiv volunteering for the army. If we commit the blunders, our world will be slowly but surely devoured, and I don’t think this is what we want.”
James Nixey
Right. Well, that wasn’t unexpected, but very poignant note to end on. And I must say that in all my years as an Analyst, [applause], Orysia, I’ve never believed we’re robots, we’re human machines. And, you know, you and I have felt it working together so closely for, well, many years now, but the last 18 months. But our analysis, of course, it comes from the head, of course it comes from research, of course it’s well – of course it’s backed up and footnoted and all that, but it comes from my heart as well, because this is a very real thing happening to real people, including friends of ours, like Victoria.
Right, that’s not too bad a timing for me at least. We’ve got about half an hour to go. There are hundreds of people online, I forgot to acknowledge at the outset. We are on the record, by the way, I also forgot to mention on the outset. So, I’ll take a mixture from the screen here and from you, ladies and gentlemen, in the audience. So, I’ll try the audience first and then I’ll go to the screen. So, okay, gentleman, yes, in the blue jacket, yes, centre, centre. Thank you.
William Horsley
Thanks. Thank you very much. William Horsley, University of…
James Nixey
Ah, William, I can see you now.
William Horsley
…University of Sheffield. Your – the report, the recommendations in your report are predicated, I think, on the idea that the countries that have decided on the – what kind of relationship there’ll be with Russia in the past, will have a rethink. They will understand their mistakes. They will rethink the habits of mind that have lasted, after all, ever since, from 2014, and indeed, showed themselves again after the invasion. And also the idea of self-interest, surely. And so, I ask you perhaps look back to the Minsk Agreements, ‘cause we’ve been here before with the West getting involved with a solution. So, what lessons are to be learned from that and what are the chances of that kind of rethink?
James Nixey
Okay, whilst you decide who’s going to take Minsk, I’m just going to say one quick thing. And I will do some responses myself as an Author, if you don’t mind, but I – when you talk about self-interest, I have to tell you all that it was extremely interesting in Hungary this week in Budapest. They – that – their response to this report could be defined by self-interest. They are interested in the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Western Ukraine, and that infuses their whole discourse, it’s all about them. They don’t seem to understand that there’s a wider – a much wider issue of European security at play. And obviously we know – and this – and I can honestly tell you that the closer you got to Viktor Orbán’s office, and the more self-interested they were and the less willing they were to talk about actually some of the substance in this report.
Anyway, the question – that was part of your question, and the other part was about Minsk and the lessons of Minsk. Who would like to take it? James, I saw a hand up, yeah.
James Sherr
Sure. I don’t think Minsk revealed anything new. I don’t think anything new has happened after. I think the motivations on the part of France and Germany, but I would say also much of Europe, much of the United States, I’m not stigmatising those two, were very mixed. They expressed this – brought a sentiment that we have to find a solution that’s acceptable to all, not ideal, but acceptable to all. And that compromise is better than the absence of compromise, and this can engender something more positive. Those sentiments, and then very difficult, given the way the human mind works and tricks itself, to draw the line between clinical, strictly rational utilitarian self-interest and sentiment.
But this other feeling also present, we really don’t want to get deeply involved here. This is fundamentally not about us. The Ukrainians are not fundamentally part of us. They’re part of something else. All this gets represented in a kind of jumble. And if you then try to have a rational discussion about, right, what exactly did the Russians agree to? What happened 24 hours after they agreed to it? Have we drawn any conclusions from the fact that they violated a ceasefire from the moment it was supposed to be concluded, or X, Y, Z? No, you don’t get these clear answers because you go back to these basic emotions and sentiments.
Now then, the question then arises, the rhetorical question, how often do we need to see that Russia has never honoured, and at least under Putin, a single commitment in the former Soviet States regarding territory or anything else? That every final demand that’s made is fine until it is accepted and then another demand follows. I mean, look at the present. You know, a lot of people, behind the scenes, that’s the last thing I’ll say, saying, “Right, what we want are simply recognition of the territories we have annexed, apart from Donetsk and Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. Oh, you mean you no longer think Odesa is a Russian city?” “Well, we didn’t say that.” “Oh, you no longer think Kiev is the mother of Russian cities.” “No, no, no, we didn’t say that.” So, those are on the menu as well, aren’t they? “Well, well, we could talk about it.” Okay, sorry.
James Nixey
No, not at all. Anybody else? Keir, I – yeah, I know in the past you have written – just I don’t know what about, I know I’m not putting words into your mouth. I know you’ve written this – you’ve written that the Minsk Agreement was basically written in Moscow.
Keir Giles
Like so many other ceasefire agreements, because I think the follow-on from your question, William, is how optimistic are we genuinely that any of the fallacies we’re identifying are actually going to be avoided? I am deeply pessimistic that we won’t end up with one of the terrible solutions that we have identified in this report, precisely because of the syndrome that you’re hinting at, of which the Minsk Agreements, ceasefires in Syria, ceasefires in Georgia, are just symptoms. The syndrome being the dogged resistance of most major Western powers to learning from experience, not just from the kind of instance that James is talking about, but also from repeating the same action with Putin and with Russia over and over again, while expecting different results.
And that’s the reason why I waved this other previous REP paper called, “What deters Russia?” “How to dissuade Russia from doing things we really don’t want them to do?” This was published in September, 2021. Unfortunately, nobody read it, and here we are.
Orysia Lutsevych
Somebody read it.
Keir Giles
The point is that there are consistent patterns in Russian behaviour and there are consistently proven methods of changing that behaviour, but nobody actually wants to adopt them. And that is the reason why I am not optimistic that the things that we are saying should be avoided in this report won’t actually come to pass.
James Nixey
Thanks. Do you want to move on, Orysia, or have you got anything on?
Orysia Lutsevych
No, come on.
James Nixey
You want to move on. Okay, I’m going to take one from the screen. Actually, two came in on the same thing right at the start, Craig Oliphant’s question and Goodrem Pursan’s question, but it’s – I’m sure all four of you have read about the so-called second track diplomacy that went on over the last few months, unbeknownst to us until recently. I think it was Richard Haass, Charles Kupchan and Tom Graham were the names I saw reported, anyway, mostly from the Council on Foreign Relations tend to be either accommodationists towards Russia or great power people, if you like. It’s been revealed that they have met with Lavrov and other Russian officials. So, I guess, they’re asking what’s your take on this? And, yes…
Keir Giles
James, you are on the record as saying that you have strenuously avoided engaging in this sort of thing because you see the dangers in it. So, what – let’s throw the question back at you. What do you see that other think tanks, including at least one in London here, don’t? Why do they sign up to this stuff and fall into the trap?
James Nixey
Yeah, thanks for that, Keir. Yeah, I – for what it’s worth, ladies and gents, since I’ve been Director, many times, but certainly since 2015, I’ve been asked to be – to run the UK side of the second track diplomacy process, or the one track, 1.5, if you prefer that, semi – half officials and half experts. And I just – I’ve just always considered it to be a bated trap. It’s always with the outwardly reasonable, the outwardly seductive Russians, who sound good, who are appealing to people who know a little bit about international relations. So, it makes it look like the Russians are being half reasonable, but you know they’re not the ones with the real power, and also, you know that actually they’re trying to get you to concede.
So, I’ve always turned it down. Not everybody has, I have to say. But I also feel that it makes, you know – the Russians, when they engage in this, they’ve got nothing to gain, really. I mean, they’re just going to stay on this, and it seems to me that the Westerners who engage in it want to look like brilliant diplomats, and that’s why they engage in this, and that’s what I’ve seen over the years. But you four, anybody.
James Sherr
One of our senior, I won’t mention the name, one of our very senior foreign policy and security figures in Estonia, said, “For us, it’s very simple. Had they done this, on return they’d be arrested because they were meeting the sanctioned individuals.” They have – this is absolutely ruled out.
James Nixey
Yeah, Orysia, please.
Orysia Lutsevych
I think we often misinterpret how this is perceived by Russia and what kind of signals Russia are actually getting from delegations like the one you’ve outlined. I mean, I believe they are either looking for the validation of their belief that the West will crack and there will be an accommodation with the West, rather than sending a very clear message that Russia has violated an – 400 actually international treaties and agreements since the annexation of Crimea and has to actually come back to those if it would like to be a member of the – a respected member of the international community. And I think these kinds of trips, other calls for negotiations, they are actually prolonging this war by giving a wrong impression to the Russian leadership of what is possible and what would be the cost of continuing the war.
James Sherr
Yeah.
James Nixey
Keir or Kateryna, final point? No, good. I’ll move on. Gentleman at the front in the white shirt, please. White jacket actually. No, light jacket, sorry, light jacket. Yes, please. Yes, right here. And then, afterwards, for just – yeah.
Peter Snow
My name is Peter Snow. You’ve made it incredibly clear, crystal clear what you think a desirable course of events should be. Wonderful. We all hope you’re right. But could I tempt you? That’s probably an unfair question. I’m going to put an unfair question. Could I tempt each of you to tell us what you think the likely course of events is going to be? Assuming things go roughly the way they’re going at the moment, very slow Ukrainian progress, pushing the Russians back, being pushed back a bit perhaps, the West, most united – most countries in the West fairly reluctant to move much further in supplying arms and so on. Are you on the whole, pessimists or optimists?
James Nixey
Okay, thank you. How’s it going to play out?
Keir Giles
Well, you’ve already heard that I’m a pessimist and I think if things continue as they are, then the rationale for not providing Ukraine with the weapon systems that it needs to win the war will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It’s a circular argument. Russia is too strong, therefore we shouldn’t provide Ukraine with what it needs to defeat it. Therefore, Ukraine is not actually going to succeed. Therefore, we need to move to a negotiated settlement. Therefore, we shouldn’t actually give Ukraine what it needs.
It goes around and round in this circle of logic. And unfortunately, I don’t see after all of the months of delay and vacillation and refusal and timidity, when it was clear what Ukraine needed in order to prosecute the counteroffensive that everybody was waiting for, I don’t see a change of gear now, so this late, that is sufficient to actually achieve the result that everybody wants. And that is because of that self-deterrence, that is self-imposed deterrence, primarily it has to be said, on the part of the United States. So it’s not the biggest sponsor, the biggest donor by proportion, is massively the biggest donor in terms of absolute volume. But in terms of the capabilities that could have been provided to Ukraine, if there were not this restraint, of course, it’s only a very small proportion.
So, what is trickling in, in homeopathic doses to keep Ukraine afloat and to prevent it from being defeated overall is unfortunately not sufficient to avoid a disastrous outcome by another route.
James Sherr
Orysia and then, James.
Orysia Lutsevych
So, I think that if we – I agree with Keir, if we continue the current policy, we are unlikely to arrive to the better place. But again, we advise in our report that there must be an increased military assistance to Ukraine. All in all, I personally also think that Putin has not achieved a single objective he wanted to achieve in Ukraine. And Ukraine has already secured some political victory in – on its pathway to become a full-fledged member of the European family of nations, that is EU membership. That is an integral part of Ukraine’s society vision for where Ukraine belongs.
I think we’re at the stage where we need military capabilities to solidify that choice, that also will firmly integrate Ukraine in the transatlantic community of – within the NATO alliance. And I believe that Ukrainian armed forces and Ukraine’s own determination to fight will change the dial in the way that the West supports it. And this has been, of course, a slow process, but quite a steady trend where Ukraine has proven that the united democratic world, and this is a much glo – more global community than just transatlantic community. More than 50 nations within the Ramstein Coalition are providing armaments to Ukraine. But if we get our own house in order here with the proper restocking and warming up military and industrial production, we will be able to achieve durable peace. I’m sure of that.
James Nixey
Thanks. Super quickly, James.
James Sherr
Keir is a rigorous pessimist. I’m a schizophrenic pessimist. I think that if you look at what the Biden administration has agreed to supply Ukraine with over the last few months and told President Biden a year ago he’d be doing this, he’d say, “That’s crazy, I wouldn’t.” So, I think there is a strong common denominator that Russia must not be allowed to win. There’s a misunderstanding of what that means. So, where’s the other side of my schizophrenia? It’s very simple. My principal worry is that there will be regime change in the United States before there is in Russia.
James Nixey
Right.
James Sherr
And then, we’ll be having a very different conversation.
James Nixey
Lady at the front, please, Melania. Thank you. Just right there, thanks.
Terri Paddock
That last comment, now, I’m American, so, I really want to pick up on that, but that wasn’t…
James Nixey
Do introduce yourself as well, please.
Terri Paddock
Oh, sorry. My name is Terri Paddock, I’m a Chatham House member. So, I would love to pick up on the regime change, I have nightmares about that, but I won’t. I’m wondering – this panel, thank you for this very important discussion and report. What is the panel’s view on Prigozhin’s short-lived Wagner coup attempt and whether that helps or hinders your recommendations?
James Nixey
Yeah, thank you very much. Actually, my colleague Patricia Lewis, who I don’t thinking is in the audience, but it’s certainly on – ‘cause I can see her question online, says, “Absolutely.” And added to that, reports that actually Putin and Prigozhin met, I think just five days after a march on Moscow.
James Sherr
They did, hmmm.
James Nixey
Who wants to take it? What’s going on? What happened?
Keir Giles
I think this is one of those situations that we come up against, as Russia watchers, from time to time where we simply have to shrug our shoulders and say, “We don’t know.” Because even if we were having any of this from reliable sources, it still wouldn’t make sense. So, how this plays out, I think it’s something we’ll only find out a long time after the fact. But the one thing that I would hope it has had an impact on, is this perception of Russia as the unassailable monolith, as the idea that power in Russia cannot be challenged.
And power in Russia, of course, is in one single pair of hands, and Russia is strong. Because what have we seen? An armed mutiny that marches on Moscow and then the perpetrator of it survives. That surely sets a dangerous precedent for Putin himself. And also shows that there is not this unity of purpose within the Russian security and intelligence services, and even to some extent within the military. Because whether or not people actually actively facilitated what Prigozhin was doing, or simply stood back and let him go, including shooting down a number of Russian aircraft on his way, it points to a very deep schism inside those uniformed and armed personnel within Russia.
And that, I think, is another powerful argument for overcoming this idea that it is impossible to defeat Russia, because clearly, if Russia is coming so close to defeating itself, that should provide encouragement for Ukraine and importantly, for its backers as well.
James Sherr
Absolutely.
James Nixey
Yeah, Orysia.
Orysia Lutsevych
And I think here is another interesting dimension, where what we do with the information that Putin provided out about Wagner? He went on the record, on the camera, to say how much Wagner was financed from the Russian budget, whereas he was denying persistently that this has anything to do with the Russian State. So, I think we should use an opportunity of having this record to declare Wagner as a terrorist organisation, or Russia as a sponsor of terror through all these means, whereas we have now a clear confession by President Putin.
James Nixey
Oh, well, I was going to come to, James. But on that point then, Kateryna, on – because this is a semi-legal point, can Wagner be declared as a terrorist organisation? Is it that simple?
Kateryna Busol
Well, I think what’s important is exactly what Orysia has said, that we can hear the Head of State saying that there has been the direct finance and the direct support. Because the idea is that we want to punish not only the direct perpetrators of the crimes on the ground, the rapists, the looters, we want to go up the scale, up the chain of command as possible, not only to those who are on the ground, but of course to the Minister of Defence and to President himself. So, I think it shows both the level of control and the level of influence and hopefully, that could also be a good indicative not just for Ukrainian domestic prosecutions, but for the International Criminal Court.
James Nixey
James, can you address the point about the meeting between…?
James Sherr
No, not really.
James Nixey
Not really, okay, because we don’t know.
James Sherr
Sorry, and nothing to add.
James Nixey
Sorry.
James Sherr
And intellectually, very content with what has been said.
James Nixey
For what is worth, my own view, I’m so glad, James, our work here is done. You know, it doesn’t feel like the sort of thing that happened with the mutiny, the uprising. It could not possibly happen in a well-organised, competent, military as it did, and it shows to me that the system is beginning to crumble.
James Sherr
Absolutely not, and I would…
James Nixey
Uh-huh, I knew it.
James Sherr
I would – just an opinion, that such things do not happen in an army that is convinced it’s on its way to victory.
James Nixey
True. Right, gentleman in the gilet, black gilet, white shirt.
Lee Wallis
Thank you. Lee Wallis, formerly in government service. We’ve seen a question about cluster munitions. There’s been a rise in controversy, rhetoric, what have you. We haven’t seen it for a long time, even though they’ve been used widely in many conflicts. Is this a genuine concern, do you believe, for Ukraine itself or for something else?
James Nixey
Right, the cluster munitions debate we’ve seen over the weekend, ladies and gentlemen. Astonishing that it’s come up like this, because actually as Keir and I were chatting about it over the weekend, Turkey has been supplying cluster munitions to Ukraine for the last eight months. But it does seem to have just come in as the Americans, I think maybe that’s different for some people, maybe it is. Who’s taking that first? You again, Keir, go for it.
Keir Giles
Yeah, is it a genuine concern? Yes. If we discount the usual suspects who are latching onto anything that they can say that will benefit Russia and have seen this as an issue, which is divisive, and therefore, using it as hard as they can to push that line that Ukraine is a terrorist state and the United States is also for backing it. If you take aside those people, and we know the checklist, then you do have a section of people commentating on this delivery of cluster weapons at the moment, who are motivated by all the right reasons, but coming up with the wrong solutions. I think in precisely the same way as we described this – the fallacies that we’ve got in this report here, right motivations, wrong solution, it’s going to be disastrous in the end.
And in part, that seems to be as a result of the fact that people are under-informed about what has actually been happening with cluster munitions. Not only the fact that this is something which has been a feature of the war since 2014 and used by both sides and people are only upset about it now that it’s actually the United States that it’s going to be providing it, as opposed to any of the other providers. But also we hear the argument that there is a moral issue here and people are concerned that this will undermine Ukraine’s right to the moral high ground because they’re using a weapon which other countries, not Ukraine, not Russia, not the United States, other countries have signed a convention against. But I think that displays a lack of consideration of the difference between how these two countries are using these weapons.
People are thinking when they hear cluster munitions of the way Russia has used them, for indiscriminate attacks against residential areas in the course of a war in which the more civilian casualties and collateral damage you inflict, the better, it’s one of your war aims. As opposed to using weapons which are designed to have very low dud rates, so, there are much fewer lasting consequences, against concentrations of troops or vehicles in the open, away from civilians and on your own territory and among your own people, which is what Ukraine is doing, and also committing to actually deal with the long-term consequences themselves. So, unfortunately, the people who turn this into an issue of moral equivalence in – on this occasion are actually part of the problem, because it is them who are equating the behaviours of Russia and Ukraine, when, in fact, they’re actually poles apart.
Plus, final point on this, unfortunately, the – some of the people who are most vociferous about condemning Ukraine for now accepting cluster munitions, not realising that they’ve been using them for some time, are also some of the people who have put Ukraine in that position in the first place. Because if there had not been this dogged resistance to providing Ukraine with the weapon systems that they identified as being essential to fight the war, they wouldn’t be in a position where they have to fall back on increased supplies of DPICMs from the United States.
James Nixey
Right. James, you look like you had something to say, but no.
James Sherr
No.
James Nixey
Anybody else? No. We’ll move on. Thank you very much, indeed. I’ll take Mary Dejevsky’s question online, please. It says, “Practically all of you said this war is about far more than Ukraine. The whole international rules-based order is at stake,” or words to that effect, says, Mary. That’s correct, Mary, that’s exactly what we said. “Quite a lot of the world doesn’t see it like this. Why are they so wrong?” Maybe I could come to you, Orysia, first.
Orysia Lutsevych
Yes. I think the – a lot of what is called Global South sees it as a European war and doesn’t want to get involved, but also, I think they’re hiding behind the convenient reliance on some supplies or partnership from Russian Federation. They’re either benefiting from it economically, through buying cheap energy resources or being dependent on arms supplies and presence of some of the groups like Wagner in – for their own state capture. Not all of these countries have democratic regimes, and I think that, to a certain degree, defines their attitude to this war. And also, their own anti-colonial, anti-imperial sentiments vis-a-vis the Global North.
What I think they are missing, to a large degree, is that Ukraine is itself a victim of imperialism, as it is very clear where Putin denies Ukraine a right to exist as both state and a nation. And I think that, eventually, they will understand, and what Ukraine is doing now in a smart way is inviting more and more opinion leaders, Journalists, from those countries to actually come and see. There’s been a delegation of Latin American Journalists talking to Ukrainians, being visiting, being eyewitnesses and hearing without intermediaries, so to say the West, that is Ukraine’s backer in this particular fight, of what it is to resist Russian aggression. Visiting the sites of war crimes, talking to, you know, Ukrainian civil society and government officials. And I think this is what they’re getting wrong. They are not actually seeing it through the prism of the colonial war.
James Nixey
I’ll go along the line. So, Kateryna, come back this way.
Kateryna Busol
Oh, thanks. The relationship with the Global South is crucial in terms of justice, and I’m happy that both the civil society and the Government of Ukraine have realised that and have acted upon that. We should realise that Russia has invested into the relationship with the Global South countries far more than Ukraine not just wanted to, but had the resources to do, first.
Second, as, Orysia, has said, Ukraine is now explaining that it has also been a victim of colonialism and that the current war is actually neo-imperial and neo-colonial, and there’s so much to learn from the Global South nations. Victoria Amelina, our colleague, who was brutally killed by a Russian missile, was actually there with her colleagues from Colombia because she was taking them to show the actual crime scene and to also say that Ukraine is open to learning from a very rich experience of the Global South nations, especially with respect to transitional justice.
So, the engagement is there both from, Zelensky’s government and also from the civil society. So, hopefully, we’ll also see the largest support of the Global South nations with respect to the prosecution of the crime of aggression, because this is where their support will be crucial.
James Nixey
The gentlemen – desperate, because I’d love to fit one more in, briefly, here.
Keir Giles
Unfortunately, it’s not just Ukraine that Russia has invested more in influence in the Global South than, because it’s also than the West as a whole. I’ve referred a couple of times already to aspects of this problem we’ve written about at length before. Go back a couple of years, you had Russia’s campaign for global influence, where we looked at precisely that problem. Russia spreading its bets across the board, trying to influence countries where they saw Western influence retreating. We studied it, we documented it, we weren’t the only ones to do this, so looked at the problem. We didn’t really understand at that time what the impact of that would be. Now it has become very clear what that campaign has led to.
James Sherr
Right, sorry, Mary, it was an excellent question, but we did not all say that. The specific point I made is that the Russians view the War in Ukraine in the context of a wider hybrid war against the West, not the world, the West. And they view Ukraine as a ward and instrument of the West and believe that the defeat of Ukraine would be a major blow to the West and the international order, which it still dominates. I personally do not believe that it is axiomatic or necessarily even legitimate, that Western interests and values should be the values of the entire world. Some might hold that position. I do not hold that position, but I know very well what kinds of consequences would ensue in Europe and most importantly, in East Central Europe, if this war ends in disaster for Ukraine. And that is – so, be clear about…
James Nixey
Okay, yeah, that makes sense.
James Sherr
Fine. That’s all I would say.
James Nixey
I’m going to risk Tom’s and Emily’s wrath by taking one – I mean, to say nothing of your own because wine awaits, by taking one last question. Lady, yes, in the middle, yes, centre grey jacket. Thank you.
Dr Nadaud
Hello, I’m Dr Nadaud, a member of Chatham House, former contractor with the US military. I wanted to loop back around to the US and the nickel and diming that, you know, we’ve been talking about in terms of support for Ukraine. The US Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, Colin Kahl, was here this morning, as you know, laying out the case for how we’ve not been nickel and diming and we’ve been logistically appropriate and proportional in what we’ve been doing. What would you say to him to change his mind?
James Nixey
Right. We – I think we can all take it, please. We’ve not…
James Sherr
Very simple. If Ukraine is not given the means to achieve its stated ends at its definition of victory, which by the way, is not regime change in Russia, it is the removal of Russian forces from all of Ukraine’s territory and the restoration of its international borders, the US – the American ability to address vital US security interests will be deeply compromised at every level, and that includes, China and the Far East. The Chinese will draw major conclusions from the way this war ends. That’s what I would say to him.
James Nixey
Thanks.
Keir Giles
I’d be sympathetic to him because, of course, in his position, he has to say that. However, at the same time, I would also remind him that the whole premise for the restraint that the United States has shown and has repeatedly stated and encouraging Moscow, of course, in that rhetoric, because they can press the same button again and get very gratifying results, has been shown to be completely invalid. Because it has been undermined by the actions of members of the other – other members of the coalition supporting Ukraine, and contrary to US expectations, the sky has not fallen, and this has been demonstrated over and over again. So, the reason for holding back from supporting Ukraine to the extent that is actually required to bring the war to a conclusion, as opposed to letting it drag on into a disastrous stalemate, has – can – been completely eroded.
James Nixey
Kateryna, Orysia?
Orysia Lutsevych
I think it’s important that we are all learning from this 500 days of war, and we have seen repeatedly that what was impossible then became possible. But that so many lives have been lost, and I think we could have prepared Ukraine better for the current counteroffensive and could have denied Russia any possibility to fortify so much of the territory that Ukraine now, at such high cost, has to take. Ukraine is being asked to fight an impossible war, without air superiority, without enough armoured vehicles, without enough, you know, air defence to protect its cities. And I think we should ask ourselves the question whether we would be sending US troops under the condition on the battlefield, like Ukrainian General Zaluzhny is sending.
James Nixey
I’ll comment on that in a second, but, Kateryna, last chance.
Kateryna Busol
Continuing this war, not providing the necessary support, completely undermines the notion of prevention and contin – completely fails the people who continue to be on the occupied territory and suffer horrific atrocities, first. And second, I fully second with Orysia’s earlier point that not helping Ukrainians win, will actually undermine the transformation in the region, especially with Russia and Belarus.
James Nixey
Let me just say to the question, in closing, that Keir and myself and two other Authors are taking this report to the United States in two weeks’ time. Meetings with Pentagon and State and on the Hill. And so, perhaps we should get back to you on some of the results of those discussions.
Listen, I’m so sorry for eating into wine time, as I say, but let me just say in closing, that we’d make the case in this report that there is a very practical European security case for the recommendations for Russia being soundly defeated in this war, but there’s also a moral case. And honestly, again, in my 22 years at Chatham House, the moral clarity here has never been clearer for – so that Ukraine can continue as an independent sovereign state, just as we accept Western European states to be so. And it still astonishes me that the moral point isn’t brought out more. That has always been the most important part of my own work here in Chatham House, since what I’ve tried to drive through a programme and I know the team has followed me, or in some cases led me in that respect as well. So that’s just the point. I just wanted to end on the moral point, if I may.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much indeed for coming, staying so late. Thank you to my amazing team. I say, 40 or 50% of the authors, including myself, there’s another 50% who deserve equal congratulation. But perhaps you could show your appreciation in the usual way [applause].
